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## CABINET

## CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet

 held at 10 Downing Street on WEDNESDAY 15 NOVEMBER 1989$$
\text { at } 9.30 \mathrm{am}
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## PRESENT

he Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe ac me ord President of the Council

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd MP jecretary of State for Foreign and homonwealth Affairs

The Rt Hon David Waddington QC MP secretary of State for the Home repartment
the Rt Hon Norman Fowler MP secretary of State for Employment

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley MP secretary of State for Trade and industry

The Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP secretary of State for Health

The Rt Hon Malcolm Rifkind QC MP secretary of State for Scotland

The Rt Hon John Wakeham MP
secretary of State for Energy
The Rt Hon Antony Newton MP
secretary of state for Social security
The Rt Hon Peter Brooke MP
secretary of State for Northern
ireland

The Rt Hon The Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Chancellor

The Rt Hon John Major MP Chancellor of the Exchequer

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MP Secretary of State for Wales

The fot Hon Tom King MP Secretraty of State for Defence

The Rt HOn Kenneth Baker MP Chancel lor of the Duchy of Lancaster

The Rt Hon Johi MaoGregor MP Secretary of State for Education and Science

The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP Secretary of State for Transport

The Rt Hon The Lord Belst Lord Privy Seal

The Rt Hon Christopher Patten MP Secretary of State for the envinomment

The Rt Hon John Selwyn Gummer Mis Minister of Agriculture, Fisherie and Food

The Rt Hon Norman Lamont MP Chief Secretary, Treasury

## SECRET

## ALSO PRESENT

The Rt Hon Timothy Renton MP Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury

## SECRETARTAT



PARLIAMENIARY AFFAIRS
HOME AFFATRS
Industrial Action in the Ambulance Service Contaminated Animal Feed FOREIGN AFFATRS

German Democratic Republic
Elections in Namibia
COMMUNITY AFFIARS
Economic and Finance Council 13 November
Health Council 13 November 7

Social charter
1989 PUBLIC EXPENDIIURE SURVEY

## CONFIDENTIAL

1. THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL said that Parliament would prorogue the following day. The successful completion of this session's programme was satisfying, although there were a number of lessons to be leamed fram the experience of the session which he asked colleagues to take into account in the handling of Bills in the new session. These included avoiding extending the scope of Bills beyond that originally agreed by OL and cabinet, and avoiding adding to Bills as they went through farliament unless this was strictly necessary to secure their sod isfactory passage. The problems encountered in handling buginess in the Commons towards the end of the present session rae pwed much to the objections of MPs from mining jfunencies to the Associated British Ports (No 2) Bill, but hat 2 Iso raised the whole question of the procedure followed by Prifgte Bills. The business managers were considering what steps could be taken to avoid similar difficulties at the start of the new session, and in the longer term were looking at whether any ghanges were needed to Private Bill procedure.
A successids of the implications of the televising of the proceedi(es ) the House of Commons had been held for Cabinet Ministert The previous week, and two further seminars for junior Minist/fy were planned. One point which had emerged strongly was that caters adjacent to a colleague who was speaking must take pory yular care not to do anything which would distract the tofytion viewer from the Minister speaking or appear out of keering . ith the oocasion. The suggestion that it would help Minister ${ }^{\text {an }}$ goposition Front Bench Spokesmen if lecterns could be provigian the Dispatch Box would need to be approved by the Speaker an a Hee Commons Services Camittee as well as the select carmitteef finelevising of the Proceedings of the House. It was already clezr that the select Carmittee on televising was opposed to the suggestion because it would involve adapting the traditions of the House to suit the needs of television. For the time beingngrefore no early moves in this direction were likely and Mikysfers would need to devise their own pragmatic solutions to the problem.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up a brief discussion, said that previous as well as present Business Managges were to be congratulated on the successful completion of the Government's business for the session and the necessary ogichosions should be drawn up for the drafting of future Bills. (T) the forthooming Debate on the Address, it would be important 0 . there was a range of good backbench speakers participate on each day of the debate.

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2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH said that there had been relatively few developments in the industrial action by ambulance workers during the previous week. The Armed Forces, together with the police and voluntary services, had been remarkably successful in providing an accident and emergency service in London. There had been no serious problems, and public and press interest in the dispute had therefore waned.
He remained pessimistic about the prospects of an early
tettlement to the dispute. The action was likely to spread over no next few days to the West Midlands and other regions: the Fer 10 d spoken to regional chairmen to encourage them to react in a congistent way to increased Union action in different aniprance services. At a press conference the previous day he had fought to move matters forward by indicating that pay talks could resume if the Unions agreed to operate the 999 emergency service normally in London and the rest of the country. He had also said that local pay additions might be available for ambulance (rorlurs with paramedical skills. The Unions showed no sign of moryoteleir position, however, and contimued to press for a substa(tia) increase with movements in their pay to be linked in future those of other emergency service workers. These demands ing ing pontinue to be resisted. Accepting them would have damag ionsequences for future pay negotiations in the National Health sos ice, and elsewhere.

THE MINISTER OF AGRICULHUR 1 FTSHERIES AND FOOD said that the problems caused by the impof Of contaminated animal feed had now been contained. It was note poected that the price of milk would rise because of the restrigtons which had had to be imposed. Lower levels of lead wnen yow being found in milk. There would therefore be growing 2 essyre to remove the restrictions, which presently covepeo same 1,400 farms. The pressure would be greater because tofe farmers involved had no means of gaining swift compensation from the feed merchants. A longer term problem lay in deciding whether the animals who had eaten the contaminated feed could be slaughteted for human consumption. Testing for lead in meat was vety complicated and the processes for doing it were only just being established. The decision would therefore not be easy to feach and could be controversial.

The cabinet -
Took note.

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3. THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEAITH SECREIARY said that events in East Germany had moved very rapidly, particularly following the measures taken to introduce freer travel between East and west Berlin. The key question now was whether the East German government would agree to hold free elections. Their intentions were still obscure. The new Prime Minister, Herr Hans Modrow, the former Party Secretary in Dresden, had been elected on 13 November. He had the reputation of a reformer. The Party

Songress had been brought forward to $15 / 17$ December. This was
o. nnd to be a crucially important occasion. The opposition orbuns were pressing for free elections, but did not want these ake place immediately since they were not yet ready. There mf ben intensive diplamatic activity as events in East Genmany allled le The Prime Minister had been in close touch with other leaders. Despite excessive press speculation, allied emerged Mitterranf hed organised a meeting of European Cammity leaders on 7 Dyember. It was to be hoped that EC leaders would expres (t) jy support and welcome for the changes taking place in Eascery forope while agreeing on the need for a careful and steadfast and garn, based on existing well-tried institutions. Forn had to be taken of the position of the Soviet President, Mry yhail Gorbachev. He faced a difficult situation but it wab much in the interests of Western governments that he novil) remain in power. The question of German reunification wal entremely sensitive. Given the German Constitution and politrpur in West Gernany, it was inevitable that there shon $/$ bo some discussion of reunification. All the a llog governments had been cormitted to this general principle lor fony years. At the same time noone in a position of influence in the West or East believed that reunification was likely to hapopidly, or that this would be desirable in the near future. 2fis view was also shared by refomers inside East Germany. Yrgsident Mitterrand's purpose in organising the meeting on 18 NO fember was probably to try to dispose of developments in Eastern Europe before the European Council meeting in Strasbourg on 8/9 December. This was unrealistic. Much was likely to happen in the intervening period before the European Council. Mor fven the issues were so important for the future of the EC that thep yould need to be discussed again in depth at the European con(ici) Nevertheless, on the whole the allied response to events in apern Europe had been sensible and prudent.

In discussion, the following points were made:
a. A clear framework for dealing with the chang Europe had been laid down, most recently in the Prine ystern Minister's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on 13 It was essential to maintain existing institutions,

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especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Ministers should not raise the issue of Gemman reumification, which was not an immediate issue. Progress had already been achieved on strengthening the EC's economic relations with East European countries. The EC had signed trade agreements with Poland and Hungary, and an association agreement with Yugoslavia. In due course Poland and Hungary might want to negotiate association agreements. Such a development was unlikely to cause major problems for the Soviet leadership. If events moved too quickly or Western governments did not Continue to take a measured and prudent attitude, there was a 5) jk that President Gorbachev might be swept away. This Whund cause grave damage to the broader Western objective of vpomoting democracy throughout both parts of Europe, and Ittimately from the Atlantic through the Soviet Union to the borders of China. The EC could not ignore these crucially important processes of historic change which would have a profound Sffect on developments within the community.
b. The Morman Finance Minister, Herr Waigel, had made clear bot) (in)the formal and informal meetings of the Economic and finance Council on 13 November that West Germany saw its future/ remaining an integral member of the EC and Western Europe was not seeking retinf ication at the present time. The same line had been takergo the West German Foreign Minister, Herr Genscher, and the cefer Minister, Herr Stoltenberg, at the Western European Unter Mi isterial meeting. Nevertheless, these statements con and with the greater attention paid to the theme of reunifation by Chancellor Kohl in recent speeches, though it shoulo 0 femembered that he had always been one of the foremost adyo tyes of reunification among German political leaders.
c. Against this background, En whegt Gemman government was likely to show an increasing teendey to examine new proposals for greater integration within the EC in the light of the implications for closer relations between East and West Germany and eventual reunification. In certain cases this tendency might be helpful to Britain't own interests.
d. In reality there were already close oporsmic links between East and West Germany. West Germen Colpanies were able to take advantage of cheap labour in sary hermany in their manufacturing processes. Goods from Eesfles many were admitted to West Germany, and hence into the EO, NHout tariffs or quotas. Hitherto West German companiesh ha been deterred from major investment in East Germany beerros of the political situation there. The recent changes were (iir) fly to stimulate a significant flow of new West German investron in East Germany. The Polish and Hungarian governments 1 stressed recently that they attached importance to sectrin

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increased investment from Britain and other EC countries to match the preponderant weight of West German trade and investment flows. On the other hand, East Germany and the other reforming East European countries would have great difficulty in practice in implementing the structural changes necessary to create genuine market economies based on private enterprise. This was likely to be a long process.
e. West Germany had a trade surplus of $£ 35$ billon with the
rest of the EC in 1988. Closer economic links between East
and West Germany would present a formidable challenge to the Sher members of the EC. With a combined population of deary 80 million people this economic entity would have a Nod distorting effect on EC projects for closer economic The EC financial unity and the concept of the Single Market. The could not afford to ignore this emerging reality. Europeapess would also affect the EC's relate Area (EFTA). The EC's import standards would seed be maintained both in relation to East Germany and EFIL and obligations. Alt rough) western governments had taken a formal position since $19 \%$ favour of East German selfdetermination, German romney cation should not be treated as an immediate issue. Government should take due account of the implications of the present 14 ) of events for President Gorbachev's position. A change the Soviet leadership would inflict major damage on the prospects for the further spread of democracy in the Soviet Union bro Intern Europe. The EC would need to discuss these issues in agron both at President Mitterrand's dinner and at the Euspean Council in Strasbourg. EC member states could not simply foncentrate on internal developments within the community without taking account of trends in Europe as a whole. A single European currency was no answer to these wider changes. Although events were moving in a favourable direction, Europe faced a diff (ul) decade ahead.

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Representative had certified that the elections were free and fair. Although Namibia was entering a period of continuing difficulty, the outcome of the elections had been as favourable as might have been hoped for Western interests.

The cabinet -

Took note.

## CMMNITY AFPAIPS

Boonomic and Pinance Council 13 November

4 HH CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that the EConomic and Fupace Council on 13 November had had a crowued agenda. Two legf texts needed to launch Stage One of Economic and Monetary Union had been agreed without much difficulty and on a satisfactory basis. He had then presented the United Kingdom's paper on whot should follow Stage one, and there had been lengthy of (scus) ion on that and on the Delors Report. It had been genetay which merited pryper consideration. The German, Dutch and Luxembourg Mina.gs had spoken in favour of a measured and cautious approary. Jerr Waigel, in particular, had warned against trying to sula the roof before the foundations were in place. Even so, the seemed to be a general expectation on the part of other Minister phat the European Council in December would call an Inter-Ever mental Conference to consider Treaty change. It had been agt a that the United Kingdam's paper would be on the table af Ca meeting, along with the Delors Report and the Report fred fificials setting out a list of questions to be addressed? 10 pad, however, been obliged to intervene to prevent the French doaiman concluding that the council had agreed to give the twol latter documents superior status. The fact that, in the weoen House of conmons debate, members of the opposition partieg vada also uniformly spoken out against the Delors prescription fyr ghieving economic and monetary union appeared, from convefsations outside the council, to have been registered by the advisers of other Ministers.

The council had adopted satisfactory concluasions on the abolition of fiscal frontiers. The desti (ation principle for applying VAT would be retained, but the ithorfagge of avoiding burdens on industry had been accepted. Then wa) ample opposition to wording suggested by the Presidene fon the need to harmonise rates of VAT. Limits on travellers ondances were to be abolished by 1993 subject to possible derobatrand for certain member states with high tax rates: but the hoto subject would need further discussion.

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Social Charter
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALITH said that the Council had, as expected, adopted the Directive on tobacco labelling despite United Kingdam objections. He would need to make regulations prescribing this labelling in due course. The Council had similarly reached a common position on the Directive on the maximum tar content of tobacco: among other things, this might eventually contribute to reducing the cost of the common Agricultural Policy. Wa. SESREIARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT said that the Conmission expected, that morning, to agree and announce its action proffarme of measures to implement the Social Charter. Indications were that 47 separate actions would be proposed including 19 Directives. So the proposed Charter would go far beyond a nemobligatory declaration. It seemed that there would be no att frot lo regulate industrial relations and the only action envogoes on minimum pay was a non-binding recormendati (n.) Inis was helpful. But the Commission would probably seek f. Tpqulate work patterns through measures on such matters rest periods, whig poyld not fail to increase labour costs if they were enacted. in eprogramme would be on the agenda of the Social Affairs Ministy for foir meeting on 30th November.

The Cabinet -
Took note.


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5. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Treasury ( $C(89) 13$ ), on the 1989 Public Expenditure Survey.

THE CHIEF SECRETARY, TREASURY, said that at the start of the bilaterals the bids he had received totalled some $£ 13$ billion for 1990-91, rising to $£ 17$ billion and $£ 23$ billion for the two later years. The Government was already committed to increases in 1990-91 of over $£ 4$ billion, and there was less scope for savings than there had been the year before. The room for manoeuvre had therefore been limited. Nevertheless, with the help of colleagues, he had had a satisfactory round of bilaterals and had agreed significant reductions in the bids. The additions to programmes which he now proposed totalled $£ 7.5$ billfon in 1990-91, $£ 9.7$ billion in 1991-92 and $£ 13.2$ billion in 1992-93. There would in particular be extra spending on the priority savices. For example, spending on the National Health Service vorila rise by $£ 2.4$ billion between 1989-90 and 1990-91. Expenditure a roads would double between 1988-89 and 1992-93, and there worid be an extra $£ 1 / 2$ billion a year to upgrade services and rei leve congestion on the railways. Similarly, there would be an increase in planned capital spending, by central Governinent and the nationalised industries, of $£ 11 / 2$ billion a year, representing a real increase of 10 per cent on a year ago. Support for Housing Associations would more than double from $£ 800 \mathrm{~m}$ this year to $£ 1.7$ billion in 1992-93. There would be extra spending on capital investment on prison refurbishment and hospitals and a $£ 1 / 4$ billion package to alleviate homelessness. There would be significant extra help for the disabled. The number of police would rise by 1100. There would also be a big ise in expenditure on higher education. Civil Service ruming costs would rise by just under 10 per cent between this year and next: this implied a substantial reduction in the bils although it still meant higher growth than in previous years to accotmodate cost rises and expansion in key areas.

As to the outturn for this year, there now seemed likely to be an overspend. On the old definition of the Planning Total he expected an excess of $£ 1.1$ billion. This was, however, more than accounted for by overspending by local authorities, which confirmed the need for the new arrangements for local authority finance which the Government was introducing.

Cabinet had agreed that the Govermment's objectiyes in the Survey were to maintain the downward trend in general government expenditure (GGE), excluding privatisation proceeds, as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and to stick as closely as possible to existing plans. The outcome was that the ratio of GGE to GDP would be the same in the first two years of the Survey period as in last year's Autumn Statement.

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would be some additions to the existing plans, but he believed that they were fully justified. He thanked colleagues for their co-operation in the Survey exercise.

THE CHANCELIOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that the Chief Secretary was to be congratulated on the skilful conduct of this year's Survey, which had been a difficult one from the outset. In the economy as a whole, it had become apparent by July that demand had continued to grow more quickly than had been expected at Budget time. More recent events had confirmed this buoyancy of demand. He now expected that, as a result, the current account deficit for this year would be $£ 20$ billion as against the £14 $1 / 2$ billion forecast in the Budget and that Retail Price Indel (RPI) inflation in the fourth quarter would be $71 / 2$ per cent compared with the forecast of $51 / 2$ per cent. Those figures clearly higher than was desirable, but they would not comes as surprise to the markets, who accepted that the economy was undamentally in a sound position. Business investment mould probably grow by over 9 per cent this year, giving a total of 40 per cent over the last three years. This worsened the cade gap in the short-term but would improve it in the long term. Aports had risen strongly and growth in non-oil goods was expected to be over 11 per cent, the highest rate since 1973. Unemployment had continued to fall, although a rise was more likely than a fall over the next few months. He now estimated debt repayment over the year at $£ 121 / 2$ billion compared with the $£ 133 / 4$ billion forecast earlier. The shortfall was the result of lower privatisation proceeds and higher than expected national insurance rebates due to the uptake of personal pensions which was in itself a considerable success story.

As to next year, it was clear that the recent very high growth in domestic demand and output could not be sustained. It was essential to damp down demand if inflation was to be reduced. This was the pre-requisite for a resumption of steady growth. He expected the economy to slow down durting 1990, with an increase in GDP of $11 / 4$ per cent, compared with the Budget forecast of 2 per cent. Domestic demand would be flat: consumer expenditure and investment would continue to grow, but more slowly than this year, and stockbuilding was likely to be reduced. The current account deficit should fall, by over 1 per cent of GDP, to $£ 15$ billion. Inflation would also fall, by the RPI measure, to $53 / 4$ per cent by the fourth quarter of 1990, although less distorted measures such as produce price increases were likely to be at around 4 per cent. The level of inflation should continue to fall after the end of 1990 , but it was clear that policy must remain tight if inflation fas to be brought down as quickly and as substantially as the Goverrment wanted.

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THE CHANCEILOR OF THE EXCHEQUER continued that, as to public expenditure, he proposed to leave the estimate of privatisation proceeds unchanged at $£ 5$ billion a year. He also proposed to fix the Reserve at $£ 3$ billion, $£ 6$ billion and $£ 9$ billion in the three Survey years. These figures were lower than those fixed in the last survey, but the Reserve would no longer have to accommodate the risk of overruns in self-financed local puthority expenditure. The result was that the Planning Total in the three Survey years would be $£ 179$ billion, $£ 192$ billion and $£ 203$ billion, and general government expenditure $£ 215$ billion, $£ 227$ billion and $£ 239$ billion. over the next two years this was $£ 5.5$ billion and $£ 6.5$ billion higher than the figures published in the 1988 Autumn Statement. These figures were probelo iy higher than the markets were expecting, but lower than had seened possible earlier in the Survey. The ratio of GGE to GDP woll lis same over the first two Survey years as forecast last year's Autumn Statement. It was, however, unexpected y fow this year at $383 / 4$ per cent, and would therefore show rise in 1990-91 to 39 per cent. In the two following yeans. it would fall to $383 / 4$ per cent and $381 / 2$ per cent, and at 3818 per cent it would be at its lowest level since 1965-6. ibe ehtoome, although satisfactory, would need to be presented with care. The new definitions of the Planning Total would be unfamiliar to the markets and it would therefore be better to concentrate on GGE. This was forecast to grow between 1988-89 and 1992-93 at 1 3/4 per cent a year, the same rate of growth as forecast in last year's Aurtumn Statement for the period 1988-89 to 1991-92 and much lower than the 3 per cent in the ten years up ta 1979. If cabinet agreed, he would that afternoon make his Autuin Statement announcing this outcome.

In discussion the following wer the main points made:
a. The decline in the volume of coverrment debt had reduced the level of debt repayment and so had allowed some increase in programme expenditure vition the Government's objectives. This benefit should be ref ected in presentation.
b. One of the most disturbing features of the econony was the growth of credit encouraged by banks and financed partly by the import of capital. It helped to account for the worse than expected deterioration in the current acgpet and in inflation. More direct pressure on the lende s by the Bank of England should be considered. On the other vinct although it was true that the creation of credit was at a Nigher level than was desirable or had been expected, there was (good evidence that it was declining. There were clear siggs of this from the housing and retail markets, although oo somal indicators like those for new car registrations still the other way.

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c. The prospect of a downturn in private capital investment was highly urwelcame since other countries were likely to continue investing at a high level. One particular concern was that the United Kingdom would fail to get a proper share of the substantial inward investment into the European Community likely over the next few years. Some measures to enocurage continued investment might be considered as part of the Budget strategy. But the current prospect was that although capital investment would not continue to increase during 1990 at the very high level of this year, it would still show satisfactory growth.
d. The markets would be interested in the prospects for the ipnetary aggregates. To retain confidence, it would be necespary to show that the long-term trend for them also was satispatiory. It was expected that Mo would move down towargl Tits target range of 1-5 per cent this year. A target range of $0-4$ per cent had been set for next year. Movements in broad non were difficult to interpret, but there were signs of sonelevelling off in its growth.
e. It would ne important in presentation to stress that prospects for the econanly were still good. The Opposition would no doubt claim that it was entering a recession. The forecast that RPI inflation would still be at $53 / 4$ per cent in the last quarter of 1990 would also attract criticism. However, the continued increase expected in exports and capital investment would holp to show the underlying strength of the economy, which whit certainly enter the 1990 s in much stronger condition than the 1980 s. The public would also welcome the extra resources fro areas such as transport and higher education which were of high priority because of their importance to the health of the ponorly in the long term.
f. Some past forecasts had proved in the event to be too optimistic, and the Government had loen forced on to the defensive when this became apparents. Whe new forecasts were the best and most central forecasts which could be made; but inevitably there were considerable ungertainties, especially at an important turning-point for the economy.

THE PRTME MINISIER, summing up the discussion, said that the Cabinet congratulated the chief Secretary on the outcome of the Survey. They endorsed the recormendations in his fiemprandum C(89)13. They also agreed with the recormendatio s paele by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the content of the mtumn Statement, and noted that he would make an oral statenont in parliament that afternoon, with publication of the full pi inted version on Wednesday 22 November. She would arrange fortt Press to be told that the cabinet had today successfully concluded its work on the 1989 Public Expenditure Survey, that the Chancellor proposed to make his Autumn Statement

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House that afternoon, setting out the outcome of the Survey and the prospects for the economy. It was important that the contents of the Statement should remain confidential until then. Ministers whose Departments had received extra allocations would need to be ready with their own supporting announcements, but should make it clear that these had been agreed within the context of priority for reducing inflation and continuing tight control over public expenditure.

The cabinet -

1. Endorsed the reconmendations in the memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Treasury.


Cabinet Office
15 November 1989


