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Berne, 28th September 1977

CONFIDENTIALMeeting of N+N Military Experts, Belgrade 21st/22nd July 1977Participants:

Yugoslavia: L. Acimović
D. Bogdanović
Colonel Civić

Austria: General Kuntner
H. Bauer

Sweden: K. Asp-Johnsson
Comm. U. Reinius

Finland: E. Rajakoski
P. Ojanen
Lt-Colonel H. Christensen,
Military Attaché, Belgrade

Switzerland: Colonel W. Mark
H. Renk

Malta: E. Saliba

Cyprus: A. Vakis



Thursday, 21st July 1977

Acimovic:

proposes the following programme:

- 1) Informal exchange of views on N+N approach to military aspects of security at the Belgrade meeting.
- 2) Examination of possibilities of common action.

Rajakoski:

Agrees with the proposed agenda.

Finland is concerned about developments in the military field.

The CBM's are lagging behind the political side of détente. The same is true for SALT and MBFR. The CBM's are psychologically important. We are grosso modo satisfied with prior notification and other CBM's so far. The CBM's are a bridge between more important negotiations and political goodwill. They should be kept in good shape. How much we can do depends very much on the general atmosphere of the Belgrade meeting. The whole problem should not be given straight away to the experts after the Belgrade meeting.

Kuntner:

The Swedish draft is a good basis for further action. It gives a dynamic element for the follow-up. Bridge-building and gap-filling is necessary for a while, because all other negotiations are not likely to yield results in the near future. Without some substantial results in the military field one cannot carry on détente. The substance should be a little bit more after Belgrade than it was before.

Reinius:

Agrees with Rajakoski and Kuntner. It is too early to decide whether the Swedish proposal should be a joint N+N proposal.

Mark :

The situation in Europe has worsened since 1975. The CBM's should not serve as an alibi for lack of progress in other negotiations. If we put too much weight on the CBM's there is a danger of it becoming an alibi. Nobody thinks that CBM's alone give more security. There is a dilemma: We should do the one without neglecting the other. We have to insist that the existing CBM's are put into action. The UdSSR has made a remarkable progress in implementing the chapter on military observers. There is yet an imbalance in the notification itself. The real danger is the confrontation between the blocks.

Troop movements: If we are to build up new CBM's we cannot finish this in Belgrade, but only by an expert group afterwards. We have been thinking along the same parameters as we have them now for manoeuvres. We must imagine this more precisely, this could be a task for the N+N. This examinations will be decisive in the attitude of the Swiss government on the CBM's. We must be sure that what we propose is realistic and does not lead to illusions.

Kuntner:

Prior notification of movements is not a new CBM, because it is in the Final Act.

Saliba:

Agrees totally with the views expressed by Switzerland.

Acimovic:

I'am glad to note that nothing substantial has changed in the group; we are rather close in the assessment and the conclusions. Yugoslavia is closely attached to the CBM's. The lagging behind of the military aspect of détente has already had a negative influence. Therefore it must have an important place in the Belgrade meeting. The N+N group was largely formed by military preoccupations. Therefore this group has also a responsibility for the future development of the CBM's.

No other countries are so interested. We have potential allies in the blocks (Rumania, Norway) but if we give up the subject nobody will take it up. We should not only talk about CBM's but about the military aspects of security as a whole. In Geneva we have taken a political commitment to go on. Troop movements are a dynamic element pushing ahead the development.

Military aspects of security must get their proper political dimensions and weight in Belgrade, starting with the opening statements. We should dramatise the issue and use the conference as a means of pressure. It is not just the CBM's but we have to stress the whole deteriorating situation. This reasoning should be reflected somehow in the concluding document. We should do something on the line of a dynamic approach. However modest the steps may be at the Belgrade meeting, we must go ahead. We are ready to go along with the Swedish proposal. It would be good if we could go together in this field where the N+N group was born. For us it is more important to go together than to reach something. Even if only some of us are sponsors, the others should co-operate with us. The N+N should prove that they are not only important in procedural matters but also in substance, first of all in the military field. We would like to see the establishment of a group of military experts after Belgrade which could be an all-European institution, going beyond Vienna (MBFR) and Geneva (SALT).

Rajakoski :

The military chapter of the Final Act is not only CBM's. We should also do something in other fields:

- 1) A general discussion on disarmament in order to get something in the final document of Belgrade.
- 2) Basic premises: We were well-informed about MBFR. Discussions about it and possibly something in writing. Bridge between CSCE and MBFR. If there

is any deal between the blocks in Vienna, this would include prior notification of movements. This is a testimony of the relationship.

Acimovic: Same approach as Finland, in view also of special session UN on disarmament. We said "A" in the Final Act - we have to say "B" now.

Kuntner: We cannot be modest on the CBM's and unrealistically optimistic on disarmament. We have to be more realistic. Disarmament can only be reached by a step-by-step procedure. Otherwise we will be schizophrenic. Inter-relationship between CSCE and MFBR: We should try and build on this. Thus those who are not in MBFR have to take an interest. Does "undiminished security" only apply to MBFR participants?

Reinius: We realize that our paper is only about CBM's, but we know from the Geneva experience that it is difficult to write down texts about disarmament. Agrees with Kuntner on the necessity of being realistic.

Acimovic: There is no equation between joint action and a joint paper.

Mark: If we agree on the Swedish paper there is ground for common action. We should take it as a basis for clearing our minds.

Friday, 22nd July 1977

Discussion of the Swedish draft

ad 1 - Prior notification of manoeuvres

Mark: We should also include a chapter on prior notification of major military manoeuvres. Implementation should be on a more equal level. There should be more details, we should not leave it up to the free will of the individual states. The quality of the troops involved is as important as their number. There should be no new dispositions but better implementation.

Kuntner: Agrees with Mark. We should specify things within the existing parameters. We can add a second parameter on smaller-scale manoeuvres.

Reinius: Agrees.

Acimovic: Three elements are important:

- 1) Avoid the splitting of manoeuvres.
- 2) General considerations.
- 3) Renew the naval component (notification of naval manoeuvres in adjacent sea areas).

ad 2 - Exchange of observers

Mark: Agrees with Swedish draft. Selectivity is no problem except for the question of inviting to some manoeuvres and not to others. We should ask for invitations to all manoeuvres exceeding 25'000.

Reinius: This is demanding too much. The aim is not to verify that there are no war preparations but a means of confidence, because no observer is able to distinguish what is war preparation and what is not.

Rajakoski: We should not go beyond the Final Act which speaks of a voluntary basis for observers too. We should also mention the positive experience made. The CBM's are a real innovation.

ad 3 - Major military movements

Kuntner: Hesitates to introduce new parameters.

Mark: The level does not matter. What matters is the "critical mass" which can be split up in force or in time. This raises the most important problem and brings us close to MBFR.

Kuntner: New formula; "considered as one movement if it is within a given time and geographical frame". We need a definition of a movement: "whatever is not included in a manoeuvre" or "same organization and framework".

Civic: If we maintain 25'000 for the movements there will be no notification. 10'000 is a better ceiling.

Kuntner: Movements should be part of our activity.

Mark: There could be a mandate for an expert group in the follow-up.

ad 4 - Other CBM's (self-restraint, budgets)

Kuntner: Agrees with the idea but it is difficult to ^{all} confine.

Acimovic: Self-restraint is part of détente.

Reinius: We want generally more openness in military matters.

ad 5 - Group of military experts

Kuntner: I see some value in this but not at the time of submission of our proposal. I hesitate because otherwise everything will be given to the experts and nothing is done in Belgrade.

Questions relating to disarmament

Yugoslavia: We should make a constructive statement with a political weight in the concluding document, but let us not make big phrases.

Reinius: This question will be one of the main points in our opening speech.

General considerations

Kuntner: This part of the Final Act has become more important than two years ago. MBFR information works well on a bilateral basis.

Acimovic: We are not satisfied, especially because of the introduction of new weapons.

Further Action

Reinius: We should be ready before the two blocks are bringing in their proposals. We would like to make our proposal a joint one.

Acimovic: We have firmly decided in Yugoslavia to make a proposal. If we cannot do it as a group we could go along with Sweden or all others who want to join.

Kuntner: Going ahead as a group gives us more impact.

Reinius: We can have separate proposals on CBM's and disarmament.

Mark: Yugoslavia and Sweden should make a joint paper on CBM's and send it to the others before the Belgrade meeting. Last corrections could be made at the beginning of the main meeting. As to disarmament we cannot go further at the moment. We should concentrate on it at the beginning of the main meeting.

Kuntner: The essence of the opening statements will be the gist of the "political" part of the general debate.

Acimovic: Agrees to "marry" the Yugoslav idea with the Swedish paper.

The following decision is made:

- 1) Sweden makes a re-draft of its paper taking into account the present discussion. *)
- 2) Get an agreement on CBM paper in the first week of the main meeting.
- 3) Draft a second paper on general matters (disarmament) after the end of the opening statements.

*) Schweden hat inzwischen einen Vorschlag ausgearbeitet. Die neue Version (datiert 17.8.77) liegt bei. Da der jugoslawische Vorschlag, der ebenfalls zur Diskussion stand, seither nicht mehr aufgegriffen wurde, wird er auch im vorliegenden Protokoll nicht berücksichtigt.