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2. Juni 1987

Luftverkehrsverhandlungen Schweiz - Japan in Tokio vom 19. - 21. Mai 1987

Bericht des Teilnehmers der Botschaft in Tokio

1) Allgemeine Charakterisierung:

Nachdem sich SWISSAIR und Japan Airlines in ihren Vorverhandlungen in Zürich vom 11./12. Mai 1987 bereits auf eine Lösung geeinigt hatten, die der SWISSAIR für ihren wöchentlichen Flugplan im Jahr 1988/89 die Wahl zwischen 2 x Pol- plus 2 x Silk-Route und 3 x Pol-Route belässt, stand naturgemäss die Frage im Vordergrund, was in der Zeit danach zu erwarten sei. Wie den beiliegenden "Agreed Minutes" entnommen werden kann, ist es der Schweizer Seite nicht gelungen, den Japanern für die Jahre ab 1989 irgendwelche Konzessionen oder Zusagen abzurufen. Da die Schweiz in der japanischen Luftverkehrsstrategie weiterhin keinen Stellenwert als "Gateway to Europe" besitzt, besteht dort nach wie vor kein wirksamer Verhandlungsanreiz. Es war deshalb durchaus folgerichtig, dass die japanische Seite vor allem auf Zeitgewinn ausging und die ganze Diskussion für möglichst lange Zeit zu vertagen versuchte. Es kann deshalb bis zu einem gewissen Grad schon als schweizerischer Erfolg angesehen werden, dass sie einwilligte, die Verhandlungen schon im November dieses Jahres wieder aufzunehmen. Wenigstens kann dadurch der schweizerische Erwartungsdruck aufrechterhalten werden.

2) Schweiz. Verhandlungstaktik

Die schweizerische Seite brachte folgende Maximalforderungen für die Zeit ab 1989 an: (1) 4 Flüge mit freier Routenwahl, (2) Fluglinienverlängerung über Tokio nach Osaka, Seoul und Beijing sowie (3) Neubewertung der DC-10 Flüge mit einem tieferen, den schweizerischen Anteil am vertraglichen Verkehrsvolumen weniger rasch erschöpfenden Koeffizienten. Die Schweizer Delegation liess sich diese Forderungen von den Japanern einzeln und möglichst ausführlich ablehnen, um sie fest in den "Agreed Minutes" dieser Verhandlungsrunde und damit auch in der Traktandenliste der nächsten Runde verankert zu haben. Diesem Zweck diene auch die Präsentation weniger weit reichender Begehren nach erfolgter Ablehnung der Maximalforderungen: (1) 2 Polar- und 2 Sibirienflüge ab 1990 und in jedem Fall 4 Flüge ab 1989 (m. DC 10), (2) Zusage einer wohlwollenden (positiven) Weiterprüfung der Frage der Fluglinienverlängerung für die verlangten drei Destinationen "beyond Tokyo", und (3)

Erhöhung der "Entitlement"-Punkte unter dem Abkommen von 7 auf 8 (statt Aenderung der DC 10-Gewichtung).

3) Besondere schweiz. Argumente:

Da die japanische Gateway-Politik für Europa und das bestehende Luftverkehrsabkommen die schweiz. Verhandlungsoptionen auch in Zukunft stark einschränken werden, erwächst einigen Argumenten, die die schweizerische Delegation im Sinne der Waffe des Schwächeren bereits verwendet hat oder die in Zukunft vermehrt ins Spiel gebracht werden könnten, besondere Bedeutung:

- Die Tatsache, dass verschiedene europäische Konkurrenten von SWISSAIR bereits über Sibirien und nach Osaka fliegen, bedeutet de facto - wenn auch nicht de iure - eine Diskriminierung der Schweiz. Da Luftfahrtpolitik ohnehin nur sehr beschränkt den Marktgesetzen folgt, kann es sich die Schweiz, die sonst im japanischen Markt (Handel, Finanz, Tourismus etc.) im internationalen Vergleich recht gut abschneidet, durchaus guten Gewissens leisten, von einer Diskriminierung zu sprechen und diesen Vorwurf politisch stärker zum Tragen zu bringen (anlässlich zukünftiger Besuche von Bundesräten, Staatssekretären u.a.).
- Dass SWISSAIR und JAL zusammen nur einen Drittel des Luftverkehrs zwischen den beiden Ländern auf sich vereinen, erscheint im Lichte der sonstigen Stärke der beiden Carriers ebenfalls unnatürlich. Dass Japan zu einer Aenderung dieses Sachverhalts in den letzten Jahren sozusagen aus Prinzip (Gateway-Politik) nicht Hand bieten will, ist politisch nicht gerade als Freundlichkeit zu bezeichnen.
- Schwer annehmbar ist für die Schweiz auch die Gefahr, die selbst dem bescheidenen Status quo aus der japanischen Ankündigung droht, dass man der SWISSAIR ab 1989 das Hinzumieten japanischer Entitlements - vermutlich wegen des einsetzenden Eintritts von All Nippon Airways (ANA) in den internationalen Luftverkehr - nicht mehr zusichern könne. Falls ANA sich - was leider nicht so bald zu vermuten ist - tatsächlich für Flüge in die Schweiz interessieren sollte, wäre eine solche Konzession teuer zu verkaufen. Jedenfalls ist die von den Japanern gewünschte Aenderung des Luftverkehrsabkommens i.S. der Zulassung mehrerer japanischer Carriers nicht mit allzu grosser Eile zuzugestehen.
- Was die Entwicklung des Luftverkehrsaufkommens auf den Routen Schweiz-Japan betrifft, so sind die von den Japanern im Hinblick auf jegliche Frequenz-Konzessionen geforderten Steigerungsraten marktwirtschaftlich ein Unsinn, indem einer Fluggesellschaft - die ja eigentlich ökonomisch selbst das Risiko für allfällige Ueberkapazität tragen muss - die Beweislast für die Richtigkeit ihrer Beurteilung der Verkehrsentwicklung aufgebürdet wird. Mag eine solche Denkweise im stark reglementierten und geschützten Bereich des Luftverkehrs auch durchaus "normal" sein, so ergibt sich u.U. doch bei gele-

gentlicher Verlagerung der Diskussion auf die politische Ebene (d.h. diejenige zwischen den Aussenministerien, statt den "abgebrühten" Fachministerien) Gelegenheit zu zusätzlicher Sensibilisierung der japanischen Seite für die Unhaltbarkeit der allzu sektoriellen Sichtweise des Transportministeriums.

Die Versteifung desselben auf das Abwarten "befriedigender" Luftverkehrszahlen als Vorbedingung für jede weitere substantielle Diskussion überhaupt verrät in Anbetracht der raschen Entwicklung der Sibirienroute zur Verbindung Japans mit dem Westen schlechthin eine gehörige Portion Arroganz. Die Schweiz darf durchaus ihre Betroffenheit darob signalisieren, zumal die Japaner keineswegs bekanntgegeben haben, ob die im ersten Halbjahr 87 feststellbare erfreuliche Verbesserung der Zahlen für den wahrscheinlichen Fall einer Trendfortsetzung tatsächlich für japanische Konzessionen als "genügend" bewertet werden soll.

- Auch die weitere japanische "Entschuldigung", man müsse zuerst das Resultat der laufenden, schwierigen Verhandlungen mit der UdSSR abwarten, bevor man sich mit der Schweiz über materielle Fragen unterhalten könne, sticht objektiv betrachtet nicht. Der Ausgang dieser Verhandlungen wird - da er ja von beiden Parteien abgesegnet werden muss - für Japan keineswegs so unerwartet positiv oder negativ ausfallen, dass die japanische Konzessionsfähigkeit dadurch gegenüber heute erheblich verändert würde.
- Ein weiterer Punkt, den die Schweiz im Auge behalten sollte, sind allfällige amerikanische Druckversuche auf Japan, die Bedeutung von Anchorage durch Verweigerung weiterer Sibirienflüge zu stützen. Entsprechende Gerüchte sind hier in Tokio immer wieder zu hören. Ihre ev. Erhärtung müsste natürlich im schweiz. Argumentarium ebenfalls berücksichtigt werden.
- Schliesslich hat der Vertreter der SWISSAIR in der Verhandlungsdelegation, Dr. Monsch, klar und überzeugend dargelegt, dass die Berechnung des Entitlement-Koeffizienten für DC 10-Flüge (1,5) im Verhältnis zu den B 747 (2,0) in Anbetracht der resp. Sitzzahlen ungerecht sei. Darüber hinaus ist deutlich erkennbar, dass das einzigartige, gemäss Aussagen der BAZL-Vertreter weltweit nur von Japan verwendete Koeffizientensystem vom Transportministerium - wie so viele bürokratische Besonderheiten in diesem reglementierfreudigen Land - geschickt zum eigenen Vorteil manipuliert wird. Die Aufbrechung dieses Systems sollte mit allen Mitteln weiterbetrieben werden.

4) Schlussfolgerungen

Vergleicht man die Hartnäckigkeit, mit der sich die schweizerischen Behörden seit Jahren für wirtschaftlich vergleichsweise weniger ins Gewicht fallende Petita wie die Importquote für Schachtelkäse, die Herabsetzung einzelner Zollsätze oder früher

die erleichterte Einfuhr von Bündnerfleisch eingesetzt haben, so muss man sich mit Fug die Frage stellen, ob den SWISSAIR-Anliegen nicht zu einem höheren Profil und einer höheren Prioritätsstufe verholfen werden soll. Nachdem auf diesem Gebiet ohnehin nicht nach Marktgrundsätzen gekämpft wird, wäre eine erhöhte staatlich Betriebsamkeit durchaus am Platz. Die relativ seltenen hohen Besuche aus Bern sollten noch stärker dem "attention getting" mittels einer gewissen Politisierung der Luftverkehrsfrage dienen. Und die einzelnen SWISSAIR-Anliegen dürften mit Vorteil auch im japanischen Aussenministerium regelmässiger und häufiger zur Sprache gebracht werden. Schliesslich dürfte auch eine gelegentliche Kontaktnahme auf der Ebene der Transportminister selbst der Sache keineswegs schaden.



(A. Thalmann)

Beilage: - Agreed Minutes
- New Framework for the Operation of Japanese Airlines
Report of the Council for Transport Policy
June 9, 1986
(Erläuterung der japanischen Deregulierungs- und Privatisierungspolitik im Luftverkehr, wie sie der Schweizer Delegation anlässlich der Verhandlungen in Tokio vorgestellt wurde)

Kopien: - Direktion für Völkerrecht, EDA
- Finanz- und Wirtschaftsdienst, EDA
- Bundesamt für Zivilluftfahrt
- BAWI, Länderdienst Japan
- Polit. Abteilung II, EDA
- Swissair, Tokio
- Swissair, Zürich, Dr. M. Monsch

(CONFIDENTIAL)

AGREED MINUTES OF CONSULTATIONS
BETWEEN
THE AERONAUTICAL AUTHORITIES OF JAPAN AND SWITZERLAND

1. Consultations between the aeronautical authorities of Japan and Switzerland were held in Tokyo from 19 to 21 May 1987 in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Agreed Minutes of Consultations between the two authorities signed on 10 May 1985. The list of delegations is attached as Appendix. Through the course of discussions which were conducted in a friendly and constructive manner, both delegations agreed as follows:

2. The capacity to be provided between the two countries shall be calculated on the basis of true origin/destination traffic and their airlines shall have an equal entitlement in sharing the total capacity to be offered unless otherwise agreed.

3.1 The designated airline of each country may operate scheduled services between Japan and Switzerland with a total of seven (7) units of capacity per week for each side from 1st April 1988. For the purposes of this Agreed Minutes, a frequency means a round trip and the following units of capacity shall apply:

One B747 frequency	2.0 units
One DC10 frequency	1.5 units

These units shall be doubled in respect of a flight operating without a stop at a point other than a point in Alaska.

3.2 The designated airline of Switzerland may make use of unexercised units of capacity per week out of the total capacity entitlement of the designated airline of Japan from 1st April 1988 until the end of March 1989 as follows:

For operations of two (2) DC10 weekly frequencies on Polar Route and two (2) B747 weekly frequencies on Southern Route: three (3) units per week, or

For operations of three (3) DC10 weekly frequencies on Polar Route: two (2) units per week.

Note: Operation on "Polar Route" means any operation between Japan and Switzerland on a northern route without overflying the territory of USSR.

3.3 The Japanese side, however, reserves the right for the designated airline of Japan to exercise up to the total capacity provided for in paragraph 3.1 above, while the designated airline of Switzerland may continue to exercise the capacity entitlement of Japan under paragraph 3.2 above.

4. The Swiss Delegation proposed either to abolish the current coefficient system or to adjust the weighting of DC10 from 1.5 to 1.3 units as this would more adequately reflect the relationship in terms of number of seats to the B747 weighted at 2.0 units.

The Japanese Delegation stated that the coefficient of 1.5 for DC10 has been accepted worldwide and the proposal was not acceptable.

5.1 The Swiss Delegation requested that the designated airline of Switzerland would be authorized to operate as of 1st April 1989 four (4) DC10 frequencies per week with free routing possibilities, including the option to choose the Trans-Siberian route. In view of the refusal of the Japanese Delegation to accept this proposal, the Swiss Delegation modified the proposal and suggested to proceed in three steps: The first step being to operate as of 1st April 1989 all four (4) weekly frequencies on the Polar route. The second step being to receive the option to switch two (2) of these four (4) weekly frequencies to the Trans-Siberian route as of 1st April 1990. And the third step being to receive the right to switch the remaining two (2) weekly frequencies to the Trans-Siberian route at a later date to be agreed. The Swiss Delegation emphasized the need for the access to Trans-Siberian route for the designated airline of Switzerland in view of the recent development of operations on the route and in particular since six of the Swiss designated airline's competitors have meanwhile been accorded these rights by the Japanese Government.

5.2 With regard to the capacity proposed by the Swiss Delegation for the period starting 1st April 1989, the Japanese Delegation stated that it was premature to determine the capacity at present stage where sufficient traffic data were not available.

5.3 As to the routing proposed by the Swiss Delegation in paragraph 5.1 above, the Japanese Delegation took note of the request and stated that, under the present circumstances, it was not in a position to support the Swiss proposal in the light of the specific characteristics of the Trans-Siberian route.

6. The Japanese Delegation explained the recently adopted policy of Japan concerning air transport services and asked for the consent of the aeronautical authorities of Switzerland on the amendment to the Air Transport Services Agreement between the two countries which would allow either party to designate more than one airline. The Swiss Delegation took note of it and stated that it will study the Japanese request.

7.1 The Swiss Delegation further requested that the following additions be incorporated into the Route Schedule for Switzerland.

- a. Osaka as a point in Japan.
- b. Seoul as a point beyond Japan on Polar Route.
- c. Beijing as an intermediate point on Southern Route.

7.2 The Japanese Delegation took note of these requests and stated that it was not in a position to accept them but agreed to leave them open for discussions in future.

8. Both delegations agreed that the next round of consultations will be held in the first half of November 1987 in Bern to discuss the capacity arrangements to apply after April 1989 and

those matters indicated in paragraphs 4 to 7 above. The designated airlines may meet before to seek an understanding on these issues which they might propose to their respective aeronautical authorities for consideration.

Signed in Tokyo on 21 May 1987

For the Japanese Delegation

For the Swiss Delegation

(K. Terashima)

(E. Aebi)

APPENDIXJapanese Delegation

- Mr. Kiyoshi Terashima
Deputy Director-General
International Transport and Tourism Bureau (ITTB)
Ministry of Transport (MOT)
- Mr. Hiromichi Toya
Director
International Air Transport Division (IATD)
ITTB, MOT
- Mr. Takenori Matsumoto
Senior Officer for Air Talks
IATD, ITTB, MOT
- Mr. Akira Ashizawa
Air Talks Officer
IATD, ITTB, MOT
- Mr. Hitoshi Ishiyama
Chief, Administration Section
IATD, ITTB, MOT
- Mr. Mitsuya Tokunaga
Assistant Director
Second West Europe Division
European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Kimiyasu Ezoe
Director
International Affairs
Europe, Middleeast and Africa
Japan Air Lines
- Mr. Toshinao Yoshida
Manager
International Affairs
Europe, Middleeast and Africa
Japan Air Lines

APPENDIXSwiss Delegation

Minister, Dr. E. Aebi
Head
Air Traffic and International Relations Division
Federal Office for Civil Aviation
Swiss Transport and Energy Ministry

Dr. O. Arregger
Deputy to Dr Aebi

Dr. A. Thalmann
Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs
Embassy of Switzerland

Dr. M. Monsch
General Manager
Air Transportation Policy
Swissair

Mr. A. Reichen
Sales Manager for Japan
Swissair

[PROVISIONAL TRANSLATION]

New Framework for the Operation of Japanese Airlines
Report of the Council for Transport Policy
June 9, 1986

The Council for Transport Policy, which has been carrying out an in-depth study of the " Basic Policy of the Framework for the Operation of Japanese Airlines ", in response to the request made by the Minister for Transport on September 10, 1985, has hereby completed the following final report.

This final report proposes comprehensive views of the Council on a new direction of Japanese civil aviation policy, taking into account such views as those revealed in the Interim Report issued by the Council on December 9, 1985.

1. Basic Policy

(1) The government, in response to the Interim Report made by the Council, abolished the 1970 Cabinet Understanding and 1972 Minister's Directive, which set forth the range of activities of each Japanese airline. By this abolition, the Japanese airline industry has entered into an era of new development, and from now on, it will make its best efforts toward improvement of its services responsive to customer needs. It will also strengthen management and international competitiveness through promotion of competition among carriers, keeping the security of operational safety as a fundamental consideration.

(2) In promoting competition, the authorities should put emphasis on its policy of respecting carriers' own managerial judgment on overall business administration. Particularly on commencement of services on new routes, increase of frequencies and introduction of various discounted fares.

If pro-competition measures are to be implemented as thoroughly as possible, all decision on the quantity, quality and price of services offered should be entirely entrusted to the airlines as is the case in the domestic market of the United States. In Japan, however, it is not necessarily apparent that such policy is desirable in terms of maximization of customer benefits. That is, provision of safe, reliable and high quality air transportation services. Under current circumstances in Japan, particularly the shortage of air traffic capacity, it is appropriate, for the time being, to promote competition through as flexible regulatory control as possible.

In order to secure effective competition in the future, it seems to be necessary, in making regulatory decisions, for the authorities to take into account the existing imbalance of competitive abilities among carriers in the light of the current industry situation.

In addition, for the purpose of furtherance of customer benefits and promotion of appropriate competition, it is necessary to strengthen management of the airline industry.

(3) It is expected by the Council that with increased competition among carriers such benefits as adequate capacity, improved quality of services and a greater selection of services would flow directly to customers. It is also hoped that airlines will fully recognize their responsibilities as a common carrier and try to expand their services actively for the benefit of customers. Also to offer higher quality of services through competition and, if necessary, cooperation among carriers.

(4) It is hoped by the Council that the aeronautical authorities will make constant efforts to review its policy in a timely manner and form a policy responsive to the needs of the era, since it is very likely that the aviation situation will change dramatically in the future.

2. Introduction of Plural Number of Japanese Carriers into International Air Services

(1) In order to promote competition in international air services, the existing scheme, in which JAL has been in principle a sole Japanese operator in the international market, should be modified and Japanese carriers other than JAL should be actively encouraged to engage in international air services depending on their willingness and ability. Pursuant to the Interim Report to this effect, ANA commenced their operation to Guam and more than one Japanese carrier is being introduced into international air services between Japan and the United States. It is desired to see a steady development in this line. Furthermore, from a long range perspective, various measures should be taken by the authorities to form a world wide network of air services by more than one Japanese carrier. In pursuing this goal, the authorities should make proper consideration of the maintenance of international competitiveness of Japanese airlines as a whole, and they should also contemplate the overall civil aviation relations and coordination of policies with other countries if necessary.

(2) In principle, pluralization should be pursued primarily in the form of more than one Japanese carrier operating on the same route. Such pluralization is desirable for the promotion of competition among Japanese carriers. Also because in many cases it is realistic for a new entrant, from an economical point of view, to enter into existing routes with high demand or a high rate of demand increase where a Japanese carrier already operates.

On the other hand, it may be conceivable for new entrants to commence operation as the sole Japanese carrier on routes to countries and cities where Japanese carriers have not provided services, or on routes from provincial airports in Japan. This type of pluralization should also be actively pursued.

(3) As concrete measures to implement pluralization, effective utilization of unused or newly acquired rights on routes and capacity should be made. Transfer of routes or frequencies from an incumbent airline can also be utilized, provided that an

agreement between carriers is reached.

It is expected that pluralization be implemented not only on routes between Japan and the United States but also on routes between Japan and countries other than the United States.

3. Complete Privatization of Japan Air Lines (JAL)

(1) It is desirable that complete privatization of JAL be implemented promptly because of the necessity of establishing equal footing in competitiveness among Japanese carriers. This will result in effective fair competition, and also the necessity to establish responsible and independent management so leading to improved managerial decision making.

Complete privatization would be implemented by abolition of Japan Air Lines Co. Ltd. Law and sale of stocks owned by the government. As a result, the difference in governmental aids and regulation between JAL and other Japanese carriers will be eliminated.

(2) It is desirable, judging from the objectives of the privatization, that the sale of government owned stocks be executed at the earliest stage, but, at the same time, it is necessary to fully consider maintenance of sound business activities for JAL in the future.

(3) With privatization of JAL, financing will become a major managerial issue in the maintenance of sound business activities of the company. This is because government guarantee of its financing, which accounted for most of its financing in the past, will be abolished. Also because bond-issuing will be curbed with the abolition of special preferential treatment with regard to ceiling of bond-issuing.

At the same time, for the benefits of the Japanese airline industry, devising a long-term and reliable program for financing will become an imminent theme. This is because renovation of existing fleets and introduction of new aircraft are required so as to cater for the increase in traffic under increased competition in both international and domestic services.

It is therefore necessary to consider promptly a new financing scheme designed for the Japanese airline industry so as to cope with above mentioned markets.

(4) It is strongly urged by the Council that JAL fully understand the objectives of its complete privatization and make the best efforts for more efficient and dynamic management through a fundamental review of its management. Also that JAL, as a unified unit, endeavor to secure operational safety and improve customer conveniences. Upon the privatization of JAL, it is strongly desired that JAL fully meet its responsibilities to the public in every aspect of its business activities. For example, offer transportation in an emergency, keeping in mind its position as the pioneer carrier in this country and the fact that its growth so far is partly due to assistance provided by the

government.

4. Promotion of Competition in Domestic Air Services

(1) With respect to domestic air services, double or triple tracking should be allowed, taking into account the size of demand, airport capacity and other factors without making former distinctions between trunk routes and local routes.

Double or triple tracking should be promoted actively on routes with large demand where promotion of competition leads to a relatively large increase in customer benefits. It is appropriate that these measures be taken on routes connecting major airports which function as the hub of the domestic air services network or which function as the center of local economy or as a major gateway for international air services. These measures should be taken if a certain volume of demand exists on these routes.

(2) Setting up a criterion for introduction of double or triple tracking such as the volume of demand should be studied promptly from the standpoint of promoting substantial competition. This should also consider the trade-off between securing equity and transparency of administrative decision and avoidance of administrative inflexibility.

(3) In promoting pro-competition measures, consideration should be made to avoid malfunction of appropriate competition due to an imbalance of competitive capability of carriers. In the case of JAL, the authorities should keep in mind the difference in route structure and company size between JAL and other carriers in implementing these pro-competition measures.

(4) From now on, although new development of air services are expected from Japanese carriers for the promotion of competition, carriers should expand their business under reasonable and not too ambitious business plans. This is because expansion of business beyond each carrier's capability is not plausible from the standpoint of securing safe operations and offering steady and high quality services. In this regard, carriers are requested to review their corporate plans from time to time.

(5) Existing smaller carriers are currently operating on many unprofitable routes. Some such routes to remote islands that are essential for everyday life of local residents and those are expected to be maintained regardless of their profitability. Therefore, in the case of those smaller carriers, it is appropriate that consideration be made for their operation of lucrative routes, and that these carriers be allowed, in accordance with their capability and characteristics, to enter into routes which are useful for strengthening their profitability. Consequently routes to remote islands that are essential for local communities will be maintained. Though it is expected that these smaller carriers can be sustained by the above measures together with more efficient management and a more appropriate level of fares, it is desirable that local communities should assist and cooperate to maintain local

transportation on their own.

While air services by commuter-type aircraft are counted on as a measure to facilitate traffic between local communities, further study of these services should be carried out taking into account the characteristics of relevant regions and the profitability of the services.

5. Securing Operational Safety

It is needless to say that safety is the most fundamental element for the transportation business, and this should be particularly emphasized in case of the air transportation business in the sense that serious damage is unavoidable once an accident occurs. Accordingly, carriers, recognizing that the most essential element of the best services is securing safety, should do all they can to secure operational safety in their everyday business activities. Safety should also be secured in any business expansion to avoid jeopardizing safety under the pro-competition regime. It is essential that all the management and employees of carriers realize the significance of operational safety and that they make every effort to take effective safety measures, and to continuously improve their own system of operation and maintenance.

It is important for the authorities to exert stringent supervision taking advantage of every possible opportunity, so that carriers perform safety measures as extensively as possible under the pro-competition regime.

6. Expansion of Air Traffic Capacity

The aforementioned pro-competition measures will be implemented through route expansion and capacity increase of carriers.

At present, however, it is extremely difficult to increase frequencies at Haneda and Osaka airports. These handle approximately 80 % of domestic traffic, and the shortage of airport capacity for international services at Narita and Osaka airport is already internationally addressed. Therefore, it is essential to expand air traffic capacity through development of airports and air traffic control services. This will promote competition smoothly as well as to accommodate increasing demand for air services. A comprehensive study should be made of measures to secure financing for this development.

Kopie an SS F. Blankart (auf seinen besonderen Wunsch)
BAWI



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EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND
IN JAPAN

TOKYO, 2. Juni 1987

9-12, Minami Azabu 5-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo 106
Azabu P. O. Box 38
Tel. 473-0121
Fax 473-6090

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Bundesamt für Aussenwirtschaft	
No.	<i>Jan 831</i>
EE	
	<i>10.6.87 Tokyo</i>
<i>4. JUN. 1987</i>	
<i>Kopie an</i>	

Direktion für Völkerrecht
EDA
3003 Bern

Luftverhandlungen Schweiz - Japan in Tokio vom 19.-21. Mai 1987

Herr Botschafter,

*Bitte Substantiv
Dankesbrief zu
Unleserlich. Perri*

Sie erhalten beiliegend den Bericht meines Mitarbeiters für wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten, der als Delegationsmitglied an obgenannten Verhandlungen teilgenommen hat.

Ich versichere Sie, Herr Botschafter, meiner vorzüglichen Hochachtung.

Der Schweizerische Geschäftsträger a.i.

[Signature]
(E. Pfister)

Beilage erwähnt