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VERTRAULICH

Reisebericht

Ausbildungsprogramm für sicherheitspolitische Experten

Reise nach New York, Washington, DC,
und Atlanta

2.-14. November 1992

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Gesprächsnotizen
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Teilnehmer
Liste der Gesprächspartner

Dr. Theodor H. Winkler
Beauftragter des Generalstabschefs für sicherheitspolitische Fragen

27. November 1992

Dodis



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Beauftragter des Generalstabschefs
für sicherheitspolitische Fragen

3003 Bern, 2.12.92

SIPOLEX-Reise USA (2.-14.11.92)

Für die Schweiz relevante Aussagen der Gesprächspartner

Die Haltung der Gesprächspartner gegenüber der Schweiz war während dieser Reise insgesamt positiver und offener als im Vorjahr. Hierzu trugen einerseits spezifische Schritte der Schweiz (geplante Aufstellung von Blauhelmen, Beitritt zum MTCR, Verordnung des Bundesrates bezüglich Exportkontrollen im Proliferationsbereich) sehr wesentlich bei; andererseits reflektierte diese Haltung auch ein gewisses Unbehagen gegenüber dem französischen Kurs in der EG und bezüglich der WEU, das sich in Interesse für unserer Lageeinschätzung niederschlug.

Unzweideutig und wiederholt wurde im Pentagon erklärt, dass jede Annäherung der Schweiz und der anderen EG-Beitrittskandidaten durch eine analoge Annäherung an die NATO begleitet sein sollte. Eine Annäherung auf der Basis der Aequidistanz zu den beiden Allianzen würde umgekehrt begrüsst. Das Verständnis für die Neutralität hat weiter abgenommen. Mit Interesse wird daher dem Bericht des Bundesrates zur Aussenpolitik entgegengeblickt.

Von finnischer Seite war zu erfahren, dass Finnland (wie auch Schweden) letztlich die volle NATO-Mitgliedschaft anstrebten. Ein solcher Beitritt sei nach dem Beitrittentscheid zur EG, wenn möglich jedoch praktisch zeitgleich mit diesem, ins Auge gefasst. Finnland habe den Besuch von Präsident Koivisto bei der NATO dazu genutzt, Sondierungen bezüglich möglichen weiteren zwischenzeitlichen Annäherungsschritten einzuleiten. Es habe von der NATO hier grundsätzlich positive Signale empfangen. Gegenwärtig prüfe Helsinki, welche spezifischen diesbezüglichen Optionen mit der NATO vertieft diskutiert werden sollten.

Von der UNO wurde der schweizerische Beitrag im Bereich der friedenserhaltenden Aktionen sehr positiv gewürdigt, wobei insbesondere der Einsatz in der Westsahara, die geplante Aufstellung von Blauhelmen sowie die prompte Einhaltung der von uns eingegangenen finanziellen Zusagen besonders hervorgehoben wurden. Diese Engagements stärken unzweifelhaft die Stellung des Landes innerhalb der Weltorganisation in wesentlicher Form. Sie vermögen jedoch nicht, die Nachteile der Nichtmitgliedschaft zu kompensieren. Ein Beitritt, nach Klärung unseres Verhältnisses zu Europa, zu den Vereinten Nationen muss eine wesentliche Zielsetzung unserer Aussenpolitik bleiben.

Die UNO würde es begrüssen, wenn die Schweiz im Bereich Blauhelme nicht nur "leichte Infanterie" (welche man relativ leicht aus der Dritten Welt erhält), sondern vor allem auch logistische Spezialeinheiten aller Art (inkl, aber nicht nur, Spitaleinheiten) für friedenserhaltende Aktionen zur Verfügung stellen könnte. Die Delegation gewann den Eindruck, dass die entsprechenden Gedanken der Schweiz bei den zuständigen Chefsbeamten der UNO nicht bekannt waren. Diese Kommunikationslücke müsste geschlossen werden.

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Irritation war auf Seiten der UNO bei mehreren Gelegenheiten wegen des geplanten Abzuges eines Küchen-Containers aus der Westsahara festzustellen. Das EMD scheint auf dem Abzug (nach dem Prinzip, dass Material nur zur Nutzung belassen wird, wenn es von Schweizer Personal begleitet, bzw bedient wird) zu bestehen, bzw bietet, alternativ, den Container der UNO für \$ 150'000.-- zum Kauf an (was aber an den Einkaufsvorschriften der UNO scheitert). Von Seiten der UNO wurde bei einer Gelegenheit gar erklärt, die Glaubwürdigkeit der Schweiz werde durch den Fall tangiert, während unsere Mission bedauerte, dass dieses Detailproblem drohe, einigen Good Will, den man sich mit unserer Medical Unit (die weit mehr als ihren Grundauftrag erfüllt habe und daher äusserst geschätzt würde) geschaffen habe, wieder zu gefährden. Ohne zu diesem spezifischen Detailproblem Stellung beziehen zu wollen und zu können, erscheint es der Delegation empfehlenswert zu prüfen, ob die Kontakte zwischen den zuständigen Dienststellen des EMD und unserer Mission in New York nicht noch weiter vertieft werden könnten.

Auch aus Sicht der Mission in New York könnte sich längerfristig und bei entsprechender Zunahme der Mitwirkung der Schweiz an entsprechenden Aktionen die Zuteilung eines Militärberaters an die Mission durchaus als nützlich erweisen. Dies allerdings unter der klaren Bedingung, dass dies nicht zu Lasten des bestehenden Bestandes von EDA-Mitarbeitern der Mission erfolgen und dass die Federführung, einschliesslich des Kontaktes mit dem UNO-Sekretariat im Zusammenhang mit konkreten Einsätzen, von EDA-Mitarbeitern der Mission nicht in Frage gestellt würde.

Die schweizerische Kandidatur für einen Sitz im Advisory Board on Disarmament Questions wird weiterverfolgt. Die International Peace Academy, die eng mit der UNO zusammenarbeitet, zeigte Interesse an einer Forschungszusammenarbeit mit uns im Rahmen des Ressortforschungsprogrammes EDA/EMD.

Sowohl die Vereinten Nationen wie verschiedene bedeutende amerikanische Forschungsinstitutionen zeigten sich sehr interessiert am Projekt Forschungsförderung des EMD und insbesondere am E-Mail-Verbund, der in Osteuropa in diesem Kontext von uns aufgebaut wird. Es wurden uns hier Zusammenarbeit und Hilfestellung angeboten.

Die National Defense University des Pentagon ist dabei, eine Art SIPOLEX-Programm zugunsten Osteuropas in Garmisch (BRD) aufzubauen. Sie ist an unseren Erfahrungen und an einer Zusammenarbeit mit uns (zB Kostenreduktion durch Teilung der Flugkosten von Referenten) interessiert. Kontakte werden in dieser Frage in nächster Zeit aufgenommen werden.

Ein Mitarbeiter des US Senates, Dr. Cordesman, äusserte - aufgrund der Golferfahrungen - Zweifel an der tatsächlichen Kampfkraft von Milizverbänden und Milizoffizieren. Einmal mehr zeigte sich hier, dass unser System im Ausland nur teilweise verstanden wird und leicht mit Reserveverbänden oder Territorialverteidigung verwechselt wird.

Die Gesprächspartner in Washington gingen davon aus, dass die neue Clinton-Administration im ersten Amtsjahr:

- sich primär auf die Wirtschafts- und Innenpolitik konzentrieren wolle;
- das Verteidigungsbudget (um mindestens 6 %, allenfalls 10 %) und die Streitkräfte (um mindestens weitere 200'000 allenfalls mehr Mann) kürzen dürfte;

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- die amerikanische Präsenz in Europa abbauen werde (auf max 100'000 Mann, wahrscheinlicher auf bloss 70'000, ev gar auf nur 50'000);
- entschlossen sein dürfte, den Technologievorsprung im Rüstungsbereich zu halten und auszubauen (bzw die Rüstungsbasis des Landes zu erhalten), hierbei aber die eigentlichen Beschaffungszahlen reduzieren und vermehrt Prototypen ("Silver Bullets") beschaffen dürfte;
- dazu neigen dürfte, dem asiatisch-pazifischen Raum einen höheren Stellenwert zuzumessen (allenfalls zu Lasten desjenigen von Europa), gleichzeitig aber gegenüber China zu einem härteren Kurs neige;
- sich in Fragen der GATT-Verhandlungen deutlich härter zeigen dürfte als die Bush-Administration;
- befürchte, dass Gegenspieler wie der Irak versuchen könnten, ihre Handlungsbereitschaft auf die Probe zu stellen und damit den neuen Präsidenten früh in seiner Amtszeit mit einer Krise zu konfrontieren;
- dem Umweltschutz einen deutlich höheren Stellenwert beimessen werde;
- grundsätzlich - in Krisenherden wie Somalia oder ex-Jugoslawien - der Interventionsoption offener gegenüberstehe als die jetzige Regierung;
- allenfalls Vizepräsident Gore - quasi im Sinne einer Arbeitsteilung - im Bereich der Aussenpolitik eine wesentliche Rolle zu überbinden, während sich der Präsident selbst auf Innen- und Wirtschaftspolitik konzentrieren würde.

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Zusammenfassender Bericht

Dieser Bericht enthält nur jene Aussagen, die als neu oder sonst besonders wesentlich bewertet werden. Für ein umfassendes Bild der gesamten Aussagen der Gesprächspartner wird auf die ausführlichen Gesprächsnotizen verwiesen, die diesem Bericht beigelegt sind.

Anliegen der Mission in New York

Die permanente Beobachtermission der Schweiz bei der UNO in New York ist von den Schweizer Beiträgen an friedenserhaltende Aktionen der UNO insgesamt sehr befriedigt. Die schweizerische Sanitätseinheit sei praktisch das einzige, das bei MINURSO funktioniere. Botschafter Manz ist stolz über diese selbständige und autarke Sanitätseinheit und froh, dass dieser Einsatz noch nicht abgebrochen wurde. Die Schweiz hat sich mit den Einsätzen in Namibia und in der Westsahara einen guten Namen geschaffen. Sie sollte sich aber nicht auf Sanitätseinheiten beschränken, sondern ihr Angebot diversifizieren. Das Projekt, Blauhelme zur Verfügung zu stellen, wird von der UNO sehr positiv aufgenommen. Botschaftsrätin Lise Favre sprach sich dafür aus, dass die Bereitstellung von Blauhelmen durch die Schweiz beschleunigt werden sollte. Weiter sei eine Professionalisierung von Teilbereichen, z.B. der medizinischen und logistischen Elemente, unabdingbar. Botschafter Manz ist nicht dagegen, der Mission in New York einen Vertreter des EMD beizugeben, sofern die politischen Aspekte nach wie vor durch das EDA abgedeckt würden.

Botschafter Manz ist für einen möglichst baldigen Beitritt der Schweiz zur UNO. Derzeit konzentriert sich die Schweiz aber auf ihre Integration in Europa, und man sollte das Boot nicht überladen. Der Bericht der Studiengruppe Krafft zur Neutralität ist dazu angetan, der Schweiz "etwas Luft zu verschaffen". Die Schweiz sollte immer berechenbar sein.

Friedenserhaltende Aktionen der UNO

Peace-keeping, humanitäre Einsätze und ein Vortasten in den Bereich des Peace-making haben der UNO eine neue Vitalität verliehen. Zurzeit hat die UNO 26 Missionen in diesem Bereich, während es noch 1985 erst fünf waren. Damit hat sie laut Per Sjögren (Direktor der Abteilung für Feldoperationen der UNO) eine Grössenordnung erreicht, wo Veränderungen und Restrukturierungen zu prüfen sind. Nicht nur die Zahl, sondern auch die Komplexität der Missionen hat zugenommen.

Zu *Somalia* war Verbitterung bei der UNO zu spüren. So sagte der militärische Berater des Generalsekretärs, die somalische Tragödie sei durch die Somalier selber verursacht worden, die nun überdies die Hilfeleistung verhinderten. Der UNO fehlten zudem die notwendigen Mittel (Fahrzeuge, Sanitäts-, Genie- und Unterhaltseinheiten). Das Mandat des Sicherheitsrates erlaube es nicht, mit Gewalt in Somalia vorzugehen, und es wäre keineswegs sicher, dass jene Länder, die Einheiten für Somalia stellen, dabei mitmachen würden. Es geht in Somalia um die Verteilung von humanitärer Hilfe unter Bürgerkriegsbedingungen. Die Infrastruktur ist zerstört. Die Bevölkerung ist von 6.5 Mio. auf rund 4 Mio. geschrumpft. Zunächst geht es darum, eine gewisse Sicherheit als Vorbedingung für die Verteilung von Nahrungsmitteln und für den Wiederbeginn der Landwirtschaft zu schaffen. Die UNO hat 50 Militärbeobachter und ein pakistanisches Blauhelm-Bataillon von 500 Mann in Somalia; die Entsendung von vier weiteren Bataillonen ist geplant.

Die friedenserhaltende Aktion in *Kambodscha* [UNTAC] umfasst rund 22'000 Personen (Militär, Polizei, Zivilisten) und folgende Komponenten:

- Humanitäre Hilfe.
- Repatriierung und Rehabilitation von Flüchtlingen.
- Polizeifunktionen. Die UNTAC soll auch die vier bewaffneten Fraktionen entwaffnen.
- Verwaltungsfunktionen: UNTAC hat in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Nationalrat, dem Prinz Sihanouk vorsteht, einen Teil der Regierungsfunktionen übernommen.
- Organisation der Wahlen: UNTAC soll neutrale Bedingungen für Wahlen im April/Mai 1993 herstellen.

Die UNTAC-Mission soll 18 Monate dauern und wird (ohne Repatriierung und Rehabilitation von Flüchtlingen, für das ein separates Budget besteht) 1.7 Mia. \$ kosten. Der Khmer Rouge hat die Zusammenarbeit entzogen, so dass sich die Frage stellt, inwieweit der Prozess weitergeführt werden kann.

Zur Frage, inwieweit die GUS-Staaten, Peace-making von aussen (UNO) akzeptieren würden, meinte Untergeneralsekretär Petrovsky [Russe, ehemaliger stellvertretender Außenminister der UdSSR], die Sowjetunion habe Einmischung von aussen traditionell abgelehnt. Ein grosser Teil der Bevölkerung habe immer noch diese Haltung. Die russische Regierung sei aber offen. Sie nehme nicht an, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft die Lage in Russland unterminieren wolle.

Die UNO hat enorme Schwierigkeiten, qualifiziertes *Personal* für Feldmissionen zu finden (z.B. Chief Administrative Officers, Finance Officers und Communications Officers). Das rasche Reagieren wird durch das Fehlen eines Pools von geeigneten Fachleuten ebenso erschwert wie dadurch, dass die Generalversammlung keine Kredite für die Lagerhaltung von immer wieder benötigtem Material gewährt.

Alle Gesprächspartner in der UNO, die mit friedenserhaltenden Aktionen zu tun haben, zeigten über die *schweizerische Unterstützung* sehr befriedigt. Ein Problem wurde aber erwähnt: Die Schweiz habe ihre Absicht angekündigt, eine von drei Feldküchen der MINURSO zurückzuziehen, was die UNO vor grosse Schwierigkeiten stellen würde. Die Schweiz habe angeboten, diese Küche für \$ 150'000 der UNO zu verkaufen. Ein solcher Antrag hätte aber kaum Chancen. Es wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass es hier - obwohl es eigentlich um eine kleine Sache handle - auch um die Glaubwürdigkeit der Schweiz gehe. Mitarbeiter des militärischen Beraters des UNO-Generalsekretärs äusserten mit Nachdruck den Wunsch, dass die Schweiz Personal in folgenden Bereichen zur Verfügung stellen könnte: Transport, Sanität, Kommunikation, Genie und Logistik. Infanterie könne die UNO leicht von Entwicklungsländern erhalten. Diese Einheiten kämen aber oft ohne jegliche Ausrüstung.

Lage im ehemaligen Jugoslawien, insbesondere in Bosnien-Herzegowina

Die Überwachung des Abzugs der Jugoslawischen Volksarmee auf Kroatien durch die UNO wurde seitens der UNO als Erfolg bewertet. Anders verhalte es sich aber mit der Demobilisierung und Demilitarisierung. Die Soldaten würden ihre Uniform einfach durch jene der Polizei ersetzen oder zu irregulären Milizen stossen. Die UNO habe auch damit Schwierigkeiten, dass Leute, mit denen sie Abkommen schliesst, kurz darauf nicht mehr in ihren Positionen seien. In den Zonen, aus denen kroatische und serbische Streitkräfte zurückgezogen worden sind, versuchen gemeinsame Kommissionen von Kroaten, Serben, der UNO und der EG Ruhe zu schaffen. Trotz kleiner Teilerfolge laufe dies aber im grossen und ganzen noch nicht, und die Spannungen seien trotz des Dialoges hoch.

Es wurde bestätigt, dass die UNO davon ausgeht, dass rund 400'000 Personen in Bosnien-Herzegowina im kommenden Winter vom Tod bedroht sind. Wenn es keine Beilegung des Konfliktes gebe, werde der Flüchtlingsstrom nicht aufhören. In der gegenwärtigen Lage sei vor allem die islamische Seite an einem Ende des Krieges nicht interessiert, weil sie befürchte, dass dies ihre territorialen Verluste zementieren würde. Darum würden

UNO-Blauhelme derzeit häufiger von diese Seite als von Serben angegriffen. Die Bosnier hätten sogar selber Strassen vermint, auf denen UNO-Konvois humanitäre Hilfe für die eingeschlossenen Bosnier nach Gorazde brachten. Bosnien-Herzegowina sei derzeit nur eine Fiktion eines unabhängigen Staates. Wenn die internationale Gemeinschaft schon die Aufsplitterung Jugoslawiens nach ethnischen Linien durch die Anerkennung der neuen Staaten gutgeheissen habe, wieso sollte sie dann nicht das gleiche Prinzip auch auf Bosnien-Herzegowina anwenden?

Prvoslav Davinic [Direktor der Abteilung für Abrüstung in der UNO; ein Serbe, der im privaten Gespräch seine Unzufriedenheit mit der Politik von Milosevic äusserte und gleichzeitig voraussagte, dass Milosevic im März 1993 nicht mehr in seinem Amt sein werde] meinte, es bestünde nun die Gefahr, dass die bosnische Seite chemische Waffen einsetzen könnte. Mit Bedauern müsse er annehmen, dass es in einigen Monaten in Bosnien-Herzegowina keine islamische Gemeinschaft mehr geben werde. Das sei nicht eine wünschbare Lösung, die Entwicklung gehe aber in diese Richtung. Auch im US-Repräsentantenhaus wurde gesagt, der Bürgerkrieg in Bosnian-Herzegowina sei de facto bereits entschieden, vor allem zugunsten der Serben, und sekundär der Kroaten.

Im National Security Council (Washington) erklärte die Direktorin der Abteilung für Europa, amerikanische Interessen seien durch die Vorgänge im ehemaligen Jugoslawien nicht in dem Masse betroffen, dass eine militärische Intervention zu erwägen wäre. "Why die for Dubrovnik?" Präzisionsbombardemente hätten nicht den erwünschten Effekt. Im State Department wurde ein Einsatz von amerikanischen Landstreitkräften im ehemaligen Jugoslawien ausgeschlossen.

Zur Lage in *Mazedonien* sagte Vladimir F. Petrovsky, Untergeneralsekretär für politische Angelegenheiten der UNO, es gehe in Wirklichkeit nicht so sehr um einen Streit zwischen Griechenland und Mazedonien als um einen zwischen Bulgarien und Mazedonien. Eine grosse Zahl von Mazedoniern lebe in Bulgarien, und die Grenze zwischen Mazedonien und Bulgarien sei willkürlich.

Zu einem präventiven friedenserhaltenden UNO-Engagement in *Kosovo* meinte der UNO-Experte für Jugoslawien, dies würde schwierige Probleme stellen, weil es darum ginge, in ein UNO-Mitgliedsland zum Schutz einer Minderheit zu intervenieren. Es sei fragwürdig, auf welcher Rechtsbasis dies stattfinden könnte und wer die Kosten tragen würde.

Struktur des UNO-Sicherheitsrates

Vladimir F. Petrovsky, Untergeneralsekretär für politische Angelegenheiten - in diesen Bereich fällt auch Peace-making -, lehnt eine Veränderung der Zusammensetzung des Sicherheitsrates ab, weil sie eine Abänderung der UNO-Charta bedingen würde. Das Vetorecht der fünf ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates hat sich nach seiner Meinung von einem negativen zu einem positiven Element entwickelt, indem die Staaten dieses Recht nicht mehr dazu benützen, Entscheide zu blockieren, sondern das Risiko eines Vetos bei der Formulierung von Entscheiden bereits antizipieren und konsensfähigere Anträge unterbreiten. Auch Sir Brian Urquhart (einer der Amtsvorgänger Petrovskys) ist der Ansicht, dass man den Sicherheitsrat nicht verändern sollte, nachdem er erst seit kurzem zu funktionieren begonnen habe.

Finanzielle Lage der UNO

Die finanzielle Lage der UNO ist nach wie vor prekär. Die Beiträge der Mitgliedstaaten treffen immer noch mit grosser Verspätung ein. Generalsekretär Perez de Cuellar machte im letzten Jahre die folgenden Vorschläge:

1. Die UNO sollte ihre Reserven auf 250 Mio. \$ oder ein Viertel eines Jahresbudgets erhöhen. 1991 musste sie Mitgliedstaaten um sofortige Beiträge von 200 Mio. \$ bitten, um eine Liquiditätskrise bis zum Eintreffen der regulären Beiträge zu überbrücken.
2. Es sollte ein "Rotationsfond" für friedenserhaltende Aktionen geschaffen werden, welche er dem Generalsekretär erlauben würde, dringende Aktionen zeitverzugslos zu beginnen. In Ausnahmefällen sollte die UNO auch Anleihen aufnehmen können.
3. Die UNO sollte ermächtigt werden, Zinsen auf ausstehende Beiträge zu erheben. Dies wurde vor allem von den USA und Japan abgelehnt.
4. Es sollte ein Fond für den Frieden mit einer anvisierten Mittelausstattung von 1 Mia. \$ geschaffen werden.
5. Es sollte eine "Steuer" auf Rüstungsexporte erhoben werden, die friedenserhaltenden Aktionen zugutekommen sollte.

Europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur

Laut dem stellvertretenden Direktor der Abteilung für Europa im State Department, James Cunningham, steht die die USA der Idee offen gegenüber, dass irgendwann - aber nicht kurzfristig - die Ausweitung der NATO in Betracht gezogen werden müsse. Wenn die Grenze von Europa zwischen der Ukraine und Russland zu stehen käme, hätte dies aber ernsthafte Konsequenzen. Der NACC könnte in die KSZE überführt werden, oder gewisse Teile der KSZE könnten dem NACC zugeteilt werden. Im Pentagon wurde die Bedeutung des NACC betont. Hier werde über Friedenserhaltung und Flugsicherung gesprochen, und der NACC könnte von einem Konsultations- zu einem Aktions- und Kooperationsgremium werden. Die KSZE könne Sicherheit nicht garantieren. Dies sei die Rolle der NATO, die sich übrigens in Zukunft verstärkt friedenserhaltenden Aktionen zuwenden werde. Im Pentagon wurde auch klipp und klar gesagt, es sei für die USA nicht annehmbar, dass die bisherigen *Neutralen* in Europa der WEU beitreten würden, ohne gleichzeitig auch Mitglieder der NATO zu werden. Hier gelte Symmetrie.

Zukunft der US-Militärpräsenz in Europa

Im National Security Council wurde als "Botschaft an Europa" gesagt, da ein Putsch in Moskau nicht auszuschliessen sei, wäre es sehr unklug, die US-Militärpräsenz in Europa unter 150'000 Mann zu verringern. Im State Department wurde erklärt, der Aufbau neuer Institutionen in Europa [gemeint war vor allem das deutsch-französische Korps] mache es den USA leichter, sich aus Europa zurückzuziehen. Frankreich handle in diesem Zusammenhang letztlich gegen seine eigenen Interessen. Die Administration habe seit Jahren den Europäern geraten, sich für den Verbleib einer US-Truppenpräsenz in Europa einzusetzen statt den Abzug als unausweichlich zu betrachten und einen Ersatz aufzubauen versuchen.

George W. Bader, Direktor für europäische und NATO-Politik im Pentagon, erklärte, die Bush-Administration habe für 1995 eine Reduktion auf 150'000 US-Truppen in Europa vorgeschlagen. Der Kongress habe 100,000 für 1996 vorgeschlagen. Clinton habe die Zahlen von 70,000 und 100,000 genannt. Die Zahl von 150'000 basiere auf der Annahme, dass ein US-Korps in Europa permanent stationiert und die Elemente für eines zweites vorhanden sein sollte, um eine schnelle Verlegung nach Europa zu ermöglichen. Dies ergebe 92'000 für die US Army, 40'000 für die US Air Force und 10'000 für die US Navy. Eine Reduktion auf 100'000 würde das politische Bekenntnis der USA zur Verteidigung Europas nicht schwächen, hätte aber militärische Konsequenzen.

Orientierung der Clinton-Administration

Verschiedene Gesprächspartner in der US-Administration bemerkten, Präsident Clinton werde sich nicht leisten können, sich mehrere Monate ausschliesslich innenpolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Fragen zu widmen. Die Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik werde seine Aufmerksamkeit bereits frühzeitig erfordern. Es wird dabei erwartet, dass die Clinton-Administration keine drastische Abkehr von der Politik der Bush-Administration vornehmen wird, vielleicht sogar für eine gewisse Zeit auch Republikaner in die Administration aufnehmen bzw. belassen wird.

Im Pentagon wurde gesagt, es sei zu erwarten, dass die Clinton-Administration vermeiden wolle, frühzeitig in den Ruf zu kommen, die Verteidigung zu vernachlässigen und darum zunächst nicht allzu grosse Reduktionen des Verteidigungsbudgets vorschlagen werde. Verteidigungsminister Cheney hat den Betrag von 1'420 Mia. \$ für den Zeitraum 1993-1997 vorgeschlagen; Clinton hat sich für 1'360 Mia. \$ ausgesprochen. Ein Mitarbeiter von Les Aspin [Vorsitzender des Streitkräfteausschusses des Repräsentantenhauses] bestätigte, Clinton werde den Abbau der Streitkräfte um- und vorsichtig vornehmen, um sich gegenüber dem Vorwurf zu schützen, die Streitmacht zu zerstören, die "Desert Storm" gewonnen hat. Die Produktion von F-14 geht ihrem Ende entgegen; die Produktionslinien für F-15 und F-16 werden nur noch durch Exportaufträge offengehalten. Die Beschaffung des F-22 könnte hinausgezögert und in der Stückzahl reduziert werden.

Ein Berater von Senator McCain [Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman] bemerkte, das Verteidigungsbudget sei fast das einzige, wo Reduktionen vorgenommen werden könnten. Die Reserveeinheiten hätten sich bei Kampfeinsätzen im Persischen Golf nicht bewährt. Generalstabschef Powell sei in der Folge dafür eingetreten, auch logistische Reserveeinheiten mit einem Anteil aktiver Truppen zu verstärken.

Nukleare Proliferation

Prvoslav Davinic (UNO) zeigte sich zuversichtlich dass der Non-Proliferations-Vertrag die Überprüfungskonferenz von 1995 überstehen werde, nötigenfalls durch brutale Ausübung politischen Druckes durch den Westen. Die Verringerungen der strategischen Nuklearpotentiale im Rahmen des START-Vertrages sowie die freundlichere Haltung der Clinton-Administration gegenüber einem Nuklearteststopp könnten dies erleichtern, weil dadurch einer der traditionellen Kritikpunkte der Dritten Welt eliminiert oder zumindest abgeschwächt würde. In bezug auf die Weiterverbreitung von Nuklearwaffen und/oder -technologie macht sich Davinic Sorgen über die Ukraine, Weissrussland und Kasachstan. Im National Security Council wurde gesagt, die USA hätten bislang keine Anzeichen dafür, dass ehemalige sowjetische Nuklearwaffen in falsche Hände geraten seien. Die USA haben keinen Überblick über die ehemaligen sowjetischen Nuklearwissenschaftler und -techniker. Sie versuchen ihre Abwanderung durch die Schaffung von Anreizen zu verhindern. Zusätzlich zu dem in Moskau eröffneten Zentrum, wo solche Fachleute beschäftigt werden, ist auch die Eröffnung eines Zentrums in Kiew vorgesehen.

Strategische Nuklearwaffen in der Ukraine, Weissrussland und Kasachstan

Die Ukraine hat, wie im State Department erklärt wurde, keine operationelle Kontrolle über die auf ihrem Territorium stationierten strategischen Nuklearwaffen. [Es handelt sich dabei, ausgehend von offiziellen Informationen, die für September 1990 gelten, aber immer noch ziemlich zutreffend sein sollen, um 90 SS-19 in Khmelnytsky, 40 SS-19 und 46 SS-24 in Pervomaysk, 21 Bear-H in Uzin sowie 13 Tu-160 Blackjack in Priluki. Das Fehlen der operationellen Kontrolle über Nuklearwaffen dürfte auch für Weissrussland (72 SS-25) und Kasachstan (104 SS-18 sowie 40 Bear-H) zutreffen.]

Im National Security Council wurde erklärt, die START-Protokolle von Lissabon sähen vor, dass die Ukraine, Weissrussland und Kasachstan ihre Nukleararsenale innerhalb von

sieben Jahren (Laufzeit des START-Vertrages) eliminieren und dem NPT als Nicht-Nuklearwaffenstaaten beitreten würden. Man müsse besonders die Ukraine ständig ermutigen, bei ihrer Erklärung zu bleiben, und versuche ihr deutlich zu machen, dass das Beibehalten eines Nukleararsenals eine aussenpolitische Beziehungen Belastung wäre. Zum ukrainischen Bedürfnis nach Sicherheitsgarantien gab es widersprüchliche Aussagen. Von einem Vertreter wurde nicht ausgeschlossen, der Ukraine eine "gewisse" Sicherheitserklärung zu geben; ein anderer meinte, niemand sei bereit, der Ukraine Sicherheitsgarantien zu geben, zumal dies Russland vor den Kopf stossen würde.

Auch in der UNO wurde Besorgnis über nukleare Ambitionen der Ukraine, Weissrusslands und Kasachstans geäußert. Laut dem Chef des Büros für Abrüstungsfragen sind diese Staaten nicht bereit, die auf ihrem Gebiet dislozierten Nuklearwaffen aufzugeben.

Amerikanische Unterstützung für den Abbau ehemaliger sowjetischer Nuklearwaffen

Unter dem Nunn-Lugar Act leisten die USA Unterstützung im Betrag von 400 Mio. \$ zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit von Nuklearwaffen in Russland, der Ukraine, Weissrussland und Kasachstan sowie zu ihrem Abbau. Unter dem kürzlich verabschiedete Freedom Support Act kann die USA auch den Bau von Unterkünften für das Militär unterstützen. Die USA hat mit Russland und Weissrussland Übereinkommen über Unterstützung beim Abbau von Nuklearwaffen abgeschlossen und der Ukraine und Kasachstan entsprechende Angebote gemacht. Sie wird spezielle Eisenbahnwagen und Abdeckungen nach Russland liefern, um die Sicherheit von Nuklearwaffen während des Transports zu erhöhen. Die USA ist auch dabei, für Russland Behälter für die sichere Lagerung von Uran und Plutonium zu konstruieren. Zusätzlich hat sie eingewilligt, die Errichtung einer sicheren Lageranlage für Nuklearwaffen mitzufinanzieren.

START und START-II

Die USA, Kasachstan und Russland haben den START-Vertrag ratifiziert. Die US-Administration ist zuversichtlich, dass die Ukraine und Weissrussland binnen Wochen folgen werden. Im State Department glaubt man, dass die ukrainische Regierung den START-Vertrag ratifizieren möchte, dass es aber im Parlament Kräfte gibt, welche Nuklearwaffen in der Ukraine beibehalten möchten.

Da sich die Ukraine, Weissrussland und Kasachstan [in den Protokollen von Lissabon, Mai 1992] verpflichtet haben, innert sieben Jahre keine Nuklearwaffen mehr auf ihren Territorien zu haben, sind die Verhandlungen über START-II vollständig bilateral [zwischen den USA und Russland]. Unter START-II wird die Umsetzung des Übereinkommens vom 17. Juni 1992 zwischen den Präsidenten Bush und Jeltsin verstanden, das über die Verpflichtungen des START-I-Abkommens hinausgehende Verringerungen der strategischen Nuklearpotentiale vorsieht. Es basiert auf der Annahme, dass der START-I-Vertrag vollständig verwirklicht ist.

In diesen Verhandlungen sind im wesentlichen die folgenden Punkte noch umstritten:

- Zerstörung der SS-18-Abschuss-Silos: Nach amerikanischer Auffassung sollen alle SS-18-Silos eliminiert werden. Russland möchte, dass ein Teil davon für die Aufnahme von Raketen mit nur einem Sprengkopf [konkret: eine silogestützte Version der SS-25] modifiziert werden darf.
- "Downloading" der SS-19-Raketen: Die SS-19 sind derzeit mit sechs Sprengköpfen bestückt. Laut dem START-I-Vertrag ist es erlaubt, die Zahl der Sprengköpfe der SS-19 von sechs auf zwei zu verringern. Russland möchte jedoch eine Anzahl SS-19 mit nur einem Sprengkopf behalten, was die USA nicht zugestehen möchten.

[Es geht hier darum, ob die SS-19 beibehalten werden darf oder eliminiert werden muss: Der START-II-Vertrag soll alle Raketen mit mehr als einem Sprengkopf verbieten; wenn die SS-19 nicht auf einen Sprengkopf "heruntergerüstet" werden dürfen, müssten sie also eliminiert werden. Die Beibehaltung einer Anzahl SS-19 mit nur einem Sprengkopf könnte in einer "break-out capability" resultieren: Wenn Russland, nach einer drastischen politischen Kehrtwendung, das START-II Abkommen brechen würde, könnte es innert kurzer Zeit sein Nuklearpotential wieder massiv ausbauen, indem es die verbliebenen SS-19 wieder auf sechs Sprengköpfe aufrüsten würde. Nach dem letzten veröffentlichten Memorandum, das den Stand von September 1990 angibt - aber immer noch ziemlich zutreffend sein soll, wie im NSC gesagt wurde - verfügt Russland über 170 SS-19.]

- Russland möchte eine grössere Anzahl von strategischen Bombern für konventionelle Einsätze umrüsten als die USA zugestehen wollen.

Laut der Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) hat Russland im Vorgriff auf den START-Vertrag bereits mit dem Abbau von SS-18-Interkontinentalraketen begonnen. Die mobilen ICBM [SS-24 Mod. 1 und SS-25] bleiben aus Furcht vor Vandalismus in der Nähe der Garnisonen. Einige SS-25 werden in ehemalige SS-18-Silos disloziert. Die russische Marine habe derzeit je ein SSBN der Pazifischen und der Nordflotte auf Patrouille. Die DIA erwartet, dass Russland in Zukunft weniger neue strategische Waffensysteme einführen wird als die UdSSR in der Vergangenheit. Eine ICBM befinde sich in der Entwicklung. In der Luftverteidigung bleibe die Aktivität auf hohem Niveau (Produktion von SA-11 und Fliegerabwehrausbildung).

Raketenabwehr (SDI, ABM-Vertrag)

Die gemeinsame Erklärung der Präsidenten Bush und Jeltsin vom 17. Juni 1992 zu einem "Global Protection System" wird als politischer Durchbruch zu einer veränderten Haltung Russlands beurteilt. Die Russen hätten realisiert, dass das "SDI-Boot" ablege, und sie wollten noch schnell an Bord kommen. Bislang wurde noch keine einzige amerikanisch-russische Vereinbarung über konkrete Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Raketenabwehr abgeschlossen. Clinton steht SDI weniger positiv gegenüber als Bush, aber im Repräsentantenhaus gibt es nach wie vor Unterstützung für SDI. Die Kredite für Projekte im Bereich der Abwehr taktischer ballistischer Raketen haben mit 800 Millionen \$ ein Rekordniveau erreicht. Der ABM-Vertrag soll abgeändert werden, wie im National Security Council und von der Arms Control and Disarmament Agency erklärt wurde. Dies sei schon allein deshalb erforderlich, um die Auflösung der UdSSR (als Vertragspartner) zu berücksichtigen. Diese Absicht wurde - auf längere Sicht - von einem Mitarbeiter Les Aspins bestätigt, auch wenn die Raketenabwehr auf bodengestützte Systeme beschränkt werden solle.

Konvention über chemische Waffen

Im State Department wurde die Befürchtung geäußert, dass zahlreiche Staaten der Konvention über chemische Waffen (CWC) fernbleiben könnten. China habe sich noch nicht festgelegt, es beklage sich darüber, dass die Inspektionen zu weit gingen und die chinesische Chemieindustrie stark belasten würden. Pakistan, als Anführer radikaler nichtpaktgebundener Staaten in den Verhandlungen, sei ein anderer Problemfall. Da Indien aber bereit sei, der CWC beizutreten, werde vermutlich starker Druck auf Pakistan ausgeübt werden. Nordkorea werde vermutlich nicht beitreten. Russland werde Schwierigkeiten haben, die Bestände an C-Waffen - ungefähr 40,000 t [die USA haben etwas unter 20,000 t] - innerhalb der vorgeschriebenen Frist zu eliminieren. Die USA habe für diesen Zweck 25 Mio. \$ an Unterstützung gegeben, und vielleicht werde in Zukunft noch mehr getan werden. Im Nahen und Mittleren Osten werde es vielleicht möglich sein,

einige arabische Staaten zu bewegen, der Konvention beizutreten, obwohl die Arabische Liga in einer Resolution im September 1992 den Beitritt der arabischen Staaten zur CWC davon abhängig gemacht hat, dass Israel dem NPT beitrete.

Lage in Russland

Nach Meinung des National Security Council wird Russland 1993 nicht in der Lage sein, den Schuldendienst zu leisten. Eine Umschuldung sei notwendig. Investitionen seien derzeit wegen der strengen Regulationen fast unmöglich. Die Lage Jelzins sei sehr schwierig. Er verfüge nicht mehr über die Stimmen, um seine Gesetzgebung ohne gefährliche Zugeständnisse durchzubringen. Er könnte allenfalls noch vor dem 1. Dezember [Eröffnung des Kongresses der Volksdeputierten] Ministerpräsident Geidar ersetzen, möglicherweise durch Yuri Skokov [Sekretär des russischen Sicherheitsrates] oder Vladimir Shumeiko [einer der stellvertretenden Ministerpräsidenten, der auf Druck der Industriellenunion von Arkady Volsky im April dieses Jahres in die Regierung aufgenommen worden war].

Im National Security Council wurde gesagt, an den russischen Klagen über die Verletzung der Menschenrechte der russischsprachigen Minderheiten in den baltischen Staaten sei wohl etwas dran. Die USA versuchten dies den Balten zu erklären. Man ist zuversichtlich, dass es keinen Krieg zwischen der Ukraine und Russland geben wird, solange Leonid M. Kravchuk und Jelzin an der Macht sind. Sie hätten sich arrangiert.

Russland ist laut der Defense Intelligence Agency im Begriff, drei Typen von Streitkräften aufzustellen:

- a) Combat-ready forces: kampfbereite Streitkräfte, die bei lokalen Konflikten eingesetzt werden können;
- b) Rapid-reaction forces zur Unterstützung, wenn eine mittlere Kampfintensität erreicht wird;
- c) Strategische Reserven für den Fall, dass die beiden ersten Kategorien nicht ausreichen.

Das russische Verteidigungsministerium habe einen Drei-Phasen-Plan formuliert.

- In der 1. Phase (1992) erhebe Russland Anspruch auf alle früheren sowjetischen Streitkräfte, die in Russland, Polen, den baltischen Staaten, Deutschland und den früheren zentralasiatischen Republiken stationiert sind.
- In der 2. Phase (1993-1994) sollen die konventionellen Streitkräfte in vier Gruppen eingeteilt werden: West, Süd, Ost und strategische Reserven. Gleichzeitig werde die Korps-Brigade-Struktur eingeführt werden.
- In der 3. Phase (1995-2000) soll der Abzug russischer Truppen aus dem Ausland abgeschlossen sein. Die gegenwärtige Planung sieht für 2000 Streitkräfte von 1.45 Mio. vor; die DIA schätzt aber, dass bereits 1995 ein Niveau von 1.5 Mio. erreicht wird.

John G. Hines vom Phoenix Institute [einem privaten Think Tank] erwartet, dass die russische *Wirtschaft* bis zumindest 1996-1997 jährlich um 10-20% schrumpfen wird, womit sie auf einem Stand von 40% des GNP von 1988 ankommen würde. Eine wirkliche Erholung dürfte erst deutlich nach 2000 kommen, weil die wirtschaftlichen Probleme strukturell bedingt sind und darum kurzfristige Massnahmen nicht wirksam sind. Bei den Streitkräften sei die Rolle der Luftwaffe aufgewertet worden. Die Marine werde sich auf Küstenverteidigung und Operationen gegen Kommunikationslinien in der Barentssee und im Pazifik beschränken. Ihr Bestand werde halbiert werden, wovon die U-Boote weniger als die Oberflächenmarine betroffen sein werde.

Anthony H. Cordesman [Assistent von Senator McCain, R-AZ] sagte, die sowjetische Armee sei schon immer ineffizient gewesen. Die Ausbildung sei schlecht gewesen. Eine kleinere und professionelle Armee würde wesentlich gefährlicher. Aber selbst wenn die Nationalisten und Konservativen in Moskau die Macht übernehmen sollte, würde es 3-4 Jahre dauern, bis man überhaupt merken würde, was sie [militärisch] vorhätten.

Gesprächsnotizen

Per Sjogren, Director, Field Operations Division, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

Sjogren: Its gets more hectic in this office every day. I hesitate to believe that it can get much worse. I took over this job on March 12, 1992. Why does the UN have a Field Operations Division? We would not need it if the UN would be as efficient as it was hoped for originally. If we were to handle personnel questions for Field Operations through normal [UN] channels, it would be much slower. We prepare the business for the Human Resources Management, and they are the ones who formally conclude the contracts we have prepared. We produce a budget for a particular operation sometimes within 12 hours. In fact, we prepared the budget for the Somalia operation in 6 hours. What we are doing in our Division is to prepare a budget, where we have sufficient expertise for this, and then we hand it over on a silver platter to the controller who will in turn forward it to the ACABQ and the 5th Committee of the General Assembly. Who are our "clients"? I would name the Department for Peace-Keeping Operations, the Department for Political Affairs, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. As for logistics, we formulate what we require then we hand the proposals on what should be procured to others. Thus the Field Operations Division by itself is not involved in procurement and hiring at the front end, except that I can give letters of assist to governments. Thus the Field Operations Division exists only to expedite the business.

In logistics, we also have the issue of deployments. The project managers determine how much personnel they need, talk with governments, and then hand it over to me - and want to have it done quickly. In Cambodia we had to move in 3 battalions very quickly to be able to declare the beginning of the second phase. The UN General Assembly did not raise any questions. Deployment, rotation and withdrawal belong to the jobs of the Field Operations Division.

Sometimes we issue bids, e.g. we contracted on such a basis for 2000 flights for observers with 100 kg excess baggage each at a price 35% lower than the APEX fare.

In 1985 we had five "dormant" missions: UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO, UNMOGIP. Then the Namibia operation came and went. Today we have 26 missions. Only with those did we come to a magnitude where we have to ask ourselves whether it will be necessary to do things differently. We did not use to have humanitarian missions. Now the Somalia case is purely humanitarian. The Mozambique operation is a strange animal, with electoral, humanitarian and rehabilitation (returnee) components. We think we need three battalions [for Mozambique]. Thus we had an explosion in the number of missions, then also in their magnitude. While we speak of about 360,000 refugees in Cambodia, we have to deal with 3-3.5 million of them in Mozambique. We also have to distribute food in Mozambique, which was not necessary in Cambodia.

Where do we get the human resources from? We have not enough trained personnel. We have competent people for the management of purchasing, finance, and personnel in the UN, but most of them have no field experience and cannot be sent out. Until March 1993 I need, for example, eight trained Chief Administrative Officers for field missions, and I may get only one. The only source I have for such people are the UNDP, UNICEF and the HCR. The Chief Administrative Officer is a most unpopular job. The military observers often want to do as little as possible and get out of the UN as much as possible. The Chief Administrative Officer has to prevent both. He has to deal with large amounts of cash.

I have so far not been told to slow down the implementation of missions for financial reasons. Another problem is that we are not allowed to keep stockpiles. A pre-fabricated building for 500 people takes 6 months to erect. At the Somali coast we have now stocks on ships, but we cannot unload them because the Pakistani battalion does not get access to the port. I am not allowed to order anything in advance. For this reason I am always running behind time. If I had been allowed to stockpile, I would have been ready. To start up the Mozambique operation in 10 days I will need one Chief Administrative Officer, one finance officer and two communications officers. They are not on hand.

Winkler: Why are you not permitted to take measures to deal in advance with these problems that you see coming? Where is the problem?

Sjogren: The problem lies with the member states. In fact, it has been tired. If I would put in money for stockpiling, the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee would take it out.

Winkler: An argument against stockpiling would be not to encourage new missions. But can you delay missions for lack of resources?

Sjögren: The Secretary General would have to decide. He may have tried. The Secretary General wanted to limit the UN engagement in Yugoslavia exactly for logistic reasons. It is for this reason that West Europeans moved in under the UNPROFOR flag. Right now we have enormous logistics problems there.

Winkler: How are financial deficits being handled?

Sjögren: You would have to ask the controller.

Winkler: Would you like to make any remarks on the assistance Switzerland has given so far to UN peace-keeping, or express any particular wishes for the future?

Sjögren: We are satisfied by the Swiss assistance. We are only somewhat irritated about a problem with a 150,000 \$ kitchen in MINURSO. Basically, you have very commendably come into MINURSO. One medical unit had a kitchen and was also used to feed our staff. If the Swiss withdraw this unit, they want to take back the kitchen unless we pay \$ 150,000. I do not think I would get such a request through the ACABQ. In a way, it is more yours than our credibility that is at stake in the ACABQ.

Catrina: What is the quantitative limit of UN engagement in peace-keeping operations? From what scale onwards would structures have to be changed? Where are the practical limits to UN peace-keeping operations? Are financial or personnel resources the limiting factor?

Sjögren: Gradually, politicians will recognize that adjustments are necessary. I think in particular of stockpiling material resources and preparing a pool of human resources.

Catrina: What are the perspectives for phasing out some of the peace-keeping and observer missions that the United Nations has now had for several decades? How much are these operations burdening your budget?

Sjögren: This depends on the parties to the conflicts. If we could close down these missions, this would make an important contribution to our budget.

Winkler: What would be your Christmas wish, personnel or finance?

Sjögren: The politicians' wish would be rapid availability of funds. My wishes would be:

1. A number (about 100) of experienced staff.
2. \$ 50 million for stockpiling.
3. Military observers, logistics units, movement control units, medical units, engineer units.
4. Get more order in valuation and depreciation of equipment. What is, for instance, the depreciation of a Caterpillar of a certain age for a certain duration? We don't know.

Grossen: Have different missions different priorities? Are pressures regarding such priorities being exerted by member states?

Sjögren: The priorities are set by the politicians. Many of the 26 missions do not bother me at all (e.g., the demarcation of the Iran-Iraq border). The "dormant" missions stemming from the 1960s are by now so well established that they pose few problems. Yugoslavia has a high priority. Somalia is at the heart of attention by the world. I personally think that Somalia has got to have the highest priority. The second priority over the weekend was Angola. Member states have invested there much over the past years, and this investment is just about to disappear. We got today 111 people out, the dependents of our staff, in 3 aircraft. Things looked very bad, today they look somewhat better. The cease-fire was still holding two hours ago. One of my Christmas wishes would be that the Khmer Rouge participates in the elections. The world has invested more than \$ 1.5 billion in Cambodia.

Winkler: The merits of peace-keeping operations are evident. Looking at the situation in former Yugoslavia, some observers have, however, also pointed out that peace-keeping operations can actually have serious drawbacks. For instance, if peace-keepers are deployed along the line of combat after an aggressor has made territorial gains, they solidify this gain by preventing the other side from counter-attacking. Moreover, the freezing of the front line by peace-keeping operations can also hinder refugees to return to their homes. How does the balance of benefits and disadvantages look to you? And can you imagine that missions will become less complex again?

Sjögren: If the Secretary-General succeeds in getting to have preventive peace-making, we could go back to simpler operations, with observer missions.

Winkler: Is there still a chance that Kosovo will not explode into another civil war?

Sjögren: There is of course always a chance, but there is an increase in the intensity of this conflict. I would like to mention another mission: We have 50 observers in South Africa. Who knows how the situation in South Africa will be in one year's time?

Brigadier-General M. Baril, Military Counsellor to the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, NY 10017 (for most of the meeting represented by two of his staff, Colonel Harleman and Colonel Hekig)

Harleman: Peace-keeping is getting very popular, but it overstretches the resources of the United Nations. The operations get more complex. It is unlikely that we will have more "simple" operations such as UNDOF. The trend is how to get the UN involved in civil war situations, which requires a new approach. We also need more protection for the UN personnel. Unfortunately, many people feel that we should go over to peace-making and peace enforcement. Those different missions should, however, not be mixed, and they require different equipment. Today the Blue Helmets are not equipped for war. We have a lot of frustration here. Your [i.e. the Swiss] contribution is well appreciated. Ambassador Hoffmann [DIO/EDA] told me recently that Switzerland will soon [i.e., by 1994] have a stand-by unit.

Winkler: How do you assess the situation in former Yugoslavia? Is the UN operation there still a mission under control?

Harleman: I believe that Yugoslavia will be covered in detail in your meeting with Mr. Tharoor. However, you are correct to assume that there are serious problems in controlling the units involved in Yugoslavia. We have administrative and logistical problems because parts of the operation are not under the UN budget. We have borrowed 30 military observers for the control of the no-fly zone. Technical information is made available by NATO (AWACS, and so on). We have requested 75 additional observers. We have today received reports that the provisions of the resolution [no-fly zone] haven been violated.

[General Baril enters and welcomes the group]

Winkler: Would you describe how the situation in Somalia looks to you?

Baril: La tragédie somalienne a été créée par les Somaliens eux-mêmes, qui refusent notre aide. De toute façon, il nous manque les moyens nécessaires pour réaliser ces projets. Les pays pauvres peuvent nous fournir des soldats, mais pas de moyens techniques. Nous n'avons pas de camions, pas d'unités sanitaires, pas d'ingénieurs et pas d'unité d'entretien. De plus, le mandat du conseil de sécurité ne nous permet pas d'aller de force en Somalie. Les pays contributeurs seraient-ils d'ailleurs prêts à s'engager dans un réel conflit?

Winkler: What is the thinking behind the idea of having rapid reaction troops at the disposal of the United Nations and activating the Military Staff Committee?

Hekig: It is up to the member states - and observer states. But I think it is an idea whose time is coming. We need this kind of stand-by units for preventing conflict.

Harleman: "Stand-by" has a different meaning in every country. There is always a need for a refresher training of several weeks [before a mission]; in fact our requirement and time frame for training [for a certain mission] would be one month. We had five weeks for shipping material for 1 battalion from Finland to Namibia.

Catrina: What did the UN troops in former Yugoslavia achieve, and what can they realistically be expected to achieve in the future? What are the preconditions for success?

Hekig: Success can be achieved only through an agreement between the parties to a conflict, and the agreement has to be honoured. That has not happened in former Yugoslavia. Our only success story [in former Yugoslavia] is the Prevlaka peninsula [Croatian territory formerly occupied by the Serbian Army who left it when UN forces took over].

Catrina: Is there not a risk that a large amount of resources are being spent on hopeless missions to the detriment of other, more promising, missions?

Hekig: Peace-keeping is financed not from the ordinary UN budget, but from a special budget. We must do with very limited resources. We were, for instance, just not able to cover the costs of the corridor protection.

Winkler: How would you comment on the co-ordination among the different parties involved in the Yugoslav peace-keeping operation, i.e., the UN, the EC and the CSCE?

Hekig: Regional organizations should assume part of the responsibilities. We have to make a division of labour. This is functioning quite well in Yugoslavia. NATO has made available a small number of personnel to deal with AWACS information. We have no formal connection with the CSCE.

Von Castelmur: The international community has probably been too slow in reacting to the war in former Yugoslavia and in stopping Serbian aggression. Now there are a couple of other conflicts, even if we speak only of Europe, where major fighting could break out. To what extent are you already engaged in military analysis and contingency planning for additional crisis spots in Europe?

Hekig: The UN has personnel in Georgia, in Tajikistan and in other threat areas. But our resources are limited.

Harleman: And having no resources, it is extremely difficult to undertake contingency planning. How are we to achieve a good level of training in peace-keeping operations? One should introduce peace-keeping as a possible item in the curriculum in military careers, and having peace-keeping taught at general staff academies. Peace enforcement is something entirely different [compared to peace-keeping]. We must learn the lessons of 1992: The mix of humanitarian and peace-keeping dimensions in operations opens new and very difficult perspectives.

Grossen: To what extent does the protection of UN troops in former Yugoslavia pose a problem?

Harleman: Self-defence and the use of force [in former Yugoslavia] are based on a UNIFIL document, but the rules are re-defined for every operation. I think we should never cross the border of official "use of force". We need more C3I, more armoured personnel carriers, more helicopters and so on. If you start training your [i.e., the Swiss] unit, think of training in particular the squad leader.

Von Castelmur: How would you comment on the idea that the UN should move to peace enforcement?

Harleman: Peace enforcement units must be professional.

Question: Switzerland has assisted in various ways in several UN peace-keeping operations. Would you in any way like to remark on this assistance, or suggest additional or different ways in which a country could be particularly useful?

Harleman: What we would really need from a country like Switzerland is not an infantry battalion, but rather:

- transportation units
- medical units
- signal (communications) units
- engineer units
- logistics units.

Personnel - light infantry - is no problem at all. We can get it easily from developing countries. However, they often come without any equipment, and we must equip them. It would be very much appreciated indeed if Switzerland could take this suggestion into account.

Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

Davinic: In Europe, and on the world, there is a generally positive development, but it is more problematic on the sidelines [by implication: in former Yugoslavia]. At the United Nations, and in the Office for Disarmament Affairs, we highly appreciate the Swiss financial and personnel support.

[Winkler presents the group and the International Training Course.]

Davinic: The world in general is moving in the right direction. The Cold War is over. A military alliance creating major concern for the West has been dissolved. The two great Powers are engaging in deep cuts of their nuclear stockpiles, and conventional disarmament is taking place in Europe. The walls are falling. This picture may, however, be somewhat misleading. At the same time the end of the Cold War has brought to fore something that was buried under the nuclear threat. All of a sudden we realize these problems.

Nuclear weapons have ceased to play the role they played in the past. The nuclear era is basically over. The concept of nuclear deterrence is changing. I do not believe it will come back [in the old form] unless something truly disastrous will happen. The conflicts were before suppressed and/or controlled. Opposing sides received support. Now the two sides are letting go. Democracy is the order of the day. There are

movements in former dictatorships striving to remove the dictatorial systems. The objective is a good one, but it is being pursued in an unruly fashion. During the Cold War there was ample supply of weapons. And those who have weapons will in the end use them. This applies also to nuclear weapons. Now there is no longer a higher, i.e. nuclear, threat. Nationalism and religious fanaticism have a revival. Europe is uniting itself while the Third World is splitting in smaller units. Interdependence is increasing among the industrialized countries, in the other parts of the world the countries are becoming more distant from each other. The North-South divide is increasing. This should worry us. You cannot have peace if one half is unruly.

The victory of democracy in the former Soviet Union was a historic event. But the change is not over yet. The situation is unstable, in particular because of economic problems. There are tremendous problems in Russia. The West has not fully delivered. Only 1 billion out of the \$ 24 billion [that have been promised] has arrived. A Russian delegation told me that those states of the CIS which at present have nuclear weapons want to keep them. There will be a bumpy road, with a risk of going into the wrong direction. Take the example of Lithuania, or former Yugoslavia: There is a tendency to go back to communism. People prefer to have three meals a day rather than freedom without bread.

There has been a change in the way in which we treat disarmament at the United Nations. What was before the Department for Disarmament Affairs has become the Office for Disarmament Affairs within the Department for Political Affairs. Before disarmament was basically a bipolar enterprise, now it is more general.

The recession in the United States is basically due to the arms race the US were involved in.

In Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan you cannot simply preach disarmament, but you have to go to the root of the problem. An example is also Cambodia where, as an effect of a larger settlement, we take away the weapons from the parties.

The first step toward disarmament is transparency and confidence-building. We have to create open societies. Disarmament is part and parcel of preventive diplomacy.

Winkler: The place of disarmament in international security has changed. One could argue that disarmament never was the motor of East-West rapprochement. What are the areas where disarmament still merits attention, where it has a future. I think, for example, of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Arms Trade Register.

Davinic: Disarmament has remained important in the East-West as well as in a global context. One area of particular importance is non-proliferation. This is the topic of the day. The states of the CIS are fighting for their [economic] survival. They would sell everything. There is a growing [de facto] alliance between Iran and some of these states. Non-proliferation concerns also ballistic missiles. As another issue, a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing must also be addressed. Still another subject are security guarantees. Negative security guarantees must also be given to nuclear states, especially those that have vowed to give up nuclear weapons. This question will come up in the context of the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1995. As for the Chemical Weapons Convention, some countries in the Middle East say that they cannot give up chemical weapons unless Israel in exchange will also give up nuclear weapons. The other side of the coin are regional approaches to disarmament. This makes for more rapid success, and creates building blocs for global approaches.

Winkler: I would like to come back to the 1995 NPT Review Conference. You said that the Arab countries do not want to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. They may also feel that they are at the receiving end of the NPT. Is there a risk that the whole structure [of non-proliferation] could unravel, especially in view of what you said about Iran and some countries of the former Soviet Union?

Davinic: The threat does certainly exist. But I am optimistic because much is at stake. I am certain that the NPT will survive, if not else then by the use of brutal political force by the West. The question is only whether this will proceed amicably or creating grudges. The Clinton administration will be favourably disposed toward a comprehensive test ban. This could help in the 1995 NPT Review Conference. There will also be further nuclear reductions. Thus a lot will have been done to satisfy the demands of article VI of the NPT. Israel will not accede to the NPT before there is a comprehensive peace settlement. But Israel could, in the absence of this, nevertheless take some steps to build confidence, e.g. close the Dimona reactor. They don't need it anymore. Israel could take several other CBMs short of disclosing its nuclear stockpile. The government of Israel is moving in this direction, but slowly. But I am more concerned about the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan than about Israel. They are not willing to give up nuclear weapons.

Catrina: What is the present status of the Arms Transfer Register?

Davinic: We have had a second report on the technical side of the register. We have moved away from calling it the "arms transfer register". The Third World wants to have a broader register including also procurement and holdings. The secretariat of the register has been opened on January 1 of this year. The deadline for the first notification is April 1993. We have spent about \$ 500,000 on computers for this project. A broader coverage of the register is envisaged for 1996.

Catrina: What are the main other projects you are currently pursuing at the Office for Disarmament Affairs?

Davinic: The main project now is the register. This is also a political exercise. The Third World is not terribly happy, and they do not now exactly what is needed. These are not open societies. They will notify us only because their suppliers would notify us [on their supplies to these arms recipients] anyway. We organize five workshops in five regions (Ghana, Egypt, Poland, Thailand and Argentina) to instruct the responsible officials how to submit information for the register to us. Italy may also sponsor a meeting in Florence. It will be an enormous task to cover conventional arms transfers, the chemical weapons convention, the NPT and the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles in a data base. The staff engaged in disarmament affairs at the United Nations have been decimated. We lost 12 senior officials. Three of them went to the office of the Secretary-General, other went to peace-keeping operations. In spite of this, the assignments given to this office have not decreased. People have their pet projects, and they do not want to give them up, regardless of the developments in the real world. New assignments come, but old ones do not go away. There are always stupid [General Assembly] resolutions, such as those requesting a report on the nuclear status of South Africa, even though everything has been disclosed.

Winkler: [Explains the Swiss project of enabling institutes in Central and Eastern Europe to link up electronically among themselves and with Western institutions.] Would it be possible for the users of such a network to have access to the electronic [arms transfer] register of the United Nations?

Davinic: Member states of the United Nations as well as Non-Governmental Organizations shall anyway have access to it, according to the relevant resolution. We, the United Nations, will not charge any fees. There were concerns by some industrialized countries not to make available everything to everybody. A compromise has been worked out. We will restrict some information for our own use here. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has a similar approach.

Winkler: [Invites the Office for Disarmament Affairs and Unidir to participate in a Conference planned for 1994 for coordinating scientific cooperation. Davinic accepts.]

Grossen: One of the problems we are facing today is that treaties are concluded between governments whereas many conflicts take place between non-governmental parties.

Davinic: One would have to look to extend the international legal system to non-state parties. I was used by the Yugoslav government for a long time as expert and negotiated a number of treaties. Now in Yugoslavia every possible convention has been violated, not necessarily by the regular army, but by renegades. There exists now the threat that Bosnian forces may use chemical weapons. For people fighting for their survival, standards are different. With sadness I say that within a few months there won't be any Muslim community [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] anymore. This is not how a solution should be, but developments move in this direction. Thus your question is a very pertinent one.

Pitteloud: The international community has never been able to prevent the spread of technology. Should we try to develop new instruments to serve this purpose?

Davinic: This should certainly be done. We should aim for strict control - and punishment of violators. One should have a special conference to clearly determine what countries should be able to receive - or not be allowed to receive. Double standards would then of course have to stop (e.g., the US policy toward Iraq).

Ryter: Could the pursuit of regional approaches not render global solutions more and more difficult and reduce the role of the United Nations in disarmament?

Davinic: Regional approaches are important. But there are also issues that need to be pursued on a global level, e.g., non-proliferation, a comprehensive test ban, the prohibition of the production of fissile material. But we must recognize that in some fields of disarmament, not all regions are facing the same problems. For instance, chemical weapons are less important for Latin America, as no country of this region has them.

Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive President of the Special Commission, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

Ekeus: The Special Commission is a unique phenomenon so far. The decisions of the Security Council were very much dictated by the victorious coalition, especially the decision regarding the destruction of NBC weapons. The Special Commission is exclusively concerned with NBC weapons and capabilities plus long-range missiles. The Special Commission is the first executive arm of the Security Council. The first task is to eliminate the Iraqi capabilities in the field of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The second task of the Special Commission is the establishment of a verification and control regime to make sure that Iraq will not build up such capabilities. Some material cannot be destroyed.

Financing is also unique. It is financed by Iraq, thus the UN budget is not involved. Thus we deal mostly with the Security Council, not with the Secretary General. I report to the Secretary General, but when we need instructions we get them from the Security Council. The Special Commission consists of 21 persons from 21 different countries, including scientists, diplomats and military advisers. It is a very peculiar body. We work through meetings and briefings. The Commission has to oversee the destruction of biological and chemical weapons capabilities while the IAEA oversees the nuclear problem. The Commission alone decides about control and verification measures whereas the IAEA provides the technical expertise. We had to make use a couple of times of the threat of enforcement foreseen in chapter VII of the resolution.

We use intelligence from various governments. The briefings by intelligence agencies have developed into a real cooperation. All intelligence coming in is processed by the Commission itself. As from now, we produce more information that we receive. The US is providing lots of information with its national technical means. A U-2 [reconnaissance aircraft] is flying three times a week over Iraq for us. The CIA provides photographs and analyses. The operation is run from a base in Saudi Arabia. The Commission notifies Iraq 24 hours in advance, indicating the points of entry and of exit. We also have three large Sikorsky helicopters from Germany for close-range photography with permanent inspectors. They fly 6 days a week. [They do not fly on Fridays.] This is almost real-time information. Any suspicion is followed up by an inspection by ground teams (which are not notified in advance). We tailor each mission in order to get the right specialists on the spot. Governments are helping us by providing scientists. The Swiss are at the top. Training, planning and debriefing are done in Bahrain. We have two Transall aircraft at our disposal. Normal missions take about 10 days.

We have identified Iraq's programmes quite well. Our assessment is that missiles are probably all eliminated. We destroyed 140 Scud missiles and 14 mobile launchers. Production facilities for the upgrading of missiles have also been destroyed, and the programme for long-range missiles, based on the Argentine Condor, has been eliminated. 150,000 chemical weapons are being moved to Al-Muthara for destruction. The Samarra facility has already been destroyed. A facility for the destruction of mustard gas is about to be taken into commission. Nerve agents are already being destroyed. We are confident that most chemical weapons will be destroyed. In the nuclear area we have destroyed the Uranium enrichment facilities. We have, however, no certainty that there is more since we lack the full Iraqi documentation. Iraq is trying to block our efforts.

Winkler: How would you evaluate the Iraqi capabilities for re-armament in the medium and long term?

Ekeus: The scientific and technical community related to the Iraqi nuclear programme numbered many thousands. We are of course worried about their knowledge being spread around and used again. But we are not too concerned about Iraqi re-armament. As soon as the embargo is lifted and Iraq will start selling oil, it will have an enormous amount of money, and Saddam Hussein will try it again. So there will be a need for close monitoring of the plants, even after all sanctions have been lifted. We have enough experts, but future monitoring will be another problem. We will need processing and industrial experts to look at the development of the Iraqi industry.

Von Castelmur: Could the Special Commission set a precedent for a similar operation in the future in another country?

Ekeus: A decision by the Security Council must be based on a real and concrete danger. But the planning cell and the expertise can certainly be used in case of a future threat.

Pitteloud: What about the efforts by Iran to acquire technology for nuclear weapons?

Ekeus: This threat is in fact a more serious one. The nuclear ambitions of Iran are extremely dangerous.

Vladimir F. Petrovsky, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

Petrovsky: You are here [in this office] right in the middle of peace-keeping operations, peace-making, and preventive diplomacy. My office deals with preventive diplomacy and peace-making. The next office is [Under-Secretary General Marrack] Goulding's, who is responsible for peace-keeping. We live in an era of global change, and we have 15 conflicts going on. One of the methods introduced to cope with this is preventive diplomacy. The basis is laid by fact-finding missions. With the end of the Cold War a new type of fact-finding has become possible: We can now send out our own fact-finding missions who report to the Secretary General. A success story in this regard is Moldova. There was the possibility of an armed conflict between Russia and Moldova. Both sides have talked with the UN mission which has helped to find a solution. We are also interested in early warning. Two new options are open: 1. Confidence-building measures: The example of Yugoslavia shows that CBMs could be used to reduce the conflict, for example the announcement of manoeuvres and measures to ensure the safety of humanitarian missions. 2. The creation of demilitarized zones as a preventive measure. We have the idea that we should be able to send observers if only one country requests such a mission (with the consent of the Security Council). Peace-making by the UN involves consultations which can lead to negotiations. Consultations take place mostly in regional organizations, such as the CSCE or the EC in the case of Yugoslavia. An example for negotiations is Cyprus.

In addition to these traditional tools we should also re-vitalize legal instruments, such as they were used during the inter-war period, e.g., activate the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The first attempt to use it has been successful: the case of Gabčíkovo. On the surface, this dispute concerns an ecological question, but it runs deeper, since the dam is located in the area of Slovakia inhabited by a Hungarian minority. It is good that both countries have agreed to use the ICJ.

These are the instruments we use in our day-to-day work, on a general level.

Winkler: [Gives Petrovsky the report on Swiss security policy of October 1990 and the report of the study group on neutrality.] If you look at the strategy you have outlined, a fundamental precondition is the region's willingness to accept missions from outside. To what extent do you believe that such a willingness exists in the former Soviet Union, in particular in Moldova, Armenia, etc. Is this not seen as interference?

Petrovsky: The Soviet Union has traditionally resisted any outside interference. A large part of the public is still opposed to any interventions by the UN or the EC. But we are at a turning point; the Russian government is open to this. It is not assuming that the international community want to undermine the situation. The missions to Moldova, and to the Baltic states, encountered no problems. The present crises in the former USSR have no precedent. There is a certain resistance in the population, but there is progress.

Winkler: Will the Russian position be affected by the fate of the Geidar government and the outcome of the Congress of People's Deputies?

Petrovsky: This could have an impact. There is a certain tendency to close off, but this tendency is not dominant. In Moldova the UN presence proved to be very helpful.

Winkler: Where in the former Soviet Union do you see possibilities for preventive deployments?

Petrovsky: The thinking here at the UN is that the first steps should be done bilaterally. The CIS is being treated as a regional organization.

Catrina: With greater unity of the five permanent member states of the Security Council, the United Nations has been able to greatly increase its role in international security. What are the perspectives to maintain this constellation? In particular how confident are you of continued support by your home country, Russia, and by China?

Petrovsky: The veto has been transformed from a negative to a positive role. It has become a political means to bring about a compromise. Thus the [possibility of a] veto plays a positive role in keeping the UN Security Council together. I am reasonably optimistic that this will last. There is also pressure from the General Assembly not to use the veto in the Security Council.

Grossen: What is your attitude toward the ideas of an enlargement of the Security Council (e.g., with the inclusion of Germany) or a change in its composition, e.g. having a permanent seat for the EC instead of France and the United Kingdom?

Petrovsky: I can only give you a personal opinion. Since it would involve the major issue of changing the UN Charter, it would be an adventurous undertaking.

Winkler: Speaking about the developments in your home country, how do you see the role and policies of Arkady Volsky?

Petrovsky: Volsky represents, as far as I know, a moderate line. The majority of the people in Russia are deprived of social protection. Volsky wants to continue the reforms while providing a measure of social protection. He is more for an evolutionary reform. He has also a strong supporter of Yeltsin during the Putsch.

Favre: How do you assess the direction of the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace?

Petrovsky: I have mixed feelings. On the one hand the Agenda for Peace has become accepted as basis for a new multilateralism. It lays out the line for a Pax UN. I have mixed feelings because there is a slow implementation in spite of the Agenda's positive acceptance. In a period of change the time factor is of particular importance. I regret that the General Assembly has not yet started to deal with the substance, and it holds the purse. Preventive diplomacy is cheaper than peace-keeping operations of which 12 are currently going on. The absence of action by the General Assembly in the financial field is a cause for mixed feelings.

Von Castelmur: What is the interface or coordination between the United Nations and the CSCE?

Petrovsky: I am in favour of putting the coordination on a legal basis and working on protocols for that purpose. The CSCE has today not a sufficient machinery. The secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Centre are today not sufficiently strong.

Pitteloud: The Special Commission [on Iraq] has had impressive achievements. What is the perspective of institutionalizing it and using its accumulated experience in the future?

Petrovsky: There is no doubt that we will draw on its experiences.

Catrina: At this stage of the disarmament of Iraq, what are the consequences you feel should be drawn for an improvement of non-proliferation regimes? How do you judge the political feasibility of such measures?

Petrovsky: There is certainly a need for [improved] monitoring and verification.

Winkler: The political and economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe is anything but stable. Hungary seems to be in a particularly precarious setting, with minorities in Romania and Slovakia. The war in former Yugoslavia could escalate to Kosovo, the Vojvodina and Macedonia. What is the UN doing to prevent such escalation?

Petrovsky: The Albanian and Macedonian issues are dangerous. The real Macedonian issue is, however, not between Macedonia and Greece, but Macedonia and Bulgaria. A large number of Macedonians live in Bulgaria, and the border that has been drawn is rather artificial. I had talks with the parties, and we are in permanent touch with the leaders.

Grossen: How confident are you that the UN will have a military staff in the future?

Petrovsky: Today I am not very confident. We do not really need a Military Staff Committee for operations, but to develop relations with countries according to Article 43 of the Charter.

Catrina: The CSFR will most likely split up. Slovakia will have a relatively poor economic basis, a rather militant policy, and a minority problem. What place will Slovakia be willing and able to take?

Petrovsky: This will largely depend on the attitude of the other countries. If a country feels that it is part of a community it behaves differently.

Von Castelmur: How do you assess the credibility of the commitments by the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to give up nuclear weapons?

Petrovsky: On the one hand one should not over-dramatize the situation, on the other hand not underestimate the risk. The governments recognize that the [strategic nuclear] forces are under CIS command. At

the level of parliaments there is, however, a growing demand to [politically] use the nuclear weapons. Changes in the republics should not affect the CIS command arrangements.

Favre: What will be the future role of the Security Council in the monitoring of non-proliferation?

Petrovsky: The Security Council should deal with this issue. It is in fact already involved by accepting positive guarantees at the time of the signature. We consider how to go further.

[Winkler informs Petrovsky on the expansion of the participation in the International Training Course and on the programme to equip institutions in Central and Eastern Europe with communications equipment.]

Petrovsky: We share the view that communications are very important. I would be ready to cooperate in this project.

Sashi Tharoor, Assistant to the Under-Secretary for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

Tharoor: The mandate of the UN peace-keeping forces in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina includes:

- The monitoring of the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Croatia: This is a 100% success story. The demobilization and demilitarization has, however, not worked. These people simply exchange their army uniforms for police uniforms or go into militias. The people who signed treaties with the UN are not any longer in place. The level of armament is more or less the same as before, as the tensions remain high. We have to seek an extension of the UNPROFOR mandate beyond February 1993.
- The Pink Zones: In the "pink zones" [i.e. zones from which Croatian and Serbian forces have withdrawn] we have joint commissions with the Serbs, the Croats, the UN and representatives of the EC. We have had minor successes. In an overall picture, it does not work, but the dialogue is still continuing. We have also a problem with a dam. If it would be blown up, we would have an ecological catastrophe. The UN was able to take over control over the dam and we have brought in experts to cope with that risk.
- Border control: We contribute personnel to the control of the borders of Croatia. In this we largely failed. We have insufficient staffing. We asked all UN member countries to contribute. An important aspect is that we are not accepted by the Serbs in the Krajina.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina we have now military observers on airfields to monitor the flight prohibition for military aircraft. We receive AWACS information on the no-fly zone. We also re-allocated observers from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina. We were able to re-open their airport of Sarajevo and to resume the airlift. For the delivery of humanitarian aid we will be fully deployed by mid-November.

Winkler: If the situation does not improve, what contingency plans do you have to help the Bosnian population survive the winter? What will happen if large numbers of people perish?

Tharoor: We are seriously alarmed. We estimate that about 400,000 people are at risk in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If there is not constitutional settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the flux of refugees will not stop. In Croatia we first try to give them asylum, but then they should be accepted in other countries. But we cannot force any countries to accept them.

Winkler: How do you judge the risk of escalation of major armed conflict to Kosovo and the Vojvodina? What can be done to prevent this from happening? Has the UN engaged in contingency planning for this case?

Tharoor: This is not on the level of peace-keeping. It would be very difficult to undertake a UN operation in a member country with the purpose of protecting a minority. We try to calm down the international context with Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria and Hungary. No preventive peace-keeping actions are envisaged at this time. In practical terms it would indeed be very difficult to envisage a preventive peace-keeping engagement. Who would finance it? What decisions will the Security Council take? On what legal ground would such an operation be based?

Catrina: What are realistically the objectives that can be achieved with the UN force in former Yugoslavia? Would the introduction of substantial additional UN forces make a major difference? What has the UN achieved so far?

Tharoor: I would mention first the Vance-Owen process. But we should not overlook the difficulties. The only solution can be found in an overall settlement of the problem at the international level. The Bosnians have an interest in prolonging the war because they fear that an end to the war in the present situation would ratify their territorial losses. They are hoping for an international armed intervention [in their favour]. In the Vance process, we had to make clear that engaging in talks was not considered as acknowledgement of defeat. We have today [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] a fiction of an independent state. The Western part is in fact dominated by Zagreb, the Eastern part by Belgrade.

Grossen: In which ways do you cooperate with the EC and the CSCE?

Tharoor: We have a division of labour. The UN engages in peace-keeping, the EC in peace-making. We have now a viable situation with the team of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen. At first the EC was discredited on the spot. We have now joint activities with the EC, and on the ground an excellent relationship with them. The CSCE is not yet operational, so we have no operational cooperation with them.

Pitteloud: How do you assess the danger of a "Lebanization" in Yugoslavia?

Tharoor: Yugoslavia has broken apart along ethnic lines into Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. If that is the general trend [favoured by the international community, as evidenced by the recognition of these new states], why should then Bosnia-Herzegovina not also be broken up along ethnic lines? None of these entities is a genuine and national one.

Winkler: What are the main lessons you draw from the Yugoslav experience so far?

Tharoor: The limitations of peace-keeping have become evident. It is essential that the international community speaks with one voice. The UN must do the job when the world asks it to do it. But it must be defined anew what our mission is. New tools are needed. Peace-keeping is too weak in Yugoslavia. We also have to keep in mind the situation in Somalia, which again requires new tools. In an evolutionary process, we may perhaps have to extend peace-keeping and give it a new quality. But in this particular region, the problem is that we have no peace that could be kept.

Ambassador Olara Otunnu, Director, International Peace Academy, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York; F.-T. Liu, International Peace Academy, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York

Otunnu: We have an ambitious agenda at the International Peace Academy. We have put together roundtables in the New York area, including a cross section of business leaders, church persons and diplomats. In our training programme, we cover the principles of peace-keeping, the non-use of force, financing, and we also make simulation exercises. In our courses we have a combination of military people, diplomats and other civil servants. In our research programme, we try to have a sharp focus. We try to analyze exactly what is being done [in peace-keeping], and then try to draw conclusions. We are, of course, following closely what the UN is doing in the field. For instance we monitored the human rights in El Salvador, and we deal with Cambodia as a case study.

Catrina: How is the International Peace Academy funded?

Otunnu: Other institutions [than the International Peace Academy] are now starting to take an interest in peace-keeping. It is getting more and more difficult to get money. In the past we had only contributions from the US [i.e., foundations]. Now we are also asking for contributions by governments. We have to work harder. The annual budget of the Academy is about \$ 2.5 million.

[Otunnu excuses himself and leaves.]

Liu: The Swiss contribution to UN peace-keeping operations has been very useful from the beginning, starting with the Congo operation, then the plane for the observer mission after the 6-days war, and so on. (By the way, then UN Secretary General Waldheim really fell in love with that plane, a Falcon.) The cooperation with the ICRC has also always been excellent, like for instance after the Yom-Kippur war. During the Cuba missile crisis, the Swiss ambassador helped to solve a last-minute problem by acting as an inspector on Cuban soil on behalf of Secretary General U Thant.

Grossen: What are the limits of peace-keeping operations? What can and cannot be achieved?

Liu: Peace-keeping operations are not foreseen in the UN Charter. It is a practical mechanism, not covered by Chapter VII. Peace-keeping operations are not based on coercion, but consent. Participation is voluntary. Peace-keeping is impartial, peace enforcement based on a Security Council decision according to Chapter VII is not. Another point is the non-use of force. The operations of the past few years have

been getting increasingly complicated because the UN is facing a new type of conflict, the civil war with internal factions and irregular elements (Somalia, Yugoslavia). We made some mistakes in Yugoslavia. Normally the UN does not interfere in internal affairs, except if the situation threatens international stability. Secession is normally considered an internal affairs. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia came too early. The EC sent observers and peace-makers. The UN came later on, first to Croatia where an agreement had already been signed, which is the minimum condition for success. The UN headquarters was based in Sarajevo. This was a mistake, as we have seen. After the war started in Bosnia, we came in without a cease-fire because it was a humanitarian emergency. Recognizing the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina opened the Pandora box.

Switzerland can make an important contribution is showing them how to live together. This trend toward splitting is worrying indeed.

Catrina: What are the perspectives for the future of the UN operation in Cambodia?

Liu: The operation started 1990. The Paris agreement which is the basis of the operation envisaged that a cease-fire would be supervised by the UN, and that the armed factions would be disarmed. The UN will also take over some government functions in the key ministries, organize the elections, and bring back the refugees. All of a sudden, the Khmer Rouge refused to be disarmed. If we do not find a new agreement, the plan will probably be abandoned. Another option would be to go on without the Khmer Rouge.

Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

[Winkler presents the International Training Course and the Group.]

[Annan asks about the development of the International Training Course and then how to proceed.]

Winkler: Given your position and background, we would be interested in the financial aspects of peace-keeping operations.

Catrina: And of the financial situation of the United Nations in general.

Annan: I propose first to have a briefing on the current situation in Somalia and Cambodia.

Mrs. Shimura: UNTAC [in Cambodia] is one of the largest UN peace-keeping operations ever mounted. We have there approximately 22,000 military, police and other civilian staff. The operation also surpasses others in the breadth of its task. It has also intrusive powers, in effect "taking over" government authority, though in cooperation with the National Council headed by Prince Sihanouk. Elections are planned for April/May 1993. The mission differs from UNTAG by not only monitoring, but also organizing the elections. UNTAC shall ensure a neutral environment for the elections. It shall also disarm the four factions. The Khmer Rouge has now refused cooperation. We cannot simply go on with the other three factions (Son Sann, the Sihanouk faction, and the government in Phnom Penh). The cantonment of the forces has by now succeeded to 25%. We have about 3,600 civilian UN police, and additional five components, namely humanitarian, rehabilitation, repatriation, administration, and electoral. The consultations held in New York in October 1992, leading to resolution 783 of the Security Council, failed to persuade the Khmer Rouge to join again in the process. Now a new consultation mission will be meeting with the Khmer Rouge in Beijing. Should this fail, the UN Secretary General will have to report to the Security Council by November 11, and then difficult decisions will have to be taken. The electoral process must proceed. The international community has invested too much to give up. If the Khmer Rouge refuses cooperation, it should not be allowed to veto the process. The total cost of the mission for 18 months is about \$ 1.7 billion. This covers only five of the seven components, without repatriation and rehabilitation which are to be paid for by voluntary contributions. The first cost estimate was \$ 1.9 billion.

Mrs. Lindenmayer: I will give you a briefing on the situation in Somalia. Put in a general context, we have the problem of distributing humanitarian aid in a country ravaged by civil war. There is no infrastructure left. This mission combines a humanitarian and a military component. For the first time, this is an operation where the challenge is to have the distribution of humanitarian aid protected by military forces. The objective is to restore a climate of security, so that agencies can start working there. In practice the priority is to create security as a precondition for food distribution. 50 military observers have been authorized for Mogadiscio plus a 500-man strong Pakistani battalion. We are about to deploy an additional four battalions, a Canadian to the North-East, an Egyptian to Bahdera, a Belgian to Kisimayo, a Kenyan to Berbera. Possibly a Nigerian battalion shall also be deployed in the South-West/Centre of the

country. In principle, it is a "traditional" peace-keeping operation with the consent of the parties. The Somali government has collapsed, and other parties have become relevant. The Security Council gave a mandate to deploy the force only with the consent of the parties. If force is needed we have to go back to the Security Council - and also to the States who have provided troops. Ambassador Kittani is the chief of this operation. There is a tendency in Somalia for the different factions to re-unite against the UN. This morning four UN vehicles have been confiscated by Al-Ihmadi who was with us so far.

Annan: In Angola, the situation is tense, but the cease-fire is right now mostly holding. We hope that the parties will meet in Kajito by noon today. Government forces are now only 10 km from Kajito which is held by the Unita. In Kapanga, people have been detained. We do not yet have confirmation that the aircraft could go in to pick them up. We had a report this morning that the UN plane was about to take off. We hope to be able to arrange a meeting between Savimbi and Dos Santos in Angola, but neither in Luanda nor in Huango. The accords have not (yet) been derailed completely. It is not certain that they can be restored, but the parties make good noises.

Winkler: What are the options open to the UN if the civil war parties in Somalia would unite and attack the UN forces?

Mrs. Lindenmayer: Belgium is ready to go, and other too. If we deploy more battalions, we may trigger an attack on the Pakistani battalion.

Annan: This morning we discussed where the US fleet was, just in case of extrication becoming necessary. (It is upcoast.) This point is well taken. The possibility of revenge against soldiers or civilian personnel cannot be ruled out. The camp of the Pakistani battalion is very close to the shore.

Ryter: Would the supply of food bring the fighting to a halt? How much food would be needed?

Lindenmayer: If we don't do anything within weeks, the patients will die. The first task is to keep Somalia alive. Its population has already decreased from 6.5 million to 4 million. Food convoys would be raided, not by the hungry, but by those wanting to sell the food. It is necessary to work simultaneously on reconciliation. The civilian population is held hostage by the warring parties. Food is the immediate need, and hence (as a precondition) also security. The bare survival is at stake. A few days ago, the two opposing leaders talked to each other in Mogadiscio.

Ryter: What are your cost estimates for the Somalia operation?

Annan: We are talking about roughly 40,000 tons of goods. Food is needed not only for immediate distribution, but also for setting up stocks and for planting. Security is necessary also to allow farming to restart. One reason why Kisimayo is a focus of our efforts is that it is a traditional farming area.

Winkler: Would you comment on the general financial situation of the United Nations, and the perspectives?

Annan: Not good. Some member states are still in arrears. The budget is set by December 15, the assessments should in principle be paid by the end of January. Usually no more than 15 countries manage to do that. In the past, it was not possible to publicly disclose the debts. But last year we produced a list with all those countries who owed to the UN. Perez de Cuellar made last year the following proposals on the budget:

1. To increase reserves to \$ 250 million, or at least 3 months of the regular budget. Last year we had to go to member states for immediate \$ 200 million to bridge time until assessments would come in.
2. To create a revolving fund for peace-keeping operations for immediate use before going to the General Assembly. In exceptional circumstances, the UN should be allowed to borrow from the market.
3. The UN should be able to charge interest on arrears. This is being opposed chiefly by the US and Japan. The question was also raised whether to put a ceiling on the arrears not subject to interest payments. But this would create the problem that only small payments would be made to stay just below this ceiling.
4. To establish a peace endowment fund open to governments, organizations and individuals. The idea was to set an objective of \$ 1 billion, with an initial amount of \$ 300 million to be paid by member states. The idea was also to have airlines raising a contribution to this fund on air tickets. Swissair, SAS and Austrian Airlines were not at all shocked by this idea. If such a fund would be created, member states could concentrate on paying for the regular budget. We have to go now every couple of months to the member states. This can be irritating.

5. To create a tax on arms exports, to be used for peace-keeping operations. This could also be budgeted in the defence budget. But there would of course be problems with getting reliable information on arms exports.

The UN assessments are in most cases not large, but they can trigger other organizations coming with their demands. The Europeans do not want to talk about new [financial] schemes until and unless the US has paid up.

Sir Brian Urquhart, Ford Foundation, 320 East 43rd Street, New York, NY 10017

Winkler: [Presents the group and the International Training Course, explains the purpose of the visit.] How do you see peace-keeping at this important transition phase, with the Agenda for Peace, the operations in Somalia and Cambodia, and so on?

Urquhart: There is a great deal of talk about a renaissance of the UN. This is foolish. The UN has four major involvements, in Yugoslavia, Angola, Mozambique/Somalia, and Cambodia. This could anytime turn into a disaster. The real problem in the UN at this time is not so much organizational, but conceptual reform. They are working as if they were still in the 1950s, in the era of de-colonization. But now we have a series of problems where the parties are not states but rather civil wars, civil anarchy with ethnically defined parties. This is self-deception. I feel sorry for the Blue Helmets because they seek to be functioning on a non-existing basis. What we should be talking about is the establishment of the rule of law across the globe. Countries do not want interference, though. We deal now with massive breakdowns of social systems, accompanied by violence. In Somalia, the old social structure was wrecked by the infusion of modern weapons. One approach is band-aid, the other going in by force and taking over. Part of the problem is to become clear what we are talking about. We should not behave as if we were back in 1955.

The Agenda for Peace is like a catalogue. You can order something without ordering anything. One has to lay a new legal basis. The UN has always been running on a shoestring, but, surprisingly, this has not yet broken. Boutros-Ghali is trying to tackle this problem. We have at the Ford Foundation a group of senior bankers looking into the financial situation of the UN. The problem is that they do not recognize the problem [as long as the UN seems to be working]. If everybody would pay its assessment on time, there would be no problem. But the UN still has no reserve, and no staff training facilities. The US has an awkward unilateral position, they want to give the UN power to do only for what they want it to do. Peace-keeping is predicated on the situation that there is a peace to keep. But what if people actually enjoy killing each other and do so regularly? During the Cold War, UN peace-keeping deployments worked faster. Now it takes several months to deploy 1 battalion of peace-keepers to Somalia. Before we deployed 4,000 men to Congo within two days. There is a role for groups like yours, or small countries like Switzerland.

Winkler: How to evolve the legal basis for effective international peace?

Urquhart: A genuine public discussion has to be started. Government declaration do, at present, not mean very much. Article 2/7 of the UN Charter, regarding non-intervention, is obsolete now. One should establish guidelines as to when international intervention is justified. The public attention has been awakened by the media. Mozambique presents a potentially much worse case than Somalia. Look what Yugoslavia has done to the future vision of Europe! We need to develop new legal instruments. The international community should establish a kind of policing force, like the French Foreign Legion, whose deployment alone in many instances suffices to stop quarrels.

Grossen: What are your views about changing the composition of the UN Security Council?

Urquhart: This is an important issue. The East-West conflict is past, but the North-South conflict remains. There is a feeling in the Third world that the five permanent members of the Security Council can impose anything on anybody. The change of the composition of the Security Council might change that. One can imagine five additional permanent members. But the remaining five seats would be too few for the remaining 170 countries. Enlarging the Security Council could, on the other hand, complicate the taking of decisions. I do not know what the solution is. One has also to consider the likely candidates for additional permanent seats. India is not popular in Asia, Nigeria not in Africa. I do not know about Brazil. Now, as the Security Council has started working, it would be a pity to wreck it.

Pitteloud: The French Minister Kouchner said that there is a humanitarian duty to intervene. Could this provide the basis for a new legal instrument?

Urquhart: We will not be able to revive the concept of trusteeship, even though it could be useful. It would still be an easier proposition than military intervention. The Croats have suggested UN trusteeship for Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have a de-facto UN trusteeship over Cambodia. In Liberia, the disaster is as great as in Somalia. Half of the population went to neighbouring countries. Straight humanitarian intervention requires a huge military involvement. Who is ready to do this, and who has got the resources?

Switzerland does a lot in the outside world. It has a right, with its experience, to put forward new ideas. We are in this situation without a plan.

Winkler: What could be a good catalyst for action, a meeting of the Security Council members as in January of this year?

Urquhart: No. The meeting was organized to help [the British Prime Minister] Major. I do not believe in summit meetings. I believe in getting a serious debate started in countries, involving also the politicians. The US presidential campaign was devoid of many important subjects, such as race relations, the UN, and other. And there was no mention of arms control. Arms control is one of the most important subjects. The development of arms technology and the availability of arms creates tremendous problems. Even in a city like New York, you cannot control the drug trade without taking away the arms, and it is similar internationally. There must be a popular movement that sees these things as being of vital importance, movements such as that in Europe in the 1920s for disarmament, in the US and Europe in the 1950s for nuclear disarmament, or in the US in the 1960s and 1970s for getting the US out of Vietnam.

Richard B. Davis and William Toby, Division for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Washington, DC

Davis: One of the major achievements was the START Treaty. [Davis describes the contents of the Treaty and mentions in particular that it also envisages inspections on short notice.] After the coup attempt in August 1991, President Bush announced on 27 September 1991 his initiative on nuclear weapons. The US has cancelled the development of the small ICBM, of an SLBM warhead and of the advanced cruise missile. In June 1992, Bush and Yeltsin agreed on further cuts of strategic offensive arms of approximately 50% and a ban on all MIRVed ICBMs. I would be surprised to see the START-II Treaty completed before January 20. We would be ready for that, but some aspects of START-II are controversial in Moscow. Last May, we also got the final protocol for START-I, changing it from a bilateral [US-Soviet] to a multilateral treaty [with the US, Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan]. It stipulates that all other CIS republics than Russia will join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapons states and that these [three] states agree to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within seven years. This process is beneficial. It will reduce the burden on our resources and it serves to lock in reductions before anything happens in Russia or in the CIS.

[Major-General Geiger presents the group.]

Ryter: Where are you at present with the implementation of the START verification regime?

Davis: We are right now in the midst of the 4th session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) meeting in Geneva. It met for terms of 6 weeks to 2 months. The first meeting was a bilateral one, to discuss some loose ends. Afterwards the meetings became multilateral. The JCIC agreed last month on its working procedures. There is a great sensitivity between Kiev and Moscow regarding the administrative control over the strategic offensive arms located in the Ukraine. An agreement has been reached. The US, Kazakhstan, and Russia have ratified the START Treaty. We are hopeful that the Ukraine will follow suit in the coming weeks. The JCIC has done 75% of the things needed for entry into force of the Treaty, including the determination of how the costs of permanent monitoring in the Ukraine, Utah and Votkinsk [Russia] shall be shared.

Von Castelmur: Will Russia be able to manage the elimination of nuclear weapon? What is the US doing to assist them in this task?

Davis: Russia will not eliminate many warheads, but primarily strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, i.e., ICBMs and bombers. But it also wants to destroy several thousands of warheads and extract the fissile material. About one year ago we had the first discussions on US assistance and the ways and means for dismantling warheads. The US has in the meantime made similar offers also to the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. We have agreements for specific assistance with Russia and Belarus. This goes slower with the Ukraine. In Moscow we agreed to provide some rail wagons to improve the safety of nuclear weapons while they are being transported. We are also constructing containers for the safe storage of Uranium and

Plutonium. In addition we have agreed to assist in the financing of a secure storage facility. The Russians were at first guarded, but have opened up subsequently.

Grossen: What is the likelihood of the Ukraine ratifying the START Treaty, and how much pressure can the US exert for this purpose?

Davis: We have different news. Arms control is not without cost. The Ukraine is realizing only now the cost of dismantling the strategic nuclear weapons deployed there. They have come to us with proposals to shift this burden in part to the US. A second issue is the political ambivalence regarding the [Ukrainian] pledge to become a non-nuclear weapons state. We need to encourage them continuously to stick to their announcement. Some kind of security assurance could be given.

Grossen: Will the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan also be parties of the START-II Treaty?

Davis: The Lisbon protocols are clear that no nuclear weapons shall be located in these countries after seven years, so they will have no role [in START-II]. START-II is purely bilateral.

Catrina: What are the problems that need to be resolved for START-II?

Davis: There are some problems regarding the interpretation of the Bush-Yeltsin agreement [of June 1992]. The Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev said that there are only technical issues open, that there is full agreement on the political level. One set of [open] issues concerns the question how the counting rules laid down in START-I are to be applied to START-II. A second set of issues concerns the downloading of SS-19 missiles. We thought they would replace these missiles, and not download them. START-I permits the downloading of SS-19 from 6 to 2 warheads. But now they want to retain some SS-19 with just one warhead. This issue is not a marginal one, as there are 170 SS-19 in Russia, with at present more than 1,000 warheads, which would be about 35% of the potential under START-II.

The Memorandum of Understanding [giving data on the US and Soviet strategic offensive arms] will be updated once the Treaty enters into force. It will then probably be published in a way similar to the data of September 1990. The numbers given in the 1990 MOU are still fairly accurate [for the present situation]; the number of SLBM is coming down.

Pitteloud: What is the truth behind the rumours about the proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons, and such weapons falling into wrong hands?

Davis: We take this seriously. And we have allocated up to \$ 800 million to cope with this threat. But we have no indication so far that nuclear warheads fell into wrong hands.

Geiger: But you certainly have to be prepared for such a contingency?

Davis: We try to direct the activities toward civilian uses. We have established a center in Moscow, and will open another one in Kiev, to clear projects.

Pitteloud: Have you an overview of who was engaged on the Soviet nuclear programmes?

Davis: We have no control system. Our approach is to increase incentives [for these people to stay in the former CIS and work on civilian projects].

Toby: We have also pressed hard on a governmental level to prevent some troublesome transfers, like that to India.

Pitteloud: Is it a realistic expectation to stop this potential proliferation, or can it only be slowed down?

Catrina: What is the status of, and future planning for, the GPALS program? Is a partial technical cooperation with Russia indeed a realistic option, or is Russian acquiescence to the program all you need from them?

Toby: The Joint Statement [by Bush and Yeltsin] on a Global Protection System of last June was an important political breakthrough. It was a reversal of old Soviet policy. We have met twice on a senior level with the Russians. The delegations were headed by Mahmedov [for Russia] and [Dennis] Ross for the USA. In the most recent working group meeting Mahmedov said that the Joint Statement should be seen as a significant change in Russian strategy. The US will continue to pursue this kind of cooperation with Russia regardless of the outcome of the US election. We have yet to agree on any single project of cooperation, but we are looking forward. President-elect Clinton is less committed to SDI than President Bush. But there is support in the House, and we have a record funding for tactical ballistic missile defense at a level of \$ 800 million.

Catrina: Will the ABM Treaty in time have to be amended? And will Russia go along?

Toby: The ABM Treaty will indeed have to be changed, if for nothing else then to take account of the dissolution of the USSR. [Regarding ballistic missile defense] the Russians realize that the boat is leaving, and they want to catch it.

Nicholas Burns, Director Russia and former Soviet Republics' Affairs, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Washington, DC

Burns: What is happening in Russia? The US takes it extremely seriously, and even during the Presidential election, there has been no disagreement between the parties in this regard. We, the West, have now a unique opportunity to create a really peaceful Europe. It means a new Europe and a smaller military commitment of the US. It is therefore very important for the Russian revolution to be continued. We must reach a real trust and security relationship between the two countries. We are going to stress the importance of START-II during the remaining two months of this administration. We even plan to go beyond START. What can we do economically? The success of reform depends upon this issue. We propose to pay \$ 2-3 billion per year, and the Germans to pay 4-6 billion. As things stand now, Russia is unable to pay its debts in 1993. We must re-schedule the debts. In the last instance, private trade investments will decide the issue. At the moment, investment is almost impossible because regulations are ridiculously tight. Yeltsin is in a very difficult position. He no longer has the votes to pass his own legislation without making dangerous concessions. He might well replace Geidar before December 1 (possibly by Yuri Skokov or Vladimir Shumeiko). There will be some other important reshuffles, but Kozyrev will probably remain. We do not think that Yeltsin will resort to totalitarian methods. A new Russian assertiveness could emerge if Yeltsin should fail. But up to now, Moscow has been resisting the temptation of pursuing an interventionist policy. Russia's record is very good in this respect. The situation in the Baltics is worrisome, but it is probably only a political manoeuvre. We consider that Russia has a case there regarding the rights of the Russian minorities. We try to explain that to the Balts.

As for the Ukraine, Yeltsin and Kravchuk have found a way to get along. As long as they are in power, there won't be a war. On the other hand, the Ukraine wants to leave the CIS and to be truly independent. The Crimea will be a major issue. The key issue is to make sure that there will never be a war between the two countries. We fear that domestic policies might lead Kiev to keep some kind of nuclear capability. We try to explain to them that this would not only be a token force, but also a liability in foreign policy. But nobody is ready to give security guarantees to the Ukraine; this would definitely alienate Russia.

A message to Europe: It is quite possible that a putsch could occur in Moscow. It would therefore be very unwise to reduce the US military commitment below 150,000. Some countries have never taken their national security seriously and have relied on the US. They feel that there is no danger left. They are wrong. The revolution in the East is not yet finished.

Mrs. (Major) Jane E. Holl, Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Washington, DC

Holl: The ethnic cleansing is continuing in former Yugoslavia. There has been a great reluctance against becoming involved militarily. We, the US, have been concentrating on humanitarian assistance. The government has done quite a lot to alleviate some of the worst excesses of this conflict. Our leadership in this affairs is obvious and has even drawn some criticism. We were instrumental in organizing the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A concerted action with the EC could certainly bring better results, but there is no consensus about the identity of the aggressor. The issue is military intervention: But why "die for Dubrovnik"? The US interests are not at stake to that degree. Why would the US act, and not the EC? Because only the US can do it. Surgical bombing would not work. The bottom line is that the West is not ready for military action.

Michael L. Moodie, Assistant Director, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, Washington, DC (together with Gordon Sterling, Bureau for European Security Negotiations; Karen Look and Stanley Riveles, Bureau for Strategic Nuclear Affairs)

Moodie [on the Chemical Weapons Convention]: After almost 20 years of negotiations, a real compromise was reached with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Not all provisions are as strong as the US would like them to be. It is nevertheless acceptable to the US and fully supported by the US. It it to

be endorsed by the First Committee and the General Assembly. It is important to get as many countries as possible to sign the CWC. Now the relevant resolution for the General Assembly has 139 co-sponsors, which should ensure a good result. The vote may take place on November 11. Among the open problems, China is not committed to sign and ratify the CWC. It claims that the challenge inspections are excessively intrusive and put a heavy burden on the Chinese chemical industries. There is also the question of destroying old CW in China. A financial arrangement has been agreed with Japan. Pakistan, as another problem case, is has been the leader of radical non-aligned countries in the negotiations. But since India is ready to join the CWC, heavy pressure will probably be exerted on Pakistan. North Korea is not a co-sponsor of the resolution. (South Korea is.) It is unlikely to sign the CWC. Russia is a co-sponsor, but it will have difficulties to met the requirements to eliminate or destroy the chemical agents. This is a financial question. The US has so far given \$ 25 million in assistance for this purpose, perhaps more will be done in the future. The Middle East threatens not to sign the CWC. In a resolution of the Arab League of September 1992 the signing of the CWC by Arab countries was conditioned on Israel signing the NPT [as non-nuclear weapons state]. Perhaps there will some readiness in some Arab countries to join the the CWC at the moment of its signature. Israel supports the CWC.

Preparations for the Preparatory Commission of the CWC: At least 50 states are expected to sign the CWC in the first days. Within two years 65 ratifications are required. The centre in The Hague will have a staff of about 1,000 people, and an annual budget of about \$ 150 million. Key issues are:

- staffing, in particular the key positions;
- financial issues;
- collection and management of the information;
- technical matters, e.g., guidelines for inspectors;
- training, in particular for countries which are neither members of nor observers to the Conference on Disarmament.

The CWC is a very ambitious multilateral arms control agreement. It is a challenging task. The hard work has to begin now.

Grossen: Where do you expect difficulties in the implementation of the CWC?

Moodie: Russia has CW stockpiles of about 40,000 tons. The US has slightly less than 20,000 tons at eight sites in the continental US and where elimination facilities are to be built. Russia has not got the financial resources for a safe destruction of the entire stock of CW. There is also the job of converting the production facilities. In the US we also recognize that the cost of destruction will be high. And we encounter opposition by environmentalists.

Sterling: Today, on November 9, the CFE Treaty is officially entering into force. It was provisionally put into force last summer. For the inspection and verification regime, we can draw on our experience from the INF Treaty. With the Russians we have some problems with adequate access to undeclared sites. There are still some remnants of old thinking there. With CFE-1a, ceilings on personnel have been set, but these are not subject to verification, and they can be revised. CFE-1a was politically important since Germany had already given a personnel ceiling commitment in the 2+4 negotiations.

We support the Treaty on Open Skies that two of our Presidents (Eisenhower and Bush) have championed. The overflights will be useful. We hope to ratify the Treaty early next year. The Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna is an excellent way to deepen and broaden the dialogue with partners and former adversaries. There is little need to go immediately to CFE-II.

The US is supporting all attempts to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[Winkler presents the International Training Course.]

Riveles: Our nuclear relationship with the CIS was earlier co-terminous with SALT, START and INF. Now there are new problems and new opportunities.

START-I: This Treaty has been ratified by the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan. The Belorussian parliament will probably ratify it shortly. Thus the Ukraine remains as the key state. There are considerable uncertainties. In the US Senate, only 6 votes were cast against ratification, and no conditions were attached that would require re-negotiation of the Treaty. We have not yet seen the Russian instrument of ratification, but we assume that it will make adherence to the START Treaty dependent on Kazakh, Belorussian and Ukrainian adherence to the Treaty. There is indeed a great deal of uncertainty regarding the Ukraine. We believe that a commitments exists there at the highest level (President Kravchuk, Prime Minister Kuchma) to ratify the Treaty, but this commitment is questionable at a lower level and in parliament.

Some members of parliament would like the Ukraine to retain some nuclear weapons. The good signs are support by the Ukrainian leadership, the bad sign is the opposition by parliament, which is linked with the discussion on military doctrine (which, by the way, does not foresee nuclear weapons). In Moscow and in Washington there is a certain idea that we would bring about maximum pressure to bear on the Ukraine. At this point it is thus too early to say when the START-I Treaty will enter into force, perhaps by the end of this year or the beginning of 1993.

START-II: While START-I is a multilateral treaty [between five parties], START-II is bilateral. It presumes that START-I is in force, that the reductions are being carried out, and that the strategic offensive arms in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are eliminated. START-II relies on almost all provisions contained in START-I except for a few which are to be modified. We have not yet been able to codify the Bush-Yeltsin agreement, but its main contents - reduction and de-MIRVing - do not seem to be unraveling. There are at present three areas of Russian objections which amount to walking back from the Bush-Yeltsin agreement:

1. SS-18 silos. The US position is that the Bush-Yeltsin agreement calls for their total elimination. Russia thinks it should be able to convert them for one-warhead ICBMs.
2. The Russian would like to be permitted to download the SS-19 from six to one warhead. The START-I Treaty allows downloading by no more than four warheads.
3. The Russians would like to convert more heavy bombers to conventional missions than so far agreed.

We are now in contact with Russia, and the US has submitted a draft treaty which is very close to the Bush-Yeltsin agreement. We have indicated that we might want to change some aspects, but that we do not insist. We are really confident to be able to complete START-II before January 20, 1993.

Winkler: What would the Russian need the SS-18 silos for?

Riveles: This is also unclear to us.

Winkler: Did Yeltsin go too far during his meeting with Bush in June?

Riveles: The Russian objections do not necessarily come from Yeltsin. There is resistance in the military against giving up the SS-18s entirely.

Catrina: If we look at the first two Russian objections, both downloading of SS-19s and keeping SS-18 silos could result in a break-out capability, all the more so as START-I limits the deployed missiles only, but not those in storage?

Riveles: This may be our main fear regarding the SS-19, but not regarding the SS-18. The SS-18 silos would have to be modified, so that it would no longer be possible to fire SS-18s out of them.

Catrina: If the Ukraine would be on its own, how long could it keep SS-19 and SS-24 ICBM operational?

Riveles: I do not know, but the Ukraine has no operational control over these missiles [located on Ukrainian territory].

Look: We finished the withdrawals announced by President Bush in his initiative on September 27, 1991, by July 1992. About 2,000 weapons were destroyed. Russia pledged in January 1992 to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. This was completed by May 1992. The US has kept gravity bombs in Europe, but the number of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has been reduced by 80%, compared to the mid-1980s. Russia has a large number of nuclear missiles to be protected. Under the Nunn-Lugar Act we provide \$ 400 million to enhance security and safety and for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons to Russia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belarus. Recently the Freedom Support Act was passed which would, inter alia, also allow to build housing for the military. Things did not start quickly last year. The initial projects included blankets to protect missiles in transit. In the future we want to help building long-term storage facilities for nuclear missiles, and perhaps also take an active engagement in the dismantlement of their missiles and silos. We have also talks with the Ukraine and Belarus. With Belarus there is progress on emergency procedures and export controls. Right now we do not have for the Ukraine and Belarus a channel of communications similar to that with Russia. With the Ukraine we have had much discussion on a communications link and on dismantlement, but we did not yet achieve agreements. We require detailed agreements before our people are going there to assist. We could not yet get the Ukraine to sign them. We also sent a team to Kazakhstan, but with them we are at an earlier stage. We understand that Kazakhstan has an agreement with Russia on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Thus what remains is to establish a communications link. Russia did not move fast enough in concluding

agreements with the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but fortunately nothing happened. I think we may soon be able to spend some money on this.

Pitteloud: Are you certain that some tactical nuclear weapons will not be unaccounted for?

Look: We have no reason to believe there was any problem, and we follow this closely.

Pitteloud: Do they [i.e., the Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and Whiterussians] have a comprehensive inventory?

Look: We don't know.

Winkler: Is it in fact possible to get rid of Plutonium and highly enriched Uranium?

Look: At this time this is not clear for Plutonium. It may have to be stored for a long time. As for highly enriched Uranium, there is the idea of selling it via the US government for civilian uses.

James Cunningham, Deputy Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC

[Winkler presents the International Training Course, repeats the invitation to the Department of State, and present the group.]

Cunningham: I am the Deputy Director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs. We deal with NATO, the CSCE and various spin-offs, from the implementation of the START Treaty to Yugoslavia, the reform of NATO, etc. I was for two years with the US Mission to the UN in New York and spent there a lot of work on the Persian Gulf and peace-keeping. Before that I was for two years Chief of Cabinet of NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner. In our office we deal with the transformation of NATO and the European security structure. This is rather difficult, and it is not being made easier by the change of the administration. In Europe there is a tendency to look at the differences [in the approach to the European security structure] as being primarily between the US and France. This is to some extent true. Other problems are what is going on in former Yugoslavia and what happens in the former Soviet Union. What happens now in an area stretching from Yugoslavia to Central Asia does not give an optimistic picture. We try to keep this process from getting out of control. There is no clear picture, neither we nor others could use military power to force the parties to negotiate. This is the kind of problems we are trying to cope with now.

Grossen: What is your view of the relationship between NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE?

Cunningham: I do not expect that the Clinton administration will look at this very much differently from the Bush administration. The US still believes that it needs to be present in Europe. It must look for ways to coordinate different institutions to maintain support in Congress, and the arrangement must be practical. The Congress of January 1993 will have a strong incentive to cut expenditures. It will look again at how the US defines its interests overseas. There is, moreover, a requirement that the administration report to Congress by May 1993 whether it is necessary to re-negotiate the NATO Treaty. Another challenge is how to structure these organizations so that they are not antagonistic to European integration, but perhaps even conducive. The Maastricht process has run into difficulties. Nobody knows how it will go forward. We cannot predict the outcome.

Grossen: We all know that Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and the three Baltic States would like to join NATO today rather than tomorrow. Do you realistically see any possibility that they might become full members of the Alliance, and if so, within what time-frame?

Cunningham: We are open in principle to the idea that at some point we may have to look at an expansion of NATO, but not in the short term. This depends on the change of structures in Europe. We are open in principle. There is the difficult question what to do with Russia. There are serious implications if the border of Europe is to be that between the Ukraine and Russia.

Catrina: What is from your point of view the purpose of the NACC? Is it intended to be a permanent or only a temporary institution? What about the possibility of the NACC becoming a competition for the CSCE?

Cunningham: The NACC could be folded into the CSCE, or certain parts of the CSCE could be taken out of it and allocated to the NACC. We are aware that the NACC excludes at present a number of countries that can contribute something.

Catrina: Is there not a problem with the NACC in that a Central Asian state like Tajikistan is formally put on the same level with a state like Hungary? If I am not wrong, the Central Europeans considered the NACC as a kind of antichambre for NATO, and a means to distinguish themselves from those states less advanced in political reform.

Cunningham: Smaller Central Asian countries will not have much capability to be active in the NACC. I am not sure whether it was a good idea to include Central Asia in NACC in the first place. However, there will be a practical differentiation. Hungary has formally the same status as all others, but can certainly contribute more than, for instance, Turkmenistan.

Winkler: If the contacts between Switzerland and NATO should be intensified, what would in your view be a good way to do it, to set up a kind of a liaison?

Cunningham: I am not aware what arrangements NATO has regarding its liaison with the Neutrals. There would be linkage with the WEU in one sense, so I do not see why it should not be possible for the Neutrals.

Geiger: We need [intensified contacts with NATO], but we have not yet taken a formal decision. We have only made a proposal to this effect to the Chief of the General Staff.

[Winkler gives Cunningham the report of Swiss security policy of October 1990 and the report of a group of experts on the future of Swiss neutrality.]

Ryter: How do you judge the ideas from some states, like France, to create some new institutions, involving the withdrawal of some forces from NATO, or leaving them there but assigning a second mission to them?

Cunningham: We do not care much for it. We have also to explain to our people, and to Congress, why we should keep a US military presence in Europe. If structures without real substance - but which appear to have substance, without actually having it - are being created, it makes it much easier for the US to disengage. France is, in this regard, acting fundamentally against its own interests, by creating the appearance of European defense approaches that do not exist but allows the US to withdraw. We have argued for years with Europe that they should find ways to keep the US in Europe, rather than see a US withdrawal as unavoidable and try to build up a replacement.

Geiger: How do you assess the situation in the Baltic states?

Cunningham: I do not know how it should be interpreted. Over the past three months we had three times reports that the Russian troop withdrawal had been stopped, and then resumed. At any rate, Russia has already withdrawn many troops. The back and fro on this question reflects the difficult position of Yeltsin in view of the forthcoming session of the Congress of People's Deputies. He has got a difficult problem to deal with. The situation of the Russian minorities in the Baltic states is used for propaganda purposes; it is an emotionally powerful issue in Moscow. So far, Russia seems to be continuing the withdrawal of troops.

Pitteloud: Is there a serious and reliable monitoring of the Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states?

Cunningham: There is no international monitoring, but we have quite good intelligence information. We must not forget that the withdrawal is being monitored closely by the Balts themselves. We expect that CSCE monitoring missions will be spread to all Baltic states. A mission of the CSCE Presidency is on the way to Estonia now.

Winkler: How do you think that Serbia will react to the change of the US administration?

Cunningham: Nobody should believe that the Clinton administration will be more flexible. He was among the first to call for a no-fly zone and for shooting down violators. However, we will not send any US combat [ground] forces into former Yugoslavia. Politically, we work to support the UN and the EC. We hope that the situation on the ground and the pain of the sanctions regime will force the Serbs [to make concessions]. Clinton at some point wanted to make a statement not to recognize a state with the name "Macedonia".

Winkler: Will the US be willing to enforce the no-fly zone?

Cunningham: Yes, if we have a resolution from the Security Council. We are not working on such a resolution?

Winkler: Will you be working on one?

Cunningham: Perhaps.

De Dardel: What about the Russian minorities in the Baltic states. Do they not want to keep Russian forces in these countries?

Cunningham: I have not heard that Russians would want to keep the troops there. They rather want to have all Russian troops out, in case something would happen to Yeltsin. The potential for a reversal and backlash exists until and unless Russia has completed the withdrawal of all its forces from the Baltic states and Germany, has reduced its strategic [nuclear] arsenal and has engaged in real conversion of its military industry.

Von Castelmur: What can the US offer in the economic field to assist the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the CIS?

Cunningham: I am no specialist on that, but there is a whole gamut of types of assistance in the laws adopted by Congress. We are trying to get private investment there as "seed projects". Nobody has the power to go there and just buy up the problem.

Ryter: What role could the French and British nuclear weapons play in a future Europe?

Cunningham: I will not discuss that. You would have to talk with the British and the French.

George W. Bader, Principal Director for European and NATO Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC

Bader: We live now, after the Presidential election, in an interesting period. For the US government it is a bit a dangerous time. The defeated government feels himself a bit in a caretaker role. The new one has not yet moved in. This is a difficult period, in particular when there are so many ethnic conflicts in the world. Some time ago, the swearing in of the new President was in March, now this transition period has been reduced to two months. Congress passed a law enabling the government to pay those appointees of the incoming administration [before January 20]. I know no more than you what attitude the new administration will have. Many of them will already have been in government, but new faces will also come in. Secretary of Defense Cheney sent a budget request of \$ 1.42 trillion for 1993-97 to the Hill. Clinton said it should be \$ 1.36 trillion, that is \$ 60 billion less. This is probably a rather optimistic figure. But the Democrats do not want to be painted prematurely as being soft on defense. When Carter came he wanted large cuts. I was irritated when he asked increases of defense expenditures in NATO of 0-5% (in the end it came to a target figure of 3%), and when we came back from our mission, Carter could not increase the US budget. Now many of our allies will be in free fall with their defense expenditures. What a candidate runs on will not necessarily be what he does. There is also a link between the defense budget and jobs that will hold back the administration. Conversion is difficult. In Moscow Secretary Cheney was shown a MIG plan converting to food processing machines. The manager said they could still get parts for MIG aircraft, but not for the civilian production line. The US intends to close about 800 military installations worldwide. We use the term "installations" because it is less offensive than "bases". The Chairman of the JCS, General Powell, has proposed to reduce the US force structure from 2.1 million to 1.6 million by 1995. Clinton proposed to take it down to 1.3 million. For Europe, the administration proposed 150,000 by 1995. Congress proposed 100,000 by 1996. Clinton said 70,000 and 100,000 on two occasions. I expect that more emphasis will be put on burden-sharing and on the European pillar of NATO. We will be crunching numbers before January 20. The figure of 150,000 [US military deployment in Europe] is based on the conception to have one corps in Europe and another corps being able to come over fast. In this regard, the difference between 100,000 and 150,000 men is important. Our figure of 150,000 is based on the following consideration:

92,000 US Army: 1 corps plus receiving elements for another corps

40,000 US Air Force

10,000 US Navy

Thus to reduce the US military presence in Europe to 100,000 would cause problems in readiness. We need to keep a robust amount of forces there. What is their mission? After the Rome NATO summit meeting, we had our missions about right, but not now. The only justification to be in Germany is to guard against the resurgence of Russia. But our forces should not just be sitting around. Thus another mission is peace-keeping. There is a large demand for that, and NATO will have to play a role. However, there is a dispute in NATO whether Article 4 of the Washington Treaty provides for peace-keeping operations out of area. In addition, there is the constitutional problem in Germany regarding the use of the Bundeswehr abroad. But the law is per se not that stringent. The SPD challenged the deployment [to the

Adriatic Sea] in court. I think that the court will reject this challenge. I expect German participation in the framework of the CSCE and the UN.

The former neutrals pose another problem. Will they be joining NATO and the WEU? We have always had the view that it was unacceptable that a country joins the WEU without at the same time also joining NATO. This has become more and more the thinking of NATO. If a country such as Switzerland would join the WEU, the question would arise what kind of guarantees [the WEU] would provide to it. Practically nothing. It would create ambiguity. NATO would not easily accept that. The new administration may perhaps not accept this position, but it would be shocking if it did not. There has to be symmetry.

The US has always been in favour of European integration. We have been involved in World War I and II. We would prefer not to be drawn into ethnic quarrels. One measure against such quarrels is European integration. In some way, the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact has also so be integrated. It is surprising that the divorce between Russia and the Ukraine has been so peaceful so far. The Ukrainians and the Balts fear being re-absorbed again. Their security concerns are not addressed by the existing structures.

The creation of the NACC came partly out of the realization that the countries of the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact wanted to join NATO. Many of them want to join NATO, or at least establish a relationship with NATO. NACC was a compromise invented by Baker and Genscher. Some feel that not the NACC but the CSCE should provide security. But the CSCE has no history of providing security. NATO has. The states of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact want to join NATO, not the CSCE. In the NACC we talk about peace-keeping and air traffic control. The NACC could become a body not only for consultation, but for actual deeds and cooperation. Cooperation has per se great value, independent of what is actually being done. Last year I made a visit to Northern Iraq, in a headquarters located at a bombed-out airport. The field commanders said that the five-country cooperation in "Provide Comfort" was the way of the future. Peace-keeping is the future role of integrated NATO.

It is unclear whether NATO could make a difference in former Yugoslavia. We have civil war in Bosnia, and our forces would be shot at. Thus the Department of Defense has been reluctant. Humanitarian assistance is a different matter. Clinton and his advisers suggested twice that we should take out guns, make air strikes. It remains to be seen whether he will keep this position. Our evaluation is that both would not help much to help the humanitarian mission. The estimate of 400,000 people who could perish during the winter seems to us very high. It is in my view a mistake to reject the cantonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It could become a loose federation. A way has to be found to stop the fighting.

The US position to Europe is that the US military presence will be maintained, with a number of between 70,000 and 150,000 men. Politically this difference is unimportant, but militarily it could make a difference. Warning time is by now almost an overtaken concept. In Russia the momentum of reforms seems to be running out of steam. Yeltsin faces the loss of his special powers by December 1. It is open whether he will be able to keep control. Clinton can, in my view, not focus exclusively on domestic affairs.

A last word on the neutrals: Against whom should they be neutral now?

Geiger [thanks Bader for receiving the group.]

Winkler [presents the International Training Course.] Regarding the need for balance in the relationship of neutral countries to NATO and WEU, it seems to me that this is in general not the time for asking NATO membership, neither from the NATO nor from a Swiss point of view. But we should have closer cooperation. The Maastricht process has run into problems, there is a variety of ideas about the "European defense identity". We have the trade disputes between the US and the EC. Can NATO stay the way it is? Or would a new treaty be useful?

Bader: I am not clear how Congress would view the conclusion of a new treaty. The size of the US forces in Europe was 100,000 when the treaty was signed, and it was afterwards built up to 300,000. It would be very risky to try making a new treaty. The existing treaty covers the needs. The addition of new member states will be the real job of the future. A first wave could include Sweden, Austria, Finland, and Switzerland, a second wave the Visegrad group of countries. Then the expansion could go further east, but for the inclusion of these countries we would need to have certain guarantees. In my mind there is no need to amend the Washington Treaty. We should not make a political football out of it.

Pitteloud: The armed forces have a new role: peace-keeping. We were at the UN last week. Some Third World countries feel that the UN is de facto an agency of the North. How will it be possible to keep the efficacy of peace-keeping and simultaneously alleviate these concerns?

Bader: I detect in Europe a strong criticism that it is the UN, and not a European institution, that carries the largest load in Yugoslavia. In principle, I would prefer that a regional organization would provide peace-keeping, but outside of Europe there is not much.

Grossen: What is your attitude toward the suggestion of deploying US ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Bader: We, the US, would become a special target, like in Lebanon. But we accept a peace-keeping role. Fort Dix, NJ, will become the home of our peace-keeping force. During "Desert Storm" the question was raised here: Where is the Bundeswehr? There must be a public impression of an equitable sharing of the tasks. Cheney and Powell are against any US intervention unless vital US interests are involved.

Catrina: Will it be possible for the WEU to be at the same time the security and defense agency of the European Union and a means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO?

Bader: We are fairly satisfied with Maastricht. But it was not carefully worked out afterwards. There was a rush to Maastricht. So they have to work it out new. The process went ahead of the substance. It should be slowed down.

Steven Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC

[Geiger thanks Hadley for receiving the group. Winkler presents the International Training Course. Hadley ask for a presentation of the situation from the view of Switzerland, which is given by Winkler.]

Hadley: Before the end of the Cold War, we were confronted with a security crisis. Now we are facing a political crisis. What is going on in former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, could start a real destabilization of all the quite moderate regimes of the region. It could bring to the fore nationalistic regimes and it could even spread to the former Soviet Union. We were used to deal with the security crisis by the means of military strength and arms control. These instruments are not suited for today's crisis. This enormous political challenge has to be met.

Foreign policy was irrelevant during the election campaign in the US. But now President Clinton has to focus not only on domestic problems. The new administration will have to tackle foreign policy, and it will probably not be too different initially from the Bush policies. We might even witness a bipartisan administration for a while. Perhaps some people will be re-appointed by the new administration, but basically it will be a new crowd that will define its own course. It will stay in Europe, since there is no alternative.

Bradley Knopp, Defense Intelligence Agency (with Colonel J.D. Wilson, Mr. Les Trevor, Mr. John Gros, Mr. Bill Shultz, Mr. Bob Kell)

[Geiger thanks the DIA for receiving the group. Winkler presents the International Training Course.]

Wilson: Eurasia is a continent where much is going on. You are much closer to it than we. Russia is in great turmoil. The Russian have trouble with the withdrawal of their forces from the Baltic states, from Poland and Germany. Some are more, some less hawkish. Yeltsin has tried to appease the nationalists. In May 1992, Russia decided to formulate a military doctrine, which emphasises the prevention of war and defense sufficiency, coupled with a retaliatory offensive capability. For the first time the Russian started to look a nuclear first use the way we, i.e. NATO, did. They have no longer a non-first use policy in the old sense, but this is not a reason for alarm. The former Soviet forces are fragmented. During the operation "Desert Storm" the Russians saw the effect of high-precision conventional weapons. Now the Russians equate such a [precision non-nuclear] strike with a nuclear strike. They are no longer focusing [their strategy geographically, but are elaborating an omni-directional doctrine. Russia may by this time define NATO as a "military danger", rather than as a "military threat".

Russia is setting up three types of forces:

1. Combat-ready forces, capable of handling local hostilities.

2. Rapid-reaction forces, to supplement the combat-ready forces when hostilities reach mid-level intensity.
3. Strategic reserve forces, for the case when the combat-ready forces and the rapid-reaction forces are not sufficient.

There is more emphasis than before on high-technology weaponry. Russia is increasing research and development in this direction, and it is keeping a surge capacity in arms production. In the absence of a perception of an acute threat from outside, the arms production is being reduced. The emphasis on intelligence-gathering capabilities has been increased. Another area of great emphasis is command and control.

The Russian Ministry of Defence has set up a three-stage plan:

1. First stage (1992): Russia will claim all [former Soviet] military forces located in Russia, Poland, and Germany. De facto Russia also claims the former Soviet forces in Central Asia which may in time be turned over to the host nations. Forces have been withdrawn from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova, leaving behind part of their equipment.
2. Second stage (1993-1994): The withdrawal from Germany and Poland will be completed. The Russian general-purpose forces will be structured in four groups: West, South, East and strategic reserves. The corps-brigade structure will be introduced for the combat-ready forces and the rapid-reaction forces.
3. Third stage (1995-2000): The withdrawal of the forces from the Baltic states will be completed, but the Russians will continue to use the Russian-speaking minorities in these states for political purposes. If the withdrawal has to be stopped for lack of infrastructure [in Russia], we may have Russian forces in the Baltics until the end of the 1990s. As the CFE Treaty is being implemented, Russia plans to have armed forces of 1.45 million by 2000. We, the US, estimate that they will be down to 1.5 million by 1995, thus ahead of the plan. The Russians have in effect no corps of Non-Commissioned Officers, and they do not yet draft the people they need.

Gros: The old Soviet doctrine was directed against the US and NATO and was geared to a high-intensity war. The new perception is that the threat of a nuclear war has diminished. But local and regional conflicts in the former Soviet Union are on the rise, as well as ethnic and religious strife. Many of the new forces to be fielded will thus be directed against a low-to-mid intensity threat. In Moscow, the debate to what extent the West still poses a threat, has not yet been resolved. In general, civilians argue that there is no Western threat left, while the military says that the West has shown in "Desert Storm" what it could do. Conservatives in the military, such as [Commander of the General Staff Academy Igor] Rodionov still see and present us [i.e. the West] as a threat, and unfortunately Rodionov is in an influential position.

The military does not talk much anymore of heavy task forces. The top five military tasks/threats are:

- internal troubles
- peace-keeping actions
- participation in local and regional conflicts
- involvement in large-scale conventional conflicts
- nuclear war

Von Castelmur: How do you assess the capabilities of the Russian armed forces at this time?

Answer: They do not pose a threat now. The Soviet army has broken down essentially into the Russian and the Ukrainian armies. They have tremendous problems with readiness. A personnel shake-up has occurred as Ukrainian and Belorussian officers have returned to their home countries. The level of training by conscripts is low. There are many deferrals, and many are dispensed for medical reasons. In many parts of Russia the draft is not enforced anymore. There is disagreement in the US intelligence community about the relevance of the [new Russian] doctrine. Some say that the intentions of the governmental and military leadership are irrelevant since they are only reacting to crises. The other "school" says that the military doctrine provides a certain guidance and framework.

In the process of withdrawing forces from Central Europe, the Soviet Union re-activated some airfields in Belarus and the Ukraine. Now the Russians cannot use these airfields because there is a risk that aircraft deployed there might be claimed by the Belorussians and Ukrainians. Hence the Russians are parking large numbers of military aircraft along runways in Russia.

Gros: Defense budgets provide a certain realism to military doctrine, according to an old saying. The question is whether the economic conditions [of Russia] allow even to cover a downgraded force. We think

that the economy will return to the level of the late 1980s only some years after 2000, at the earliest. What will Russia do at the turn of the century? The more resources they put now into the military, the worse will their economy be by 2000. The government has thus incentives to keep military expenditure low.

How long will the Geidar government last? It could fall before the beginning of December, but Geidar himself could remain Deputy Prime Minister. But I would not bet on that. If representatives of the military-industrial complex come to power, they will at least gradually change the allocation of resources. Yeltsin may be willing to compromise on Geidar, if Geidar can keep an important and prestigious portfolio, e.g., First Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Reform.

Grossen: Could the economic burden endanger the implementation of the CFE Treaty by Russia?

Answer: This is a good question. The Russians have asked it themselves. They have at present not a good grasp on the costs of the elimination of conventional forces. And they are asking for financial assistance. They have also difficulties to ensure the implementation of the CFE Treaty for forces located in other states of the CIS.

Von Castelmur: Is a strict implementation of the CFE Treaty and important issue for the US?

Answer: Politically yes. But I have the feeling that the elimination [in Russia] will take longer than allowed in the original terms of the CFE Treaty. An important aspect is whether the Russians will demonstrate a honourable intention [to meet the CFE deadline] or engage in an attempt to circumvent the treaty provisions. The Russians are now in a worse economic situation that we were during the depression, but it is not as bad as it was during the Russian civil war. Even if they would want to keep some items [to be destroyed under the provisions of the CFE Treaty], this would lead only to block obsolescence.

Catrina: What are the current trends and the mid- to long-term perspectives of Russian strategic offensive and defensive programs?

Answer: Basically the strategic forces have been less affected by the break-up of the Soviet Union than the general purpose forces. The destruction of SS-18 has started in anticipation of the START Treaty. The mobile ICBM (SS-24 Mod. 1 and SS-25) stay near their garrisons for fear of hooliganism. Some SS-25 are being put into former SS-18 silos. The Navy continues deploying [i.e., sending out on patrol] SSBN. There is one SSBN each in the Pacific and in the Northern Fleet on patrol now [at any given time]. There have been cutbacks in R&D programmes. One ICBM follow-on system is in the works. We expect in the future fewer systems to be introduced than in the past. But R&D has not come to a standstill. It is going on. There is also some testing going on that required sites in Kazakhstan. The Russians might try to get other countries to agree on joint development projects. They continue their activities in air defense, e.g., in the production of the SA-11 and in air defense training.

Major-General John Sewall, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC (together with Dr. Johnson, Colonel Vic Stamey, Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Dr. Phoebe Marr, Mr. Jeff Snyder, and Dr. Ron Montaperto)

Johnson: The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is concerned about a hasty withdrawal from Europe since due to pressures for a reduction of the [US] defense budget. The European security architecture might have to pay the price.

Sewall: What are US key interests in Europe? To keep peace and maintain stability, to prevent regional hegemonies or the emergence of hostile camps in Europe. We vigorously support democratic regimes and market economies. In general, liberal regimes do not want to go to war with each other. (Though I am aware of the white wine problem.) How do we operationally go about this objectives:

- Continued US military presence is essential. This applies also to the new administration. If we left Europe alone, we could have another World War.
- NATO is the best instrument to safeguard the trans-atlantic links.
- We share the concern about what is happening in Europe. We want to sit at the European table and to be able to influence European security affairs.

We have a new world disorder, or the return of the old order, ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts. My personal view is that Yugoslavia has been a failure of the US and European leaders to act, and it re-

mains a test case for the United Nations. What is going to happen in the CSFR is open. Then we have the Caucasus. We have, on top of that, an extreme fragility of the democratic reforms in Russia, which has nuclear weapons and large holdings of conventional weapons. There is the economic fragility of Central and Eastern Europe. It is a dicy situation. There is, in addition, a direct concern to the Southern part of Europe: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Libya, Iraq, Iran). Finally, what is going to happen with France and Germany? France does not want us, and Germany is moving toward the status of a great power (UN Security Council seat, constitutional issues).

The European security architecture must be built on a strong European pillar, but not on competing institutions. We resist competitive structures, but are in favour of complementary ones. The WEU can't do anything in terms even of modest deployments out of area without US assistance. We want hence to be involved right from the beginning in the decision making process, not to have to bail out the WEU in the end. NATO is our preferred vehicles: It worked for 40 years and it can act and take decisions. In Gleneagles [Nuclear Planning Group meeting, 20-21 October 1992] the NATO Defense Ministers spoke about peace-keeping, and the possibility of peace enforcement. The WEU is a competitive bidder. The deployment in the Adriatic Sea is clear evidence of that. It is a farce. Naval monitoring is not a key issue. The WEU is weak in planning. It is a club within a club. The CSCE can play a significant complementary role, but it has no own forces and means. It has a political role in peace-keeping and peace enforcement.

Stamey [presented by Sewall as one of the three co-authors of the new NATO strategy]: I will talk about the NATO strategy and the United States. The key new documents are:

- The Alliance's Strategic Concept (adopted at the summit meeting of Rome). Since MC 14-3, France has joined the strategic concept (with the exception of six paragraphs), so the new strategic concept is indeed a document of 16 nations. MC-14-4 is the classified implementation programme.
- The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, which marked the beginning of the NACC.
- MC 317, the base document for NATO's new force structure.
- The new command structure, still two more years away.
- Six NATO-Spain coordination agreements. These will tie the Spanish - without being integrated - into the military structure of the alliance. France was a key player here. The Spaniards went after each session to Paris.

Some things have not changed:

- Military power is necessary for stability in Europe.
- Russia will remain a military (but not economic) superpower, since it has nuclear weapons.
- There is now as before a need for a trans-atlantic link.
- The aims and objectives of the Atlantic Alliance remain the same.

The changes:

- The political control over the military is not new. But it has been even more clearly stated to have it really crystal clear. Germany is very strong on that.
- There is no static linear defence anymore.
- "Cooperation" has been added as new third element to the Harmel approach.
- NATO recognizes that other institutions exist and have a role to play in the security of Europe.
- Crisis management is a key element of the Alliance's future, and NATO pays tremendous attention to that. It has plans for this also in military terms not only for a build-up, but also for a build-down.
- More warning time: Force build-up capabilities (reinforcement, mobilization, reconstitution) have been increased, compared to standing forces.
- The role of nuclear weapons has been reduced. For the first time, NATO recognizes also the British and French nuclear forces.
- Multinational concept: Rapid-reaction forces, main defence forces, and reinforcements.
- The commands have been reduced to two: SHAPE and ACLANT. CINCHAN has been eliminated. A new subcommand AFNORTHWEST has been created. (This was a political decision. "Star Wars" (competition for high command posts) were involved, and Great Britain did well in it by picking up three four-star generals.

Simon [on Central and Eastern Europe, Russia]: The revolution since 1989 has resulted in a whole series of new states. The US wants some stability in their re-entering of Europe (democracy, market economy).

It is supportive of and encouraging change. We deal on a bilateral level with these countries. They have some very primitive demands, e.g. how to write a constitution, how to establish political control over the military, how to design forces, and budgets. The US does that with the Visegrad group, and with the Baltic states, Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. The National Defense University (NDU) is also giving some support in this regard. We do also work through NATO.

In the military realm, EUCOM is engaged in military contacts. We had numbers of officers coming to the US for visits. The NDU works closely with EUCOM on that. It helped the Hungarian military academy with computers. Another programme involves the European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch. This is a facility to train civilians or military personnel. There are courses of 2-3 days for senior civilians at the Deputy Ministerial level, courses of 2-3 weeks for military personnel at the level of Colonel and their civilian equivalents, and courses of 2-3 months, including trips, for other [i.e., lower-ranking] personnel. The NACC also comes in this context. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the NACC now has 36 members (like the old CSCE). This causes some problems. There are several experts on Central and Eastern Europe at the NDU.

Marr (on Iraq and the Persian Gulf): In the past, the major interests were to fend off the Soviet Union, to defend vital interests in the area, the security of Israel in recognized borders, stability, access and commerce. Now the first interest, relating to the Soviet Union, has gone. At the same time a new set of interests has emerged: Access to oil and energy at reasonable prices has become the vital interest; the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic missiles has become a key issue, too.

In the Persian Gulf, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War were key events. The US wanted a balance of power in the region between Iran and Iraq. None of them should get a dominating role. This did not work. The balance tilted toward Iraq that then invaded Kuwait. The US still has no policy where to go from here now. There are now two powers hostile to the US in the Persian Gulf. The GCC countries are friendly, but cannot defend themselves. What role is there for the US military? Should it be present just over the horizon? Or should it be a "policeman" in the Gulf? The latter is not what the US military want.

Iraq is the most immediate concern. The war was fought for three objectives:

- to prevent an invasion of Saudi Arabia
- to liberate Kuwait
- to restore regional balance, not to eliminate Iraq

Should the removal of Saddam Hussein be a key objective? This will be one of the key issues for the new administration. As long as Saddam Hussein is around the question is how to contain him. The operation for the Kurds and the non-flight zone have led to political entities taking shape there. Will this lead to an independent Kurdistan? What would be the impact of this on the neighbouring countries, including Turkey? The US will not give up the Kurds, but there are problems. This applies also to the no-flight zone in the South of Iraq. To formulate US policy toward Iraq is a key problem. We do not want a total collapse and fragmentation of Iraq.

Iran is getting increasing attention. Is the revolution over? Are new and pragmatic policies here to stay? Has Iran become a status quo power or not? There is a general consensus here in Washington that although the economy of Iran is improving it is still in very bad shape while confronted with large demographic growth. The Iranian GNP is still below what it was under the Shah. Iran has received three submarines from Russia, it has a nuclear programme and large-scale conventional arms purchases. Its security situation has improved due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time there is the possibility of a spill-over of ethnic unrest from Central Asia to Iran. The attraction of Islamic fundamentalism is decreasing, the Turkish nationalism on the rise. In spite of that, Iran is seeking a hegemony.

The GCC area is fairly safe at the moment. But there are some problems on the horizon, such as demands for greater democratic participation. There are, moreover, fears of a Saudi Arabian hegemony over the Arab peninsula. There are no US ground troops in the GCC area. But the US has a series of bilateral agreements on pre-positioning, exercises, airlift, port calls, etc. The role and mission of the US in the region are still evolving. There are still many questions open.

Snyder: We know little about Central Asia. We have no embassies there. We have first to train specialists on that region. The military was more farsighted in that respect. States bordering the area (Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) are worrying about Tajikistan and others. The US does not see it that way. Central Asia is a large region. We have also to take into account the Caucasus. We have a two-year project at the NDU on the region. Diversity is a strong factor in the region. It is rich in resources, but most of them are difficult to get at. It is a good agricultural region, but drugs are also grown. There are upward

of 25 [former] Soviet divisions in this region. [The Russians] have offered four [of these] to the new states. All of us are unaccustomed to the states there. All local leaders, except for Akayev (Kyrgyzstan) supported the coup against Gorbachev. (They are, so to speak, "reluctant founding fathers".) Semi-rehabilitated communist parties are running the governments.

What are the great power interests over the long term? This is a great game. There are two key US partners with different interests: Turkey and NATO. In Central Asia you have a belt of Turkish people, not an islamic belt. The Turks see a chance for themselves. Kazakhstan is also a nuclear power. In fact, it would be the largest nuclear power in Asia [if it could keep, and acquire effective control over, all nuclear arms located there at this time]. There are more Russians in Kazakhstan than Kazakhs, which is an untenable situation. The borders of Kazakhstan are artificial. They were drawn by Stalin. In Tajikistan there is one of the more hard-line rulers (Nabiyev), and an incompetent one at that. He was swept from power, but is likely to be returned to power. Nabiyev succeeded in presenting himself as the only alternative to islamic fundamentalism, though he created the problem fist. The US has no natural surrogate in this region. Neither Turkey nor Pakistan are that. It is unclear whether and how the region will organize itself in security terms. Kazakhstan could lead such a process if it keeps nuclear weapons. If it does not, it cannot.

Montaperto: The NDU approach to the Far East region centers on three questions and tasks:

- What will the region look like?
- Assessment of the impact of changes in the region on the United States
- Development of alternative strategies for the United States

The US forces in the region will be reduced. they might well fall below 100,000 troops. How can the US manage its security and foreign policy in this situation? A shift [of US emphasis] from Europe to the Asian region is likely. This gives an additional dimension to the problems. A key question is how to preserve US interests in the region with a shrinking US military presence. We need also to assess our long-term strategy. We have four pillars for such a strategy:

- the US-Japanese relationship
- the US-South Korean relationship
- the US-Chinese relationship
- sufficient military presence in the region to cope with crises

If all should be falling apart, the US-Japanese relationship would come under terrible stress and would not survive in its current form. A Korean unification would create a new situation. The relationship with China is problematic. Clinton is willing to be tough. The US forces in the region are diminishing. Hence there is no truly encouraging picture.

Key aspects:

- The struggle for dominance between Japan and China has begun. We have to look at the Chinese military capabilities in this context. We have to develop strategies to integrate China in a wider security concept and arms control, but China does not want to be integrated.
- Proliferation is an important issue: North Korea has the "bomb in the basement". Soviet experts have contributed. An urgent and important question is also how to prevent China from making nonsense.
- Korean unification: What forces work in favour of unification? Will it follow the German example? If Korea should be united, it would have an army with over 1 million men, a nuclear option and modern equipment. How should we deal with such an entity, in the same way as with Japan? What would be the implications?
- The bilateral system worked well during the last 40 years, but this may no longer be so. Hence we need to think about some new multilateral approaches in the region.
- For the US the question is posed whether it will be possible to substitute access agreements for permanent bases.

John G. Hines, Director, The Phoenix Institute, BDM International Inc., 7915 Jones Branch Drive, McLean, VA

A BDM [parent company] official: We are now in the the transition period in the US. But I must tell you that here [at BDM] we have more insights on Eurasia than on Washington. The USA is going to be far more domestically oriented. Clinton has been elected on a domestic agenda. But the US will not lose

sight of its commitments and responsibilities. Al Gore was member of the Armed Services Committee. He is an expert on security matters and will probably play an important role [in the incoming administration]. The Vice-Presidential post has become more important in the past few administrations. John Chancellor asked on TV whether what is going on in Yugoslavia and the Baltics is to some extent due to US self-preoccupation.

[Winkler thanks BDM for receiving the group, presents the International Training Course and the group. The BDM official offers John G. Hines as guest-speaker for the International Training Course.]

The Rand Corp., founded 1947, is the "grandfather" of think tanks like BDM. Now there are many think tanks with a huge experience.

Hines: What do BDM and the Phoenix Institute do? BDM employs about 4,000 people in 15 places in the US. It is, among other things, involved in information management and energy exploitation. It was founded by three physicists in 1960. One of them had to help the US government in the application of quantitative analysis in support of defense policy and force restructuring. The Phoenix Institute was founded to analyse what to do in a world turned upside down. I personally was trained in the US Army Russian Institute (Garmisch-Partenkirchen) and in California, and came to the US Army as a Sovietologist. Some colleagues of mine bemoan the passing away of the USSR. I want to engage in an effort to aggressively understand what is going on. The pace of change went from a glacial movement to a fast rate of change indeed. My area of specialization is the former Soviet Union, but with a look to its European and Asian context.

The focus of our work [at the Phoenix Institute] is to try to understand how Europe will evolve, with particular focus on the former Soviet Union. While doing that, we try to look out into the future, for up to 30 years, but also to the next week. Some federal institutions of the US have asked us to do this. Another issue is how you can forecast, given the [drastic] changes? I would argue that you cannot anticipate a particular future. For the long term, the most one can do is to define the bounds of the possibilities and try to identify which economic, political-geographic and ethnic trends will affect the possible futures. Thus we try to define possible futures to assist in formulating defense policy and force structures.

A methodological question is how to evolve the future in forecasting. One way is to force people in various disciplines to think out into the future, try to find points of change, then try to identify the driving forces and actors. Then one tries to move back from the future to how we get there. In 1990 we estimated that the Soviet Union would come apart between 1993 and 1995, but we did not predict the collapse and self-destruction of the CPSU in 1991. Forecasting is not a mathematical science. Why are we leaping into the future? The human mind makes many assumptions and conclusions it is not consciously aware of. This is kind of an exploitation of intuition. So far this has helped us to foresee basic developments.

What will the US do? There are many open questions. What will NATO's role be? How would you see Europe (and, in particular, the neutrals) defining their role in this situation? We are trying to help the incoming administration to understand the world. Foreign policy will, in the Clinton administration, have to be introduced as an economic issue, in terms of how it influences the US economy.

Russia is struggling for survival as a state or federation. Political and ethnic forces are pulling in a centrifugal way. The situation will not be to turn around in less than one decade. The US and Europe have turned inward. Russia and Central Asia are trying to define themselves. Europe and Central Asia face a bloody time. This is a historic period that will last for years. The former Soviet Union is on a downward drive that will last at least until 1996, perhaps 2000. In the former Soviet Union, politicians are building "blind". They have no clear picture of what they aspire for. In August 1990 we predicted that what had started would continue. It would not matter that much whether Zhirinovskiy, Rutskoy or Blagovolin would lead. The situation, and the development, are relatively unresponsive to leadership. They can perhaps by 2010 start picking up the pieces.

The collapse of the Russian economy at the rate of 10-20% (reduction in production) per annum will continue to 1996-1997, resulting in a GNP by this time of about 40% of the 1988 GNP. Real recovery could start well beyond 2000. The economic problems are structural and impervious to short-term measures, e.g. plans are located at wrong places, relative to supplies and the sales network. What politicians in Moscow decide will not determine the fate of Russia. The CIS is only a transitional structure. Shaposhnikov is a Chief of Staff without staff; and he let now go the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Deterrent Forces.

I expect pogroms, warlording, and a fight for control over territory in Russia. Disintegration is unavoidable, with the following regions being prime candidates for secession: The Far East, Tatarstan, Buryatia and the Northern Caucasus.

General Gennadi Ivanov has the mission to define how the Russian armed forces should be structured by 2000 and at the same time formulate a doctrine. Deputy Defence Minister Andrei A. Kokoshin and the Russian Chief of the General Staff Dubynin [who died in the meantime] are reportedly also working on a new military doctrine. The army 2000 is to be smaller and better armed. Nuclear weapons are likely to become relatively more important as Russia will increasingly fall behind in conventional weapons technology. The target size for the armed forces by 2000 is 1.5 million. The General Staff was very upset with the Bush-Yeltsin agreement of June 1992 because it envisages a 70-30 distribution between sea- and land-based strategic offensive arms, at lower numbers. The [Russian] military feel that Yeltsin sold out since they never wanted to rely on SSBNs. They also see their SSBNs as less reliable than the ICBMs. Clinton may face Russian attempts to revise the Bush-Yeltsin framework agreement. The role of the air force has been increased. This applies also to investment in research and development. And the air force has been placed under stricter central control. The Russians presented to us an Army with Corps and Brigades, no divisions, and a strategic reserve in corps-strength. 2-3 corps would be for peripheral defense, 3-4 airborne/airmobile brigades for deployment to the periphery within one week. The Russian Navy is to limit itself to the missions of coastal defense and against sea lines of communications in the Barents Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Its size is to be reduced by half. The largest part of the cuts will fall on the surface fleet.

Dr. Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Vice President for Policy Research, Pacific-Sierra Research Corp., 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1100, Arlington, VA 22209

The presentation of Pacific-Sierra was structured into the following segments:

- Overview of Pacific-Sierra Research Programmes and Capabilities
- Non-Apocalyptic Threats: Planning for More Diverse Regional Threats
- Exploiting Commercial Satellite Imagery for Military and Environmental Applications

Pacific-Sierra was founded 1971. From 1985 to 1989 it was a subsidiary of Eaton Corp. until it was bought back by the employees. It has about 300 employees, and an annual turnover of about \$ 27 million, thus it is a small business, compared to some other think tanks. The company has grown steadily and expects this to continue in a controlled way. The Washington office has become the largest, with 135 employees, surpassing the Los Angeles office with about 100 employees. Smaller offices are in White Sands, San Diego, Warminster. The principal field of the Washington office of Pacific-Sierra is policy advice and intelligence support. The customer base is broken down as follows (for all activities of Pacific-Sierra Corp.): Commercial 16%, Navy 15%, Department of Energy 4%, Defense Nuclear Agency 11%, Department of Defense 4%, US Army 5%, US Air Force 2%, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 7%, other government 35%.

Pacific-Sierra specializes in the following fields:

- Communications, in particular communications with submarines.
- Effects of nuclear weapons
- Electro-optics: modelling, system design and development
- Image processing, enhancement, rectification, classification, data fusion and change detection

Pacific-Sierra has, inter alia, been engaged in advisory roles for the following projects:

- The Integrated Long-Term Strategy Commission ("Discriminate Deterrence")
- DARPA panels
- Congressional testimony (in particular on theatre ballistic missile defence)

Non-Apocalyptic Threats, Planning for More Diverse Regional Threats: It has to be expected that land-attack cruise missiles (including ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, and sea-to-ground cruise missiles) will increasingly proliferate to the Third World with the increasing availability of low-cost navigation and guidance technologies. Rapid growth in land-attack cruise missiles would challenge the US ability to respond to regional contingencies. The vulnerability of the US to such threats will grow as technology is increasingly substituted for manpower. The requirements of air defence should grow correspondingly as the Third World land-attack cruise missile threat matures. The perceived performance of the Tomahawk cruise missile in "Desert Storm" and the vulnerability of US forces to attack during the build-up phase to "Desert Storm" provide strong motives for the proliferation of land-attack cruise missiles. The Global Position System (GPS), which is important for the navigation of land-attack cruise missiles, will in its final configuration include 24 satellites. Its completion is scheduled for 1993. At that time there will be 24 hours a day two-dimensional coverage, building up to a 24 hours a day total coverage. In addition to

GPS, inertial navigation systems are proliferation. What causes a quantum jump is the combination of GPS and inertial navigation.

Collaborators of Gormley demonstrated subsequently how commercial satellite imagery can be exploited for military and environmental applications. Pictures from a multitude of satellites can be bought commercially, and with a programme developed by Pacific-Sierra it is possible to use them for detection of change in the environment (e.g., the effects of radioactivity) and military planning. According to Gormley, with an investment of about \$ 250,000 (in addition to the training of the analysts) all the necessary equipment for significant applications can be acquired.

Clark M. Murdock, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2120 Rayburn Building, Washington, DC 20515

Winkler: [Informs Murdock about the expansion of the International Training Course and the participation by the US, presents the group and gives Murdock a copy of the report of an expert group on the future of Swiss neutrality.] What are the perspectives of American national security after the elections?

Murdock: Already last year when I spoke with you I did that from the position of a Democrat. Now, after the Presidential election, we are meeting different circumstances. Clinton will focus at least in the first weeks on domestic affairs. The bulk of the appointments will not be made before the first or second week of December. Clinton appears to recognize that what counts is what he will do after the inauguration, not the media reporting on the transition phase. Les Aspin is one of the leading candidates for the post of Secretary of Defense. We know nothing further.

What are our areas of particular concern in security policy? We have a new debate on the use of force after the end of the Cold War. In fact, the end of the Cold War made the world safe for the use of force again, as we witness in Yugoslavia, Liberia, Somalia, Angola etc. How, under what conditions to use force, is the main question. It might have been better to use force in Yugoslavia at an earlier stage. Then it could have made a difference. Once Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence, the situation was no longer salvageable. What about the use of force to prevent the spread of armed conflict to Kosovo? The answer of the specialists is that if you exert pressure on Belgrade, the Kosovo-Albanians will rise. There is a gap between the statements of our leaders and what we are indeed prepared to do.

Another issue is the restructuring of US forces. Bush made a 25% draw-down. Aspin added another 3-4%. By 1997 we should thus have a 28-30% draw-down, compared to the present. I suspect the cuts will be deeper because of pressure to work on the economy. This presents an enormous challenge for the leaders of the Pentagon. Clinton knows that the people in charge will have to manage this draw-down correctly because they will be vulnerable to the accusation of having destroyed the fighting force that won "Desert Storm". It must be clear that we kept the critical capabilities. The military needs to be restructured to take into account new missions and new technologies. Unless we do that, the inefficiencies will remain. The Secretary of Defense will have to focus on that as Clinton will focus on the economy.

Grossen: What is the future of the US military presence and engagement in Europe?

Murdock: This debate is placed in the context of the relationships WEU - NATO and France - USA and the question what form the European pillar of NATO should take. The Bush administration closely identified the US security role in Europe with NATO. If we stand back, we see the larger question: How to manage European security affairs? It is ridiculous to say that NATO takes on new missions and then rule out an action in former Yugoslavia. The relationship between NATO and the WEU is not the main issue, the substance is important. I think the new administration will focus less on institutional problems than on addressing real security problems. In the Bush administration we had a growing gap between declarations and deeds. The economic competition between the EC and the US is now looked upon as a zero-sum game. If we cannot work out economic rules, we will also not be able to do it in security affairs. The Clinton administration will make this link much clearer. Clinton will have a more active agenda.

Catrina: What could then effectively be done to improve the situation in former Yugoslavia?

Murdock: There is a lot of consultation [on that] in the Clinton team. Horrible things are occurring on both sides. One should bring together a group of people such as Admiral William Crowe, Les Aspin, Senator Nunn and Representative McCurdy. Bush went to the UN Security Council to have a resolution allowing the use of force. The military stuck its head in the sand, arguing that if they could not do everything, they should not do anything. If US forces were deployed in Bosnia to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, they would be attacked by Muslims in order to engage the US in the conflict. The civil war in Bosnia has effectively already been won by the Serbs and, to a lesser degree, by the Croats.

[Winkler informs Murdock about the number of former Yugoslavs in Switzerland.]

Murdock: Before using force, you have deliberately to apply certain standards. It is a difficult decision.

Catrina: What objectives could still be achieved in former Yugoslavia?

Murdock: We have no clear and realistic strategy. The restoration of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of a multi-ethnic government is not a realistic objective. We should have a dialogue among military people and politicians about what are the objectives and the means to realistically bring them about.

Haiti is another challenge. Clinton said during his campaign that refugees from Haiti are to be accepted. We do not have a coherent policy regarding Haiti and Yugoslavia now. You cannot redress a lost civil war. The EC has to change its attitude toward Macedonia.

Winkler: What US military programmes will be looked at differently by the new administration?

Murdock: The fate of the B-2 has been decided, production will be stopped at 20. The SDI programme will be restructured, giving up space-based assets. The Democrats will not make anything that would violate the ABM Treaty. They will focus on ground-based systems. At a later stage, if Russia does not cooperate in changing some provisions of the ABM Treaty, it may have to be abrogated. The proposition of [technical] cooperation [in BMD] with Russia looks more and more dicy all the time. Yeltsin is in the process of walking two to three steps backwards. We will continue to invest in theatre ballistic missile defense, but we also want to protect ourselves.

Pitteloud: What about the V-22 Osprey programme?

Murdock: There will be a compromise, allowing to start the establishment of a production line. The V-22 will go ahead, but the number of systems to be procured is open. The Osprey could be the high end of a high-medium-low mix. The A-12 is dead. The Seawolf is basically an industrial base decision. Two were authorized, but Bush cut both of them off. The production of one Seawolf SSN would keep the production line open for an additional 2-3 years. The F-14 is in its final draw-down. The production lines of the F-15 and F-16 are kept open now by expert orders. You don't need 13-14 production lines for fighter aircraft, but more than one, perhaps 3-4. The F-22 procurement will probably take place somewhat later, and with lower numbers. It may be employed in a "silver bullet" role, similar to the F-117. You don't need to buy 600.

Winkler: What will be the attitude toward Iran and its nuclear programme?

Murdock: All Americans are concerned, like in the case of Iraq. The economic pressures working in favour of sales from the former Soviet Union are enormous. Sometime in the future we will have to think how to use force to protect US interests in the Persian Gulf against a regional hegemonic power. A lot of stuff is going on. At some point we have to make a tough decision on nascent nuclear powers, and think again about pre-emption.

Pitteloud: Would it be thinkable to put US military forces under UN command for peace-keeping operations involving military action?

Murdock: This belongs to the questions the new administration will have to address. From a security point of view, the US is still the most powerful power. When you think about what is needed for peace-making, only the US has got it. The US will always in effect have a veto over collective security because if the US does not participate [in a certain action] it won't work.

David P. Barton, Staff Consultant, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, 2401 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC

Barton: 1992 has been the most active year of my career, and a lot of things have been accomplished. Issues on which we worked: Congress has been very busy on arms exports, foreign legislation, assistance and foreign aid. So the Committee has been very active in these fields. In the policy area, Congress has to legislate if there will be sanctions or a specific policy only in very special circumstances. In the last 12 years, Congress and the Committee have been very active in presenting alternatives to what the administration was doing. The substantive research reports that Congress can make were an important issue. The Committee assumed a proper role in defining the policy for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). We have been supporters of the work of ACDA. Our role is to call important issues to the attention of the public, e.g. arms trade and proliferation.

We can publish reports to try to influence the different institutions. The General Accounting Office is an institution who makes reports for us. Our reports can for example make an estimation over the assessment of the threat posed by the former USSR that was overestimated for years. This kind of report is very complete and analyses quite deeply this topic. The reports that we do are attempts to influence the policy community. So our study over the USSR will be a base for the next five years of policy-making in defense matters. We act also through editorials in the open press. This is a way we can act beside our official role.

The chemical weapons issue is actually a very important one, one that we have been working on for ten years. The crucial element was in the field of the inspection possibilities: The US had pronounced the principle: "Anywhere - anytime". But we also wanted to protect our black programmes, so the principle suddenly appeared ridiculous for us. We saw the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We had to respond to the enormous changes due to the end of the Cold War. We travelled a lot, for instance to chemical weapons destruction facilities in the former USSR and in the US. We had to ask for technical expertise. The visit to the Johnston Island was the most extensive. Dealing with this field, we grew sceptical about the environmental hazards linked to the destruction of the chemical weapons. The destruction process on Johnston Island has a clean record, but is very slow. The same people who built the weapons thirty years ago are now destroying them. We voted a credit of \$ 940 million for assistance to non-proliferation and destruction of armaments. \$ 100 million are foreseen only for chemical weapons destruction and chemical disarmament. We also looked to give enough support so that the mission to Iraq could succeed.

I see in the future an important role for Switzerland in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament, especially in providing technical assistance, training and specialized personnel.

Concerning arms sales, we have a mixed result. Overall, US sales were sometimes delayed, or there were more controls, but at the end they were done.

The principle of "War powers" is actually being misunderstood. The problem is to decide who can declare war and engage US troops in action. The "War powers" legislation is not well understood even in the Senate, and it remains one of the most important topics of the Committee.

Winkler: What changes will happen within the Committee after the retirement of the current chairman? What will be the future relationship between the House and the Committee?

Barton: Bush was willing to achieve changes. The old Congress supported him mostly. The role of the new Congress is unclear. Most of the new members have absolutely no knowledge about the important issues. The main policy lines will remain: arms sales, trade issues, foreign aid. Arms control will lose priority. We shall have to make sure the destruction of weapons in Russia. We have to help them to disarm. We need to give the CIS republics the money they need to eliminate their weapons. Mr. Hamilton will probably be appointed by President-elect Clinton [as Secretary of State] because of his experience. If he is appointed, he will play a moderate and modest role. The Department of State is very demoralized. It has to be re-vitalized to assume new roles. The Department of Defense has fewer problems in this regard.

Catrina: What is your personal view of the Yugoslav situation?

Barton: Yugoslavia was, in a sense, a clear case where the US waited that Europe would act and take the lead. They should have deployed NATO forces in the very early days. If the Serbs feel no opposition, they go on. There could have been, and still could be done, more, but now under the UN peace-keeping action only. Many of us thought that the US should have made more, but it was difficult to justify. We are not very good Blue Helmets, we are not trained for that. But we could be excellent in logistical support. Yugoslavia is a harmful example for the US of what may arrive in other parts of Europe. It causes here a kind of turmoil, bringing back the images of World War II, at a time when we just came out of the Cold War. There is a tendency in the US to want to wash our hands of these issues, but we are trying to fight against that. What can we do in this conflict? Sell arms to Bosnia? One thing is sure. This conflict will influence the long-range US-European relations.

Winkler: What do you think about the possibility of trade disputes between the US and Japan?

Barton: Trade disputes with Japan will concern first the overture of their market. They have to show progress, and I think they are intelligent enough to do it when they feel they have to. The Americans recognize better than two years ago the benefits of Japanese investments in the US.

Grossen: What is your view of the future relationship between Russia and the Ukraine, in particular with regard to strategic disarmament issues?

Barton: Progress on START-II should be imminent, but Bush and Baker pay not attention to it for the time being. There is little chance that START-II will be accomplished before January 20. I would like to get rid of all the nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. The time between the administration will be difficult. Now a breakthrough could be relatively easy. In next spring, it could be more difficult.

Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Legislative Assistant to Senator John McCain, SR-111, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC

Cordesman [goes through his tables and graphs]. [Main points are:]

- Defense is almost the only field where budgets cuts can be made, where resources can be taken from.
- The reserve forces did not work well in combat [during "Desert Storm"], especially officers are not able to continue their duty for more than 24 hours. After "Desert Storm" Powell wanted to have active manning on logistics reserve units. National Guard units are spread all over the US.
- What does it mean today to be a superpower? We can maintain only a fragile presence, similar to Great Britain at the end of the 19th century.

Ryter: What will be the future of US forces in Europe, and what form should the European pillar of NATO have?

Cordesman: There should be a logical shift. The US should try to respond to the European security concept, rather than trying to influence it. But I do not see a European security concept emerging. Nuclear forces will be cut, sea forces will be cut; the US will keep some air force and perhaps two divisions [in Europe]. Nobody in Europe really knows what they want. The Yugoslav conflict could have been a catalyst; it has in fact been a catalyst for paralysis or impotence. We [the US] may keep the position of the SACEUR longer even than we wanted. We will probably see a gradual reduction of US forces in Europe. NATO did come into force because it was needed.

Von Castelmur: What are the current status and the reconstitution capabilities of the Russian army?

Cordesman: The Soviet army has always been an inefficient army. It would be much more dangerous if it would be smaller and professional. The production of military equipment is on the way down. Conversion is not working. There is no market for, and no mass production of, civilian goods [produced in converted military industries]. Military training in the USSR involved a lot of space and personnel, but it was poor. Out of all that one could consolidate a highly effective army. Nobody has an effective concept for fighting low-level wars at the Southern periphery. The only real reason to fight there is the fate of the Russian minorities. The Russians have to be rebuild 7/8 of their division-size assets and 40% of their airfields. If the right wing would come to power, it will take 3-4 years just to recognize what they are up to.

Grossen: What is the situation in arms control, in particular regarding the implementation of the CFE Treaty by Russia?

Cordesman: The CFE Treaty does not provide any security to the former Soviet Union against fights between its components. The CFE Treaty is irrelevant, and if no peace-making is created, peace-keeping is also going to be irrelevant. The CFE Treaty does not deal with the instabilities of today, i.e., in Central and Eastern Europe and among the former republics of the Soviet Union.

Winkler: What about the relationships of the US with Japan, and with China?

Cordesman: The shadow of war is still active because the leadership consists of gerontocrats. The Chinese market will not be very attractive for another 10-15 years. Japan will not come to grips that a new generation of Chinese nuclear weapons is coming.

Winkler: What is the likely impact of the election of Clinton on the US-Chinese relationship?

Cordesman: Clinton will be harder on proliferation and for this he will have bipartisan support.

Grossen: How destabilizing would a unification on the Korean peninsula be?

Cordesman: Unification would per se not necessarily be destabilizing if it were not done on Kim Il-Sung's terms. But it is indeed difficult to image unification to happen, especially on Kim's terms.

Ryter: How do you expect the dispute over the Spratley Islands to continue?

Cordesman: Vietnam is in fact not able to do anything. The strategic value of the Spratleys is very limited. They are too small to deploy troops.

Programm

Montag, 2. November

- 0945 Bern - Zürich Flughafen (Ankunft 1116)
 1300 Zürich - New York (JFK): SR 100 (Ankunft 1555 Lokalzeit New York)
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Dienstag, 3. November

Wahltag (Präsident, Vizepräsident, ein Drittel des Senats, das ganze Repräsentantenhaus)

- 1000 Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, 757 Third Avenue, 21st Floor: Meeting with Ambassador Johannes Manz, Minister François Chappuis, Counsellor Lise Favre and Ambassador Herbert von Arx
 1530 Mr. Per Sjogren, Director, Field Operations Division, United Nations, S-2260 A, Tel. (212) 963-6141
 1630 Brigadier-General M. Baril, Military Counsellor to the Secretary-General, United Nations, S-3750, Tel. (212) 963-2400
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Mittwoch, 4. November

- 0930 Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, S-3150 A, Tel. (212) 963-5590
 1030 Visit of the United Nations Headquarters
 1130 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive President of the Special Commission, United Nations, S-3120 G, Tel. (212) 963-3018
 1315 Lunch offered by Ambassador Johannes Manz, UN Plaza Hotel, Perez de Cuellar Suite 29/35
 1530 Mr. Ian Cuthbertson, Institute for East-West Studies, 360 Lexington Avenue, Tel. (212) 557-2570
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Donnerstag, 5. November

- 1100 Mr. Vladimir Petrovski, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, United Nations, S-3720 A, Tel. (212) 963-3166
 1200 Mr. Sashi Tharoor, Assistant to the Under-Secretary General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, S-3727 D, Tel. (212) 963-2912
 1830 Cocktail offered by Mrs. Lise Favre, 240 East 47th Street
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Freitag, 6. November

- 1000 Ambassador Olara Otunnu, International Peace Academy, 777 UN Plaza, Tel. (212) 949-8480
 1030 Mr. F.T. Liu, International Peace Academy, 777 UN Plaza
 1130 Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary General for Peace-Keeping Operations, S-3630 A, Tel. (212) 963-8079
 1500 Sir Brian Urquhart, Ford Foundation, 320 East 43rd Street, Tel. (212) 573-5000
 1730 New York (La Guardia) - Washington (National): DL 1763 (Arrival 1836)
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Samstag, 7. November*Washington und Umgebung (2 Personenwagen der Botschaft stehen zur Verfügung)***Sonntag, 8. November***Washington und Umgebung (2 Personenwagen der Botschaft stehen zur Verfügung)*1230 (SCOS) Zürich - Washington, DC (Dulles International): SR 128 (Ankunft 1715
Lokalzeit Washington)**Montag, 9. November**

- 0830 Meeting at the Swiss Embassy with Minister Blickenstorfer, Acting Ambassador; Major-General Dürig, Defense Attaché; Staff Members
- 1000 Division for Defense Policy and Arms Control, NSC, 17th Street, Entrance Pennsylvania Avenue, Richard B. Davis and William Toby, Tel. (202) 395-5865, Room 180
- 1100 Director for Soviet Affairs, NSC, Mr. Nicholas Burns, Tel. (202) 395-6849
- 1130 Director for European Affairs, NSC, Mrs. Jane E. Holl, Tel. (202) 395-4996
- 1230 Lunch at the Riverview Grill, Watergate, 2650 Virginia Avenue, Tel. (202) 295-4455
- 1400 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W.: Assistant Director Michael L. Moodie and colleagues, Tel. (202) 647-5999, Room 5941
- 1600 Office of European Security and Political Affairs, Department of State: Deputy Director Jim Cunningham, Tel. (202) 647-1626
- 1700 Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Department of State, Tel. (202) 647-0025, Room 7635
- 1930 Dinner with Dr. Pauli Järvenpää (Counsellor, Embassy of Finland), meet at Hotel Lobby, Holiday Inn, Georgetown

Dienstag, 10. November

- 1025 Meeting at Mall Entrance with Dr. Joseph Halgus, Tel. (202) 695-6508
- 1030 Principal Director for European and NATO Policy, Mr. George W. Bader, Tel. (202) 697-7207
- 1130 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, the Honorable Steven Hadley
- 1200 Lunch at the Pentagon, hosted by Major-General Dürig
- 1330 Mr. Brad Knopp, DIA: The Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
- 1530 Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W.: Meeting with Major-General John Sewall and colleagues, Tel. (202) 287-9213
- 1930 Dinner hosted by Counsellor Dr. Jean-Jacques De Dardel, 2726 Brandywine Street, N.W., Tel. (202) 966-9582 (with Prof. Hans Binnendijk, Dennis Gormley, David P. Barton, Mark Jackson)

Mittwoch, 11. November

Veteran's Day

- 1000 Mr. John G. Hines, Director, The Phoenix Institute, 7915 Jones Branche Drive, Tysons Corner, McLean, VA, Tel. (703) 848-6754
- 1200 Lunch at the Stockyard Inn, Tysons Corner, hosted by Major-General Dürig, Tel. (703) 356-0545
- 1430 Dr. Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Vice President, Policy Research, Pacific Sierra Research Corp., 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Rosslyn, Arlington, VA, Tel. (703) 527-4975
- 1730 Reception at the Johns Hopkins University, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue (Rome Building), hosted by Dr. Fred Tanner, Tel. (202) 833-9577
- 1900 (SCOS) Washington, DC (Dulles International) - Zürich: SR 129 (Ankunft Donnerstag 1030)

Donnerstag, 12. November

- 0930 Mr. Clark M. Murdock, Professional Staff Member, House Committee on Armed Services, 2120 Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2212, Tel. (202) 225-4151
- 1030 Mr. David Paul Barton, Staff Consultant, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, 2401A Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2255, Tel. (202) 225-8926
- 1145 Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Legislative Assistant to Senator John McCain, SR-111, Russell Senate Office Building, Room 111, Tel. (202) 224-2235
- 1315 Lunch at the Residence of Major-General Hans Dürig (with Mr. Dennis Gormley and Dr. Joseph Halgus), Tel. (202) 537-1526
- 1500 Meeting at the Embassy of Switzerland, debriefing with Minister Dr. Christian Blickenstorfer, Counsellor Dr. Jean-Jacques De Dardel, Major-General Hans Dürig, Colonel Hansruedi Rüesch
- 2000 Washington (National) - Atlanta: DL 1185 (Arrival 2147)

Freitag, 13. November

- 1000-1200 Visit of Cable News Network (CNN), Meeting with Lori Konopka and Eavis Jordan
- 1915 Atlanta - Zürich: SR 121 1915 (Arrival Saturday 0955)

Teilnehmer

- Delegationsleiter:* Div Louis Geiger, Stabschef für Operative und Strategische Schulung, Stab GGST, EMD
- Stv. Delegationsleiter:* Dr. Theodor H. Winkler, Beauftragter des Generalstabschefs für sicherheitspolitische Fragen, EMD
- Delegation:* Dr. Christian Catrina, Stellvertreter des Beauftragten des Generalstabschefs für sicherheitspolitische Fragen, EMD
Dr. Linus von Castelmur, Politische Abteilung III, EDA
Dr. Philippe Grossen, Stab GGST, EMD
Dr. Jacques Pitteloud, Stab GGST, EMD
Lic. ès. sc. pol. Marc-André Ryter, Stab GGST, EMD

Liste der Gesprächspartner

- Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, New York, NY 10017
- Mr. George W. Bader, Principal Director for European and NATO Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
- Brigadier-General M. Baril, Military Counsellor to the Secretary General, United Nations, New York, NY 10017
- Mr. David P. Barton, Staff Consultant, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, 2401 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC
- Mr. Nicholas Burns, Director Russia and former Soviet Republics' Affairs, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Washington, DC
- Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Legislative Assistant to Senator John McCain, SR-111, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC
- Mr. James Cunningham, Deputy Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
- Mr. Ian Cuthbertson, Institute for EastWest Studies, 360 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10017
- Mr. Richard B. Davis, Division for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Washington, DC
- Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY 10017
- Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive President of the Special Commission, United Nations, New York, NY 10017
- Dr. Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Vice President, Policy Research, Pacific-Sierra Research Corp., 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1100, Arlington, VA 22209
- Mr. Steven Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
- Mr. John G. Hines, Director, The Phoenix Institute, BDM International Inc., 7915 Jones Branch Drive, McLean, VA 22102
- Mrs. Jane E. Holl, Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Washington, DC
- Dr. Johnson, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC
- Mr. Brad Knopp, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
- Mr. F.-T. Liu, International Peace Academy, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York
- Mrs. Karen Look, Bureau for Strategic Nuclear Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, Washington, DC
- Dr. Phoebe Marr, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC
- Dr. Ron Montaperto, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC

Mr. Michael L. Moodie, Assistant Director, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, Washington, DC

Mr. Clark M. Murdock, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2120 Rayburn Building, Washington, DC 20515

Ambassador Olara Otunnu, Director, International Peace Academy, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York

Mr. Vladimir F. Petrovsky, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

Dr. Stanley Riveles, Bureau for Strategic Nuclear Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, Washington, DC

Major-General John Sewall, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC

Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC

Mr. Per Sjogren, Director, Field Operations, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

Mr. Jeff Snyder, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC

Colonel Vic Stamey, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie McNair, 4th and P Street, S.W., Washington, DC

Mr. Gordon Sterling, Bureau for European Security Negotiations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, Washington, DC

Mr. Sashi Tharoor, Assistant to the Under-Secretary for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, New York, NY 10017

William Toby, Division for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Washington, DC

Sir Brian Urquhart, Ford Foundation, 320 East 43rd Street, New York, NY 10017