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AUSBILDUNGSPROGRAMM FÜR SICHERHEITSPOLITISCHE EXPERTEN

BERICHT  
 DER REISE NACH  
 NEW YORK UND WASHINGTON  
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Für die Schweiz direkt relevante Erkenntnisse  
 Zusammenfassender Bericht  
 Gesprächsnotizen  
 Programm  
 Liste der Gesprächspartner  
 Teilnehmer  
 Liste der personellen Beiträge an friedenserhaltenden Aktionen der UNO  
 per 30. September 1993

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BÜRO DES BEAUFTRAGTEN DES GENERALSTABSCHIEFS FÜR SICHERHEITSPOLITISCHE FRAGEN  
 EIDGENÖSSISCHES MILITÄRDEPARTEMENT, VIKTORIASTRASSE 82, 3003 BERN  
 14. DEZEMBER 1993

Dodis



## VERTRAULICH

Beauftragter des Generalstabschefs  
für sicherheitspolitische Fragen

3003 Bern, 13.12.93

SIPOLEX-Reise nach New York und Washington

## Zusammenfassung der für die Schweiz wesentlichsten Punkte

### 1. Aufenthalt in New York

- (1) Dank der hervorragenden Betreuung durch die Schweizer Beobachtermission bei der UNO wurde die Delegation erneut auf hohem Niveau empfangen. Es erwies sich als kluger Vorschlag von Herrn Botschafter Manz, den Chef des AC-Labors, Dr. Brunner, für den Teil New York in die Delegation aufzunehmen. So konnte der UNO in einem für sie wesentlichen Bereich auch Information geboten werden. Es wird empfohlen, an diesem neuen Modell festzuhalten.
- (2) Die Vereinten Nationen sehen sich heute, vier Jahre nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, erneut in einer schwierigen Lage. Es handelt sich in mancher Beziehung um eine durch Erfolg bedingte Krise.

Endlich befreit von der Paralyisierung durch den Ost-West-Gegensatz haben die Vereinten Nationen in den letzten Jahren jene Rolle zu spielen begonnen, die ihnen in San Francisco zugeordnet worden war. Sie sind zum Träger eines neuen Ansatzes zur Schaffung einer Weltordnung geworden. Die KSZE hat sich als Regionalorganisation der UNO gemäss Kapitel VIII der UN-Charta erklärt. UNO und KSZE verleihen Aktionen der Staatengemeinschaft die unabdingbare Legitimität. Mit "Agenda for Peace" wurde ein in die Zukunft weisendes, ambitioniertes Konzept vom UN-Generalsekretär vorgelegt. Zahl, Umfang und Komplexität der friedenserhaltenden Missionen der UNO haben dramatisch zugenommen. Heute stehen über 76'000 Mann UNO-Personal aus 75 Ländern in 16 derartigen Missionen im Einsatz. Neben militärischen Kontingenten stehen immer häufiger auch zivile Experten aller Art im Einsatz. Es wurde (in Somalia) der Versuch unternommen, von reinen Operationen des Peace-Keeping (gemäss Kapitel VI der Charta) zur gewaltsamen Durchsetzung von Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrates (gemäss Kapitel VII der Charta) überzugehen.

Dieser Versuch ist hingegen gescheitert. Der amerikanische Entscheid zum Abzug aus Somalia (bis Ende März 1994) stellt eine eigentliche Zäsur dar. Die UNO stand während des Besuches der Delegation deutlich im Zeichen dieses Ereignisses. Die Euphorie der letzten Jahre ist einer Denkpause bezüglich des künftigen Kurses gewichen. Weitere Operationen unter Kapitel VII werden zwar nicht a priori ausgeschlossen, kommen aber faktisch schon deswegen nicht als reale Möglichkeit in Betracht, weil niemand bereit zu sein scheint, hierfür Mittel zur Verfügung zu stellen. Situationen, in denen die UNO selbst zur Partei zu werden droht (wie in Mogadiscu Süd) müssten, so war immer wieder zu hören, unbedingt vermieden werden. Gleichzeitig wurde die Befürchtung laut, dass sich die UNO überdehnen könnte (wenn nicht gar bereits überdehnt habe). Neue Missionen könnten, so wurde ausgeführt, inskünftig wohl kaum einfach automatisch übernommen werden (kurz nach dem Besuch der Delegation wurde den auch erstmals eine Peace-Keeping-Mission in Afrika abgelehnt). Die Finanzkrise der UNO selbst

(Jahresbudget 1 Mrd \$) und des Peace-Keeping (Jahresbudget bereits 3 Mrd. \$) verstärkt nur noch diesen Zwang zum Umdenken.

- (3) Angesichts der bevorstehenden Abstimmung über die Blau-Helme vom kommenden Juni ist es wesentlich die folgenden Punkte besonders hervorzuheben:
- Es besteht die Gefahr, dass die Aktion in Somalia im kommenden Frühjahr mit dem Abzug der Amerikaner zusammenbrechen wird. Bereits haben die meisten anderen westlichen Nationen verlauten lassen, dass sie ihre Kontingente auch abziehen würden, wenn die USA sich zurückzögen. Von den an der Operation beteiligten Staaten der Dritten Welt wird erklärt, dass sie wohl ebenfalls nicht weitermachen würden, wenn sich der Westen abmelde.
  - Es wird, zumindest in absehbarer Zeit, keine weiteren "Somalias" mehr geben. Wohl dürfte in den Mandaten künftiger Operationen vom Sicherheitsrat eine Referenz zu Kapitel VII eingebaut werden (um für den Fall einer Eskalation der Lage gewappnet zu sein); die Mandate werden aber insgesamt auf Kapitel VI (Peace-Keeping) beruhen und es fehlt gegenwärtig der politische Wille, für Operationen des Peace Enforcement Mittel zur Verfügung zu stellen.
  - Wahrscheinlich erscheint, dass das Schwergewicht künftig auf Operationen vom Typ Kambodscha liegen wird - also Operationen multidimensionaler Natur, in der neben militärischen auch zivile Komponenten und eine solche der Mithilfe beim Wiederaufbau der Einsatzländer eine zentrale Rolle spielen. Kambodscha wurde als grosser Erfolg gewertet.
  - Der Bedarf der UNO an finanzieller, materieller und personeller Unterstützung ist im Bereich Peace-Keeping immens. Jeder Schweizer Beitrag wäre höchst willkommen. Am liebsten sähe man schweizerische Spezialeinheiten (Logistik, Genie, etc.). In diesen hochspezialisierten Bereichen liegen die dringendsten Bedürfnisse der UNO. Dies will natürlich nicht besagen, dass nicht auch ein Schweizer Infanterie-Battalion erwünscht wäre. Mehrere Länder, die traditionell die UNO sehr stark im Bereich des Peace-Keeping unterstützen, stossen an die Grenzen ihrer Möglichkeiten (zB Kanada). Ein Ausbau des schweizerischen Beitrages käme angesichts dieser Lage aus Sicht der UNO genau zum richtigen Zeitpunkt.
  - Staaten, die aktiv zum Peace-Keeping beitragen (zB die skandinavischen Staaten, Kanada), haben in der UNO auch deutlich mehr Gewicht. Sie zögern auch nicht, einen grösseren Einfluss in der Entscheidungsfindung bei Peace-Keeping einzufordern.
  - Der bisherige schweizerische Beitrag im Bereich Peace-Keeping wird von der UNO hoch geschätzt und qualitativ als erstklassig bezeichnet. Das betrifft sowohl das von der Schweiz gestellte Personal aller Art wie das Material. Dies sei mit einem Beispiel verdeutlicht: Die Schweiz hat in der West-Sahara Container zum Einsatz gebracht und damit wegweisend gewirkt. Bisher wurden bei Operationen der UNO vor Ort die notwendigen Gebäude gekauft oder gebaut. Dies war zeitaufwendig; die Investition verfiel, nach Beendigung der Mission. Container können wiederverwendet werden, reduzieren damit Kosten, und sind erst noch - in der spezialisierten Konfiguration, die die Schweiz entwickelt hat - besser. Die UNO möchte, dass auch andere Staaten das Schweizer Modell übernehmen.

- (4) Der gute Ruf der Schweiz in der UNO, ihre (pro Kopf der Bevölkerung) hohe Beitragsleistung ans Budget, ihr sich verstärkendes Engagement im Bereich Peace-Keeping und ihre Situation als Sitz des europäischen Hauptquartiers der UNO stehen in immer stärkerem Kontrast zur schweizerischen UNO-Nichtmitgliedschaft.

Heute sind, von allen Staaten der Welt, gerade noch die Schweiz und der Vatikan nicht Mitglied der Weltorganisation. Dies ist ein absolut unbefriedigender Zustand.

Unsere Beobachtermission leistet hervorragende Arbeit in New York. Ihr sind aber wegen der Nichtmitgliedschaft oft in in sehr hemmender Weise die Hände gebunden. Man ist immer wieder auf die Hilfestellung und Unterstützung befreundeter Länder angewiesen. Wir haben nicht die Möglichkeit, unsere Interessen - gerade in der Vollversammlung - in einer Form zu vertreten, die angemessen ist. Interventionen in der Vollversammlung müssen dieser Umstände wegen (und nicht etwa, weil wir nichts zu sagen oder zu bieten hätten) dosiert werden. Sie sind auf politischer Ebene, also auf Stufe Bundesrat, gar kaum denkbar, da die Rahmenbedingungen (Beobachterbank, stunden-, wenn nicht gar tagelanges Warten, bis man - womöglich in einer Randstunde und vor weitgehend leerem Saal - sprechen kann) einem Vertreter der Landesregierung einfach nicht zugemutet werden können.

Diese Sachlage ist angesichts des neuen Gewichtes, welches der UNO zukommt, erst recht nicht länger verantwortbar. Sollten wir der UNO ab 1995 Blauhelme zur Verfügung stellen können, so würde sie aus Sicht des Unterzeichnenden noch weniger verständlich.

Die entsprechende Schlussfolgerung des Berichtes des Bundesrates zur Aussenpolitik deckt sich daher vollumfänglich mit dem Eindruck der Delegation.

- (5) Oesterreich, Schweden und Finnland sind im Bereich Peace-Keeping in New York in den zuständigen Stäben sehr gut vertreten, haben Einfluss und verstärken diesen durch relativ kostengünstige Initiativen weiter. Ein für letzteres typisches Beispiel ist die Initiative Wiens, in Oesterreich Kurse für UNO-Peace-Keeper durchzuführen. Es liegt im Interesse der Schweiz, hier nachzuziehen und einerseits ihr Ausbildungsangebot zugunsten der UNO, wenn möglich, weiter auszubauen, andererseits die Mission in New York durch einen sicherheitspolitischen Experten - der dem Missionschef untersteht, dessen Stelle nicht zulasten des ohnehin knapp bemessenen Stellen-Etats der Mission geht und mit den strategischen, militärischen sowie technischen (nicht aber politisch-diplomatischen) Aspekten des Peace-Keeping betraut ist - zu verstärken.

## 2. Aufenthalt in Washington

- (1) Dank der gewohnt ausgezeichneten Unterstützung durch unsere Botschaft in Washington war es erneut möglich, in einem sehr dichten Programm hochrangige Vertreter der amerikanischen Administration zu treffen. Herrn Botschafter Jagmetti, seinem Mitarbeiter, Herrn Vogelsanger, Div Schlup und Oberst Rüesch sei an dieser Stelle herzlichst gedankt. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Administration seit der letzten SIPOLEX-Reise wechselte, kam dieser Möglichkeit der Kontaktaufnahme besonderes Gewicht zu.
- (2) Insgesamt hatte die Delegation den Eindruck, dass die Clinton-Administration ihre definitive Kursbestimmung noch nicht vorgenommen und eventuell auch noch nicht zwingenderweise ihre definitive personelle Zusammensetzung gefunden habe. Die

Besetzung der rund 8'000 politischen Stellen innerhalb der Administration war noch immer nicht abgeschlossen. Kurskorrekturen, auch in wesentlichen Fragen, prägten durchaus weiter das Bild (vgl. zB ex-Jugoslawien und Somalia).

Dieses für neue Administrationen an sich durchaus nicht unübliche Bild fällt beim Clinton-Team im Bereich der Aussenpolitik deshalb stärker als normal auf, weil die neue Administration - entsprechend der Stimmung in der Bevölkerung - ihren Hauptakzent im ersten Amtsjahr auf die Innen- und Wirtschaftspolitik legte. Erst allmählich scheint ihr bewusst geworden zu sein, dass Führungsstärke vom Präsidenten auch klare aussenpolitische Kursbestimmungen und aussenpolitischen Erfolg verlangt.

Gleichzeitig ist ein stärkerer Realismus in der Politikgestaltung erkennbar. Idealismus beginnt Pragmatismus zu weichen. Man beginnt aus den ersten Erfahrungen auch Lehren zu ziehen. Kurskorrekturen werden vorgenommen, ev. aber immer noch zu hastig vorgenommen.

Als Beispiel sei etwa Somalia angeführt. Nachdem man dem Kommandanten vor Ort zuerst einen allzu ambitiösen, politisch eher nebulös formulierten Auftrag überband, ohne ihm die dafür unabdingbaren Mittel zur Verfügung zu stellen, zieht man sich nun so schnell wie möglich zurück. Auf die Frage, ob das Kapitulieren vor General Aidid nicht letztlich den Saddam Husseins dieser Welt den Eindruck vermitteln würde, die USA gäben nun jedem brutalen Druck nach (was später dazu zwingen könnte, Glaubwürdigkeit wieder mit höherem Einsatz zu belegen), wurde mit den Schultern gezuckt und bemerkt, das sei wohl wahrscheinlich so, könne aber eben nicht geändert werden.

Derartige Ausschläge des Pendels gehören stets zu amerikanischer Politik. Sie fallen aber bei der gegenwärtigen Administration tendenziell deswegen eher stärker aus, weil 12 Jahre republikanischer Präsidentschaft auch bedeuten, dass die Demokraten über einen sehr kleinen Stab von aussen- und sicherheitspolitischen Experten mit Regierungserfahrung verfügen.

Mit weiteren Schwankungen der amerikanischen Politik ist wohl bis mindestens zu den Mid-Term-Elections vorsichtigerweise zu rechnen.

- (3) Ein wesentliches Thema war für die Delegation, ob die USA unter Präsident Clinton den traditionellen transatlantischen Schwerpunkt durch eine asiatisch-pazifische Ausrichtung ersetzen könnten.

Mehrere kluge Beobachter hielten dies durchaus für möglich, wenn nicht gar wahrscheinlich.

Der Unterzeichnende kann zwar die Argumente, die in diese Richtung weisen, durchaus verstehen und würdigen, die Ansicht als solche aber nicht teilen.

Die pazifische Versuchung besteht ohne Zweifel. In diesem Raum liegt heute die "Aktienmehrheit" des amerikanischen Aussenhandels. Im Gegensatz zum unter der Rezession leidenden Europa sind in diesem Raum die wirtschaftlichen Wachstumsraten zT mehr als beeindruckend. Der wirtschaftliche Stellenwert des Raumes wird daher, zulasten der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung Europas, in den kommenden Jahren noch weiter zunehmen. Zudem ist das wirtschaftliche Verhältnis zu Europa von den harzigen GATT-Verhandlungen mit überschattet.

Dem muss hingegen entgegengehalten werden, dass die sicherheitspolitischen Schwerpunkte der Weltmacht USA nicht im pazifischen Raum liegen (klammert man China, den wesentlichen Spieler von morgen, und Nordkorea, einen der wichtigen Irritationspunkte der nächsten 5 Jahre, einmal aus). Der Handel wird in Asien weder heute, noch während der Amtszeit der Clinton-Administration durch zentrale aussen- und sicherheitspolitische Interessen ergänzt. Ferner ist der pazifische Raum sogar noch heterogener als die Lage in Europa. Gemeinsame Nenner finden sich hier selten. Die bilateralen Einzelbeziehungen zu den USA kennen, aus unterschiedlichen Gründen, starke Belastungen (China: Menschenrechte und Demokratie; Japan: US-Eindruck eines Free Ride und der technologischen Rivalität; Südkorea: Bange Frage, welchen Einfluss ein vereintes Korea auf Japan hätte; Philippinen: Bitterer Nachgeschmack der Stützpunktverhandlungen; etc.). Der pazifische Gipfel war mehr Symbol denn Gehalt. Es wird auch gerne übersehen, dass der Aussenhandel für die USA einen gesamtwirtschaftlich unendlich kleineren Stellenwert hat als etwa für die Schweiz. Was die USA schmerzt und bewegt, sind eher die Importe als die Exporte. Hier steht Europa im Agrarbereich und in Einzelkategorien (zB Airbus) auf der schwarzen Liste. Die wirkliche Herausforderung liegt jedoch in den Augen der amerikanischen Bevölkerung in chinesischen Textilien, japanischer Technologie, südkoreanischen Schiffen und Autos. Der Durchschnittsamerikaner mag Europa nicht besonders lieben (es sei denn als Ferienziel); er steht der asiatischen Handelspolitik aber klar ablehnend gegenüber.

Letztlich sollten wohl die amerikanischen Irritationen bezüglich Europa nicht überschätzt werden (wohl aber - und ganz besonders im wirtschaftlichen Bereich - sehr ernst genommen werden). Die jüngste Entwicklungstendenz in den GATT-Verhandlungen bestärkt diesen Eindruck.


Die US Truppenpräsenz in Europa wird weiter absacken. Das Potential für einen Handelskrieg besteht. In letzter Konsequenz werden die USA aber sich weder aus Europa zurückziehen, noch mit ihm brechen.

- (4) Klare und permanente Linien hat die neue Administration im aussenpolitischen Bereich erst wenige gezogen. Zu ihnen gehören jedoch die folgenden:
- Der Versuch, durch eine konsequente Unterstützung Yeltsins, Russland als kooperativen Partner zu erhalten.
- "Partnership for Peace" (PFP) ist deutlicher Ausdruck dafür, dass die USA nicht bereit sind, Russland in einer mehr als kritischen Periode seines politischen Entwicklungsprozesses vor den Kopf zu stossen. Konkret: Man war nicht bereit, dem Wunsch der Visegrad-Gruppe und dem Drängen Deutschlands nachzugeben, Mitteleuropa eine konkrete Beitrittsoption zur NATO zu geben. Man befürchtete vielmehr, dass der NATO-Gipfel (zeitlich, aus damaliger Sicht, zwischen Duma- und Präsidentschaftswahlen gelegen), falls er eine solche Option eröffnen würde, beinahe alle politischen Gruppierungen in Russland zu einem Anti-NATO-Kurs verpflichten würde. PFP stellt einen eleganten Versuch dar, die Quadratur des Zirkels zu versuchen.
- Non-Proliferation hat einen sehr hohen Stellenwert. Man spricht nun aber von "Counter-Proliferation" und fügt damit bewusst den diplomatischen und politischen Nonproliferationsinstrumenten die Option militärischer Massnahmen gegen Proliferations Sünder hinzu. Man weiss, dass Proliferation nicht gestoppt werden kann; man hofft hingegen, sie zeitlich ganz erheblich verzögern zu können.

- Die Verknüpfung von Aussen- und Wirtschaftspolitik. "There will not be a free lunch anymore", ist man versucht zu sagen. Das betrifft GATT ebenso wie die Handelsbeziehungen mit Asien.
  - Die Bereitschaft, das militärische Engagement des Landes rein von nationalen Interessen leiten zu lassen. Die Überprüfung der Verteidigungsdoktrin ("Bottoms-up Review") ist hierfür ebenso Ausdruck wie die mangelnde Bereitschaft, "body bags" und Geiseln in Somalia hinzunehmen. Die Clinton-Administration ist nicht bereit, Weltordnung zu schaffen (besonders nicht, nachdem sie idealistischere Ansätze in ex-Jugoslawien auf den Klippen europäischer Skepsis auflaufen sah). Dies ist jedoch - das zeigt etwa der Nahost-Friedensprozess - nicht einfach mit Isolationismus gleichzusetzen. Man behält sich einfach offen, in jedem Fall die eigenen Interessen nüchtern abzuwägen. Das zeigt sich auch im Schluss, militärische Mittel für 2,5 Regionalkonflikte à la Golf weiter bereit zu halten.
- (5) Der Stellenwert der Schweiz hat sich für die USA marginal verbessert, generell aber unter der neuen Administration weiter abgenommen. Marginal verbessert hat sich der Ruf der Schweiz im Non-Proliferationsbereich. Alte Vorurteile (besonders des Kongresses) sind nach wie vor anzutreffen, gehen aber weniger tief als früher. Generell hingegen hat unser Land, nun da der Kalte Krieg vorbei ist und man Genf weder für Gipfeltreffen, noch für nukleare Rüstungskontrollverhandlungen mehr benötigt, fühlbar reduziert. Wir sind auch für die USA kein "Sonderfall" mehr - und drohen ganz einfach zu einem europäischen Kleinstaat zu werden.
- (6) Wesentlich war, dass - obwohl die Neutralen bei der Konzipierung von PFP bestenfalls ein "afterthought" waren - das Pentagon (in der Form des für PFP verantwortlichen Assistant Secretary of Defence) die Schweiz spezifisch und explizit einlud, diese Einladung aufzunehmen, während die zuständige, gleichrangige Beamtin im State Department uns zudem auch einlud, auf die konkrete Ausformulierung des Konzeptes noch vor dem NATO-Gipfel Einfluss zu nehmen, sofern wir dies gern möchten. Man wäre für jeden Denkanstoss dankbar.

### 3. Zusammenfassende Beurteilung

Die Reise hat erneut wesentliche Erkenntnisse und Denkanstösse vermittelt (vgl. beiliegenden "Zusammenfassenden Bericht" und Gesprächsprotokolle). Vor allem hat sie erneut ermöglicht, Kontakte zu für uns wichtigen Entscheidungsträgern zu pflegen und zu knüpfen. Am Prinzip dieser Reisen ist zwingend festzuhalten.



Dr. Theodor H. Winkler

## VERTRAULICH

## Zusammenfassender Bericht

Die dominanten Themen bei den Gesprächen waren die Fragen, die sich um friedenserhaltende Operationen der UNO nach den Erfahrungen in Somalia und angesichts des anhaltenden Konflikts im ehemaligen Jugoslawien stellen, sowie die Ausrichtung der amerikanischen Aussen- und Rüstungskontrollpolitik, mit besonderer Betonung der Problembereiche ehemalige Sowjetunion und Eindämmung bzw. Bekämpfung der Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen und ihrer ballistischen Trägersysteme.

Dabei ergab sich der Eindruck, dass das Überschreiten bisheriger Prinzipien (friedenserhaltende Aktionen nur mit Zustimmung der beteiligten Konfliktparteien) in Richtung Peace enforcement weniger das Ergebnis einer sorgfältigen Abwägung als vielmehr der Dynamik der Lageentwicklung in Somalia war. Durch diese Erfahrung veranlasst, fragt man sich nun in New York wie in Washington, ob man die Linie zwischen Kapitel 6 und 7 der UNO-Charta nicht zu leichtfertig überschritten habe. (Kapitel 6 betrifft friedenserhaltende Operationen mit Zustimmung der Konfliktparteien, Kapitel 7 Zwangsmassnahmen ohne deren Zustimmung). Die Stimmung und die geäusserten Zweifel deuten darauf hin, dass man sich wieder eher auf "traditionelle" Missionen zurückbesinnen will, wobei diese allerdings zivile Elemente enthalten sollen. Dies ergibt sich aus der Problemstellung: zunehmend geht es nicht nur darum, Waffenstillstandslinien einzufrieren und zu überwachen, sondern um den Wiederaufbau "gescheiterter Staaten". Beispiele für "gescheiterte Staaten" sind Kambodscha, wo die UNO-Operation im ganzen erfolgreich war, Somalia und möglicherweise auch Haiti.

### *Peace-keeping*

Die Krise in UNO-Peace-keeping wurde von manchen Gesprächspartnern als "Problem des Erfolgs" betrachtet. Die UNO könne in dieser Hinsicht erstmals die in der Charta vorgesehenen Funktionen ausüben. Damit stellten sich andere Fragen als bei den "traditionellen" friedenserhaltenden Operationen. Die volle Funktionsfähigkeit der UNO habe das Problem der Kommandostrukturen erst aufkommen lassen. Es erscheine aber zweifelhaft, ob die UNO sich noch in Operationen wie jener in Somalia einlassen werde, zumal die USA und andere Staaten nicht bereit seien, diese Richtung zu unterstützen.

Drei Arten von friedenserhaltenden Operationen wurden identifiziert: Interposition zwischen feindlichen Parteien (traditionell), multidimensionale Operationen ohne Anwendung von Gewalt (Kambodscha) und Operationen mit gewaltsamer Durchsetzung von Beschlüssen (Somalia). Schwierigkeiten bereitet die dritte Kategorie, allerdings könnten auch Operationen wie in Kambodscha sich so entwickeln, dass eine gewaltsame Durchsetzung notwendig würde. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat tendiere denn auch dazu, nunmehr in Mandaten für friedenserhaltende Aktionen eine Referenz zu Kapitel 7 (d.h. Möglichkeit gewaltsamer Durchsetzung ohne Zustimmung aller Konfliktparteien) aufzunehmen, um die Möglichkeit der Eskalation nicht auszuschliessen. Dies wecke aber Besorgnisse der Staaten, die Truppen für solche Operationen stellen, da damit unklar sei, ob eine Operation im Rahmen des traditionellen Peace-keeping bleibe.

Es gibt einen klaren Trend zu multidimensionalen Operationen, die auch zivile Elemente einschliesst, wie in Namibia und Kambodscha. Die Erfahrungen in Somalia und im ehemaligen Jugoslawien haben aber zu einer Stimmung geführt, in der man sich fragt, ob man nicht besser zu traditionellen und einfachen friedenserhaltenden Operationen zurückkehren sollte. Es bestehen nach den Erfahrungen in Somalia insbesondere Zweifel, ob die USA sich mit einem bedeutenden Truppenkontingent an einer potentiellen Operation im ehemaligen Jugoslawien beteiligen würden.



Gefragt, welches Bild die friedenserhaltenden Operationen im nächsten Jahr abgeben dürften, wurde gesagt, dass im nächsten Frühling dürften die Bilder aus Somalia weniger negativ sein dürften, wenn die Amerikaner (und gleichzeitig andere Kontingente) abziehen werden. Indessen könnte die Lage in Kroatien sehr schlecht aussehen. Es gebe zwei Arten von Bildern, die Peace-keeping in einem schlechten Licht dastehen lassen: friedenserhaltende Truppen, die angegriffen werden, und eine schlechte Lage, die durch friedenserhaltende Truppen nicht verbessert wird. Ein Rückzug ohne klare Verbesserung der Lage setze einen schlechten Präzedenzfall.

### *UNO-Mission in Somalia*

Fast alle Gesprächspartner - in der UNO, in unabhängigen Think Tanks, und auch in der US-Administration und im Kongress - betonten, die Operation in Somalia sei nicht so schlecht verlaufen, wie man glauben machen wolle. In 95% des Gebiets verlaufe die Operation gut, eigentlich sei sie nur in Süd-Mogadiscio schiefgegangen. Im Rest des Landes seien lokale Verwaltungskomitees eingesetzt worden, die humanitäre Hilfe komme an, landwirtschaftliche Planung sei wiederaufgenommen worden, und die Polizeikräfte würden ausgebildet.

Die dafür zuständige UNO-Beamtin machte darauf aufmerksam, dass man in Situationen wie in Somalia mit einem Teufelskreis konfrontiert sei: Man brauche Sicherheit, um humanitäre Hilfe und politischen Aufbau leisten zu können, und man brauche gleichzeitig politische Versöhnung, um Sicherheit zu erreichen. In Somalia habe die Offensive zur Abrüstung der Clans die politische Versöhnung zurückgeworfen. Aus den Erfahrungen in Somalia seien die folgenden Schlüsse zu ziehen bzw. Fragen zu stellen:

- Will die internationale Gemeinschaft nochmals in einem solchen Konflikt Massnahmen nach Kapitel 7 der UNO-Charta einsetzen? Dies impliziere, dass man den eingesetzten Truppen das Recht gebe, letale Gewalt anzuwenden.
- Sollte Abrüstung der einzelnen Parteien nur mit deren Zustimmung oder nötigenfalls gewaltsam erfolgen?
- Die internationale Gemeinschaft sei für derartige Operationen nicht bereit. Jeden Tag sei zu hören, dass andere Staaten (Frankreich, Belgien, Deutschland, Schweden) auch abziehen wollen, wenn die US-Truppen Somalia verlassen werden.

In der UNO wurde grosses Gewicht darauf gelegt, dass es nicht die UNO selbst sei, welche die Politik in bezug auf Somalia (oder andere Einsätze) festlege. Dies erfolge durch den Sicherheitsrat, was wiederum bedeute, dass in den Hauptstädten (der Mitglieder des UNO-Sicherheitsrates und der Länder, die Truppen stellen) die Politik für Somalia bestimmt werde. Wenn die Länder entschieden, ihre Truppen abzuziehen, habe der UNO-Generalsekretär wenig Manövrierraum.

### *Vereinigte Staaten und Peace-keeping*

Nach den Erfahrungen in Somalia, und angesichts der Entwicklungen im ehemaligen Jugoslawien, wollen die USA Bodentruppen für friedenserhaltende Operationen nur dann zur Verfügung stellen, wenn die Streitparteien vorgängig zu einer Einigung gekommen sind, erklärte ein Stabsmitglied des Streitkräfteausschusses des Repräsentantenhauses. Man sollte Bodentruppen, die Luftwaffe und die Marine nicht einsetzen, wenn die Voraussetzungen für ihre Wirksamkeit nicht gegeben seien. Ein Kollege meinte aber, Operationen unter Kapitel 7 der UNO-Charta (d.h. notfalls *mit* Gewaltanwendung und *ohne* Zustimmung der Konfliktparteien) seien keineswegs ausgeschlossen. Die Operation in Somalia sei nicht zu weit gegangen, sondern fehlerhaft ausgeführt worden. Die Konsultation sei unzureichend gewesen. Die USA stünden zu globalen Sicherheitsanstrengungen und zu multilateraler Zusammenarbeit.

Die Direktorin für europäische Angelegenheiten im National Security Council wies darauf hin, dass ein strenger Winter in Jugoslawien zu einem Ansteigen des Flüchtlingsstroms führen könnte. Die USA seien dafür, die Verhandlungen weiterzuführen, humanitäre Hilfe zu leisten und militärische Optionen offenzuhalten. Die meisten Bedenken seitens des Senats würden hinfällig, wenn eine militärische Option im Rahmen der NATO durchgeführt würde. Das würde aber nicht über Nacht geschehen; die USA würden vorher eine taugliche Koalition zusammenstellen. Ein Einsatz ohne Limiten ("open-ended") liege aber in niemandes Interesse. Die USA habe ein solches "commitment" für die NATO, und Europa, nicht aber für das ehemalige Jugoslawien. Hans Binnendijk, Vizedirektor des Planungsstabes im State Department, äusserte aber Zweifel, ob die Vereinigten Staaten für eine potentielle militärische Operation in Bosnien-Herzegowina die von ihnen erwarteten Truppen stellen würden. Die vergangenen sechs Monate hätten die Probleme im Peace-keeping aufgezeigt, z.B. in bezug auf die Kommandostrukturen. Jetzt müsse man dies analysieren. Ein zweites Somalia könne man sich nicht leisten.

### *UNSCOM/Irak*

Der Direktor der UNSCOM, Botschafter Rolf Ekeus, erklärte, wenn Irak wieder bei den chemischen, biologischen und nuklearen Waffen aufrüsten dürfte, würde es bald erneut eine dominante Position in der Region etablieren und die Staaten der Region bedrohen. UNSCOM habe die absolute Verantwortung, dies zu verhindern. Heute könne der Irak keine Staaten dieser Region einschüchtern oder den arabisch-israelischen Friedensprozess stören, und dies ohne dass die legitimen Verteidigungsbedürfnisse des Irak gefährdet worden seien. Die Massnahmen gegen den Irak seien gut ausgewogen.

Im September erhielt die UNSCOM zum erstenmal eine, wenn auch inoffizielle, Anerkennung seitens des Irak, im Krieg gegen Iran C-Waffen eingesetzt zu haben. Gleichzeitig wurden höhere Produktionszahlen für C-Waffen angegeben. Der Sicherheitsrat verlangt die volle Anerkennung von Resolution 715 durch den Irak; der Irak möchte sich dies aber mit der Aufhebung des Erdölexportverbots honorieren lassen, was aber ausgeschlossen ist. (In der Zwischenzeit hat Irak Resolution 715 ohne Vorbehalte anerkannt, ohne dass das Erdölexportverbot aufgehoben würde.) Die Zerstörung der C-Waffen Iraks soll bis Ende 1993 im wesentlichen abgeschlossen sein; es werden dann aber noch Vorläuferstoffe vorhanden sein. Die Kontrollmassnahmen der Nuclear Suppliers Group sollten verstärkt werden. Ekeus zeigte sich auch beunruhigt über mögliche "off-shore"-Programme Iraks (d.h. durch den Irak mitfinanzierte Waffenprogramme im Ausland).

Im US-Aussenministerium erklärte ein Beamter, der an UNSCOM-Missionen teilgenommen hatte, solange die IAEA im Iraq präsent sei und überwache, werde der Irak keine Gefahr für die internationale Gemeinschaft bilden. Wenn dieses Regime aber eines Tages aufgehoben werden sollte, werde die Kontrolle von Importen von "dual-use"-Gütern sehr wichtig.

### *Aussenpolitische Prioritäten der USA*

Im National Security Council (NSC) wie im State Department wurde die strategische Priorität, den Fortschritt der Demokratisierung in Russland zu konsolidieren, betont. Russland nicht zu "verlieren", sei von kritischer Bedeutung. Ein Misserfolg könnte zur Ablehnung westlicher Werte durch Russland führen. Dies sei die grosse aussenpolitische Priorität der USA, für die sie bereit seien, Milliarden von Dollars auszugeben. Europa werde, so erklärte die Direktorin für europäische Angelegenheiten im NSC, in den USA mitunter als "Werkzeugkasten" für die USA betrachtet; dies sei aber auch umgekehrt der Fall. Europa sei aber wichtig nicht nur als Ressourcenquelle; es sei ein fundamentales Ziel der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik, die Wohlfahrt und Sicherheit der Europäer sicherzustellen. Das solle durch offene Märkte, freien und gerechten Wettbewerb bei den Ideen

wie in der Wirtschaft geschehen. Im Sicherheitsbereich suchten die USA keinen Wettbewerb. In Anspielung auf die der WEU zugewiesene Rolle wurde gesagt, wichtiger als eine "europäische Identität" seien europäische Fähigkeiten.

Der Vizedirektor des Planungsstabes im State Department gab folgenden Überblick der ausserpolitischen Prioritäten:

1. Eine gewisse Harmonie zwischen den Grossmächten beizubehalten, wobei damit Russland, China, Japan und die europäischen NATO-Mitgliedsstaaten gemeint sind.
2. Die Probleme von Regionalkonflikten anzugehen, die für die USA von vitalem Interesse sind: Korea, der Persische Golf und der Nahe und Mittlere Osten, Russland, die Ukraine und der indische Subkontinent.
3. Das Problem der sogenannten "gescheiterten Staaten" anzugehen, wobei hier nicht Sicherheits- sondern humanitäre Interessen involviert seien. Dabei wolle man multilateral vorgehen. Die USA wollten nicht in einer Lage wie im Libanon festfahren. Man wolle rasch agieren und nicht steckenbleiben. Operationen des Peace enforcement lägen ausserhalb des derzeit Vorstellbaren.
4. Demokratie aufzubauen.
5. Globalen Problemen wie Terrorismus, Drogen und Migration entgegenzutreten.
6. Die Wirtschaft wieder zum Laufen bringen. Dies sei nicht die letzte Priorität, sondern vielleicht die zweite. Die USA wollten den freien Handel bewahren und die Bildung von Handelsblöcken verhindern.

#### *Transatlantische Beziehungen*

Die fortgesetzte Militärpräsenz der USA in Europa wurde von keinem Gesprächspartner grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt. Bislang unterstütze der Kongress den Plan der Administration, den Bestand in Europa bis 1996 auf 100'000 Mann zu verringern. Im Planungsstab des State Department wurde versichert, selbst jene, die eine minimalistische Aussenpolitik vertreten, seien dafür, eine starke Verpflichtung für Europa beizubehalten. Es gebe keine Gegnerschaft zu einer Fortsetzung der US-Militärpräsenz in Europa im Umfang von 80'000-100'000 Mann. Von Stabsmitgliedern des Streitkräfteausschusses des Repräsentantenhauses wurde aber darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass 1994 ein Wahljahr sei, in dem Überseedislozierungen schwieriger als sonst zu rechtfertigen seien. Die "Bottom-up review" überschreite die budgetären Vorgaben, so dass man nach zusätzlichen Kürzungsmöglichkeiten suchen müsse, wobei im Ausland dislozierte Truppen ein wahrscheinliches Ziel seien. Ein demokratisches Mitglied des Streitkräfteausschusses habe vorgeschlagen, dass 35% der Kürzungen für das Budgetjahr 1995 auf die im Ausland dislozierten Truppen entfallen sollen.

In der National Defense University wurde darauf hingewiesen, der Einfluss der USA in der NATO könne daran gemessen werden, wieviele hohe Positionen mit Amerikanern besetzt würden, und diese Zahl sinke. Viele Amerikaner betrachteten NATO als ein Relikt des Kalten Krieges. Peace-keeping würde als alleiniges Mittel des Zusammenhalts kaum genügen. Die USA wollten kein Konkurrenzverhältnis zwischen NATO und WEU; sie unterstützten den Vertrag von Maastricht und die Entwicklung der WEU zum Verteidigungsarm der Europäischen Union. Die KSZE habe eine Rolle, aber eher in präventiver Diplomatie als in Krisenmanagement, weil der Entscheidungsprozess mit 53 Mitgliedern schwierig sei. Egal, ob - und wie - die NATO erweitert werden sollte, sei es wichtig für die USA, mit Russland und mit der Ukraine ein besonderes Verhältnis beizubehalten. Die Agenda des NATO-Gipfeltreffens werde Peace-keeping, die künftige Nützlichkeit der Allianz und die Beziehungen zu Mittel- und Osteuropa umfassen. Die USA sei mit dem Abkommen über den Status des Eurocorps zufrieden. Der Enthusiasmus über das Euro-

corps sei etwas geschwunden, nachdem die durch die deutsche Verfassung gesetzten Beschränkungen erkannt worden seien.

Laut Gesprächspartnern im National Security Council ist in Diskussionen vor dem NATO-Gipfeltreffen die Frage aufgekommen, ob Mitgliedschaft in der EG und in der NATO miteinander verknüpft werden. Die USA seien aber dagegen, man wolle keine Ausweitung der Mitgliedschaft.

#### *Die Lage in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion*

Bis nach den Parlamentswahlen in Russland (Dezember 1993) und in der Ukraine (März 1994) werden im State Department keine wesentlichen Fortschritte in den *ukrainisch-russischen Beziehungen* erwartet. Umgekehrt wird auch die Anwendung von Waffengewalt als unwahrscheinlich erachtet. Die Streitkräfte beider Staaten seien in einem schlechten Zustand, und niemand glaube, dass Waffengewalt hilfreich sein könnte. Die Angst vor einem Bürgerkrieg sei gross. Wenn aber Krieg ausbrechen würde, dann würde er bösartig sein. Es wurde darauf hingewiesen, die Desintegration der UdSSR sei eigentlich bemerkenswert friedlich verlaufen, und das russisch-ukrainische Verhältnis sei davon der vielleicht bemerkenswerteste Teil.

In der National Defense University wurde die Möglichkeit nicht ausgeschlossen, dass in *Russland* Präsident Boris N. Jeltsin mit der Unterstützung des Militärs einen dritten Putsch inszenieren könnte. Dafür wäre aber ein expliziter "Deal" mit den Streitkräften erforderlich. Im Oktober seien die Truppen, die nach Moskau gerufen wurden, zunächst nicht für den Sturm des Weissen Hauses, sondern für die Verteidigung des Verteidigungsministeriums eingesetzt worden. Es hätten Verhandlungen zwischen Jeltsin und dem Verteidigungsministerium stattgefunden, wobei der Präsident sich selber zum Verteidigungsministerium habe bemühen müssen. Verschiedene Einheiten seien nicht eingesetzt worden, weil sie gegen die Operation gewesen seien. Vom Planungsstab im State Department wurde bekräftigt, die USA sähen Jeltsin als bestes Element für Fortschritte der Demokratie in Russland. (In Zentralasien sei Demokratie bestenfalls in ferner Zukunft erreichbar; im Kaukasus müssten die Konflikte enden, bevor Demokratie eine Chance habe.) Premierminister Victor Chernomyrdin soll im Oktober eine Vermittlerrolle übernommen haben. Im National Security Council wird angenommen, dass er Reformen unterstütze. Vizepräsident Albert Gore habe mit ihm ein gutes Verhältnis aufgebaut (im Rahmen der amerikanisch-russischen Kommission für Wirtschaftsreformen).

Im State Department zeigte man sich ziemlich gewiss, dass die *Ukraine* in zwei Jahren immer noch ein unabhängiger Staat sein werde. (Bei Weissrussland sei dies weniger sicher.) Es gebe einige Herausforderungen für die territoriale Integrität der Ukraine, bislang aber nur auf friedliche Weise. Die Möglichkeit einer Spaltung der Ukraine sei aber nicht ganz auszuschliessen. Man sei aber optimistisch, dass in der Ukraine keine Lage wie in Bosnien-Herzegowina entstehen werde. Die Wirtschaftslage in der Ukraine wird in Washington als noch schlechter als jene in Russland beurteilt; und die wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit könnte die formelle Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine materiell tangieren. Die Ukraine habe auch weniger ökonomische Reformschritte unternommen. Die Frage sei, wer das Land regiere, der Präsident oder das Parlament. Die USA hätten erkannt, dass sie die Beziehungen zur Ukraine nicht auf die Frage nach dem Verbleib der Nuklearwaffen beschränken sollten. Präsident Clinton habe sie auf eine breitere Grundlage gestellt, so dass einige Unterstützung auch ohne Fortschritte bei den Nuklearfragen geleistet werde. (Dies war vor dem Beschluss des ukrainischen Parlaments, START-1 zu ratifizieren, aber Artikel V des Lissaboner Protokolls abzulehnen.)

Die USA wollen den Präsident *Georgiens*, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, unterstützen. Auch Russland sei bereit, die Regierung von Shevardnadze zu unterstützen, und habe ihm Truppen zur Verfügung gestellt, welche die Kommunikationslinien schützen sollen; die Rolle dieser Truppen sei indessen nicht ganz klar. Shevardnadze ist für die USA der

legitime Präsident Georgiens, wobei entscheidend sei, dass sich der gestürzte Präsident Zviad Gamsakhurdia in einer unannehmbaren Weise verhalten habe.

### *Nuklearwaffen der ehemaligen Sowjetunion*

Die Ukraine fordert als Bedingungen für die Ratifizierung von START-1 und Beitritt zum NPT als Nicht-Nuklearwaffen-Staat:

- 2,8 Mia. Dollar finanzielle Unterstützung, nominell zur Deckung der Kosten, die durch die Eliminierung der Nuklearwaffen entstehen (diese Summe wurde von Außenminister Christopher unverzüglich als unrealistisch zurückgewiesen);
- Sicherheitsgarantien in Form eines NATO-ähnlichen Abkommens zwischen den USA und der Ukraine, was einfach "nicht drinliege", wie im State Department gesagt wurde; die USA hätten "übliche" negative und positive Sicherheitsgarantien sowie Garantien der Grenzen durch die KSZE angeboten;
- Kompensation für das in den Nuklearsprengköpfen enthaltene hochangereicherte Uran. Dies sei eine bilaterale ukrainisch-russische Frage, bei der eine Einigung über die strategischen Waffen grundsätzlich erreicht worden sei. Die Ukraine wolle nun aber auch Kompensation für das in den taktischen Nuklearwaffen enthaltene spaltbare Material (die bereits vor Jahresfrist nach Russland zurückgeführt worden sind). Russland zeige hier etwas Flexibilität, solange der Besitz der taktischen Nuklearwaffen nicht zur Debatte gestellt werde.

Die US-Administration nimmt die Position ein, dass alle Nuklearwaffen in der Ukraine unter das Lissaboner Protokoll fallen. *Alle* Nuklearsprengköpfe und alle Raketen müssten abgebaut werden. Die USA gehen mit einiger Sicherheit davon aus, dass in der Ukraine nur Interkontinentalraketen und Marschflugkörper, aber keine nuklearen Fliegerbomben, disloziert sind. Die USA wollten die Ukraine nicht dafür bezahlen, dass sie die Vertragsverpflichtungen erfülle. Unterstützung für den Abbau von Nuklearwaffen sei nicht eine Belohnung für Wohlverhalten, sondern liege im Interesse der internationalen Gemeinschaft. Die USA, und in etwas geringerem Mass auch Russland, seien bereits dabei, die Bestimmungen des START-Abkommens zu implementieren. Die Ukraine werde ermuntert, dies ebenfalls zu tun. Der Vizedirektor des GUS-Büros im State Department sagte, die Russen hätten damit begonnen, SS-19 in der Ukraine abzubauen (?). Weissrussland habe mit Russland vereinbart, die Sprengköpfe zurückzugeben, und Kasachstan habe zugestimmt, dass sie in Kasachstan mit russischer Unterstützung zerstört werden sollen. Die USA haben bereits 700 Mio. \$ für Unterstützung von Russland, Weissrussland, der Ukraine und Kasachstan beim Abbau der Nuklearwaffen ausgegeben. Zu jedem gegebenen Zeitpunkt sind 2-4 amerikanische Technikerteams in Russland. Mit Russland sind zehn, mit Weissrussland fünf und mit der Ukraine ein diesbezügliches Abkommen unterzeichnet worden. Der kasachische Präsident Nursultan Nazarbayev soll Außenminister Christopher zugesichert haben, dass er dem Parlament vor Ende des Jahres den NPT zur Ratifikation unterbreiten wolle oder dass das Parlament vor Ende des Jahres den NPT ratifiziert haben werde. (Die Ausführungen der Gesprächspartner in Washington waren hier nicht konsistent.)

Die Nuklearwaffen in Weissrussland und Kasachstan sind unter der *Kontrolle* der russischen Streitkräfte. In der Ukraine haben, laut mehreren Gesprächspartnern (National Security Council, National Defense University), russische Truppen Kontrolle über die Depots mit den Sprengköpfen und auch über die operationell dislozierten Sprengköpfe, mit der möglichen Ausnahme einer Luftwaffeneinheit. Die Ukraine habe "administrative Kontrolle" und bewache die Perimeter dieser Anlagen. Die ukrainischen Kräfte müssten nach dieser Darstellung die Anlagen überrennen, um physische Kontrolle über die Nuklearsprengköpfe zu erlangen. Die Ukraine soll also noch nicht positive Kontrolle über die Nuklearwaffen erlangt haben, aber daran arbeiten, diese zu erhalten. (Positive Kontrolle

ist Fähigkeit zum Abschuss, negative Kontrolle ist die Fähigkeit, einen Abschuss zu verhindern.) Rüstungskontrollexperten im State Department machten darauf aufmerksam, man müsse die Möglichkeit in Rechnung stellen, dass russische Techniker Massnahmen ergreifen könnten, um die Gefahr zu reduzieren, die entstünde, wenn die Ukraine diese Waffen übernehmen sollte.

Bei der Frage nach der *technischen Sicherheit* der in der Ukraine stationierten Nuklearwaffen wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass beide Seiten, die Ukraine und Russland, dieses Thema manipulieren. Die Russen dramatisierten die Probleme, um internationalen Druck auf die Ukraine für raschen Abbau der Nuklearwaffen zu mobilisieren; die Ukraine ihrerseits stelle die Lage als im wesentlichen unproblematisch dar. Die USA gehen davon aus, dass keine realen und dringenden Sicherheitsprobleme mit diesen Nuklearwaffen bestünden. Im National Security Council wie im State Department wurde erklärt, man glaube, dass der Unterhalt der Waffen regulär vor sich gehe. Nach ukrainischen Angaben würden die russischen Physiker mit dem Unterhalt wie vor dem Auseinanderbrechen der Sowjetunion weiterfahren. Es wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass Sicherheitsprobleme auch in Russland bestünden, da manche Lagereinrichtungen für Nuklearsprengköpfe über die bisher beachteten und von Sicherheitsüberlegungen bestimmten Limiten hinaus überfüllt seien, obwohl andere nicht ausgelastet seien. Der Abbau der taktischen Nuklearwaffen in Russland hat begonnen. Die USA gehen davon aus, dass Russland etwa 3'000 Sprengköpfe pro Jahr eliminiert. Sie haben keine erhärteten Hinweise, dass Nuklearsprengköpfe abhanden gekommen sind.

#### *Partnership for Peace*

"Partnership for Peace" wurde einige Tage vor den Treffen in Washington von Verteidigungsminister Les Aspin lanciert. Die Aussagen der US-Administration waren entsprechend vage. Im State Department wurden drei Aspekte betont: Die "Selbstselektion" (Partnerstaaten können die Nähe zur NATO selbst festlegen, indem sie Natur und Umfang der unter "Partnership for Peace" fallenden Aktivitäten weitgehend selbst bestimmen), die Nicht-Ausgrenzung von Russland und der Ukraine und die Vermeidung des Eindrucks, dass sich die NATO nach Osten erweitere. Das Verhältnis von "Partnership for Peace" zum Nordatlantik-Kooperationsrat (NACC) war den Gesprächspartnern noch unklar. Insbesondere wurde als bislang undefiniert bezeichnet, ob Teilnahme an "Partnership for Peace" Mitgliedschaft im NACC erfordere. Immerhin wurde darauf hingewiesen (vom Direktor des Büros für Mitteleuropa im State Department), wenn "Partnership for Peace" im Januar offizielle Politik werde, werde man wohl offen sein, falls die Schweiz gemeinsame Missionen auf ad-hoc-Basis vorschlagen werde.

Darauf angesprochen, ob Russland nicht via "Partnership for Peace" - das auch Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Vorbereitung friedenserhaltender Operationen vorsieht - westliche Unterstützung für eine starke militärische Hand in der ehemaligen UdSSR anstrebe, wurde im National Security Council erwidert, für Probleme wie jene im Kaukasus betone man multilaterale Lösungsansätze. Man müsse aber begreifen, dass für die Russen das "nahe Ausland" wichtiger sei als z.B. die Lage in Madrid.

#### *Nuklearer Teststopp*

Die USA wollen so rasch wie möglich ein vollständiges nukleares Teststoppabkommen (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT) aushandeln und unterzeichnen. (Nukleartests in der Atmosphäre, unter Wasser und im Weltall sind durch den Limited Test Ban Treaty von 1963 bereits untersagt; Frankreich und China sind diesem Abkommen nicht beigetreten, halten sich aber autonom an seine Bestimmungen.) Die von früheren Administrationen geltend gemachten Bedenken seien nicht stichhaltig. Die Vorteile eines Teststopps,

z.B. die Stärkung des NPT, seien gewichtiger als allfällige Vorteile von weiteren Tests (z.B. Entwicklung weiterer Sicherheitsmechanismen).

Der Nukleartest von China im September 1993 hat die USA enttäuscht, man will sich indessen davon nicht abhalten lassen, einen CTBT anzustreben. Auch nach dem chinesischen Test wäre es schwierig, den Kongress zu bewegen, Nukleartests wieder aufzunehmen. China wird ermuntert, sich einem CTBT anzuschliessen; aber man will in keinem Fall zulassen, dass China Fortschritt auf einen CTBT hin blockiert. Die Verhandlungen für einen CTBT werden im Januar 1994 in der Conference on Disarmament in Genf beginnen, und sie könnten zwei Jahre dauern. Die USA sehen die Sicherstellung der Verifikation als wichtigste Aufgabe und Element, das die Geschwindigkeit der Verhandlungen bestimmen wird. Fragen, die sich hier stellen sind:

- Soll das Verifikationsregime nur Tests erfassen oder auch bereits Vorbereitungsaktivitäten für Nukleartests?
- Welches sollen die Strukturen der Verifikationsagentur sein?
- Wie soll das Verhältnis der (internationalen) Verifikationsagentur mit den "nationalen technischen Mitteln" (z.B. Aufklärungssatelliten) gestaltet werden?
- Welches sollen die Verifikationsstandards sein?

Die USA wollen, dass der CTBT möglichst universell angenommen wird. Vor allem die unerklärten Nuklearmächte (Israel, Indien, Pakistan) und die nuklearen Schwellenmächte müssten dem Abkommen beitreten. Die USA würden, so wurde in der Rüstungskontroll- und Abrüstungsagentur im State Department (ACDA) gesagt, jede Idee zurückweisen, in einer Übergangsperiode z.B. China eine Quote von Nukleartests zuzugestehen. Die USA geben sich Zeit bis 1996, um einen CTBT zu erreichen, glauben allerdings, dass "etwas" schon Anfang 1995 bereit sein sollte.

### *Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen*

Im amerikanischen Verteidigungsministerium hält man es für durchaus denkbar, wenn nicht gar wahrscheinlich, dass der Gegner in einer nächsten Operation wie "Desert Storm" Nuklearwaffen einsetzen wird. Die USA wollten darum nicht nur Proliferation verhindern, sondern auch den Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen verhindern, z.B. dadurch, dass sie zerstört würden, bevor sie eingesetzt werden könnten. Darum wurde ein "Bureau for Counter-Proliferation Affairs" eingerichtet. Während Non-Proliferation die Weiterverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen zu verhindern sucht, geht "Counter-Proliferation" einen Schritt weiter: Sie hat zum Gegenstand, was gemacht werden kann, nachdem Proliferation stattgefunden hat. Es wurde dargelegt, "Counter-Proliferation" habe militärische Aspekte, von denen sich ein Teil auf eine Kriegssituation beziehe. "Counter-Proliferation" verlange nach einem regionalen Ansatz. Verschiedene Gesprächspartner meinten, letztlich werde Proliferation nicht zu verhindern sein, solange die Motivationen der potentiellen Proliferatoren weiterbeständen. Die USA hätten die Exportkontrollen noch verstärkt, man wolle aber stärker als früher die Motivationen angehen.

Die Exporte Chinas sind eine Quelle der Beunruhigung; die USA glauben jedoch in Anbetracht des ökonomischen Potentials des chinesisch-amerikanischen Handels, dass wirkungsvolle positive und negative Anreize gesetzt werden können. Was das russisch-indische Geschäft um Raketentriebwerke betrifft, wurde am 15. Juli 1993 eine russisch-amerikanische Einigung erzielt. Russland wird solche Transfers einfrieren, und was weiterhin geliefert werden wird, soll mit der Vereinbarung konsistent sein, Raketentechnologie nicht weiterzubreiten. Im Gegenzug erhält die russische Weltraumindustrie Zugang zum westlichen Markt für die Beförderung von Satelliten in den Weltraum.

Iran hat laut mehreren Gesprächspartnern noch einen weiten Weg vor sich, wenn es Nuklearwaffen erwerben will. Selbst bei aktiver Beschaffung seien noch mindestens zehn Jahre nötig.

Die USA haben, so das State Department, beträchtliche Unterstützung für eine Verlängerung des NPT ohne Änderungen mobilisiert. Dies gebe Grund für Hoffnung. Die Lage in den Verhandlungen für einen vollständigen Nuklearteststopp werde einen starken Einfluss auf die NPT-Überprüfungskonferenz von 1995 ausüben. Die Zuversicht, dass der NPT 1995 verlängert werden könne, wurde auch im Zentrum für Abrüstung der UNO deutlich gemacht. An gleicher Stelle wurde die Vermutung geäußert, dass im Hintergrund der Probleme mit Nordkorea ein Machtkampf in diesem Staat stattfinde. Dieses Regime sei im Begriff zu fallen und versuche sich mit allen Mitteln an der Macht zu halten.

### *Chemische Waffen*

Der grösste Teil der russischen Vorräte an chemischen Waffen (CW) sind in unterirdischen Einrichtungen gelagert. Russland hat derzeit keine Eliminierungskapazität. Das Transportsystem taugt nicht für einen sicheren Transport von den Lagerstätten zu den (erst noch zu errichtenden) Vernichtungsanlagen. Die USA schliessen aus, russische chemische Waffen in der eigenen Anlage auf Johnston Island zu eliminieren. Man will aber Russland bei der Bewältigung des Problems unterstützen, z.B. durch Demonstration sicherer Vernichtungsverfahren für chemische Waffen, wovon man eine Verringerung lokalen Widerstandes gegen die Errichtung von Eliminierungsanlagen erhofft. Insgesamt glauben die USA, dass Russland die Beseitigung seiner CW-Vorräte unter Einhaltung der in der CW-Konvention vereinbarten Regeln technisch schaffen könnte, wenn entsprechende Anstrengungen unternommen werden.

Im State Department gab man sich optimistisch über die Chancen einer breiten Unterstützung für die CW-Konvention auch unter arabischen Staaten. Aegypten werde unilateral und auf autonomer Basis die Bestimmungen der Konvention beachten. Man glaube nicht, dass derzeit eigentliche Programme zur "weaponization" chemischer Waffen (d.h. zur Bereitstellung von CW in direkter Waffenform) im Nahen und Mittleren Osten liefen.

### *Implementierung des CFE-Abkommens*

Die US-Administration ist im grossen und ganzen mit der bisherigen Implementierung des CFE-Abkommens befriedigt. Rund 15'000 "treaty-limited items" seien bislang zerstört worden, davon rund 6'000 in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion, rund 4'000 in den anderen Staaten des ehemaligen Warschauer Paktes und rund 5'000 von den NATO-Mitgliedstaaten. Die USA betonten, das CFE-Abkommen müsse innerhalb der vorgesehenen Zeit, also bis 1995, voll verwirklicht werden. Erst nachher könnten allenfalls an einer Überprüfungskonferenz Änderungen am Vertragstext erwogen werden.

### *Haltung der USA zu einer Erweiterung der Mitgliedschaft der Conference on Disarmament*

Gesprächspartner im State Department bedauerten, dass die Schweiz davon betroffen ist, dass die USA die vorgeschlagene Erweiterung der Mitglieder der Conference on Disarmament (CD) abgelehnt haben. Die USA wären sehr erfreut gewesen, die Schweiz und einige andere Staaten als neue Mitglieder der CD willkommen zu heissen. Die Opposition der USA sei ausschliesslich gegen die Aufnahme Iraks gerichtet gewesen. Hinter den Kulissen seien andere CD-Mitglieder eher gegen eine Erweiterung der Mitgliedschaft und suchten darum nicht sehr engagiert nach einer Lösung dieses Problems. Als künftige Themen für die CD werden neben der Ausarbeitung eines Abkommens für ein vollstän-



diges Ende aller Nukleartests Sicherheitsgarantien und Massnahmen zur Erhöhung der Transparenz gesehen.

#### *Forum für Sicherheitszusammenarbeit in Wien*

Vertreter der Rüstungskontroll- und Abrüstungsbehörde im State Department erklärten, der globale Austausch von Information und militärische Kontakte seien nicht kontrovers. Die NATO habe bei einem kürzlichen Treffen in Bornholm die Betonung für Rüstungskontrolle nach Implementierung des CFE-Vertrages auf regionale Rüstungskontrolle eher als auf europaweite Beschränkungen gelegt. Bei den stabilisierenden Massnahmen des Wiener Dokumentes von 1992 könnten die Schwellenwerte gesenkt und ein Mehr an Notifizierung vereinbart werden. Die US-Administration habe noch keine Entscheidung getroffen, sich für tiefere Schwellenwerte zu verwenden. Man sei sich bewusst, dass die Schweiz in bezug auf Obergrenzen besondere Anliegen habe.

#### *UNO-Register über konventionellen Waffen*

Das Register über Rüstungstransfers, das die UNO eingerichtet hat, wurde von dem zuständigen Beamten als politischer Erfolg bezeichnet. Rund 80 Staaten hätten Berichte zugestellt. Es gebe einige bedeutende Ausnahmen, z.B. Nordkorea. Da aber sowohl Rüstungsexporte als auch -importe erfasst würden, sei man zuversichtlich, dass rund 95% des globalen konventionellen Rüstungshandels abgedeckt werde. (Auch wenn z.B. Indien, Saudi-Arabien und Syrien ihre Rüstungsimporte nicht melden, wird der Grossteil davon in den Meldungen der Rüstungsexporte Russlands, Amerikas, Grossbritanniens und Frankreichs ausgewiesen.) Das Register dürfte bald in dem Sinn ausgedehnt werden, dass nicht nur Rüstungstransfers, sondern auch Rüstungsproduktion und -bestände erfasst werden (wofür sich vor allem Entwicklungsländer schon seit jeher stark machen); später könnten auch weitere Kategorien von Waffensystemen hinzukommen.

#### *Amerikanische Verteidigungsplanung*

Im Department of Defense (DOD) und im Kongress wurde wiederholt über die "Bottom-up review" gesprochen. Während im Kongress bemängelt wurde, diese Review entspreche nicht ganz den Vorgaben, wurde sie im DOD als damit konsistent bezeichnet; die Abweichung von den Vorgaben des Präsidenten liege bei 1-2%. Es wurde beteuert (vom Deputy Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Resources), die USA würden an einer Strategie der Kooperation festhalten; es sei unmöglich, die Probleme unilateral anzugehen. Die Streitkräfte der USA müssten fähig sein, zwei fast gleichzeitige Operationen von den Dimensionen von "Desert Storm" zu bewältigen. Dies sei nötig, damit sich potentiellen Aggressoren keine günstige Gelegenheit biete (wenn die USA in einer solchen Operation engagiert sind). Das setze wesentliche Grundlinien für die benötigten Kräfte, die u.a. folgendes einschliessen: 7-12 Armeedivisionen, 8-12 Flugzeugträger, 16-20 tactical air wings. Benötigt würden auch "force multipliers", z.B. eine Verstärkung der See- und Lufttransportmittel. Es sei unumstritten, dass die US-Militärpräsenz in Europa ausreichende Fähigkeiten ohne Verstärkung haben müsse, und damit komme man auf rund 100'000 Mann. Es wurde auch darauf hingewiesen, dass die USA den Zusammenhang zwischen Sicherheits- und Handelsbeziehungen betone (GATT).

VERTRAULICH

## Gesprächsnotizen

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*Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the Special Commission on Iraq, United Nations; Mr. Tim Trevan, UNSCOM*

EKEUS: Welcome. I am particularly happy to see Dr. Bernhard Brunner again.

WINKLER: Many thanks for receiving us [presents the delegation, explains the purpose of the visit].

BRUNNER: I am also happy to be here again. One year ago I was in Iraq with UNSCOM 44. I have heard a couple of things afterward, related mostly to Security Council resolution 715. What is the present status of the disarmament of Iraq?

EKEUS: UNSCOM is mopping up after the Gulf war. The Iraqi aggression was clear cut, the coalition had the UN blessing. The decision not to destroy the Iraqi army may be disputable. I, for one, believe that the decision not to push on was wise, though not unqualified. The condition is that we conduct a mopping up. If Iraq would be allowed to continue with its armament programmes (BW, CW, nuclear) it would soon be able to re-establish a dominant position in the area, threatening all countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The extraordinary Gulf war would then be an insignificant footnote in history, we would be back in the same situation that prevailed before, and the costs and suffering would have had no purpose. UNSCOM has absolute responsibility to prevent Iraqi from re-establishing this threat. A lot of work has been done since its establishment in 1991. I feel we have had very great success in our work. Iraq cannot today project any serious threat, it cannot intimidate other countries of the region, or disrupt the Arab-Israeli peace process. Countries in the region are not threatened. The legitimate defence requirements of Iraq are meanwhile not being endangered. The Iraqi armed forces have problems with the resupply of spare parts, but they are perfectly capable of defence. Hence we are not destabilizing the region. I feel this has been very well balanced. Iraq is politically isolated, and limits have been placed on its capability to disturb and undermine positive developments in the area.

But there are problems, concrete problems. Some of them we were able to defuse. A major crisis occurred in January 1993 when Iraq tried to dictate the roads of access to the country (via Jordan) for our people. This was rejected from our side. I could give you reasons why this

would have rendered our work more difficult. During spring, Iraq continued this aggressive policies, and we had many mini-crises. The phase-in of resolution 715 became blocked over the question of cameras. Of course, these are not ordinary cameras, but special ones for monitoring. Iraq is busily engaged in developing and building missiles with ranges below 150 km. But we know that they transformed short-range missiles to longer ranges. Thus when Iraq is developing a missile with a range of 120 km, we feel it is important to have that monitored. Iraq interpreted this, correctly, as the beginning of the implementation of resolution 715. We proposed several face-saving formulas, but without success. I went then to Baghdad in July, and during a meeting there a turn-around happened. They started to cooperate with us instead of blocking us. In the Arabic version of a speech by Saddam Hussein were interesting elements of change in the previous stance. From July on we had no serious problems in this area. A high-level Iraqi delegation was invited to New York to settle technical issues. We had technical talks in August, up to September 9, in which problems were identified. There were rather far-reaching concessions from UNSCOM, especially regarding foreign suppliers of Iraq. We limited our attention to critical, choke-point items and raw materials. We also got some first acknowledgment, though unofficially, that Iraq had used chemical weapons in its war against Iran. We went to Baghdad to follow up on this. Iraq gave us quite a lot of data, and also a new, higher, figure on chemical weapons production. Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran on a massive scale. Before, the policy of Iraq had been to admit having produced as much chemical weapons as we could find, suggesting that there had been no use of such weapons. The data submitted in October do, however, correspond to Iraq having used chemical weapons. A large amount of chemical weapons had been produced. A large part of it was used against Iran, a part had been destroyed by the coalition, a part by UNSCOM, and an unverifiable small amount unilaterally by Iraq. Tarek Aziz will come to New York on November 15, trying to influence the review set for November 19. In the meantime we will continue our analytical work. We decided not to loudly announce the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran. Suppliers' issues will take time since we have to contact governments through diplomatic channels. A third issue not settled during my visit to Baghdad is full acceptance by Iraq of resolution

715. We demand absolute acceptance of resolution 715. Iraq argues that resolution 715 places an extremely heavy burden on themselves. We are covering Iraq by reconnaissance aircraft 4x48 hours per week. Iraq said that they would like a quid pro quo. UNSCOM should lift the embargo on oil sales. The code word regarding Iraq is now paragraph 22 of the resolution 715. Iraq goes for a complete lifting of the embargo. Tarek Aziz will announce acceptance of resolution 715 if the UN lifts the embargo. I have made clear that there is no chance to get that, but possibly we may be able to make some good noises. Iraq is still not accepting the conditions. They still see Kuwait as one of their provinces, and they are continuing to detain foreigners. But the Iraqi population is suffering, though the suffering is self-inflicted. If the oil embargo would be lifted, this would have a strong impact, it would also matter a great deal in economic terms, change the oil markets.

THEVOZ: Could Iraq export as much oil as it did before the conflict, given the damage of the war?

EKEUS: They could probably. The pipeline via Turkey is intact, and Turkey is pressing us to open it. It would be very quickly up and running.

TREVAN: Iraq has boasted that they have rebuilt the oil-related installations.

EKEUS: I also recognize a concern on the side of Saudi Arabia. They would have to cut back their oil production if Iraq started up its own exports. Iraq would go out massively.

THEVOZ: The shift in the Iraqi position you mentioned, is it a change of opinion by the same persons in the leadership or a change of the composition of the leadership.

EKEUS: The power play is going on. It was even said to us that different opinions exist. The President has to take into account the interests of different groups. The military has now also been hit, for the first time, especially in terms of the condition of their weapons. We do not know as yet whether Iraq will indeed be forthcoming with data. We are asking for documentation, and Iraq says that it has been destroyed. What we have got so far was only oral data.

BRUNNER: Do you assume that the period of destruction of arms, e.g. chemical weapons, will soon come to an end?

EKEUS: In principle yes. The CW elimination plant in Iraq processes as much as the US plant on Johnston Island. The bulk of it will be taken care of by the end of 1993; but precursors [for CW] will then still be left. The aim is to have

the bulk of Tabun, the 155mm shells, out by the end of this year.

WINKLER: How confident are you that Iraq might not try to bypass the restrictions in the future? Could they continue to develop missiles, for example together with North Korea?

EKEUS: Absolutely, this is a major concern, less regarding Western countries. There is also a link between this and the eventual lifting of the oil export embargo, which would provide the money necessary. The Indian government, for example, has little control over the exports of missile technology. Iraq is very innovative, which makes this area difficult to control. What is required is a change of the Iraqi mind set.

TREVAN: We are worried about the possibility of off-shore programmes. I hope that Iraqi weapons scientists move to civilian programmes.

WINKLER: What are the implications of this whole experience for the NPT review conference of 1995?

EKEUS: The NPT is a good treaty. But it is a treaty within a club of countries agreeing not to proliferate. But there are problems if somebody remains outside. We have no alternative to the NPT. I do not share the view of some American academics that "controlled proliferation" should be contemplated. As for the review conference, this might be the time to provide negative security guarantees. They could be given easier now than in the past. We should decide on additional control measures. The Nuclear Suppliers Group should be hardened. We cannot afford to be nice, actually this would carry a great risk.

WINKLER: Have you, based on the new data, any indications whether any additional Swiss companies are involved [with Iraq]? Non-proliferation is certainly a priority of the Swiss government.

EKEUS: I cannot tell since I did not yet check these data in detail. We continue our policy of approaching governments if data points to their countries. The Swiss government has been very cooperative and forthcoming.

#### *Zusammenfassung von Dr. Bernhard Brunner*

Ekeus gibt seiner Genugtuung über das von UNSCOM Erreichte wie folgt Ausdruck: Irak bedeutet keine Gefahr mehr über seine Grenzen hinaus, es konnte aber seine Verteidigungsfähigkeit erhalten und ist politisch isoliert.

Die Phasen: 1. Aufspüren, erfassen, katalogisieren und 2. Vernichten sind auf allen vier Gebieten (nuclear, chemical, biological und Raketen) erfolgreich verlaufen. Irak forciert die

Zerstörungsarbeiten und möchte sie noch dieses Jahr beenden, und der Wunsch, die UNSCOM-Leute bald nicht mehr im Land zu haben, ist unverkennbar.

Schwierigkeiten gibt es bei der Kontrolle, dass Irak keine neuen, unter Resolution 687 fallende Waffenprogramme aufbaut und die Auflagen befolgt, d.h. konkret bei der Umsetzung der UNO-Resolution 715.

Irak hat der UNO folgende Schwierigkeiten in den Weg gelegt, resp. sich nicht an die Resolutionen gehalten:

- Flugverbot für UNO-Flugzeuge auf der Route Bahrain-Kuwait-Irak mit Abschussdrohung (Januar 1993)
- Widerstand gegen Installation einer Kamera auf einem Raketentestgelände
- Verweigerung der Herausgabe der Firmennamen der Lieferanten für die verschiedenen Waffenprogramme

Anzeichen einer Kooperation wurden im Laufe des Jahres 1993 sichtbar. Gespräche auf hoher Stufe, welche sowohl in Bagdad als auch in New York geführt werden, ergaben eine Annäherung mit der Freigabe von Angaben über die Zulieferer, Eingeständnis der C-Einsätze gegen Iran zwischen 1984 und 1987 sowie (damit zusammenhängend) die Angabe neuer, höherer Produktionszahlen. Es ist der UNSCOM klar, dass Irak mit dem Widerstand gegen Resolution 715 einen "deal" anstrebt.

*Mr. Michael Doyle, Vice-President; Mr. Ian Johnstone (Program Officer), International Peace Academy*

DOYLE [welcomes the delegation].

WINKLER [thanks for the meeting, presents the delegation and explains the purpose of the visit]. I would perhaps begin with a general question: How do you see the current status and problems of peace-keeping operations by the United Nations, and how is this activity likely to evolve, having in mind the experiences made in Somalia, Cambodia and Haiti, as well as financial aspects?

DOYLE: Let me perhaps first briefly present the International Peace Academy. It has three functions:

- To be a facilitator behind the scenes, working informally and off the record. In the Cambodia peace process we brought the parties together, which resulted in the second meeting in 1991.

- We are also a research academy with a long tradition. We are for instance studying the development to multi-dimensionality in peace-keeping as is became very evident in Cambodia, and also in Somalia.

- We have been conducting training for peace-keepers for 25 years.

As for the current development in UN peace-keeping, I see two main points that have to be considered.

First, the crisis in peace-keeping is in a sense a crisis in the United Nations. The UN has never get more close to the Charter than now. It is thus a crisis of success. There is now a crisis regarding the use of force. The traditional peace-keeping of the UN was very appreciated, it was to separate and monitor forces, based on the consensus of the parties, with essentially no use of force involved. There are two risks in UN interventions. The first is that a teenager with a gun can stop an entire mission, that you risk an escalation in the course of overcoming slight resistance. The second dilemma is that a decision to step in and use force, as in Somalia, carries the risk of becoming engaged in a quasi-colonial mission involving large-scale use of force, and running the risk of losing the political support. It is possible to achieve a mandate but lose the support of the participating parties at the same time. Bosnia is another example. The mission stopped without using force. There is a crisis in peace-keeping, but a lot of peace-keeping operations have been and are successful.

Second, a crisis of legitimacy. The UN was doing little in peace-keeping for a long time. Decision-making on peace-keeping was not that important at that time. Now that the UN can and does intervene, as it has more money available for that, the issue of who decides has become very important. There are claims for a larger representation in the Security council, and claims of the large contributors for a greater say.

WINKLER: What would you predict to be the outcome?

DOYLE: That is very hard to say. We are not likely to see much heavy-duty peace-keeping according to the Somalia model in the future. The United States and a number of other countries are not willing to take this course. I am skeptical that the US will commit 25,000 soldiers to an operation in former Yugoslavia even if a peace agreement would be signed. On the good side, the UN should try to implement more Cambodia-like operations. The UNTAC did very good work, and this has also an impact on

the whole region, Vietnam, and ASEAN. More work of this kind should be done.

JOHNSTONE: There are three kinds of peace-keeping operations: interposition, multidimensional peace-keeping without the use of force, and enforcement operations. The third variety is the one that causes problems. The second category can lead to the third one.

DOYLE: There will always be the danger that the dilemma will go on, the danger that force will become necessary. There is always a grey zone when the authorization to use force has to be contemplated.

JOHNSTONE: The UN develops the tendency to throw in some reference to chapter 7 in the peace-keeping mandates just to be on the safe side. This raises concern in many countries, as they do not know whether any given operation will stay within the provisions of chapter 6 or cross the border to enforcement under chapter 7.

CATRINA: I understand that traditional peace-keeping requires the consent of all concerned parties. What occurred was that former Yugoslavia and Somalia were some rather special cases. There was no longer any government in Somalia which could have given, or withheld, its consent. What are the criteria to intervene in a case like Somalia? You mentioned that the case of Cambodia could serve as a model. For which cases could it be a model?

DOYLE: Moçambique could be one place to apply the Cambodia model. Cambodia could have become a catastrophe. It was a very tough job. As for failed states (Somalia and former Yugoslavia), these do not have any internal cohesion, the representatives at negotiations do not have control over their factions. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a good example. Agreement can in effect be vetoed by field commanders. Regarding the criteria for intervention: The Somalia operation began in December 1992 as a humanitarian rescue operation, to prevent the death of many Somalis. Not to go in would have been as difficult as going in.

CATRINA: But now you have a situation where somebody [Aidid] painted as being a kind of criminal is accepted as negotiation partner by the international community.

DOYLE: This is one price of peace-keeping, to shake hands with the Khmer Rouge, with Aidid, with those who attacked UN forces in Bosnia. But in Somalia, the operation is going very well in 95% of the country. Only Southern Mogadiscio is going wrong. In the remainder of the country, local committees have been established, relief is arriving, agricultural planning is resuming, police forces are being trained.

JOHNSTONE: It is not possible to be certain you will not use the force when you intervene, such as in Somalia. We should think of criteria where, when and how to use force. There are some rules what to do if the situation is getting worse, to a level where the use of force becomes likely. It is important to get the hearts and minds of the people. Civic action is necessary. The medical supply must arrive. This will give the population the impression that the UN is fulfilling a useful and necessary function. As a general rule, the minimum force possible should be used.

CATRINA: As for the hearts and minds, this may be difficult if some parties profit more than others from a UN peace-keeping presence. It seems to me that the UN is very strong in giving legitimacy to an operation, but it has a weakness when it comes to the use of force. Are not operations shaped on the model of Desert Storm a combination of the strengths of the UN (mandate) and ad-hoc coalitions (military capability)?

DOYLE: The UN is not NATO. For one thing, it has no comparable C3I. Desert Storm is not a model. UNITAF is a model. The US went in, and it let some decisions be taken by the UN. The US is however not prepared to stay in Somalia.

BREULEUX: How do you assess the role of regional bodies for peace-keeping missions in view of a possible increase in the number of missions?

JOHNSTONE: The OAU has a significant role in Africa. There is consensus in the OAU on preventive diplomacy, peace-building, but not peace-making. One of the points needing attention is that some parties from the same region may not appear to be impartial. Such organizations as OAU are best able to respond in a diplomatic way, but when you go to peace-keeping the consensus may break down. Europe could be an example for peace-keeping done under the auspices of a regional organization. Peace-keeping missions in the other regions should be conducted under UN auspices.

WINKLER: There will be a referendum in Switzerland next years on the government's decision to establish a battalion of Blue Helmets that could be put at the disposal of the CSCE as well as of the UN. Pictures like those from Somalia can have an impact on this issue. People may come to think that all peace-keeping operations would look this way, even if this is not true. What kind of TV pictures do you expect for next year, that is when the opinions in Switzerland will be made? Are we going to-

ward a less violent operation in Somalia, will we see a new debate on peace-keeping?

DOYLE: Somalia will be looking better next spring because the US has decided to disengage. How it will be next fall is difficult to predict. I fear there will be a catastrophic situation in Bosnia. No one can stop the use of force by the parties. Croatia could become a real scare. Next spring it could look very bad. On the positive side I feel that the UN is learning very quickly. The more recent mandates are better defined. The casualties in the UN peace-keeping troops will probably be lower than they are now.

JOHNSTONE: There are two kinds of bad news, peace-keepers being attacked, and bad situation not being improved by peace-keeping. To pull back without a major improvement is setting a bad precedent, and in Somalia there will be a pull-back.

DOYLE: I would say that next year the UN may look less effective, but the casualties will be lower.

*Brigadier-General Maurice Baril, Military Counsellor to the Secretary-General; Mr. Sashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations*

BARIL: Let me welcome you to the Department for Peace-Keeping Operations, also on behalf of Under Secretary-General Kofi Annan. I am his military advisor. Sashi Tharoor is special adviser to Annan, and a specialist in everything concerning UNPROFOR.

WINKLER [introduces the delegation, explains the SIPOLEX programme and the purpose of this visit]. Peace-keeping is a particular important aspect of UN activities. We will have a referendum on the establishment of a battalion of Blue Helmets in Switzerland next year. This is an additional reason to thank you for receiving us since what you say may be of direct operational interest. Where do we stand with UN peace-keeping today, and what would be your forecast for the next 12-18 months? How do you look back at the experiences made in former Yugoslavia, in Somalia, and at the case of Haiti? Are we going back with UN peace-keeping operations to UNFICYP-like operations?

THAROOR: We are at a crossroads. There is a growing trend towards multi-dimensional operations, such as in Cambodia and Namibia, including elements with a civilian emphasis. We are no longer just freezing the military situation on the ground. This trend seemed, one year ago, to indicate an increasing usefulness of peace-

keeping operations. In the meantime, the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Angola have intervened, though the latter one in special circumstances. Regarding Bosnia we said all along what the limits were, but the Security Council went ahead anyway. In Somalia we started off with a modest operation, which was then supplemented by non-UN forces doing only part of the task, then a UN-led force came in to do the full range of tasks. We found then ourselves in a situation where we had to enforce peace.

There is a mood of questioning now. This could lead the UN to go back to simple operations of the UNFICYP type. It could also start a process of rediscovering what can and cannot be done. I feel we will go the second course, but this is by no means certain. Somalia and Haiti give right now a setback. But I am not pessimistic because the international community has no alternative. It is easier to instruct us what to do and not to do than to do something different.

BARIL: In Haiti the United States, France and Canada are to consider seriously whether to commit forces. The European Community looks to Bosnia-Herzegovina, asking whether this can indeed be allowed to happen. The world community is asking what we are doing in Somalia, and the world will not allow their sons to be killed. We saw the world turning in a kind of global NATO, but this came to a dead halt on October 3 in Somalia.

WINKLER: Why have there been these high casualties in Somalia? What happened in the case of this ambush?

BARIL: The operation that led to these US casualties was in fact a rather simple one. However, they had to put together very quickly this operation. Contingency planning was not in place. 2 helicopters went down, and the ground troops circled around one of them, and this happened to be right in the centre of a wasps nest.

CATRINA: In May, NATO was seriously considering putting together a large force for Bosnia. However, as it came out, this would have been something with the brakes of a Rolls-Royce and the accelerator of a motorcycle, with many people and bodies up the line having veto power over any contemplated operation.

THAROOR: In May an intervention force of 75,000 men was considered in the framework of the Vance-Owen peace plan. The UN could not undertake or run such an operation. Thus it was subcontracted to NATO, but it would nevertheless have been a UN operation under the flag of the UN. A newer form of the peace plan could be implemented with fewer forces, it might no

longer be a question of finding 50,000. But after Somalia, will the US contribute? Another suggestion is to arrive at a global settlement, making a large peace-keeping force unnecessary, since the settlement would be in all sides' interest.

What lessons are to be drawn? The UN can be given any capacity, the question is political will. What do member states want the UN to do? The Secretary-General's view is that the UN cannot do this, that it should be given to a coalition of member states. He said so much to the NATO Secretary-General. But the discussions have not become focused, perhaps because there is no concrete plan to be enforced now.

BARIL: Such a coalition would have to be based on national interests, national security or vital interests. The will would have to be there to switch to peace enforcement if the international community would so desire. UNITAF, consisting almost exclusively of US forces, worked well, for the rest I would say that operations worked well only when vital interests were involved.

WINKLER: Switzerland not being member of the United Nations, the average Swiss citizen is not terribly well informed about the UN. This may be a reflection of a larger trend of looking inward. Swiss neutrality is of long standing, but since World War II it has become even more part of the Swiss identity. How would you forecast the news broadcasts we shall receive from Somalia, as troops withdraw? Will UN peace-keeping be seen as ineffective or will there be a mixed picture? What will be the situation regarding casualties? This all might have an impact on the outcome of the referendum in Switzerland. A larger question: What will be done regarding the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace. The time bracket of particular interest to us is roughly from March to October 1994.

BARIL: We are not at a breaking point, but rather on a plateau. The future is in the hands of the member countries. It is unclear in which direction they will go. Will other states also withdraw their forces if the US does? I am asking myself why it is a bigger step to go to peace enforcement for Switzerland than for my country.

WINKLER: Switzerland is accepting casualties as a fact of life in the context of the activities of the ICRC.

BARIL: We have two kinds of people, those highly paid to go into such operations, and those highly motivated by the cause to put their life on the line. To join the ICRC is a private choice. In Somalia the people of the ICRC, and

of other non-governmental organisations, lived under great danger.

THAROOR: Would Swiss peace-keepers be full-time professional soldiers?

WINKLER: No, they would come from a pool of volunteers.

THAROOR: Are you optimistic that a sufficiently large number will volunteer?

WINKLER: Yes.

BARIL: I would also assume that this should not be a problem, as there are everywhere many people ready for an adventure.

WINKLER: In medical units there was no problem to find people willing to spend the necessary period, but for sustained operations we might have the problem that the pool would dry out after a certain time. But in principle it is not difficult to recruit.

BARIL: We have realized over the past months that the parties have no stomach to face peace enforcement. Let me add that we can have infantry peace-keeping battalions all over the world.

THAROOR: We would need much more urgently a professional engineering unit. This is where we face constant shortages.

*Mr. Reza Iqbal, Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, with Mrs. Elizabeth Lindenmaier, Mrs. Sako Shimura, Col. Heikki Purola*

IQBAL: Welcome. It is a pleasure to have you here. I met some days ago a Swiss newsman. Switzerland is not member of the United Nations, but we receive a lot of support from your country. It is thus a special pleasure. Let me present my collaborators: Sako Shimura who has been heavily engaged with Cambodia, and Elizabeth Lindenmaier who deals with Somalia and whom you already met one year ago at the same occasion. Col. Purola will soon join us. I have no more preliminaries, I am ready to address the issues most important and relevant to you.

WINKLER [introduces delegation, presents the SIPOLEX programme, and the purpose of the visit]: This visit is particularly important since we shall have a referendum on the establishment of a Blue Helmet battalion in Switzerland next year. What will in your view be the future of peace-keeping over the coming 12 months. What about the risk of overstretch or collapse?

What kind of pictures of peace-keeping are we likely to see on television?

LINDENMAIER: I am not sure that Somalia will help Switzerland in its referendum. But Somalia may be a typical case. Haiti may, after Somalia, be another case of a "failed state". The problems posed are multi-dimensional, starting with a humanitarian mission which then needs force to guard the convoys. Somalia may be an example of all peace-keeping "medicines". We started low, then we increased our force to 500, all under chapter 6, then we moved to 35,000 men under chapter 7. The UNITAF was limited to the humanitarian task, then the task was expanded immensely, including disarmament and the rehabilitation of the country. You have a vicious circle: you need security to engage in humanitarian relief, political reconstitution and rehabilitation, and you need the latter to have some security. Political reconciliation is in the centre of the nature of modern conflicts. In Somalia we started with a humanitarian mission, then we expanded, and now we are re-assessing. We try to put as much emphasis as possible on the political process (reconciliation). The offensive on the disarmament front harmed political reconciliation. Now we try to foster political reconciliation, and perhaps we may reach a consent with the parties on disarmament. A report on UNISOM II is due end of this month, we are working on it right now. What are the questions and lessons:

- Does the international community want to use chapter 7 [of the UN Charter] again in conflicts of this kind? Enforcement action in a civil war requires effectively to give the forces the right to kill.
- Should disarmament be coercive or take place only with the consent of the parties?
- The international community is perhaps not prepared for this kind of operation. I am hearing every day that other states want to withdraw their contingents if the US forces leave.
- The relationship between humanitarian missions and security: Can these two be independent from each other in conflicts of the new type? The ICRC needed protectors in Somalia, in a deviation from its principles. They are now re-assessing what this means.

WINKLER: Speaking about an extension of the mandate for the mission in Somalia, what do you expect Germany and Italy to do when the US pulls out? And what about the other countries [having contingents in Somalia] if Germany and Italy go?

LINDENMAIER: This will be part of the report of the Secretary-General, and it is a major challenge. A number of nations have said that they will also leave if the US forces leave: France (except for police training), Belgium, Germany, Sweden. The Secretary-General urged NATO member states to stay, but if the largest member goes, this appears doubtful. The whole thing could very well unravel.

WINKLER: Might negotiations lead somewhere, or will in the end General Aidid simply take over?

LINDENMAIER: If Aidid enters the fray, other factions might also come in. A lot of political work has been done on the ground. Regional councils have been established, 49 out of 64 are by now established. The danger you mentioned certainly exists. [Lindenmaier leaves.]

IQBAL: Traditional peace-keeping was a calm affair. Now the situation, the problems, the challenges have all changed. It is unfortunate that the missions in former Yugoslavia and in Somalia came simultaneously, putting tremendous stress on the system. This is a difficult time. It might be more manageable if Germany and Japan would also come in. What is going to happen in Somalia is not in our control; it is being determined in the capitals. If they take decisions to withdraw their troops, the Secretary-General will have little room for manoeuvre.

WINKLER: Do your reflections also concern financial support for and the legitimacy of peace-keeping?

IQBAL: Those are separate issues. It is well-known that we need more money [for peace-keeping]. The decisions by the Security Council are taken by 15 governments; the other governments are expected to follow.

EBERHART: What progress has been made regarding the establishment of UN stand-by forces? Could you also envisage a role for Switzerland in that, especially in unarmed units?

IQBAL: We cannot predict what will happen in Somalia. Quite possibly mistakes were made in the implementation of this mission. The decision to try to apprehend Aidid was taken by the Security Council. On the other hand, it is easy to predict what will happen in former Yugoslavia if governments stay out. Haiti may present some similar problems, but is probably even more complex. We have now a critical period. Governments have to re-evaluate their commitment to collective security, asking themselves how deep their commitment is and how it is to be balanced with the national interests. And if they come to the conclusion that



they are committed to collective security they still have to decide how to translate this commitment into material support. We cannot carry on in the present way. A third question: What is the alternative to collective security? Should it be left to the United States to become a global policeman? But Washington does not want that.

As for stand-by forces: According to the UN Charter, member states are obliged to make forces available, but they don't. We are trying now to have governments declare their readiness. But this would still not be a guarantee, we would still require their individual agreement for each given mission. As for unarmed service, yes, this would be possible in operations under chapter 6, with observers.

EBERHART: What is the timetable for the study on stand-by forces?

IQBAL: We hoped to conclude it by the end of 1993, but I think that it will take longer. Moreover, it will have to be kept up to date after its completion. A small office in the military department will do this.

CATRINA: Having heard so far about the more problematic cases - former Yugoslavia and Somalia - you might perhaps as well tell us something about a relative success story: Cambodia.

IQBAL: In Somalia all is not dark, the problems are in fact heavily concentrated on Southern Mogadiscio. But let us now hear Mrs. Sako Shimura on Cambodia.

SHIMURA: Before the elections in May 1993 we had grave doubts. It was the darkest hour. We were accused of sleepwalking into disaster. But no one wavered regarding the holding of the elections. It was the right judgment, in hindsight. But the case was not clear-cut, the process could have been disrupted. The Khmer Rouge were confronted, but never closed out of the political process, the door always remained open. On a broader level, I would point out two changes from simple peace-keeping to complex peace-keeping missions: The first one is the use of force, under chapter 7. The second one is the multi-dimensionality of the mission. This is a result of the fact that a comprehensive political settlement has to be implemented. Another lesson from UNTAC: Many people said that the decision to invoke chapter 7 should have been reserved. But UNTAC was able to conclude the mission successfully, showing that traditional peace-keeping, so to say under "chapter 6 1/2" can accomplish this task.

IQBAL: There are many ways of looking at our experience, but several aspects stand out. The disintegration of the USSR has caused instabil-

ity. In some missions, the UN is implementing negotiated agreements. Former Yugoslavia and Somalia belong to another type of missions. There is unanimous desire to avoid the use of force, to stay within chapter 6, but faced with the situations in former Yugoslavia and Somalia, was there indeed a choice for the United Nations to become or not to become involved? In Somalia we faced gangs, a famine, a drought, the terrorizing of humanitarian operations. In former Yugoslavia we are confronted with the acquisition of territory by force, and with massive violation of human rights, including war crimes. Both experiences indicate that when the United Nations become involved in internal conflict, and moves to chapter 7, it becomes extremely difficult to remain impartial and neutral.

*Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, Director, Centre for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations*

WINKLER [presents the delegation]. As first question I would like to ask you where we stand with arms control after the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention (CWC), what are the outlook and the perspectives for arms control.

DAVINIC: I would first give an overview, before we may enter a discussion. There was a notion that arms control had come to an end with the end of the Cold War. There was euphoria, and the idea that it might now be possible to devote our interest to other areas. But things did not materialize in this way. The international community discovered that it had to continue with its focus on arms control, and attention consequently came back to arms control and disarmament. But the approaches are now somewhat different. On the one hand we continue with "traditional" arms control and disarmament, on the other hand the importance of, and attention given to, regional conflicts and tensions has increased. The latter ones are to be dealt with by preventive diplomacy.

The CWC is a great success, but the people in the CD did in a way not know what to tackle next. Issues related to nuclear weapons are still at the top of the agenda. The US Ambassador [to the United Nations] said that there are no things more important than non-proliferation. The strategy is to link non-proliferation with a stop in the qualitative arms race (test ban, stop of production of highly-enriched uranium). Speaking about non-proliferation, measures to stop the spread of ballistic-missile technology are included. Conventional weapons have been spread all over the world. And these are the weapons that are actually being used. The spread

of this kind of weapons is also dangerous, and it involves sophisticated weapons. An example of this: The missile that shot down a US helicopter in Somalia may have come from the stocks of missiles supplied by the United States to Afghanistan. The time may have come to think about restriction on arms production and transfers.

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) have a continued role to play. An example falling in this category is the Register of Conventional Arms established with the United Nations. I see a role for CSBMs between preventive diplomacy and disarmament. Preventive diplomacy is often considered to be a novel approach, but it is actually a rather traditional instrument.

EBERHART: Non-proliferation remains a core concern of Switzerland. In 1995 there will be the NPT review conference. What could and should be done to strengthen the NPT regime, and how will the cases of the Ukraine and North Korea impact on this review conference?

DAVINIC: The NPT is very important. Many countries have made clear their support for an extension of this treaty. But a consensus is needed. How the review conference will go, will depend on the progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). I am rather confident that an extension for another 25 years will come out of it, and this would be a good result. Increased political backing of the activities of the IAEA is necessary. That kind of support was given in Vienna.

As for the Ukraine, I have just come back from Kiev. We heard there very different opinions. The Ministry of Energy favours to keep the nuclear weapons. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the Ukraine will give up these weapons, but will have to be paid for doing that. I expect that in the end the Ukraine will give up the nuclear weapons. They have effectively no choice. The United States is exerting strong pressure. By 1995 they will have to give up the nuclear weapons. This is not just a problem limited to the Ukraine, as it could set a precedent. It will be a financial question. The Ukraine is asking for almost \$ 3 billion. What the United States offers is less than \$ 1 billion.

Regarding North Korea there are conflicting views. According to US intelligence, North Korea is developing a nuclear capability. Others think that a political game is in the background of this affair. They say that the North Korean regime is trying to remain in power. This regime is about to fall, and it clings to power. China may play an important role in persuading North Korea to comply with the NPT provisions.

In this context, it is not helpful that the US-Chinese relations are not terribly good at the moment. The Chinese want to show the world that they are their own masters, giving the signal to the US that they do not want to be treated in the same way as the Russians.

CATRINA: I have a somewhat naive question. Why should negotiations on a CTBT not be concluded just among the five nuclear-weapons-states, since the other states [members of the NPT] are already being taken care of by the NPT?

DAVINIC: These five states could very well agree on a CTBT. The reason to negotiate a global CTBT is that nuclear threshold countries [not parties to the NPT] shall also be party to the CTBT.

BREULEUX: Beside the NPT there is also the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) against proliferation.

DAVINIC: The NPT alone would not be enough, as it focusses only on science and technology relevant to the nuclear field. The control regime must be standardized, there must be strict export control policies. Guidelines should be worked out in a fair way.

EBERHART: What kind of additional verification measures could you envisage [regarding the NPT]?

DAVINIC: Verification measures should be strengthened, for example those of the IAEA. If this should not work, I would not exclude other means of pressure, e.g., economic or military ones.

CATRINA: What has been your experience so far with the Register of Conventional Arms? How many countries have submitted information to this Register?

DAVINIC: The Register is a great success in one sense, a political success. We have received responses from about 80 states. Some important countries did not report, e.g., North Korea. But since we cover the transfers both from the supplier and recipient side, I am confident that about 95% of all arms transfers are being covered. Among the important countries in this context, India, Saudi Arabia and Syria have not responded. But the reports by the suppliers have covered most of this area. From a substantive point of view, we have a pretty good transparency. Quite a number of those states that did not respond have simply nothing to report. It is important that more countries shall join the Register to have a global picture.

CATRINA: What is the status of the follow-up to the Register in the First Committee?

DAVINIC: The Register as we have it now is a first step. There exists an agreement in principle to add new categories and to cover national production and holdings. The time frame for an expansion in these directions is up to three years. Some countries do not want any longer to exclude military holdings. There will be a follow-up, but it could be a prolonged process. [The chairman of the group of experts dealing with the Register, Ambassador Wagenmakers, said afterwards in a private conversation that it is likely that the Register will first be expanded to cover arms production and holdings, and then in a second step to include additional categories of arms.]

EBERHART: I would think that air defence weapons should be included in the Register. I think that maneuverability is also an important characteristic that should be reflected.

DAVINIC: There are many possibilities. The field is wide open. But one should not put too much pressure at this stage on an expansion of the categories of arms. The last thing the countries want to agree upon are these categories. They could more easily agree to include production data. The rest is also more complicated, we should first cover the seven categories agreed so far more extensively, and perhaps postpone somewhat the addition of new categories.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Harlemann,  
Senior Training Officer [Peace-keeping], United Nations*

HARLEMANN: What am I to tell you, what are you particularly interested in?

WINKLER: [presents the group, explains the purpose of the visit]. We would be interested in the current situation in training for peace-keeping and the remaining needs? I am also asking myself whether the logistics of peace-keeping are capable of following the expansion of operations.

HARLEMANN: The major responsibility for training rests with the member states. When talking training, we mean training for peace-keeping, not peace enforcement. What we have to do here is to guide national governments in training for peace-keeping. There is some confusion. In peace-keeping training we do not look only at the military aspects, but we also create a better awareness for those to be involved. Another point: To create training programmes for member states is not so easy. You have to be cautious regarding the general level of education and adapt the programme to that, which means that some training has to be rather basic. Training is an on-going process, aware-

ness contributes to training. We have also to distinguish between pre-mission and in-situ training.

Most people see peace-keeping as a reactive operation, with the deployment as the most active part. This is completely wrong. We must see peace-keeping as an instrument for de-escalation. Negotiation is necessary for de-escalation, and it must be conducted at all levels. Soldiers are useful, but rather costly, since they are multi-functional. (They can, for example, defend themselves and build their own accommodations.) Civilians are much less costly. For example, out of an engineer company for mine-sweeping numbering 180 persons, perhaps 90 might really sweep mines. If we would employ 180 civilians, perhaps 160 might be engaged in this real work. Militaries must be able to include political considerations in their assessments, and the same must be true, vice versa, for diplomats.

Peace-keeping is really a question of timing. We have to concentrate not just on patrolling, observation, etc. but also on the recognition of opportunities for positive change. Somalia is an excellent point. If a core of observers would have been there, the outcome might have been different. Peace-keeping is really a question of timing. Preventive diplomacy is a modern word, and sometimes it is unclear what is meant. Preventive diplomacy must start earlier than is now realized. If a UN ambassador is in a country for some time, he has "Fingerspitzengefühl", he can use a network he has built up. That, together with a group of observers coming in, may stabilize a dangerous situation.

Training [for peace-keeping] is more comprehensive than showing a soldier how not to use force.

As for civilians, we have problems with them. They have difficulties to cope with the environment. They often present a danger to themselves, and to other ones, and we may have to protect them. The Austrian government has established a training programme for civilians engaged in peace-keeping. This is an excellent idea. [Staff course for peace-keeping, with an international teaching staff.]

WINKLER: This is an Austrian initiative. What would be your further wish list?

HARLEMANN: We should have more of these centres like the Austrian. But I can list you a couple of other priorities: 1) We should have, in various regions, regional peace-keeping centres for training, including some disarmament and deployment training. We should have the capability to deploy at short notice 5,000-10,000

troops. We need more engagement of regional organizations. 2) We should increase co-ordination of peace-keeping with, for example, disaster relief. There is a school working in this direction in Madison, Wisconsin. 3) Another priority area is training of election observers. You have a good two-week course on that in Switzerland.

WINKLER: We have several training programmes in Switzerland now. We are also studying the question whether there should be new initiatives, and whether to bring existing training programmes together. The Chief of the General Staff has asked to look into the possibilities of optimizing what we have. What you said is useful information with this in mind.

EBERHART: Would you elaborate on the first priority you mentioned (cooperation with regional centres)? What could be the role of the CSCE, as it understands itself as regional organization under chapter 8 of the UN Charter?

HARLEMANN: Liberia was a case of a regional organization being involved in peace-keeping. The OAU was the only regional organization to try to be engaged in peace-keeping, the first time in Chad. In future we shall see regional organizations being more active in peace-keeping, with the UN Blue Helmets on top. The regional organizations have a better cultural understanding. It is for example questionable whether one should send Swedish peace-keepers to China. Peace-keeping should be more regionalized. The CSCE has difficulties, as Europe has difficulties. There is also the WEU, and NATO. Here, people think that NATO has soldiers available all over the country. But it has only a headquarters and a secretariat. We have difficulties in the OAS, in OAU and in Europe. The OAS has on paper a good basis for peace-keeping, and the best institutional framework. The Centre for the Prevention of Crises may be activated for peace-keeping in Europe.

EBERHART: Yes, and the CSCE secretariat could be strengthened.

HARLEMANN: I have visited the Centre for the Prevention of Crises two years ago. It had one man with one secretary. But the mandate offers many possibilities.

EBERHART: Switzerland wants the CSCE to be reinforced, since it is member of the CSCE. As for peace-keeping and de-escalation, you need military capability and negotiating capability.

HARLEMANN: Absolutely. Negotiations is the only means at disposal for de-escalation. There must be efforts toward that at every level, down to the soldiers. General Greindl said this re-

cently regarding Cyprus, that negotiation is essential, down to the level of the soldier.

CATRINA: You said that regional organizations have a better cultural understanding. At the same time there has - at least in the past - been the rule of taking peace-keepers from distant countries, so as not to raise doubt regarding their impartiality.

HARLEMANN: In UNPROFOR [Yugoslavia] we have also contingents from close-by countries. The Slovaks, for example, are doing a very good job. To return to the requirements for peace-keepers: Engineer units are best since they have many in-built capabilities, from road and bridge building to defence. There, conscription armies are best suited for peace-keeping, since they are also more likely to deal with the situation in a civilian way.

WINKLER: We shall have a referendum on the establishment of a Blue Helmets battalion in Switzerland sometime next year. This is nothing to be afraid of, but it has to be won first. The date at which the referendum will be held may matter. What would be your prediction for the situation regarding peace-keeping in the time between spring and fall of next year?

HARLEMANN: I will have to answer this question from a more official point of view. Somalia was a setback. We have to consider the mechanism. We have also to reconsider how to write the mandates. I do not think that peace-keeping will move into peace enforcement. We shall rather go back to peace-keeping and widen it. If we cross into peace enforcement we are no longer impartial. This line has been crossed too early, and we have to go back. Peace-keeping can be made more effective. It was too early to use force. Personally, I am rather pleased that we realize that we have to work without force. I think that this is the time to think about a global security organization.

WINKLER: If courses are done nationally, would it be possible to get some international teaching personnel free of cost?

HARLEMANN: We have been asked several times whether the UN would be able to support such courses. The answer is that we cannot give any financial support. Teachers can be provided on a case-by-case basis. We have a list of training courses world-wide. Switzerland is in there. Another thing that has been discussed: One could pick teachers from several countries, put together a team, and send this team out, together with some back-up.

EBERHART: In view of increasing the operationality of peace-keeping forces, you plan to set up a UN stand-by peace-keeping force at

high readiness. Do you also plan to have this force structured in modules, for example having in there a negotiation module?

HARLEMANN: The most important part at the start-up of any operation are the liaison officers. There might be some module for that. It has been discussed, but I do not know what has come out of it. The team planning stand-by forces puts together people, money and equipment. In the future, I hope that training teams from country X come to New York, and go to teach a training course in country Y.

As for post-conflict problems: The United Nations should write some basic principles for building-up new armed forces, including principles on human rights, some from the UN Charter and some on the democratic control of forces, etc.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Duval, Military Adviser for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations*

WINKLER [presents the delegation]. The Swiss government has decided to establish a battalion of Blue Helmets. There will a referendum on this question next year, hence we are this time particularly interested in the perspectives of peace-keeping. What kind of images do we have to expect of peace-keeping operations over the coming 12-18 months?

DUVAL: I would give different responses, depending on each individual operation. Since two weeks I am dealing with the Middle East and Asia, and to some extent also with MINURSO. In Georgia the situation has unfortunately not developed in the way we expected. There is no way to implement the mandate of the Security Council. This is most certainly an area where observers are necessary, as Tajikistan may also become one. In Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova the CSCE has the leadership, in Georgia and Tajikistan the United Nations. Operations in these regions could move beyond mere observation missions. We face problems of command and control. The Russian Federation has proposed to put its operations under the auspices of the United Nations. Speaking about the four regions I mentioned, the United Nations has the relatively greatest chance of success in Georgia, which is an excessively complex situation. The UN is hesitating now, but if this situation persists, we will have to do something. A problem to be solved is of course who will be doing this something.

In the Middle East, it is possible that some missions may come to an end if a peace settlement can be achieved. Israel and the PLO will have to make clear what they expect of the UN

in such a case. In Africa other missions in South Africa and in Sudan appear possible. In Somalia several other countries will follow the example of the US and withdraw their forces.

THEVOZ: Is there any impact of the experiences in Somalia on other regions and missions, such as UNTSO, UNIFIL, UNDOF?

DUVAL: So far we have not noticed any particular effect. However, there has certainly been an effect on Haiti, and there will be more.

THEVOZ: What has been the reaction of Israel after September 13?

DUVAL: The change, in a positive sense, began in early 1993. We had a seminar on peace-keeping in Haifa.

EBERHART: What would you see as the criteria to be fulfilled for a peace-keeping engagement to take place?

DUVAL: There is a difference between momentary conflicts and those of potentially long duration. Classical peace-keeping aims at the separation of belligerents, and the prevention of a civil war. Important are the definition of the mandate, of the measures to be taken and of the duration of the mandate. The organization [United Nations] must be strengthened, and it must revise the procedures. It must adapt itself to the kind of conflicts where it may, or must, intervene.

BREULEUX: There are "classical" conflicts between states and civil wars. What needs to be done regarding peace-keeping for civil wars?

DUVAL: We risk to encounter more cases of the second type. It is important to determine whether one operates under chapter 6 or chapter 7. Can one intervene in an internal conflict other than under chapter 7? No. If there is an internal conflict in a European state, Europe, and the United States, have means at their disposal.

WINKLER: What is the impact of the Somalia operation on the willingness of states to contribute financially to peace-keeping operations?

DUVAL: So far there has been no noticeable impact, but that will come. The position of the US will harden. They want anyway to reduce their share from 28% to 25%. The delay in payments has the effect that we cannot reimburse the countries participating with forces on time. For example, a Nigerian battalion was withdrawn from Bosnia because they had not been paid for one year. It might be possible to ask one or several states to make their contribution in advance.

BREULEUX: Is the financing of the mission in Cyprus a possible model?

DUVAL: This may work in some cases. Cyprus is one example, Kuwait is another. But it would be difficult to see that as a general rule.

*Major (US Army) Jane Holl, Director,  
European Affairs, National Security Council*

WINKLER [presents the delegation, explains the purpose of the visit]: How do you consider the position of Germany in the changed situation of Europe?

HOLL: If the Bush administration made Bonn nervous, Bonn does not know what the US administration's point of view is. We had on the same day discussions on Germany and on Maastricht. The United States has not the same discomfort with respect to Germany as France, or Great Britain. There are some fears there of a German Europe, instead of a European Germany. The US does not share those fears. There is the moving away of Germany from more nationalistic German policies (like the call of Germany for the Visegrad countries to be allowed to join NATO), while Europeans are very concerned about Germany shaping European policies. The "partners in leadership" initiative of the Bush administration was a device to bring Germany into joint action. Now there are serious problems with the Germany economy, and also with asylum seekers, etc. Germany will be the spearhead for an "outreach" policy in order to create a band of stable markets also to the East of Germany. This will take place for simple economic reasons. To get there will be difficult, though. Eastern Europe has to do most of that job. To achieve this objective, it will also be necessary to get some stability in Russia, to get its economy moving. It is a major concern for Germany to assist in this. What role do we see for Germany? GATT is an important issue. The EC consists of twelve individual countries, and each has a role to play. France has highlighted the agricultural problems, and Germany is sensitive to that. It finds itself in an impossible role. The Blair House agreement is not open for re-negotiation. The European have to sort that out among themselves.

EBERHART: What strategic priority has Europe for the United States? What roles does it see for NATO?

HOLL: The strategic priority for the United States is to consolidate the progress of democracy in Russia. Not to lose Russia is critical, also because of Europe. The extension of market democracies is necessary. Maastricht was touch and go until the very end. The West is the

envy of the world. It has been an unprecedented success over the past 40 years. This needs to be safeguarded. That is why Russia is the key. If it is not consolidated, it would lead to a clear rejection of Western values by Russia. This is the major foreign policy priority of the United States. We are ready to spend billions of dollars on that.

How does Europe matter? We live in an era of transition which will last for some time, and it is not yet clear where Russia will go. We cannot solve the Russian economic problems, nor can we give it military guarantees. The EC has not been very coherent toward former Yugoslavia. If the economies of Russia and Eastern Europe are important, then the EC and Europe are important too. Europe is regarded by some as a "toolbox" for the United States (but then that is how the US is also often perceived). Europe is important not only as source of resources. It is a fundamental objective of US foreign policy to secure its welfare and the security of its citizens. How do we go about this? By open markets, free and fair competition, also in ideas, as well as in the economy. We do not seek competition in security. War in Europe is for the United States of a completely different importance than war, e.g., in Central Africa. Europe is still very important, and NATO is central in this regard. NATO is the most tangible symbol for US interest in Europe. This has not changed. We all need each other.

CATRINA: How do you see the trend of France to get closer to the military side of NATO again? What implications would this have for the Alliance?

HOLL: An evolution can be seen in the French attitude. What role should the US have in Europe? France has tried to answer this question. There is a trend in the United States to disengage.

CATRINA: To what extent is this linked to, or has caused by, the Maastricht Treaty?

HOLL: If the WEU is to become the military arm of the European Union, there will not be a 1:1 exchange for the US role in Europe. It will be good if Europe takes over some [additional] responsibility. We have no ideological debate of NATO first or WEU first. One should not have here a European "identity", but European capabilities. We do not think that tensions are necessary. We have to be pragmatic.

DIV GEIGER: What about the role of the neutral states?

HOLL: We knew what neutrality meant in the Cold War. But now? I would understand "non-alignment". The United States prefers European

integration to European conflicts. The only countervailing factor to disintegrative effects in Russia and Eastern Europe is economic prosperity. I had discussions about neutrality with Austria. Austria is ready to play a regional role, but then can one still be neutral? This does not make much sense. In discussions before the NATO summit it was suggested to link EC membership with NATO membership. But we are not in favour. We should not go beyond the the current 16 members of NATO.

CATRINA: What about the role of the NACC and the wish of some Central European countries to have more privileged relations with NATO than others?

HOLL: In "partnership for peace" a universal invitation is being extended. It shall deal with peace-keeping, interoperability, etc. Hungary may respond to this in a different way from, say, Tajikistan.

CATRINA: What if things should go badly in Russia?

HOLL: Our choice in Russia is clear. If things go bad there, "partnership for peace" is a less provocative approach than a stepwise expansion of NATO (first the Visegrad group, then the Baltic states, etc.).

CATRINA: I understand that "partnership for peace" will also involve cooperation in peace-keeping, at least as far as training is concerned. Could this not lead to a situation where the Russian government or military might seek Western blessing for restoring control over the former USSR in the name of peace-keeping?

HOLL: We emphasize, in this context, multilateral approaches to problems like the Caucasus. We also understand that Russia's "near abroad" is for them of greater concern than the situation in Madrid. As for the further development of the NACC, we see the growing of security for Europe as a gradual process. The NACC played an important role in the first stage; "partnership for peace" is a next step.

WINKLER: What is the US policy in respect to former Yugoslavia at this stage?

HOLL: It has not changed. A bad winter may come, and it could lead to more refugees. We will thus pursue negotiations, push humanitarian assistance, and keep military options open. It would be a NATO operation, hence different to Somalia. Most concerns of the Senate would be met if it would be a NATO operation. Such an operation would not be decided upon overnight. We could prepare a viable coalition. However, an open-ended commitment is in nobody's interest. The United States has such a

commitment to NATO, and Europe. But it does not want it for former Yugoslavia.

BREULEUX: How do you see the future of the CSCE?

HOLL: For the United States the CSCE is an important mechanism for an open dialogue, and the prevention of conflicts. The NACC has, for instance, a more narrow agenda. Hence there is no competition. The United States counts on the CSCE. It can do some things nobody else can do.

*Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Principal Deputy  
Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of  
State*

[Winkler explains the purpose of the visit. Among the issues we would like to address are the US foreign policy priorities, trans-Atlantic relations, etc.]

BINNENDIJK: I shall have to leave for about 15-20 minutes. During this time you will be able to talk with two of my collaborators on questions related to Russia. [leaves]

X: Russia is very much at the top of the foreign policy priorities of the US administration. This is underscored by the present visit of Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Off the record, I would also like to add that this it is nice to have at least one issue perceived as success in our foreign policy. Priorities we inherited from the previous administration, but approach perhaps somewhat differently, include the de-nuclearizing of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. The success is different. We were most successful with Belarus, which has signed both the START-1 Treaty and the NPT. Kazakhstan has ratified START-1, and President Nazarbayev has pledged to send the NPT to the Kazakh parliament before the end of this year. We have most problems with the Ukraine. The commitments undertaken by President Kravchuk are not met by progress. We hope to come up with an idea to persuade the Ukrainian parliament [to ratify START-1 and the NPT]. In the approach this administration may differ from the previous one. We are broadening our relationship with the Ukraine but continue to hold our focus on the nuclear weapons. We insist that the Ukraine has to live up to the commitments undertaken under the Lisbon Protocol in order to fully broaden our relationship.

We have also inherited the goals of US foreign policy towards the remainder of the CIS from the Bush administration, and have here again perhaps slightly changed the approach. President Clinton made a firm promise to President

Yeltsin to deliver what had been promised to the Russian Federation. Almost all of [the assistance planned to the former USSR] has been obligated, but an obligation is not delivery. To build democracy in the former USSR is in their hands, but we try to give them a helping hand. The US administration has been criticized for unconditionally supporting Yeltsin, but it sees Yeltsin as the best element for progress toward democracy in Russia. In Central Asia democracy will at best be achievable in the distant future, but there are some encouraging signs. In the Caucasus, the conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh and in Georgia must come to an end before democracy can come.

Y: We have inherited these goals from the previous administration. There is much continuity in this.

WINKLER: What would be the US policy if the Ukraine should indeed stick to the nuclear weapons?

X: This is the 1000 dollar question. The view of most people in the US administration is to stick to the goal of getting the Ukraine to adhere to the Lisbon Protocol. The Ukraine has concluded with Russia an agreement under which Ukrainian nuclear weapons could be dismantled within 24 months. Perhaps there has been some backtracking, but we hold out for that. Perhaps we have to lower our expectations regarding Ukrainian [foreign] policy, since they are heavily preoccupied with domestic politics. It is very difficult now to get anyone in the Ukraine to focus on the question of nuclear weapons. We need a political programme taking into account the political realities, and still enabling us to reach our objectives.

WINKLER: What is your feeling regarding the stability of the Ukraine?

X: So far, the Ukraine has been remarkably stable, considering the circumstances. This often tends to be forgotten. Indeed, the disintegration of the former USSR has so far been remarkably peaceful, and the Russian-Ukrainian relationship may be the most remarkable part of that. There is now some tugging at Ukrainian territorial integrity, but so far it has been peaceful. I am optimistic that we will not face a Bosnia-type situation here. What could happen is that the Ukraine may lose some of its independence for reasons of economic dependence. But we shall probably not see a civil war.

EBERHART: Do you envisage giving the Ukraine more financial support in order to bring them to signing the NPT?

X: This is a possibility, but we cannot offer much more than we did already since we have

not much more in the coffers. Whether the international community might make an additional contribution is a different question.

EBERHART: Do you also mean NATO by "the international community"?

Y: The Russian government has taken some tough measures toward economic reform. The Ukraine has not gone as far. It is hard to see any movement in economic reform in the Ukraine.

[Binnendijk comes back.]

WINKLER [presents the members of the delegation]: What are the foreign policy priorities of the Clinton administration, and to what extent do they differ from those of the Bush administration?

BINNENDIJK: I can tell you what our priorities in foreign policy should be, and they are indeed emerging. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright talked about multilateralism, and the enlargement of the community of democratic states. I would identify six basic tasks of the US policy in national security:

1. To maintain a degree of harmony among the world's major powers. This may seem self-evident, but it is not. We live now in an unique situation. By the major powers I mean Russia, China (trying to get it to reforming without snapping the relationship), Japan (constructing a framework for the relationship), and NATO (which should be strengthened and changed in response to the demands of the times).
2. To deal with regional conflict in areas of vital interest to the United States, especially regarding proliferation and resources of vital importance to us. The regions include Korea, the Gulf, the Middle East, Russia/Ukraine, and the Indian sub-continent. I should mention that Mexico is also important to us, but it has no regional conflicts.
3. To deal with what is called "failed states". Here is not the security, but humanitarian interests which are involved. We have to prevent genocide in Bosnia, and starvation in Somalia. The key is to act multilaterally. The United States does not want to be caught in a Lebanon-type situation. We have to act boldly and quickly, and not to get stuck.
4. To build democracy.
5. To deal with global problems, such as terrorism, the drug problem, and migration.



6. Economics. This is not the last priority, perhaps it should be the second. We want to maintain free trade and prevent the formation of trading blocks.

The past two weeks have been bad for US foreign policy in the press (Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti); the critics had a field day. Our foreign policy is still in evaluation. The administration came in hoping to use the United Nations process. The past six months have demonstrated the problems, e.g., regarding the command and control arrangements for UN operations. Now we are in a period of re-assessment.

EBERHART: If the working of the United Nations shows some limits, could the conclusion be to assume more US leadership in NATO, or the CSCE?

BINNENDIJK: Warren Christopher and Les Aspin have showed US leadership. The Aspin formula provides NATO with new missions. As far as ongoing operations are concerned, e.g., in Bosnia, the situation is different. If an agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be reached, it is a difficult question whether the US will provide the troops expected from it. But leadership requires a willingness to put chips on the table.

BREULEUX: Could you elaborate on US non-proliferation policy? Would it be conceivable for the US to act unilaterally against North Korea?

BINNENDIJK: We do in fact act unilaterally regarding North Korea. Our new initiative could be a success. There are three fora for negotiations: North Korea - United States, North Korea - South Korea and North Korea - IAEA. The issues at hand are too important to be dealt with at a purely technical level. What elements will have to be involved remains to be determined.

BREULEUX: How far is the United States ready to go to battle proliferation?

BINNENDIJK: We agree to a complete test ban. After China has conducted a test, it would still be difficult to move Congress to resume nuclear testing. Thus I think that a regime of non-testing will continue. The non-production of fissile material is another issue in this context. The NPT was also the key issue in the meetings of Secretary of State Christopher in Kiev and Alma Ata. This is an area of real success so far.

WINKLER: Is the United States in the current mood ready to put chips on the table, and accept the possibility of body-bags coming back, as it has indicated an end to its involvement in Somalia, and some shots in Haiti were enough not to intervene, and questions abound about

Bosnia? Many feel that the United States has lost interest to deploy troops in Europe. The Congress is looking to curtail the powers of the President. What would the "chips" of the United States be?

BINNENDIJK: It all depends on the scenario. Many in Congress and among our pundits concentrate on the essential issues and neglect the less vital ones. Events in Somalia contributed to this. But even those favouring a minimalist foreign policy would keep a strong commitment to Europe. There is no challenge to keeping 80,000-100,000 troops in Europe. This is sustainable. I expect that this will be underlined at the NATO summit meeting. What could change this is a series of relatively small disasters of the Lebanon type where our forces would be pinned down. We cannot afford another Somalia, this would erode the base of support from the American people. In Bosnia, we must review the situation on the ground carefully. If the forces are being shot at by both the Muslims and the Croats, the situation would be unsustainable. We need to take a careful look, and be sure that the parties will be serious about an agreement and determined to keep it.

WINKLER: We will have a referendum on the formation of a battalion of Blue Helmets in Switzerland. Is the United States at the current juncture against moving from peace-keeping to peace enforcement in a UN context? May it act unilaterally, or does it rather stick to the traditional concept of peace-keeping?

BINNENDIJK: No, one could envision situations in which operations would involve peace enforcement. The key is not to get stuck in another Lebanon, not to become a party to a fight without end in sight. This is what has to be avoided, not peace enforcement as such.

EBERHART: I assume that the support by the American population will be important.

BINNENDIJK: We will develop modes of working with Capitol Hill, of working out a consultative mechanism. To keep involvement in peace-keeping acceptable, the US contribution [to the United Nations] cannot be sustained at over 30%. A bi-partisan consensus is achievable, and it would lead to sustainable support. The trouble with the people is usually not at the beginning of an operation, but comes as the operation drags on.

*J.D. Bindenagel, Director, Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State*

BINDENAGEL: I welcome this chance for an exchange of views. As there is fast change in Europe, Switzerland has an interesting role. I am aware of its decision regarding the European Economic Area and am pleased about its decision regarding the F/A-18. It will be exciting to hear what are the plans of Switzerland, and to answer your questions, dispelling media reports that we in the United States are not interested in Europe. We have indeed a Euro-centric view here in the Department of State. If we develop our contacts with Pacific states, this should not be seen as a competition, but as a balance.

WINKLER: What would you forecast for the NATO summit meeting? What could be the kind of mission the United States envisages for itself?

BINDENAGEL: The arrival of the new administration in Washington coincided with the recognition of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This administration follows the objectives of promoting democracy, market economies, and the restructuring of armed forces. In our endeavour to promote an economic recovery, we focus on the GATT agreement. The authority of the President to conclude such an agreement will run out by December 15. The question poses itself whether we should pursue an agreement or an extension of this authority. The position here is not to seek an extension of the authority, as other important issues come up, such as NAFTA and health care. The view here is that a GATT agreement would be the best way to economic recovery.

The US armed forces in Central Europe are being restructured. The focus of the NATO summit will be to reaffirm the Washington Treaty, especially Article 5. A different structure is needed, with, for example, fewer tanks. The Central and East European countries want to join NATO, but they are militarily and politically not compatible with the alliance now. The NATO Defence Minister have found a consensus in Travemünde by developing "partnership for peace", for co-operation in training and consultation. In the framework of the NACC, the consultation mechanism dealt with concrete disputes. The package is not easily balanced. We are not yet at a consensus regarding Central and Eastern Europe, but hopefully we will be there by January 1994.

WINKLER: What is the impact of the events in Russia this month on this question, the relationship to Central and Eastern Europe?

BINDENAGEL: The run-up to the December elections in Russia makes the two objectives of stability and democracy rather more compatible.

WINKLER: Before the events in October in Moscow, Germany was quite outspoken in favour of offering a serious perspective of joining NATO to the states of the Visegrad group. What has been the impact of the events in Moscow on the eagerness in this direction, as Yeltsin has to rely on the support of the Russian armed forces?

BINDENAGEL: The German Defence Minister was for some time, after his March 26 speech, quite outspoken regarding the membership question. But this question is for us still not on the agenda. After August, alternatives to membership have been given more attention. All of these are still on the table. From a Western point of view, the meeting in Travemünde meant to extend collective security without enlarging the Alliance.

CATRINA: It seems rather doubtful whether this can resolve the basic problem, which is a kind of pressure for most-favoured nation status in security policy, in the sense that some nations want to get a more privileged position, and those which do not get it, have somehow to be reassured that all are still on an equal footing.

BINDENAGEL: In Travemünde, a cooperative arrangement for initiatives from the outside was developed. But the problem you mentioned is very clear to us.

VOGELSANGER: What could be the Swiss reaction to Aspin's invitation?

BINDENAGEL: If this becomes policy by January, and if Switzerland would propose common missions on an ad hoc basis, we might be open.

WINKLER: Could Les Aspin's proposal lead to a broader cooperation between NATO and Switzerland? The Federal Council will, as you know, in two days deliberate the report on foreign policy and neutrality. This may lead to a debate among our people. The potential offer [by NATO] could thus be potentially interesting. Switzerland will, of course, not give up neutrality, which is deeply ingrained, but probably the Federal Council will re-define it. This could lead to a wish for normalizing our relationship with NATO, for example in the form that an Ambassador and/or Defence Attaché might be appointed with NATO. I understand that this would not pose any problem with the United States.

BINDENAGEL: This is not inconceivable, if the Aspin approach is being adopted.

VOGELSANGER: Aspin spoke of partnership for peace, and co-operation. What would be the relationship of such undertakings with NACC?

BINDENAGEL: It is so far undefined whether participation in partnership for peace would also imply NACC membership.

EBERHART: What shall be the division of labour between partnership for peace and the NACC, also taking into account the CSCE?

BINDENAGEL: We are at an early stage of thinking in this regard. We have not defined it yet. Even Aspin's presentation is not yet official policy of the United States. A concrete approach will need consensus of all NATO countries.

WINKLER: How do you look at Austrian moves to get closer to the WEU, and to its appointment of an Ambassador with NATO and the WEU? How does the United States look in general at the possibility of neutrals joining the European pillar of the Alliance?

BINDENAGEL: First, I want to say that this is a sovereign decision of Austria. We encourage the European Community to assume a role in foreign and security policy, in European security as a pillar of NATO. Our motto is: separable, but not separate, for the WEU relating to NATO. It is an interesting issue for the WEU to consider how to reconcile neutrality with membership in the WEU and the European Union. The European Monetary Union is also not moving forward as fast as expected. On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty can now enter into force.

DIV GEIGER: Are there any questions by the Lady of the Swiss desk?

[Swiss desk officer]: My questions would focus on the operational level. The report of the Swiss government on foreign policy and neutrality are of great interest to us. Peace-keeping is also a very relevant question, perhaps the single biggest issue for us. Is Switzerland going to change, to evolve?

WINKLER: The main feature is that the country does not know at this juncture where it wants to be in ten years time. The government may know, but not the country as a whole. Bilateral agreements are to be concluded where possible with Brussels. But there are limits, as the European Community is busy with other issues, such as the accession negotiations of Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. We must also take into account that the EC wants to conclude a deal, it wants a quid pro quo. By and large, I do not expect the emergence of a clear mood, at least for one year. I don't expect either that the European dossier will be back for

a referendum within two years. The mood is certainly to retain neutrality. But the tight jacket may be loosened, it may be reduced to the military dimension, giving more room of manoeuvre. But it is an open question how this will relate to the European security structure. Switzerland wants, at any rate, to remain a partner, and to contribute to stability and order in Europe, inter alia, by peace-keeping. We did already a lot in the past, by financial and personnel support in UNTAG, MINURSO, UNTSO, and in former Yugoslavia, to name a few. The formation of a peace-keeping battalion would just be one more step in this direction.

*David Clinard, Assistant Director, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State (plus Mr. Cordenne, Bert Brummel, Scott Davis and others)*

CLINARD: What we are doing in our bureau is backstopping, particularly for Geneva (Conference on Disarmament) and The Hague (Chemical Weapons Verification Agency). Mr. Cordenne has been with UNSCOM, and will now focus on the comprehensive test ban issue as it is being dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament. Scott Davis is from the bureau on non-proliferation. ACDA has also a verification bureau. This is a busy time in arms control, and in ACDA. The world has changed, but arms control has not slackened, but rather increased its pace. With regard to the Commonwealth of Independent States, bilateral arms control has evolved into multilateral arms control. The pace in the Conference on Disarmament has also picked up, as we move toward negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. These negotiations will start in January 1994. Mr. Cordenne will be the principal backstopper for this.

VOGELSANGER [presents the delegation].

WINKLER [explains the purpose of the visit]. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was in Kiev, and the news were on the whole rather pleasant. Is this reading correct, has headway been done, or has it just been one more round?

BRUMMEL: Ultimately, what will happen with the SS-24 will be a matter of compromise. What we heard this week was more encouraging than last week, when President Kravchuk spoke about keeping the SS-24. We want to get some commitment from the Ukraine that the SS-24 will be included in the elimination just as the SS-19. To keep the SS-19s would be inadvisable, for security and economic reasons. I am not convinced that the issue is closed. The

Secretary of State rejected the Ukrainian request for \$ 2.8 billion out of hand. What will come of this issue will depend on the interaction between President Kravchuk and the Rada.

WINKLER: There are two problems, the ratification by the Ukraine of the START-1 Treaty and the adhesion to the NPT [as non-nuclear-weapons state]. What is the situation regarding the ALCM? Where is the process of Ukraine joining the NPT?

BRUMMEL: The most recent signs are not encouraging. We would like them to accede to the NPT before giving them assistance. The things they told us were not what we wanted to hear. The Ukraine has, in its own view, certainly separated the two issues (START-1 ratification, and adhesion to the NPT).

WINKLER: An important deadline, in this context, is certainly the 1995 review conference of the NPT. A nuclear Ukraine would certainly make an extension of the NPT more difficult to achieve. What would you do in case the Ukraine would stay out of the NPT, and what about US assistance to the Ukraine as long as it does not join the NPT?

BRUMMEL: There was a time when we drew a clear link between the two issues. What President Clinton did then was to broaden our relationship with the Ukraine. As a result, some [U.S.] assistance will be available even without progress in the nuclear question. But it would be very hard to provide technical assistance without the necessary commitments on the side of the Ukraine. We have certainly an interest in early dismantlement and de-activation of strategic nuclear weapons, but in this more narrow area there will be no US. assistance. However there will be in broader areas.

WINKLER: What is your assessment of the technical safety of the nuclear warheads in the Ukraine? Apparently hydrogen is building up in the warheads, and one warhead has reportedly been returned to Russia for such reasons.

BRUMMEL: I do not have a good answer. There are conflicting reports. The Russians have an evident interest to tell such things. I think that maintenance is being continued. Our basic objective is to get the warheads off the delivery systems, or at least de-activate them, as fast as we can. The best case would be to get them out of the Ukraine.

EBERHART: What are the contents of the umbrella agreement?

BRUMMEL: This is a very broad agreement that provides an overarching framework how assistance is to be provided. The necessary funds

come out of existing DOD accounts. But some legal requirements have to be met. Now that the umbrella agreement has been concluded, we can go on to sign technical agreements, e.g. on

- dismantlement of strategic offensive arms, e.g., missiles, bombers, warheads, etc.
- exports control
- emergency response equipment
- government-to-government communications

The umbrella agreement is the first step. It provides the basis for further steps. We have four or five specific agreements in the pipeline.

EBERHART: Would that include the purchase [by the United States] of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium?

BRUMMEL: We focus for the time being on highly-enriched uranium. We have on this an agreement so far with the Russian Federation, but not with the Ukraine.

EBERHART: What do you foresee in case proliferation cannot be stopped?

DAVIS: The American non-proliferation policy has held the objective of stopping proliferation. But it has also assumed that as long as the motives exist, in the long run proliferation cannot be avoided. Export controls shall deny the capability, other elements shall impact on the motivation. We have not stopped export controls, but indeed strengthened them. But more than before we are trying to deal with the motivations.

WINKLER: Where are North Korea, India, Iraq and Iran at present regarding nuclear ambitions? What about the other ones, such as Pakistan? And what do you about this trend?

DAVIS: You mentioned the principal countries we have in mind. There are different aspects to what we do in each of these cases. In effect, we apply the policy I described, e.g., in the Middle East we deal with it also through the peace process. As for North Korea, this is a special case, as this country is member of the NPT. We work through the IAEA, and the United Nations. If the proliferation problem of North Korea is not solved, it could cause South Korea and Japan to go some way. The good news regarding non-proliferation come from Latin America and South Africa.

WINKLER: Have you any evidence that South Africa destroyed its nuclear weapons, as it officially announced?

DAVIS: We are satisfied in this regard, as they are now implementing full-scope safeguards. We are working through the IAEA. The stockpile of highly-enriched uranium has to be dealt with.

WINKLER: What is the U.S. position regarding China, as it relates to export controls, and the MTCR in particular, and nuclear testing?

DAVIS: China is a major problem regarding export controls. China is of great concern also as supplier of nuclear material, principally to Iran and Pakistan. We try to engage China bilaterally and by way of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We also try to look at possible measures outside of that.

CLINARD: We have expressed our strong regrets to China regarding its nuclear test, and urged it to go back to a non-testing regime.

BREULEUX: Do you think that China could be allowed some quota of tests before a comprehensive test ban will be concluded?

CLINARD: We urged them not to test at all.

CORDENNE: No discussions on quota are taking place. We would not countenance such proposals.

CLINARD: It would be a mistake to take this approach.

CATRINA: Previous U.S. administrations have for three decades argued that nuclear testing is necessary to ensure the reliability of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile and to develop additional safety mechanisms. Have you come to the conclusion that nuclear testing is not necessary for these purposes?

CORDENNE: The concerns can be met without nuclear testing. The benefits of not testing, in terms of strengthening the NPT, more than outweigh the benefits of developing new safety measures.

WINKLER: If I may come back to South Africa, do you have any conclusions regarding the incident when a flash of light, possibly from a nuclear explosion, was observed some years ago over the Indian Ocean?

CORDENNE: Some people in the U.S. weapons community are still debating. South Africa has explicitly denied that it conducted a nuclear test when it declared its former possession of nuclear weapons, and it has also denied that it had assisted in any nuclear test of another country.

WINKLER: Have you any indications regarding a proliferation of nuclear material, scientists, etc. from the former Soviet Union?

DAVIS: There have been numerous reports, but no confirmation that significant amounts of weapons-grade material have been involved. Potential proliferator countries in the Third World are certainly interested. There may be a need to link assistance to improved export con-

trols. There are no reasons to lean back and relax, but so far this risk has not become really serious.

BRUMMEL: We are trying to set up international scientific-technological centres in Moscow and Kiev to keep the former Soviet nuclear scientists employed.

WINKLER: Switzerland has allotted money to this project, but it has so far been blocked by the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments.

BRUMMEL: The United States has allotted \$ 23 million.

WINKLER: The Swiss contribution is, if I remember correctly, between \$ 1 and 2 billion. I would also be interested to hear which potential proliferators are the most active and which are the most advanced.

DAVIS: We have said for some time now that Iran is seeking a nuclear capability that it might achieve in perhaps 10 years. We have a policy of double containment, preventing that Iran or Iraq get a nuclear capability. Iran has still a long way to go, perhaps 10 years, even if it conducts active procurement. This is good news, we have time.

BRUMMEL: The United States also has a counter-proliferation policy. This refers to measures after proliferation has happened. Ultimately we think that proliferation will occur. We are beginning a new process to see what to do in such circumstances. We are certainly ready to defend our values.

EBERHART: What is the situation, and the perspective, of UNSCOM?

CORDENNE: I am just back from Iraq. On the whole, we are remarkably successful in keeping a lid on Iraq. As long as the IAEA can be present and monitoring in Iraq, this country should not pose any threat to the international community. If this regime should someday be lifted, the control of dual-use imports will be very important.

EBERHART: Switzerland has supported about 15 UNSCOM missions. This may have been a fairly modest contribution. Where would you see a need for further Swiss contributions?

CORDENNE: I am now back in Washington, no longer with the UNSCOM. The Swiss support has been very useful. Any advice on export controls you might give to Ambassador Ekeus might be useful.

WINKLER: What are your feelings regarding the potential outcome of the NPT review conference on 1995? What outcome do you consider neces-

sary in terms of strengthening the safeguards? What is the influence of the Iraq business?

DAVIS: We have mobilized quite an amount of support for an extension of the NPT without amendment. This gives us some reason for confidence, but one must be prepared for the possibility of falling short. What will have a strong influence on the review conference will be the situation regarding a comprehensive test ban.

WINKLER: Would you say that the target date for the completion of a comprehensive test ban is 1994?

CORDENNE: Our legislation gives us time up to 1996 to achieve a comprehensive test ban. We hope to have something already by early 1995.

WINKLER: What is the attitude of the United States regarding an enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament, if we leave aside Iraqi membership?

CLINARD: We did not agree to the inclusion of Iraq. Consequently we did not agree to the entire package. We would have been delighted to see Switzerland and some other countries as new members of the Conference on Disarmament. We would accept all countries on the list except for Iraq.

VOGELSANGER: One can also take the position that the sinners should be present when one speaks about sin. The Swiss official policy is in favour of having Iraq as member in the Conference on Disarmament.

WINKLER: What do you see as the main future activities of the Conference on Disarmament, beyond the elaboration of a complete test ban?

X: For example security guarantees and transparency issues. The Conference on Disarmament works best when it puts emphasis on a specific item. In the past that was the Chemical Weapons Convention, not it will hopefully be a comprehensive test ban.

CATRINA: I would take the opportunity to put a simple question to you, to which I have in the past had rather confusing answers. Are you certain that the only two kinds of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine are ALCMs and ICBMs, and in Belarus as well as Kazakhstan only ICBMs?

BRUMMEL: We are pretty sure that they have only these systems. The tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn to Russia in 1992.

CATRINA: You are also certain that the Ukraine has no nuclear gravity bombs?

BRUMMEL: There could be some there. Some of those warheads have been returned. On tacti-

cal nuclear weapons we are confident, as we have mutually confirming reports from the Ukraine and Russia. The remainder is certainly still in the Ukraine, waiting for an agreement?

CATRINA: And the situation in Belarus and Kazakhstan?

BRUMMEL: Belarus is not a problem.

CATRINA: Some four months ago we were told that the Ukraine might achieve positive control over the nuclear weapons on its soil within six months. How do you assess this risk as of today?

BRUMMEL: I have no good answers. We have seen conflicting reports. The capability is probably there. However we have also to take into account measures taken by Russia to degrade the weapons in case the Ukraine obtains positive control. Administrative control is with the Ukraine.

CATRINA: I have seen reports according to which the Soviet strategic nuclear forces were on a launch-on-warning posture, and I find this hard to believe. What do you think of such reports?

BRUMMEL: We do not know anything on that beyond what has been in the newspapers.

EBERHART: What is the US position regarding the implementation, so far, of the CFE Treaty? What position does the United States have regarding the suspension of Article V of this treaty?

CLINARD: We are on the whole satisfied with the CFE Treaty implementation. A large number of treaty-limited items have been destroyed, and a large number is being readied for destruction. The break-up of the Soviet Union has certainly made the implementation less smooth than it could otherwise have been, but on the whole we are satisfied.

Y: About 15,000 treaty-limited items have been destroyed so far [by all parties combined], of which about 6,000 in the former Soviet Union, about 4,000 in other former Warsaw Pact member states, and about 5,000 in NATO member countries. By November 16 the parties must have done 25% of their destruction liabilities. One item of uncertainty is whether Russia does fulfil the promise of destroying part of the material moved behind the Urals. Our emphasis is on full implementation of the CFE Treaty by 1995. Subsequently a review conference may be convened which could also consider modifications to the Treaty.

EBERHART: Do you see a clear military reason behind the Russian demarche regarding Article V?

Y: The Russians are concerned about the conflicts in the Caucasus. But we do not feel that there is a need to build up forces [in this region] beyond the CFE ceilings.

WINKLER: We have heard that at least 2,000 treaty-limited items in the former Soviet Union are not accounted for.

Y: There is great disorder in the former Soviet Union. For example in Armenia many weapons were left behind by the Russians, and nobody wants now to be responsible for them.

EBERHART: In Open Skies, what is the present status of the consultative commission (including the Sensor Working Group)? Will an extension of the period of application be an option, and if so, why?

Y: The period has been extended for six months two weeks ago. The consultative commission does not make much progress.

CATRINA: As long as the Ukraine does not ratify the START-1 Treaty, START-II cannot move forward. Nevertheless, what would be the attitude of the Senate toward START-II?

BRUMMEL: We are still interested in this agreement. The ratification of it appears, though, distant since we will first have to get START-1 into force.

CATRINA: The Ukraine has at times taken the position that the Lisbon Protocol to START-1 does not oblige it to eliminate the SS-24 ICBM. Is it true that the United States takes the position that START-1, including the Lisbon Protocol, obliges the Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons on its territory?

BRUMMEL: Our position is clear that all Ukrainian nuclear weapons are covered by the Lisbon Protocol. All warheads have to be withdrawn, all missiles have to be dismantled. We do not want to pay the Ukraine for complying with the Treaty.

CATRINA: Is there a difference between SS-19 and SS-24 regarding the timetable for their elimination?

BRUMMEL: The time scale is for both 7 years, any difference is more linked to the kind of assistance necessary.

DAVIS: Funding for dismantlement is in our interest. It is not a goodie for good behaviour, but in the interest of the international community.

EBERHART: Which areas of the Forum for Security Co-operation in Vienna do you consider important?

Y: The global exchange of military information and military contacts are not controversial. NATO had a meeting at Bornholm some weeks ago to discuss the direction of post-CFE arms control. There was heavy emphasis on regional arms control rather than on Europe-wide restrictions.

EBERHART: Do you see new stabilizing measures that could or should be introduced and, if so, which ones?

Y: The measures of the Vienna Document of 1992 may have to be looked at, with a view, e.g., to lowering the thresholds, and providing more notification.

EBERHART: Would lowering the thresholds really be useful?

Y: We have not yet reached any conclusion on this matter in the United States. We know that Switzerland has particular concerns regarding ceilings.

EBERHART: We are in favour of non-bureaucratic transparency of defence planning.

WINKLER: One year ago, the Russian Deputy Defence Minister told me that in Russia there were about 18,000 railroad wagons with chemical weapons waiting for elimination. How do you assess the Russian capability to implement its obligations to eliminate chemical weapons. And what about US assistance?

Z: We shall certainly not take Russian chemical weapons to Johnston Island for elimination. We have also somewhat different information on their chemical weapons. 18,000 railroad wagons would be about 50% of the Russian stockpile. But most of the stockpile is located in underground storage. Right now there is no elimination capacity in Russia. We try to help developing a plan for that. The U.S. might assist in establishing elimination facilities, and also ask other Western countries to help. It is not going to be cheap. There is a problem with transportation, as the rail and road network does not make for safe transportation. The Russians have, on top of that, the "not in my backyard" problem. We have promised to help them by demonstrating safe elimination procedures. On the whole, I do not think that the elimination liabilities are beyond Russian technical capabilities, within the limits set by the Chemical Weapons Convention, if they make a determined effort.

WINKLER: The Chemical Weapons Convention is also being rejected by Arab states due to the Israeli nuclear capabilities.

Z: The link is no longer really there. The Arab League first said that no Arab states should sign the chemical weapons convention, but some did. Egypt and Syria indicated that they need some assurance regarding the Israeli nuclear capability before joining the chemical weapons convention. But Egypt will adhere unilaterally by the provisions of the chemical weapons convention. As for active chemical weapons programmes of Arab states, there are some concerns in the United States. But we do not think that actual weaponization programmes are going on in the Middle East.

CORDENNE: Iraq said it could not join the chemical weapons convention as long as Israel had not joined the NPT.

Z: I would add that Iran is a signatory to the chemical weapons convention.

*Mary Ann Peters, Deputy Assistant Secretary,  
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,  
Department of State*

PETERS: Partnership for Peace is right now a preliminary concept that needs the NATO summit to be endorsed. It would include a series of unilateral declarations of work plans by countries willing to cooperate, e.g. in the area of peace-keeping. The criteria for the areas concerned still need to be defined. We expect of course those countries most interested in NATO membership to be the most active. In this sense, Partnership for Peace will be self-selective, which is one of its appeals. Partnership for peace avoids to isolate (and by this token, insult) Russia and the Ukraine. It will avoid the perception of a larger NATO moving closer to Russia's borders. It navigates between an exclusive opening [for some states] and no move at all. I may, to some extent, be a competition to the CSCE, but above all for the NACC. The division of labour between Partnership for Peace and the NACC is unclear.

WINKLER: The Visegrad countries have hoped for NATO membership, perhaps already by 1996. This perspective is now apparently being pushed back. The NACC was created two years ago, also to cope with pressure from Central Europe for membership in NATO. Are you now selling the same horse for the second time? Or, to put it differently: Where is the beef?

PETERS: We are indeed in a way selling the same horse a second time, only it is a better one. The states wishing to join NATO will get closer, though. Within NACC we had started in Athens to talk about peace-keeping. Members can continue the work in the NACC. This was decided last week. Where is the beef? We do not

know as yet, perhaps joint peace-keeping exercises. The individual countries will decide how far they want to go. NATO is a sophisticated outfit, and it needs sophisticated people.

WINKLER: Would you encourage neutral countries to participate in Partnership for Peace and to provide assets for joint exercises?

PETERS: Secretary of Defense Aspin mentioned the neutrals explicitly. To get more assets [by the participation of neutrals] for peace-keeping is not the issue. It is not clear whether Partnership for Peace will result, for example, in forward deployments of NATO or permanent access to the NATO air defense system. Partnership for Peace will not be the only topic of the summit meeting. France, in particular, has also other subjects. We have a feeling that the neutrals should not be excluded; Partnership for Peace is intended not only for former Warsaw Pact member states. We thought in particular of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Switzerland was not in the focus, but Switzerland could impact on the definition of Partnership for Peace before the summit will take place, if it so wishes. Even if Switzerland is invited to Partnership for Peace, it is not meant as pressure or anything else. We just do not want to exclude anybody. I would be silly to exclude the neutrals in peace-keeping.

Out-of-area operations of NATO: Some people responded to criticism of NATO [in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina] by saying that NATO did all that was asked from it. NATO is a defensive alliance. It is not geared to the Bosnias of this world. It is not even completely clear what "out of area" is. The two main issues, to which NATO has to respond are the relationship with Central and Eastern Europe, and to respond to the challenges of the 1990s.

We do not know how to cope with Russia and its peace-making desires in its "near abroad". A United Nations "chapeau" is probably the key here. We do not know [yet] how to integrate this problem in Partnership for Peace. We have, though, to find a solution.

*Roundtable with the Bureau of Politico-Military  
Affairs, Department of State: Richard Sokolsky,  
Director, Office of Strategic and Theater Policy;  
Pat Hanscom, Deputy Director, Office of  
Strategic and Theater Policy; Phil Dolliff,  
Action Officer, FSU Nuclear Dismantlement,  
Office of Strategic and Theater Policy*

HANSCOM: Where are we regarding a complete test ban treaty (CTBT)? As you know the United States is committed to a CTBT as soon as possible. We are disappointed about the nu-



clear test by China, but this will not hinder the achievement of a CTBT. We are encouraging China to join the CTBT; but we will not allow China to stand in the way of a CTBT. The negotiations will start in January 1994. We had informal consultations with the other four nuclear-weapons states. We aim for a common commitment for speedy progress. There are also consultations with the other CD members. We are also moving in the UN General Assembly to get a resolution in favour of a CTBT there. Inside the United States they key is to solve the verification regime. Hence several avenues are used simultaneously.

SOKOLSKY: We want a broad adherence to the CTBT, including in particular all non-declared nuclear-weapons states. We want to involve them in the negotiations.

WINKLER: What is the US position regarding an enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament (CD)?

SOKOLSKY: We have problems with Iraq due to its non-compliance with UN sanctions. Hence the US opposition to the enlargement package focused exclusively on Iraq. Iraq is not in full compliance with UN sanctions. The US would like to find a solution on the CD problem. We regret the negative effect it has had on Switzerland. We are open to any constructive ideas, and any good suggestions. Not all CD members were in favour of the enlargement. Some do not seek very actively a solution.

CATRINA: If almost everybody is in favour of a CTBT, do you expect the negotiations to be relatively easy and short?

SOKOLSKY: I think they will probably take two years. The verification regime is the pacing factor. Why? Is the objective of the verification regime to catch tests or to catch already pre-test activities? What shall be the structures of the verification agency? What shall be the relationship with national technical means of verification? A whole gamut of verification techniques is conceivable. As you know, nothing happens quickly in the CD. What are the standards we aim for? All these issues explain why so much time is needed. Above all there are also non-nuclear weapons states with proliferation concerns attached to these negotiations.

WINKLER: What is the situation with START-I and -II?

SOKOLSKY: We have just completed discussions in Moscow and Kiev, but we have not yet received information on these talks. The Lisbon commitments need to be implemented by all (NPT adhesion and START ratification). The Ukraine has concerns and set conditions it

would like us to meet. Over the past 12 months we began forming a package to address that. But it is not sufficient for the Ukraine:

1. They want more than the \$ 195 million [the US has offered]. They want to get \$ 2.8 billion. We have not found any technical basis for that figure.
2. The Ukraine seeks security guarantees in form of a NATO-type treaty between the United States and the Ukraine. This is simply not in the cards. We offered normal negative and positive assurances, plus CSCE border guarantees.
3. The Ukraine seeks compensation for the highly enriched uranium. This is an affair between Russia and the Ukraine. They have in principle agreed on this question, as far as strategic nuclear weapons are concerned. The Ukraine wants, however, also compensation for the highly enriched uranium contained in tactical nuclear weapons. Russia begins to be flexible on that, as long as this does not touch the issue of ownership over tactical nuclear weapons.

The Rada has not yet acted on START for these reasons. We shall see what will come now. START-II is intimately tied to START-I. It cannot enter into force before the ratification of START-I. I expect neither Russia nor the US Senate to act quickly on that. I do also not expect the Ukraine to move quickly on the NPT. President Kravchuk said that they would adhere, but when? The next election in the Ukraine will be in March 1994, they will hardly move on this issue before then. START-I is in progress regarding its implementation in the United States. Russia does this too, though slower than the United States. We are also encouraging the Ukraine to do so.

CATRINA: Have you any clear information on whether the Russian Federation has already begun to dismantle warheads of tactical nuclear weapons?

DOLLIFF: The reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia has begun. We have no reason to disbelieve that they are indeed reducing their number by some 3,000 per year. This is, technically, a continuation of the process initiated by the INF Treaty. Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 are the key facilities, but there are also other facilities involved.

SOKOLSKY: Belarus and Kazakhstan have been very cooperative, Belarus by agreeing to hand the warheads back to Russia, Kazakhstan by agreeing to destroy them on its territory with Russian assistance. The Ukraine tries to bargain. The US encourages the Ukraine and

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Russia to sort out these problems among themselves. We had technical progress, but both sides walked away again from the Massandra agreement. They had agreed on principle, but not regarding the details. Christopher addressed all these issues on his trip, but we have not yet received the full information. But we have reached an umbrella agreement, which provides for US assistance for the destruction of the SS-19, the SS-24 and the bombers.

The Nunn/Lugar package got \$ 800 million from Congress. We will get some \$ 400 million more this year. \$ 700 million have been spent. We have concluded 10 detailed agreements with Russia, 5 with Belarus, and one with the Ukraine. We are also hoping to conclude an umbrella agreement with Kazakhstan, and we have one already with Russia. 2-4 technical teams of the United States are in Russia at any given time, and roughly every two weeks there is a delivery of equipment (e.g., from the programme to provide rail wagons for safe transportation of nuclear warheads). There has been progress in missile and bomber dismantlement. A key problem is the storage of fissile material. The US is helping in the design, and will provide some material for the construction. Japan has committed \$ 100 million. France and Great Britain have smaller programmes. And Sweden will co-finance the international science and technology centre.

CATRINA: What is the risk of physical accidents with nuclear weapons in the Ukraine, due to lack of maintenance?

DOLLIFF: Both sides, Russia and the Ukraine, are tempted to use this issue to bring in third parties. There is some manipulation there. Our assessment is that there are no real and urgent safety problems with these nuclear weapons, as far as we know. High-ranking officials have confirmed this view. There will always be some problems, there will also always be warheads being returned to the production facilities (since they have little field maintenance). Both sides play this issue manipulatively. This is the worst form of brinkmanship. Problems exist also with regard to the storage of nuclear warheads. The Russians put too many warheads in some facilities, though others would have been available.

WINKLER: How do you assess the risk that warheads might "disappear" in the whole operation?

DOLLIFF: We have no hard intelligence on any warheads having disappeared.

*Steve Coffey, Deputy Director, Russian and Security Affairs, Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State*

WINKLER [presents the delegation, explains the purpose of the visit].

COFFEY: One of the key purposes of the Secretary of State's visit to Moscow was to state US support for reforms. This trip followed the events of early October, and took place before the elections of December. Christopher met Yeltsin, Kozyrev, Chernomyrdin and others. He got good briefings. He asked them how the electoral process will go, and about the treatment of the media during the election process. On two occasions, Foreign Minister Kozyrev underlined that there would be free elections with a free press. This is important to the United States. There was a discussion on economic reforms, and how the West can assist Russia in this process. We are committed here. Vice-President Gore heads the commission from the United States, and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin the Russian commission on that. President Clinton will visit Russia in January. He will underscore our commitment to Russia and reforms. The discussions of Christopher covered also the "near abroad". This time the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states was covered. The Russians have still to establish a date for the end of their withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia. But now there are less than 25,000 Russian soldiers left in these two countries. We think that Russia will withdraw all of them. Latvia, where they have still about 17,000 soldiers, is perhaps the toughest case. As for Estonia, perhaps all Russian soldiers may have left before the end of this year. We have no firm commitment from Russia on that, but we are cautiously optimistic. The Russian government is concerned about the treatment of Russians in the Baltic states. Our assessment is that this problem has recently been defused somewhat (e.g., by the elections in Lithuania). The Baltics begin to understand that they need to integrate the Russians living there. But there are still problems, for example with housing. The situation in the Baltics is on the whole under reasonable control.

Kiev was an important stop on the Secretary's trip. We have not yet firm information on his talks there. Key issues were certainly START and the Lisbon Protocol, and the NPT. We hope for progress, but the problem is an internal one in the Ukraine, a problem of the Rada which will be up for new elections next March. There is not much than can be expected before March. There is only an outside chance for the Rada to

ratify START (but not the NPT). The Russians have begun to dismantle SS-19s [in the Ukraine], but the key are the SS-24. Overall, the relationship between Russia and the Ukraine is in a phase of marking time. The nuclear issues are dependent on the overall political relationship. Both countries will have parliamentary elections soon. The Massandra agreements between the Presidents are dead letters. They may have moved the process, but the details remain wide open.

The most volatile issue in the "near abroad" is the Caucasus. In Nagorno-Karabakh the CSCE sponsored a mission to get a cease-fire. Kozyrev and Christopher agree on the Minsk process. There is no substantive progress in the process itself. We got a reaffirmation by Russia of the importance of an international approach to this problem. In Georgia, the situation is volatile and troublesome. There is evidence that some Russian elements supported the Abkhasian side, certainly until July. It is difficult to know how much Moscow is involved in all that. At any rate, it destabilized Georgia, and put Shevardnadze in peril. The situation now is that Shevardnadze is still in danger. We want to support him. Russia has, together with other CIS troops, supplied forces to protect the lines of communications. Yet their role is not clear either. Russia has shown a willingness to support the Shevardnadze government. We are cautiously optimistic that Russia will eventually play a constructive role. Shevardnadze is for the United States the legitimate president of Georgia. A fundamental point for us is that Gamsakhurdia conducted himself in an unacceptable way. Russia and the US recognize Shevardnadze. The situation remains however delicate. I would not be surprised by continuing trouble in Georgia, possibly even a division of the country.

In Tajikistan, the Russians are intervening to support the government against Islamic opposition. The interesting thing here is that this situation touches on many old Russian fears - from Mongol hordes to the disintegration of Central Asia. There is the risk of many refugees, of instability spilling over. The US has not pressed Russia on this issue. Ultimately, a national reconciliation will be necessary in Tajikistan. There is also the problem of involvement of Afghanistan. Russia seems to understand all of this and has started to press on the Tajik government to open a dialogue on national reconciliation. If some modest progress can be achieved, e.g., by having all ethnic governments represented in the government, then a chance is perhaps at hand.

Christopher also met President Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan will before the end of this year ratify the NPT. It has already ratified the START Treaty. Belarus is OK on these issues across the board.

WINKLER: Do you think that the CIS states will remain independent?

COFFEY: I am fairly certain that the Ukraine will still be independent in two years time. I am less certain about Belarus. I think we face a rather volatile situation regarding the possibility of a split of the Ukraine. You cannot exclude anything. But we hope that this is not going to happen. The economy is the key to many things. If the economy collapses, you have the potential for a split. The industry is mostly in the Eastern, Russian-dominated part of the Ukraine. If strikes should start there, that would be a problem. If the Ukrainians can make progress, a national economy can create national cohesion. Today Russia has still economic leverage on the Ukraine. This is not to be overestimated, but it is an unhappy reality. The best we can hope for is to gain time to get the economy on track.

The Ukrainian-Russian relations have their ups and downs. The move by the Russian parliament on Sevastopol heightened the tension, then Yeltsin and Kravchuk met to defuse the situation. But their agreements were not precise. Then new tensions came along, and the two presidents had to meet again. Kravchuk took much flak in his country because of Massandra. Domestic forces in societies are very suspicious of each other. But the use of armed force is unlikely. Both armies are in disarray. Nobody believes that force would be helpful. There is fear of civil war there. But if war should break out it would be vicious.

*House Armed Services Committee, Rayburn House Office Building: Mr. Paul Walker, Professional Staff Member; Mr. Ron Bartek, Professional Staff Member; Ms. Vickie Plunkett, Staff of Representative Glen Browder (Alabama); Mr. Hugh Brady, Staff of Representative John M. Spratt (South Carolina)*

BARTEK: We are at an important juncture in the US defense budget. Right next door a hearing is in progress on personnel.

DIV GEIGER: We are certainly very interested in your experiences.

BARTEK [presents his colleagues, mentions that a chemical weapons stockpile is located in the constituency of Rep. Browder].

WINKLER: What is the future for US military forces abroad, and what is the mood on Capitol Hill regarding a continued military presence in Europe? I would also be interested to hear what may be the implications for the relationship between the President and the House of the move in the Senate to reduce the war powers of the President.

BARTEK: This is an excellent question, and probably most important for US military policy in the global arena. When Clinton came, the expectation was that he might neglect foreign policy. This has not proven to be the case, as several bills of this year testify. We have about 200,000 troops in Europe and Asia. Clinton is supporting to keep 100,000 in Europe, and to arrive at this number no later than 1996. This was a snapshot of the mood in the House last year as well as this year. But it could change next year, as mid-term elections come up. Overseas deployments will then be harder to justify. We are also facing the challenge of peace-keeping, peace enforcement, and peace-making. The conviction of Secretary of Defense Aspin, our chairman Ron Dellums and the majority of the House is that those functions cannot be done unilaterally, that they require cooperation to be successful. Every step in this direction, the direction of a new world order, is a step into the unknown. The new challenges are very taxing: former Yugoslavia, the former USSR, Haiti. There are no easy solutions. I will leave to my colleagues to address the question of war powers. Chairman Dellums has clear convictions on this question.

WALKER: The experience in Somalia has been very difficult for the American public, and troubling for many of us on the Hill. I sense growing isolationist sentiments on the Hill and in the public, liberal and conservative, democrat and republican. Dellums has argued against isolationism, but is also very much against the use of force. He argued in the past for a 50% reduction of military expenditure. He has also argued to stay in Somalia. The US provides a large part of the logistics and intelligence [for this mission]. There is the conflict regarding command and control. All these issues combine to bring up the question of war powers. The Congress has the power to declare war. Some Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee argue that no deployment at all should be possible without the consent of Congress. We shall cut military expenditure by 15%, compared with fiscal year 1993. The bottom-up review does not appear to fit within the budgetary constraints. Thus we are looking where additional cuts could be made. One likely area are US troops abroad. We have a proposal

of a democrat Representative on the House Armed Services Committee that 35% of the cuts for fiscal year 1995 should relate to forces abroad.

WINKLER: Is it fair to say that after Somalia, and with the budget constraints the US would not land in Haiti if there was the risk of violence, and that there is no mood to send US ground troops to Bosnia?

BARTEK: The debate on that is far from over. The President said that US ground troops will be sent only if there is a peace to enforce. General Shalikashvili said that a window of opportunity existed before in former Yugoslavia, but that it has now closed. He is not advising an insertion of US ground troops unless there is peace between the three parties. Ground, air and naval forces should not be used when they are ineffective. There should be preventive missions rather than an insertion of troops in the middle of conflict.

VOGELSANGER: The proportions are not the same, but perhaps I may compare the US with Switzerland regarding peace-keeping. Both are relative newcomers. The lines between peace-keeping and peace enforcement may deliberately be blurred. Now there is a recognition that a clear distinction has to be made. Now even "traditional" peace-keeping missions are being affected by the trouble with "untraditional" missions.

BARTEK: Unilateralism and isolationism are not real options. We have to act together and engage in these international crises. The first option should not be a military one, but economic, political, social to prevent crises. Partnership for Peace is seeking to project stability into Eastern Europe, to provide some hope. By the way, is there an emphasis in your training course on peace-keeping? Do you take into account the experiences of Swiss peace-keepers?

DIV GEIGER: What are the objectives of the mission in Somalia?

BARTEK: The US presence in Somalia is being continued to give Somalia a chance to arrive at a more stable situation than that existing before the intervention. We do not want to leave without having achieved anything.

WALKER: We have withdrawn from aggressive operations with rangers in Somalia. It is clear to this Committee that something went wrong at some time. After the Pakistani casualties the operation was stepped up. There are loads of lessons from Somalia. The clear goal now is not to find Aidid, rather to deliver food, to encourage mediators to find a political solution.

The disarmament of the clans has also been shelved as objective, it is too dangerous.

DIV GEIGER: Would the new approach also include an attempt to re-build government?

WALKER: We would not do this as the United States, but we encourage others, for instance the OAU.

VOGELSANGER: There was a speech by Senator McCain last week in which he said that he was extremely reluctant vis-à-vis any new engagements, e.g. in Bosnia. But he is in favour of humanitarian missions, even if and when US vital interests are not involved.

WALKER: Whether we intervene or not, on whatever grounds, there remain groups in the United States that cannot tolerate any Holocaust. We will consider preventive action, diplomatic moves, limits on transfers of arms, aid, development assistance, multilateral alliances. Perhaps there is a possibility at the CSCE summit to establish a group to deal with former Yugoslavia, larger than the Geneva conference but smaller than the entire CSCE. There are also a lot of questions regarding peace-keeping troops and stand-by forces. I do not think there will ever be US stand-by troops for the UN.

WINKLER: I want to return to Mr. Bartek's question on our training course. It includes a week on peace-keeping, but we do not train specialists for peace-keeping in particular, rather officials for security affairs in foreign and defence ministries.

VOGELSANGER: But Switzerland is offering training for military observers.

WINKLER: I share the view that preventive diplomacy is preferable, but this is easy to say. [Goes on to present briefly the basic tenets of Swiss security policy.]

BARTEK: Stability is one important purpose, even when no vital interests are involved.

WINKLER: We should call a spade a spade. The talk on peace-keeping cuts no ice. If chapter 7 operations are ruled out, then it is not impressive. In Somalia the operation is sliding back from chapter 7 to chapter 6. You need the possibility of force to back up preventive diplomacy if you confront somebody like Saddam Hussein, or North Korea. The US is not for peace enforcement, and even for peace-keeping only under US command.

BARTEK: Chapter 7 is not out. We made mistakes in Somalia. There was not enough consultation. We must learn the lessons. In order to make the humanitarian mission successful, forces were needed to provide security. No one

realized that this implied shifting to a different operation. The Somalia mission did not go too far, but it was not done well. There is a US commitment to global security, to work multilaterally.

EBERHART: I would underline a non-military option: arms control. This can be part of preventive diplomacy, for example what is being done in implementing the chemical weapons convention.

PLUNKETT: We have a plant for CW elimination on Johnston Island. Each installation of this kind costs \$ 5-6 billion. If additional plants are not being built the whole process is in question. The CW cannot be transported according to our law. The weapons are deteriorating and become dangerous. Incineration of CW is a very emotional issue. We are providing funds for Russia to make progress in the elimination of CW, but they have yet to go forward. An umbrella agreement has been signed. It provides for \$ 80 million, in two installments. \$ 25 million are for the design and location of a facility, \$ 35 million for construction and technology. We are cooperating with the Russian government on how to proceed. They have not yet found a possible site. The Russian-American bilateral agreement is our building-up to the CWC.

DIV SCHLUP: Is the bottom-up review being accepted as a whole? Do you think that in two years time, there will no longer be any US troops deployed abroad?

WALKER: The bottom-up review is not real, it is too much top-down. It does not ask all the tough questions, there is no real zero-budgeting. The basic questions regarding US forces abroad have not been addressed. There is also evidence of competition between the services. Some projects continue without need, e.g., the Seawolf submarine. The budgetary constraints have not been met. I would not even accept the argument that the programmes are necessary to provide jobs. I do not think that we will cut our deployments abroad to zero. There is certainly a very isolationist wing in Congress, but also a very interventionist wing.

BRADY: Regarding isolationism, I would add that we should either have a clear mission or get out.

WALKER: I would predict that the US forces in Europe will sink below 100,000, for budget reasons.

PLUNKETT: We cannot go it alone. Burden-sharing is necessary. The isolationists try to achieve their goal by cutting budget items relating to troops abroad. We are at a key juncture.

*Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University: Captain Michael O'Brien; Mr. Jim Brusstar, Senior Fellow; Dr. Patrick Clawson, Senior Fellow; Mr. Edward Dulch; Mr. Ron Montaperto, Senior Fellow; Major-General John Sewall, Senior Fellow; Mr. Jed Snyder, Senior Fellow*

O'BRIEN [welcomes the delegation]. The INSS has 25 analysts, grouped in regional bureaus, making up five working groups.

DIV SCHLUP [presents the Swiss delegation].

WINKLER [presents the International Training Course in Security Policy and Arms Control, makes a presentation on Swiss neutrality].

O'BRIEN: Is there a chance that Switzerland might take part in a European system of collective security?

WINKLER: [expands his presentation by explaining that this could be the case only if such a system would provide an effective functional equivalent to the protection and security afforded by neutrality, explains that neutrality is deeply ingrained in the Swiss people].

SNYDER on the Middle East and Central Asia: There is no consciousness regarding a collective security system in Central Asia and the Caucasus. They try to contain Islamism. These countries try to replace communism by something else. Four out of five presidents are former First Secretaries of the communist parties. The Russian influence is strong. There are about 45,000 Russian border troops in Central Asia. These republics have no own forces. It is unclear whether the dominant identification in the end will be Western or Eastern. The Central Asian states were accepted in the NACC before their foreign policy had really being decided.

Regarding proliferation, we have a new approach. It is no longer dealt with only at the global level, but also at the regional level. In Egypt, high officers see the Camp David agreements as an aberration, to be complied with until they get a better lock on Israeli nuclear weapons.

Jed Snyder gave in addition the following two hand-outs:

#### **Instability in the Middle East**

- Background:
  - viability of Baghdad regime is key question
  - decline of Iraqi military power relative to Iran
  - new internal pressures on Egyptian government
- Ongoing research:

- objective: identify Iranian strategic objectives and examine regional implications
- Future projects will examine:
  - Iranian potential for threatening U.S. interests
  - Baghdad's possible loss of control in Iraq
  - impact of destabilized Cairo government

#### **Southern Periphery Fragmentation**

- Background:
  - emergence of rival ethnic/sectarian groups will accelerate fragmentation
- Ongoing research:
  - objective: responses to fragility of central governments
- Future projects will examine:
  - effect of economic and political pressures on policies of Central Asia and Transcaucasus nations
  - policy alternatives toward key regional states (Turkey, Pakistan)

CLAWSON on Iran: It is difficult to know where Iran is headed. It is rather difficult to assume that Iran wants to challenge the United States, but there are continued provocations.

VOGELSANGER: It seems to me that the US government has two different objectives in Iran and Iraq. In Iraq it aims at a change of government, in Iran at a change of the behaviour of the existing government. But so far I have not seen any indication that the US would be successful in changing the behaviour of Iran's government.

SEWALL: The influence of the United States in Europe can be measured in the number of Americans in high posts in NATO, and this is going down. Many Americans see NATO as a relic of the Cold War, and they wonder that it still exists. I would see peace-keeping as the single glue for NATO as questionable. The southern Mediterranean littoral receives in Europe insufficient attention. North Africa poses a more diffuse threat, involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the possibility of large-scale migration, and organized crime taking control of the state structures.

The US supports the Maastricht Treaty, is in favour of the WEU becoming the defence arm of the European Union. We do not want a competition between NATO and WEU. In the Adriatic operation, there were three channels of command: NATO (Stanavformed), WEU and the US/Sixth Fleet. The CSCE has a role, but more in preventive diplomacy than in crisis management. Its decision-making process is difficult, with 53 members. The NACC is an important instrument to bring in Central and

Eastern Europe in cooperation, which can lead to association, and - in the long term - possibly to membership. I do not know whether a NATO enlargement should take place in a package or country-by-country. But at any rate we have to keep a special relationship with Russia and the Ukraine. The agenda of the NATO summit meeting will include peace-keeping, the further usefulness of NATO, and the relationship with Central and Eastern Europe.

The US is happy with the agreement that has been concluded between Shalikashvili, Lanxade and Naumann on the status of the Eurocorps. The enthusiasm regarding the Eurocorps has in the meantime faded somewhat, among other things because of the recognition of the limits set by the German constitution.

Sewall gave the following hand-outs:

#### **Maintaining the U.S. military presence**

- Background:
  - gives U.S. a voice in European security deliberations
  - provide stability
  - facilitates interoperability with key coalition partners
- Ongoing research:
  - objective: provide U.S. decision makers with a strong rationale for the role of continued U.S. military presence in Europe
- Related projects:
  - European security environment
  - European security relations

#### **Emerging challenges in the southern region**

- Background:
  - proliferation in North Africa poses threats to Western Europe/NATO
  - instability exacerbates security and immigration problems for Southern Europe
- Ongoing research:
  - objective: provide U.S. senior leadership with assistance on security issues in region
- Future projects:
  - militant Islamic movements: North Africa
  - Conference with AFSOUTH, regional allies on Northern African security issues

#### **Future European security relations**

- Background:
  - will eventually define European defense role

- will shape playing field for U.S. security decisions and future U.S. military role in Europe
- Ongoing research:
  - objective: provide assistance to U.S. decision makers on how to respond to changing relations among European nations
- Related projects:
  - future U.S. military role in Europe
  - future of Germany/Germany's role as a great power
  - future of US/French relations

BRUSSTAR: What is the status of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union? All tactical nuclear weapons have been returned to Russia. We have some concern regarding the ability of Russia to control them. The Russians do not know how many warheads were produced.

As for strategic nuclear weapons outside Russia, Belarus has indicated that they will be returned to Russia. These weapons are under control of Russian troops. The weapons in Kazakhstan are also under the control of Russian forces, though there haven't been conflicting reports. The Ukraine is different. Russian armed forces have control over warheads in depots, and also those deployed with units, with the possible exception of one air unit in the Ukraine. The Ukraine has administrative control, guarding the outer perimeter. The Ukrainian forces would have to overrun the sites to take control. In one air unit, the officers report directly to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, and the Ukraine may, in this case, have direct control over bunkers with nuclear weapons. The Ukraine has probably not yet achieved positive control over nuclear weapons, but it is working toward that.

Regarding arms control, the Ukrainian line is to say yes to the START-I Treaty, but then to add that the SS-24 are not part of it. The Ukraine is unwilling to join the NPT, it is kind of expecting an offer from the West, and the United States, where to go. Belarus has acceded to the NPT, and Kazakhstan has promised to do so. With the implementation of the CFE Treaty there are no particular problems, except for the Russian demand to re-negotiate Article 5.

The economic situation is disastrous. The Ukraine has taken even fewer steps towards economic reforms than Russia. The basic question in the Ukraine is who runs the country, the President or the Rada? It is in some ways a situation similar to that in Russia before the events of early October.

Yeltsin may lose power next year since more liberal politicians will have motives different

from his. The reform may continue, but not necessarily along the lines envisaged by Yeltsin. There is also the possibility of Yeltsin trying to stage a "third coup", but to do that he would need an explicit deal with the military. We have to be concerned primarily about stability, not about Yeltsin. The October events could have turned out differently. Afghan veterans were used for storming the White House, not normal troops. The troops called to Moscow were used to defend the Ministry of Defense, not to storm the White House - this came only later. There were negotiations, and Yeltsin had to go himself to the Ministry of Defense, they did not come to him. Certain units were not used because they were against the operation. On the whole, the armed forces have not taken as clear-cut a decision as it tends to be seen.

SEWALL: Regarding peace-keeping, the United States has yet to establish a balance between unilateralism and multilateralism, and also between traditional peace-keeping and Desert-Storm-like operations. An example of this ambiguity is the Somalia operation.

Sewall gave the following hand-out:

#### U.S. military operations with the United Nations

- Background:
  - increased involvement of U.S. military in UN peace-keeping
  - U.S. still has to review and think through doctrinal approach to United Nations missions
- Ongoing research:
  - objective: to provide assistance to senior leadership on the future of UN military operations
- Related topics:
  - conference on standing up coalitions and execution of coalition warfare
  - workshops at NDU and in New York

MONTAPERTO on the Pacific region: China, Japan and the United States seek their positions without any arrangement between themselves, independently from each other, hoping that no clash will occur. In South Korea the United States will shift from a leading to a supporting role. Our work is to recommend new approaches and new strategies.

*Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Mr. William T. Parsons, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations; Mr.*

*Steven M. Polansky, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations; Dr. Randy Rydell, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Government Affairs*

WINKLER [presents the delegation, explains the purpose of the visit]. What are the priorities of US foreign policy?

PARSONS: The Clinton administration has two key priorities in foreign policy:

- to improve the US position in commerce and trade;
- to work against proliferation in all its aspects, nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, conventional arms

It is difficult to say what are the priorities on Capitol Hill. This is often coincidental. Proliferation is certainly one of them. But often we are reactive. There is little long-term thinking, also due to the staff situation. Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia. The weight of Asia is in general growing.

WINKLER: Speaking about proliferation, and having in mind past visits to Capitol Hill, do you have the impression that Switzerland is doing its share to prevent proliferation?

RYDELL: It was not only Switzerland that caused concern. This came from the UNSCOM findings, and I am aware that you contribute to the work of UNSCOM. Many countries were involved. We accept that much has changed. But we need all to do whatever we can to stop proliferation. We need consensus, both on principles and on their implementation. Aggressive enforcement of end-use controls is necessary. We have to look at how statements of intent are actually being implemented.

EBERHART: What would you think about an international information centre?

RYDELL: There is an extraordinary need for further sharing of information. There are many levels of information, UN statistics, licensing data (Switzerland and the US are against sharing that since they are considered proprietary), intelligence information. The notion of one giant computer being fed with all the data would, however, be naive. This will never happen. No even the US has that for its own country alone.

WINKLER: We thought of that in the context of the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

RYDELL: Perhaps that is a desirable goal to pursue.

CATRINA: A pitfall is that the UN register is not sufficiently detailed.

RYDELL: The US is very interested in knowing whether the EC has moved closer to share information about proliferation.



CATRINA: The EC considers proliferation as one of four identified areas for common action in the framework of the common foreign and security policy. One would have to ask the EC, though.

WINKLER: How would you describe the time-scale for potential proliferator states?

RYDELL: We need export controls, and sanctions when they are violated. We have to balance the economic value of an export against the security implications. There is a general trend to reduce export controls. There was an excellent article on that by Harald Müller in the Herald Tribune, in connection with the EC. According to Müller, each country is reluctant to give up its national systems, which makes for a number of loopholes. If Switzerland would ever take any sanction against a country or a company [engaged in proliferation] this would be a useful step. It would show the depth of commitment.

WINKLER: Switzerland has in fact already done that.

PARSONS: 1995 is for us the critical time. What will happen to the NPT? A country that caused this committee great concern is China with its assistance to some Third World countries, but also because of its nuclear testing. We want an indefinite extension of the NPT, and a CTBT. North Korea is, comparatively speaking, less important for the US right now.

*Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, Director, Russia, Ukraine, Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council*

GOTTEMOELLER: Separate delegations have been to Moscow and Kiev. Under-Secretary Lynn Davis was head of the group associated with Warren Christopher.

WINKLER: How do you judge the relationship between Russia and the Ukraine after this trip, in particular regarding nuclear arms control?

GOTTEMOELLER: I was in Moscow over the weekend of October 4, when we arrived in the afternoon. We had a joint commission, and discussed among other things also cooperation in space ventures. We had a meeting with the Russian space agency. We were accommodated close to the Oostankino TV centre [where there were riots on that evening], but we continued with the business as if nothing particular were happening. Nevertheless it was a very unsettling time in Moscow. We made some progress during that trip. We agreed on a certain set of activities in the fields of energy, space, and environment.

CATRINA: I take it then that the disturbances in the US-Russian relationship over the originally planned transfer of Russian cryogenic rocket engines are over?

GOTTEMOELLER: We have to see that in the context of the MTCR. Several people close to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin were stalling for some time. But Russia seems now ready to implement the MTCR memorandum. In fact, it is committed to do so since October 1. As for the Indian contract, they are going for a visit [to India] in November. There will be no interruption of the contract, but also no final sale agreement until at least the end of this year. They will modify the draft agreement. Beyond this particular transaction the flow of technicians and the transfer of technologies in critical fields has to be stopped.

CATRINA: Are you confident that Russia, in its present situation, will be able to enforce export controls, even if the government is determined to do that?

GOTTEMOELLER: A number of organizations relevant in this context, e.g. border control, are centralized and are going to stay so. The ability of the central government to exercise control over the constituent parts goes beyond border control.

But to come back to the question on the Ukraine, three agreements were signed during the Massandra meeting between Yeltsin and Kravchuk, on maintenance [of the nuclear weapons based in the Ukraine], on compensation [for their withdrawal to Russia for elimination], and on a schedule for their departure to Russia. These agreements form the base for future, more detailed, negotiations. The questions of compensation for the Ukraine for highly-enriched uranium contained in the nuclear warheads and of the time-table for their withdrawal to Russia for dismantling are linked.

CATRINA: We have heard several reports indicating that the nuclear weapons based in the Ukraine may be in a precarious state due to deficiencies in maintenance.

GOTTEMOELLER: We believe that maintenance is being conducted in a regular fashion. It is mostly the Russian media that are reporting that the Ukraine is careless regarding nuclear weapons. Lynn Davis's interlocutor in Moscow was Ambassador Sokolov [the chief of the arms control department in the Russian Foreign Ministry]. He said that the Ukraine have physical control over the nuclear weapons sites. However, as far as we know, the Ukraine has not physical control over nuclear warheads. It looks as if the Russians are trying to make us worried, so that we would enter this debate and

pressure the Ukraine for a quick withdrawal. In the Ukraine, we were given a different picture. According to the Ukrainians, Russian physicists are continuing with normal maintenance, in the same way as it were before the break-up of the Soviet Union. It seems to us that both sides are willing to go on with the Massandra process (negotiations on compensation and the timetable). It does not make much sense for us to push now. The next step will depend on whether and how the issue of compensation for highly-enriched uranium will be settled.

Christopher had a good meeting in Kiev. The interlocutors said that the SS-24 missiles are, also in their interpretation, included in the Lisbon Protocol. But there are still some conflicting reports on that.

WINKLER: We have also heard, as a possibility, that the Ukrainian parliament might ratify the START Treaty, but insist on a separate timetable for the dismantlement of the SS-24.

GOTTEMOELLER: We have to watch the development of the political situation in the Ukraine, and an important aspect will be the outcome of the parliamentary elections in March. Our approach is to recognize that the US-Ukrainian relations cannot be confined to the question of nuclear weapons. They are broader. During the trip of Secretary of Defense Aspin in June, we agreed on a certain cooperation regarding conventional arms, and assistance in the establishment of their armed forces. There is also cooperation regarding economic reforms. So far, the Ukraine has lagged behind in this regard. Indeed, they have a lot ahead of them if they want to get major US assistance. The inflation is incredible. Within one week the exchange rate between their "Kupons" and the US dollar went from 14,000 to 20,000. The Ukraine has also a long way to go regarding the MTCR. We have information that there was an attempt to ship chloride to Libya, but it was stopped by their export controls.

CATRINA: What is your impression regarding the issue of Sevastopol?

GOTTEMOELLER: This is a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian issue. We have an interest in as good as possible Russian-Ukrainian relationships, but we should rather not become involved in this issue.

WINKLER: What was the reaction in Kiev to the events of early October in Moscow?

GOTTEMOELLER: The Ukraine seems to conduct business as usual with Moscow. They try to continue in the normal way to make progress. And on a technical and practical level there are possibilities to go forward. Strategic

nuclear arms are not a good subject for progress at this very time.

CATRINA: The Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin has for a long time been suspected of not being enthusiastic about economic reforms. What is your impression, based on your visit to Moscow?

GOTTEMOELLER: Chernomyrdin seems to have played a role of mediator in October. He seems committed to reforms. He has established a good personal relationship with Vice-President Gore.

BREULEUX: After the events of early October, how do you assess the influence of the armed forces, the Ministry of the Interior, and the security agencies on Russian foreign policy?

GOTTEMOELLER: It is rather unclear what is their overall input on foreign policy. It is also unclear whether the military and security forces will not rather opt to abstain from involvement in politics and focus on dealing with their social problems. The picture is not clear. What are their interests? There are several currents. A problem is also the regionalization of the armed forces, as it has happened most clearly with the 14th Army. This loss of central control seems to be their main preoccupation.

WINKLER: Russia seems also to be pushing the idea of peace-keeping and peace-making in what they call the "near abroad", tacitly pursuing the objective of taking care of the Russians living in other former republics of the Soviet Union.

GOTTEMOELLER: There is certainly a lot of pressure for the Russian Federation to get involved. The different sides in the conflicts, e.g. in Nagorno-Karabakh, are trying to pull them on their sides. We tried to improve the situation in Georgia by sending UN observers. It seems that certain units of Russian forces [stationed abroad] are pushing their own policies. What we are pushing for is an international settlement. We could work together with Russia in working out a mandate for peace-keeping. It would have to be an international mandate that could realistically also be implemented. There is a lot of work to be done until we would be there, though. We would certainly be in favour of involvement by the UN and the CSCE. Any cooperation with Russia in these fields should be part of Partnership for Peace. We could tackle operational problems, e.g., training and C3I; this would be a pragmatic way to work. We could expand what is being done so far on a bilateral level, in the direction of cooperation between the armed forces, and an increase of interoperability. For this we need to know what are their requirements, and, perhaps more impor-

tant, in which direction their armed forces are going to go.

*Dr. Ochmenik, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources, Department of Defence*

DIV SCHLUP [presents the Swiss delegation].

OCHMENIK: Secretary of Defense Les Aspin asked for the Bottom-up review. He was determined to reassess the US military posture, the military dimension of our security policy strategy. Aspin wanted to identify the range of missions coming to the fore in the post-Cold War world, in particular for the United States, including peace-keeping, peace enforcement, etc. My office has prepared this strategy in cooperation with others in this building. This is a strategy of cooperation. It is just impossible to meet the problems unilaterally. This will depend on who or what will be the threat, and also on who can support our efforts. We will remain an ally in Europe, and we want to improve our capabilities in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. Proliferation was also emphasized in the Bottom-up review, both proliferation and counter-proliferation. The next time we will have to fight a Desert Storm-like operation it is likely that we will face the use of weapons of mass destruction. We want not only to deter and prevent proliferation, but also to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, e.g. destroy them before they are being used. The R&D community will have to be restructured. Military R&D will be less separated from the civilian sector. We are also emphasizing the link between the security relationships and trade issues. Most of our allies are our trade partners. These are some of the main features of the Bottom-up review.

DIV SCHLUP: This is a good document. The media has criticized it for being too much top-down. There is also a feeling that the US military presence in Europe may be cut below 100,000 next year.

OCHMENIK: The Bottom-up review has not been made with a view to a certain budget. Rather we show in this document what are the forces we would need, provided we can get the money. In a second step, the strategy has to be matched with the resources. The force should be able to cope with two almost simultaneous operations as large as Desert Storm since we do not want to create any window of opportunity for any adversary. Then the set of forces necessary has to be identified. This includes, among other things, 7-12 Army Divisions, 8-12 aircraft carriers, 16-20 wings of tactical air fighters. The force also needs multipliers, i.e. en-

hancements of, for example, air-/sealift assets. We came in within 1-2% of the guidance we had from the White House. There will be adjustments as we go on. There is no debate on the necessity of the US military presence in Europe, with a size that gives it sufficient capabilities without reinforcement, with comes out at about 100,000 men.

WINKLER: How smooth was your cooperation with the individual services in the Bottom-up-review?

OCHMENIK: The services understand that the resources will diminish. They do also understand that it would be wrong to stick with the existing forces and structures. The Air force of 1994 will have about 50% of the resources it had in the 1980s. The Navy is willing to take even deeper cuts. The Army was more reluctant, but it accepted the level of 10 active divisions. The reserve forces will number 37 brigades. Such a large force will not be usable militarily, but for political reasons it could not be cut deeper. The Bottom-up-review contains a programme up to 1999. It is up to Congress to vote on the consequences. The fiscal year 1994 budget was technically submitted before the Bottom-up-review, but the legislators had a draft of the Bottom-up-review, so that the latter had already an impact on the fiscal year 1994 budget.

WINKLER: Is the plan to cut the Navy also an effect of the experiences in Somalia?

OCHMENIK: The Navy wanted to keep 12 aircraft carriers. This desire was driven by the need for carriers in major warfare and the number of carriers necessary to mark a forward presence.

EBERHART: What is the role of logistics in the Bottom-up-review?

OCHMENIK: The importance of logistics is always being underrated. We do not want any force structure that could not be supported logistically.

*Mr. Richard Spear and Mrs. Buckley, Bureau of Counter-Proliferation Affairs, Department of Defense*

DIV SCHLUP [presents the Swiss delegation].

WINKLER [explains the training programme and the purpose of the visit].

DIV GEIGER: We had a briefing by the DIA this morning. The mid- and long-term threats were presented. What level of priority do you assign to threats below the level of open conflict?

SPEAR: We do not assign a particular priority to terrorist threats, but we take this possibility seriously. This is also an issue of counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is,

in fact, a very real risk in the 1990s. We try to do some planning how to cope with that. Switzerland and the United States take the same position regarding the importance of preventing proliferation. The Secretary of Defense has outlined what he considers the major four threats. One of them is proliferation, another one the explosion of the former Soviet Union, a third one regional conflicts. Non-proliferation seeks to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Counter-proliferation goes one step further. It has military aspects, some of which related to a war situation, some other to a situation without actual war. This issue [proliferation] is now much more decentralized than it used to be during the Cold War. This calls for a regional approach. A small amount of certain items can make an enormous difference to the stability in a region. We are assisting the Secretary of Defense in issues of proliferation, nuclear security, and counter-proliferation. Ashton Carter is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for counter-proliferation. The bureau produces the military assessments and formulates proposals for responses.

WINKLER: I would assume that North Korea and China [transfers] rate among the major problematic cases. The US relationship with China is not at its highest point, also due to human right concerns. How do you order the priorities in this relationship?

BUCKLEY: We have here two or three priorities of first importance. We think about what we can do to push China in a constructive way. China can certainly not be ignored, as its activities can be very destabilizing, in particular the spread of weapons of mass destruction or the corresponding technologies. We have to prepare a range of incentives and disincentives regarding Chinese behaviour. There exists an enormous potential for US-Chinese trade. This should be taken into account if we impose sanctions on China for giving sensitive material to Pakistan. The [Chinese] Foreign Ministry is perhaps not on top of what happens in China. It is the militaries who are on top of these things. They must be pushed to work together.

WINKLER: We talked with Ambassador Sokolov in Moscow in June about the planned deal with India on cryogenic engines. The US was not happy about that agreement. Russia is certainly interested in the economic benefits of such a deal, but also in a good relationship with the United States. How do you see this trade-off? Beyond that, do you think that such an issue is directed centrally in Moscow, or is it a matter of different ministries doing different things independently of each other?

BUCKLEY: Foreign affairs, the military, and the trade ministries may not be communicating. Under the direction of Ashton Carter we are also considering how to deal with Russia to help keep them on a democratic path. The next meeting in the context of the MTCR will take place in Switzerland, which we appreciate. I was in a number of briefings on the Russian-Indian deal. Almost every agency had its own policy on that, but agreement with Russia was reached on July 15. The Russians are going to freeze any transfer of this kind of technology to India. What they transfer will be consistent with the understanding not to proliferate missile technology. In exchange the Russian space industries will be given access to the Western satellite launching market. This is progress. The implementation of this understanding will be one of the main issues for the MTCR meeting at Interlaken.

WINKLER: Have you so far any evidence of technology transfer or human transfers from Russia concerning weapons of mass destruction? Some time ago I read news that some 20 nuclear physicists were stopped at the airport with contracts already signed.

BUCKLEY: I have not seen our intelligence assessment, but we are in general concerned about this risk. It is a major problem since two years. We take several approaches: We work with the Russian government and encourage it to support initiatives intended to stop proliferation. However, the Russian government is not a coherent entity. There has also been much tension between the executive and the legislative branches. That may change. The control of such transfers is being made more difficult by the trend of disintegration in Russia. Money is given to enhance export controls. Transfers from Russia to Third World countries by way of a second CIS country are very difficult to control.

CATRINA: To what extent are you in touch with the Central Asian states to cope with this risk?

SPEAR: It is important to train people in these countries, to provide computers, to help them establish a legal basis, to set up the customs services, and to have this all implemented to control exports. The focus has so far been on Russia and the Ukraine, but we deal with all of these republics. We are also providing funds for international seminars dealing with this issue.

WINKLER: Switzerland has also pledged resources for the International Science and Technology Centres which shall offer employment to Russian and Ukrainian nuclear scientists.

BUCKLEY: We see new nuclear dangers coming from the former Soviet republics beyond Russia and the Ukraine. Former German Foreign Minister Genscher has proposed to criminalize the companies and industries helping proliferation. If we can do something, we should certainly make it more difficult for someone to get rich by assisting proliferation.

WINKLER: In our administration, I would think that Ambassador Jeker is the best expert. Our intentions are certainly to ban all exports going to such installations. Countries can be black-listed. We have also a new law to prevent that the revenues from drug traffic are laundered in Switzerland.

VOGELSANGER: The Swiss policy is to move against everyone who is assisting proliferation, and we are open to any suggestions, how to improve our vigilance.

## Programm

### Dienstag, 19. Oktober

- 0945 Bern - Zürich Flughafen (Ankunft 1116)  
 1300 Zürich - New York: SR 100 (Ankunft 1630 Lokalzeit New York)  
 Transfer zum Harvard Club of New York City, 27 West 44th Street
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### Mittwoch, 20. Oktober

- 0900 Staff meeting at the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations, with the participation of Dr. Olivier F. Desarzens.  
 1100 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the Special Commission on Iraq, United Nations, Room S-3120G, Tel. 963-3018.  
 1515 Mr. Michael Doyle, Vice-President; Mr. Ian Johnstone (Program Officer), International Peace Academy, 777 UN Plaza, 4th Floor, Tel. 949-8480.  
 1630 Brigadier-General Maurice Baril, Military Counsellor to the Secretary-General; Mr. Sashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, Room 3727A, Tel. 963-2400, 963-2912.

*Dr. Hans Eberhart:*

- 0945 Bern - Zürich Flughafen (Ankunft 1116)  
 1300 Zürich - New York: SR 100 (Ankunft 1630 Lokalzeit New York)  
 Transfer zum Harvard Club of New York City, 27 West 44th Street
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### Donnerstag, 21. Oktober

- 1130 Mr. Reza Iqbal, Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, Conference Room 3727, Tel. 963-3446, accompanied by  
 Mrs. Elizabeth Lindenmaier (Somalia)  
 Mrs. Sako Shimura (Cambodia)  
 Colonel Heikki Purola, Deputy Military Adviser,  
 1315 Lunch offered by Ambassador Johannes Manz, UN Plaza Hotel, Perez de Cuellar Suite 29/35  
 Guests:  
 Mr. Sashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations  
 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman, Office of the Special Commission, United Nations  
 Colonel Heikki Purola, Deputy Military Adviser, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations  
 Colonel Gérard Gambiez, Chief of Standing-By Forces and Planning Team, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations  
 Colonel Juhani Loikkanen, Mission of Finland to the United Nations  
 Major Michael Sheehan, Mission of the U.S. to the United Nations  
 Colonel Chris Prickett, Mission of Australia to the United Nations  
 Colonel Nils Alstermark, Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

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- Colonel Daniel Bastien, Mission of France to the United Nations  
 Mr. Suresh Kumar Goel, Mission of India to the United Nations  
 1530 Mr. Ian Cuthbertson, Vice-President of Programmes, Richard Levitt,  
 Director of Publications, Institute for EastWest Studies, 360 Lexington  
 Avenue, 13th Floor, Tel. 557-2570.
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### Freitag, 22. Oktober

- 0930 Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, Director, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United  
 Nations, Room S-3150A, Tel. 963-5590.  
 1100 Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Harlemann, Senior Training Officer, Room  
 U-207 (First Avenue / 45th Street), Tel. 963-2626.  
 1500 Lieutenant-Colonel Duval, Military Adviser for Peace-Keeping Operations,  
 United Nations, Room S-3650, Tel. 963-2205.
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### Samstag, 23. November

- 0930 New York (La Guardia) - Washington (National), DL 1747  
 Transfer zum Holiday Inn, 2101 Wisconsin Avenue
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### Sonntag, 24. Oktober

*Washington und Umgebung (2 Personenwagen der Botschaft stehen zur Verfügung)*

- 1820 Ankunft von Div Louis Geiger, Dulles International, SR 128
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### Montag, 25. Oktober

- 0900 Programme briefing at the Embassy of Switzerland (Major-General Hans  
 Schlup, Colonel Hansruedi Rüesch, Dr. David Vogelsanger)  
 1000 Welcome by Ambassador Carlo Jagmetti, Mission briefing by Dr. Theodor  
 H. Winkler  
 1145 Lunch, hosted by Dr. Vogelsanger (First Secretary) and Colonel Rüesch  
 (Deputy of the Defence Attaché), Ristorante Primavera, 3700  
 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Tel. (202) 342-0224  
 1430 Jane Holl, Director, European Affairs, National Security Council, Old  
 Executive Building, Room 368, Te. (202) 395-4996  
 1600 Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
 Department of State, Room 7311, Tel. (202) 647-2972  
 1715 J.D. Bindenagel, Director, Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of  
 European and Canadian Affairs, Room 4228, Department of State
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### Dienstag, 26. Oktober

- 1000 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State  
 David Clinard, Asst. Director of Multilateral Affairs, Tel. (202) 647-7450  
 Mr. Cordenne  
 Mr. Scott Davis  
 Mr. Brummel  
 (+ weitere 3 Beamte)

- 1300 Lunch hosted by Ambassador Carlo Jagmetti (Ambassador's residence), with Mary Ann Peters, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and Captain Lloyd Abbot, U.S. Navy, Deputy Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
- 1530 Mary Ann Peters, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State, Room 6219
- 1600 Roundtable with the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
Richard Sokolsky, Director, Office of Strategic and Theater Policy  
Pat Hanscom, Deputy Director, Office of Strategic and Theater Policy  
Phil Dolliff, Action Officer, FSU Nuclear Dismantlement, Office of Strategic and Theater Policy
- 1645 Steve Coffey, Deputy Director, Russian and Security Affairs, Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State, Room 4228
- 1900 Meeting with Mr. Dennis Gormley, Senior Vice-President, Pacific-Sierra Research Corp., Arlington; Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, Counsellor, Embassy of Finland; at The Tivoli, 1700 North Moore Street, Rosslyn, VA, Tel. (703) 524-8900

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### Mittwoch, 27. Oktober

- 0930 House Armed Services Committee, Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2120:  
Mr. Paul Walker, Professional Staff Member  
Mr. Ron Bartek, Professional Staff Member  
Ms. Vickie Plunkett, Staff of Representative Glen Browder (Alabama)  
Mr. Hugh Brady, Staff of Representative John M. Spratt (South Carolina)
- 1200 Lunch hosted by Major-General Hans Schlup, Defence Attaché  
Captain Michael O'Brien, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University  
Dr. Joseph Halgus, Office of the Secretary of Defence  
Mr. Brad Knopp, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Major-General John Sewall, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
- 1330 Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University  
Captain Michael O'Brien  
Mr. Jim Brusstar, Senior Fellow  
Dr. Patrick Clawson, Senior Fellow  
Mr. Edward Dulch  
Mr. Ron Montaperto, Senior Fellow  
Major-General John Sewall, Senior Fellow  
Mr. Jed Snyder, Senior Fellow
- 1715 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 446, Tel. (202) 224-9700  
Mr. William T. Parsons, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations  
Mr. Steven M. Polansky, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations



- Dr. Randy Rydell, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations
- 2000 Dinner of Dr. Winkler and Dr. Catrina with Captain Michael O'Brien at his residence.
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**Donnerstag, 28. Oktober**

- 0920 Meeting at the River Entrance of the Pentagon with Major S. Tharp, Tel. (703) 614-3254, Fax (703) 614-8230
- 0930 Meeting with Defense Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Sloan, Mr. Brad Knopp (Defense Intelligence Officer, Europe), Mr. Zuehlke (Russia), Mr. Spohn (Arms Control, Non-Proliferation), Mr. Hannah
- 1100 Meeting with Dr. Joseph Halgus, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Tel. (703) 695-6508, Fax (703) 695-6506
- 1115 Meeting at the Bureau of Counter-Proliferation Affairs with Mr. Richard Spear and Mrs. Buckley
- 1200 Working Lunch at the Pentagon, hosted by Dr. Joseph Kruzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, European and NATO Affairs
- 1315 Meeting with Dr. Ochmenik, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources

*Div Louis Geiger, Dr. Hans Eberhart:*

- 1820 Abflug Washington (National) - Boston - Zürich
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**Freitag, 29. Oktober**

- 1000 Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, Director, Russia, Ukraine, Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council, Old Executive Building, Room 373, Tel. (202) 395-5054
- 1500 Debriefing at the Swiss Embassy with Ambassador Carlo Jagmetti, Major-General Hans Schlup, Minister Jean-Claude Joseph, Dr. David Vogelsanger, Colonel Hansruedi Rüesch
- 1900 Abflug Washington (Dulles International) - Zürich: SR 129, Ankunft in Zürich, Samstag, 30. Oktober, 1030
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## Liste der Gesprächspartner

(mit Ausnahme der Mitarbeiter der Mission in New York und der Botschaft in Washington)

---

BRIGADIER-GENERAL MAURICE BARIL

Military Counsellor to the Secretary-General, United Nations

RON BARTEK

Professional Staff Member, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, DC

J.D. BINDENAGEL

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Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Washington, DC

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MICHAEL DOYLE

Vice-President, International Peace Academy, New York

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Military Adviser for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations,

AMBASSADOR ROLF EKEUS  
Executive President of the Special Commission, United Nations,

DENNIS M. GORMLEY  
Senior Vice-President, Policy Research, Pacific-Sierra Research Corp., Arlington, VA

DR. ROSE GOTTEMOELLER  
Director, Russia, Ukraine, Eurasian Affairs; National Security Council, Washington, DC

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Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC

MR. HANNAH  
Defense Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, DC

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MR. SPOHN  
Defense Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, DC

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DR. GREGORY F. TREVERTON  
Vice Chairman for Estimates, National Intelligence Council, Washington, DC

PAUL WALKER  
Professional Staff Member, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC

MR. ZUEHLKE  
Defense Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, DC

## Teilnehmer

- Delegationsleiter:* Div Louis Geiger, Stabschef Operative Schulung (Washington)
- Stv. Delegationsleiter:* Dr. Theodor H. Winkler, Beauftragter des Generalstabschefs für sicherheitspolitische Fragen, EMD
- Delegation:* Dr. Bernhard Brunner, Direktor, AC-Labor, Spiez (New York)
- Dr. Christian Catrina, Stellvertreter des Beauftragten des Generalstabschefs für sicherheitspolitische Fragen, EMD
- Lic. Pierre-Yves Breuleux, Stab GGST, EMD
- Dr. Hans Eberhart, Chef der Sektion Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung, Stab des Delegierten für Rüstungskontrolle und Friedenssicherung, Stab GGST, EMD

## SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993

		UNTSO	UNMO GIP	UNFI CYP	UNDOF	UNI FIL	UNA VEM	UNI KOM	MINUR SO	ONU SAL	UNTAC	UNPRO FOR	UNO SOM	ONU MOZ	UNO MUR	UNO MIG	UNO MIL	TOTAL CIVPOL	TOTAL TROOPS	TOTAL MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL	
1	ALGERIA	O									7							O			7	7
2	ARGENTINA	P										30						P	30			
		T		73				51		7		915		40				T		1086		
		O	6					6	5		2	5		8				O			32	1148
3	AUSTRALIA	P		22														P	22			
		T							44		400		38					T		551		
		O	13						1			1						O			15	588
4	AUSTRIA	P							6	3								P	9			
		T		355	455													T		810		
		O	13	4				7	1		4							O			30	849
5	BANGLADESH	P									1	43						P	44			
		T									40		979	1417				T		2436		
		O						6	5		11	29		20	23			O			97	2577
6	BELGIUM	P							5									P	5			
		T									834	964						T		1798		
		O	6	2					1		1	7						O			18	1821
7	BOTSWANA	T											247	745				T		992		
		O												14	10			O			24	1016
8	BRAZIL	P					7			15		10						P	32			
		T					11							3				T		14		
		O					5			4		23		19	13			O			66	112
9	BRUNEI	O									3							O			3	3
10	BULGARIA	T									5							T		5		
		O									11							O			11	16
11	CAMEROON	O									10							O			10	10
12	CANADA	P										45						P	45			
		T		3	206				23		180	1965	7					T		2393		
		O	13					5	15	2		13		15	1			O			64	2502
13	CAPE VERDE	O												15				O			15	15
14	CHILE	P								28								P	28			
		T									9							T		9		
		O	3	3														O			6	43
15	CHINA	T									5							T		5		
		O	5					15	20		28			10				O			78	83
16	COLOMBIA	P								34		24						P	58			
		O								2		4						O			6	64

P=CivPol, T=Troops, O=MilObs. // Troops=Infantry, Log, Engr, Air, Med(Mil or Civ), MovCon, Naval, Staff ...Etc. \* NOTE: UNDERLINED UNPROFOR FIGURES INCLUDE F.Y.R.O.M. COMMAND.

## SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993

		UNT80	UNMO GIP	UNFI CYP	UNDOF	UNI FIL	UNA VEM	UNI KOM	MINUR SO	ONU SAL	UNTAC	UNPRO FOR	UNO SOM	ONU MOZ	UNO MUR	UNO MIG	UNO MIL	TOTAL CIVPOL	TOTAL TROOPS	TOTAL MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL
17	CONGO	O				2											3			5	5
18	CZECH REPUBLIC	T										498							498		
19	DENMARK	P										24		20						44	540
		T		3				46				46						46			
		O	12	7				6				1130							1179		
20	ECUADOR	O								5						5				57	1282
21	EGYPT	P										11						11			
		T										426	557						983		
		O							8			11		20						39	1033
22	FIJI	T				653													653		
		O						6												6	659
23	FINLAND	T		3	355	521						226							1105		
		O	17	6				7				7								37	1142
24	FRANCE	P								22		39						61			
		T				442					1260	6135	1126						8963		
		O	14					15	30		25	11								95	9119
25	GERMANY	P							4									4			
		T									138		1737						1875		1879
26	GHANA	P									1							1			
		T				787					870								1657		
		O						6	1		10	22								39	1697
27	GREECE	T															123		123		
		O						6	1											7	130
28	GUYANA	P								8								8			8
29	GUINEA	O							4											4	4
30	GUINEA BISSAU	O					2							20			5			27	27
31	HONDURAS	O							14											14	14
32	HUNGARY	O		4		3	6							18	4		1			36	36
33	INDIA	P									1							1			
		T									973		3124	919					5016		
		O				4	6			2	17			18						47	5064
34	INDONESIA	T									1789								1789		
		O					6				13									19	1808
35	IRELAND	P										20						20			
		T				674							76						758		
		O	13					6	6	2	6	8								45	823

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## SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993

		UNT80	UNMO GIP	UNFI CYP	UNDOF	UNI FIL	UNA VEM	UNI KOM	MINUR 80	ONU 8AL	UNTAC	UNPRO FOR	UNO 8OM	ONU MOZ	UNO MUR	UNO MIG	UNO MIL	TOTAL CMPOL	TOTAL TROOPS	TOTAL MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL	
36	ITALY	P								12								P	12			
		T				49							2668	1032				T		3749		
		O	8	4				7	6									O			25	3786
37	JAPAN	T												53				T		53		53
38	JORDAN	P										55						P	55			
		T										919						T		919		
		O					2					45						O			47	1021
39	KENYA	P									1	49						P	50			
		T										939						T		939		
		O						6	10			45						O			61	1050
40	KUWAIT	T											108					T		108		108
41	MALAYSIA	P							5									P	5			
		T									955		879					T		1834		
		O				1	6	1			17	20		20			3	O			68	1907
42	MEXICO	P								97								P	97			97
43	MOROCCO	P					1											P	1			
		T											1347					T		1347		1348
44	NAMIBIA	T									43							T		43		43
45	NEPAL	P									1	50						P	51			
		T				721						897						T		1618		
		O										6						O			6	1675
46	NETHERLANDS	P					2											P	2			
		T									836	1855						T		2691		
		O	15				2					39			10			O			66	2759
47	NEW ZEALAND	T									56		48					T		104		
		O	7									9						O			16	120
48	NIGERIA	P									1	29						P	30			
		T											651					T		651		
		O					3	6	1			7						O			17	698
49	NORWAY	P										30						P	30			
		T				816		19				332	134					T		1301		
		O	20	8			4	8				39						O			79	1410
50	PAKISTAN	T									207		5100					T		5307		
		O						7	1		14	21					3	O			46	5353
51	PHILIPPINES	P																P				
		T									114							T		114		114

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## SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993

		UNT80	UNMO GIP	UNFI CYP	UNDOF	UNI FIL	UNA VEM	UNI KOM	MINUR 80	ONU 8AL	UNTAC	UNPRO FOR	UNO 8OM	ONU MOZ	UNO MUR	UNO MIG	UNO MIL	TOTAL CIVPOL	TOTAL TROOPS	TOTAL MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL	
52	POLAND	P										33						P	33			
		T			55	77					265	900						T		1357		
		O						7	2		9	20					3	O			41	1431
53	PORTUGAL	P										35						P	35			
		T										2		284				T		286		
		O										12						O			12	333
54	REP OF KOREA	T											251					T		251		251
55	ROMANIA	T											236					T		236		
		O						5										O			5	241
56	RUSSIAN FEDERATION	P										40						P	40			
		T									4	831						T		835		
		O	14					15	26		26	13		20			3	O			119	994
57	SAUDI ARABIA	T											678					T		678		678
58	SENEGAL	O						6			2				10			O			18	18
59	SINGAPORE	P									1							P	1			
		O						6										O			6	7
60	SLOVAK REPUBLIC	T										402						T		402		
		O					5											O			5	407
61	SPAIN	P								105								P	105			
		T										1183						T		1183		
		O					3			8		15		20				O			46	1334
62	SWEDEN	P		18						2		35						P	55			
		T		6		475						695	148					T		1324		
		O	17	8			3	7		1		15		20			1	O			72	1451
63	SWITZERLAND	P										6						P	6			
		T							41									T		41		
		O	7									7						O			14	61
64	THAILAND	T									711							T		711		
		O						6										O			6	717
65	TOGO	P							5									P	5			5
66	TUNISIA	P										11						P	11			
		T								1		142						T		143		
		O							9		11							O			20	174
67	TURKEY	T											324					T		324		
		O						7										O			7	331

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## SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993

		UNTSO	UNMO GIP	UNFI CYP	UNDOF	UNI FIL	UNA VEM	UNI KOM	MINUR SO	ONU SAL	UNTAC	UNPRO FOR	UNO SOM	ONU MOZ	UNO MUR	UNO MIG	UNO MIL	TOTAL CIVPOL	TOTAL TROOPS	TOTAL MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL	
68	J.A.E.	T											683					T		683		683
69	UKRAINE	T										402						T		402		402
70	UNITED KINGDOM	T O		573				15	2		49	2318						T O		2940		
71	UNITED STATES	T O	17					15	30		29	13	584	2821				T O		3406	59	2999
72	URUGUAY	T O									61			843				T O		904		
			1					6			7			18			2	O			34	938
73	VENEZUELA	O						7	15	4		7						O			33	33
74	ZAMBIA	T O												850				T P		859		
														8				P			8	867
75	ZIMBABWE	P T O					4						916					P T O	4			
							5									10		O			15	935
	<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	P		40			14		25	326	7	641						P	1053			
	<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	T		1024	1071	5215	11	116	108	7	9050	24446	26112	6195				T		73355		
	<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	O	220	39	12		44	251	215	30	297	525		303	81	5	31	O			2053	
	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		220	39	1076	1071	5215	69	367	348	363	9354	25612	26112	6498	81	5	31				76461