



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bern, Switzerland

September 20, 1982

His Excellency
Pierre Aubert
Federal Counselor
Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs
Bern

Excellency:

I have the honor to forward the enclosed
message from Secretary Shultz to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James W. Shinn".

James W. Shinn
Charge d'Affaires

[Enclosure]

September 20, 1982

Dear Federal Counselor:

I am writing to ask your support on a problem of serious concern. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has recently been in touch with firms in a number of supplier countries, including Switzerland and the United States, asking them to declare their interest in bidding on a new contract to design and build a nuclear power plant at the Chasma Site in Pakistan.

As you know, Pakistan is constructing unsafeguarded enrichment and reprocessing facilities in an effort to acquire a nuclear explosives capability. Acquisition of nuclear explosives by Pakistan would have far-reaching consequences for regional stability and would severely set back our common non-proliferation goals.

In the past, the major nuclear suppliers have cooperated in efforts to restrain Pakistan's attempts to acquire equipment and materials for its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. By providing economic and military assistance to the Zia Government, the United States has also been seeking to help reduce the security concerns that are motivating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities.

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The United States believes strongly that suppliers should not engage in any significant new nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states that do not agree to accept full-scope safeguards. Particularly where the evidence shows that a non-nuclear-weapon state is seeking to develop nuclear explosives, the supply of any item like a reactor without such a safeguards requirement would signal other countries that they are free to pursue nuclear explosives at no cost to their civil nuclear programs. If such a belief gained currency it would gravely undermine the non-proliferation regime.

Accordingly, the United States will not permit U.S. companies to assist the Chasma Project unless Pakistan agrees, inter alia, to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all its nuclear activities as a precondition for the sale of technology, equipment or materials. In our view it is not sufficient that the Chasma Nuclear Power Plant itself be under safeguards while other troublesome Pakistani activities, including enrichment and reprocessing, remain unsafeguarded.

Pakistan's Chasma bid is a major test of our common commitment to non-proliferation goals. I urge that Switzerland join with the United States and other potential suppliers in requiring full-scope safeguards before agreeing to any sale of technology, equipment, or materials for the facility. By working together and with other suppliers we can meet this challenge successfully.

Sincerely yours,

/S/

George P. Shultz
Secretary of State