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- Presse und Information (z.K.)  
- Telegrammdienst (z.K.)

Gegenstand: "The magic intercepts" und der schweizerische  
diplomatische Telegrammverkehr im Jahr 1945

Die Vereinigten Staaten haben, wie dieser Tage aus Presseberichten bekanntgeworden ist (Beilagen), während des letzten Weltkriegs nicht nur die Kommunikationen von Feindstaaten, sondern, was kaum überrascht, auch von alliierten oder neutralen Ländern abgefangen. Die noch heute für die technische Nachrichtenbeschaffung zuständige National Security Agency (NSA) hat schon vor geraumer Zeit die Akten, welche ehemalige Feindstaaten betreffen, zur Veröffentlichung freigegeben. Diejenigen, welche Kommunikationen anderer Länder zum Gegenstand haben, wurden jedoch bis vor kurzem weiterhin als "top secret" klassifiziert. Eine private Forschungsinstitution, das Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), hat nun kürzlich mittels eines Gerichtsverfahrens unter der Freedom of information act erreicht, dass die NSA auch diejenigen "Magic intercepts", welche den Drittstaatenverkehr betreffen, freigeben musste. Es handelt sich um ungefähr 900 Seiten in Form von "Magic" diplomatic summaries aus der Periode Januar bis August 1945, also bis zur japanischen Kapitulation. Natürlich sind die Kommunikationen auch vorher und nachher abgehört worden, aber das IPS war ausschliesslich am erwähnten Zeitraum interessiert.

Mein Mitarbeiter Vogelsanger hat aufgrund der erwähnten Pressebericht mit dem zuständigen Forscher am Institut, Herrn Sanho Tree, Kontakt aufgenommen und gestern Kopien der die Schweiz betreffenden Teile der "Magic intercepts" erhalten, welche auf dem Kurierweg ans






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Bundesarchiv übermittelt werden. Die Schweiz betreffend Teile deutscher oder japanischer Kommunikationen waren im übrigen bereits bisher öffentlich zugänglich und können hier in den National Archives von jedermann eingesehen werden.

Aus den jetzt freigegebenen Materialien geht hervor, dass die Amerikaner die Telegramme unserer Gesandtschaften in Tokio, Berlin, und Washington, vermutlich der Vertretung in Chungking und mit Sicherheit des EPD in Bern abgehört und entziffert haben. Darüber hinaus wurden in Bern nicht nur Gesandtschaften von Feindstaaten, sondern auch etwa von Argentinien und China, eines alliierten Landes, abgehört. Im Mittelpunkt des Interesses für die Forschung dürften die Berichte des Gesandten Gorgé in Tokio stehen, welcher aus schweizerischer Sicht den Endkampf des japanischen Reichs schildert.

Um den Presse- und Informationsdienst des EDA auf allfällige Anfragen von Journalisten vorzubereiten, weisen wir darauf hin, dass auch ein in den USA lebender Korrespondent der SDA und schweizerischer Zeitungen, Herr Reto Pieth, beim IPS Einblick in die "Magic intercepts" erhalten hat und beabsichtigt, für die SDA einen Artikel zu schreiben.

DER SCHWEIZERISCHE GESCHAFTSTRAEGER A.I.



O. Knapp

Beilagen: Presseberichte



New York Times, August 11, 1993

# U.S. Spied on Its World War II Allies

By TIM WEINER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 — The United States spied on its World War II allies, breaking their codes and intercepting their secret diplomatic communications, newly declassified documents show.

The documents depict an enormous and previously unknown American intelligence effort. The origins of the cold war can be seen, like a photograph beginning to develop, in the 800 pages of intercepted communications from 1945 released to a historian as a result of a lawsuit filed against the National Security Agency, the principal United States surveillance and communications-interception agency.

For example, American intelligence officers read the private communications of the French leader, Gen. Charles de Gaulle. They came to understand France's fury at President Franklin D. Roosevelt's refusal to support its wish to rule Indochina. After Roosevelt died, the United States gave its blessing to France's return to Indochina, in large part to win French solidarity against the Soviet Union.

The documents also show that the United States had information suggesting that top members of the Japanese Army were willing to surrender more than three months before the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 48 years ago.

"Since the situation is clearly recognized to be hopeless, large sections of the Japanese armed forces would not regard with disfavor an American request for capitulation even if the terms were hard," a German diplomat reported to Berlin after talking with a ranking Japanese naval officer on May 5, 1945, three days before Germany itself surrendered.

## Passed Up Chain of Command

United States intelligence analysts underscored this information as they passed it up the chain of command, the records show.

The question of whether the atomic bombs were necessary to end World War II in the Pacific is the subject of unending debate among historians. Many United States officials believed that the alternatives were atom bombs or an invasion of the Japanese mainland.

"We anticipated that we would have losses of 500,000 killed or wounded, and the Japanese perhaps 10 times that many," said Andrew Goodpaster, who in 1945 was a general concerned with strategic planning under the Army

Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall.

The historian who filed suit to obtain the documents is Gar Alperovitz, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington who has argued that political considerations overwhelmed military imperatives in the decision to use the atomic bomb.

"Every new fragment of secret information suggests the Hiroshima decision was totally unnecessary," Mr. Alperovitz said. "With the cold war over, it's high time we cracked open all the secrets that have been kept from the American people."

For three years the National Security Agency fought release of these intercepts, which Mr. Alperovitz sought under the Freedom of Information Act, saying their release would cause "grave damage" to national security.

## Long List of Nations

Camille Branch, a representative of the N.S.A., which conducts all of the

## Was Japan ready to quit before Hiroshima?

nation's electronic eavesdropping, said the disclosure represented "an unusually large release" of information by the N.S.A.

The documents, part of a collection known as the Magic intercepts, reflect American spying on Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Iran, Italy, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, as well as on Germany and Japan, in 1945.

Intelligence veterans said it was natural that all nations spied as assiduously as possible on their allies as well as their enemies.

"It's an old saying: a nation does not have friends, it has interests," said Thomas Polgar, a 40-year veteran of United States intelligence. "You spy wherever you have interests. Spying is limited only by the availability of resources. If you have the resources to do it, you do it."

The communications of two major wartime allies — Britain and the Soviet Union — are not represented in the

intercepts selectively released by the N.S.A. But they do reveal that the United States knew what the Soviets were telling other countries by reading ambassadors' wartime communications.

"Stalin called me to the Kremlin," the Mexican Ambassador to Moscow reported back to Mexico City in January 1945. "American problems were extensively discussed." Stalin took a special interest in "the possibilities of closer cooperation between Mexico and the U.S.S.R. after the war," the ambassador reported.

By reading such communications, the United States learned what the Soviets negotiating positions were for the division of the postwar world.

The documents also show that the United States analyzed the thoughts of Latin American diplomats to help devise pacts giving Washington a free hand to intervene in Latin America, while opposing similar Soviet spheres of influence in Europe.

One tap reveals a Venezuelan diplomat reporting to his government on a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Nelson A. Rockefeller.

"Rockefeller communicated to us the anxiety of the United States Government about the Russian attitude," the Foreign Minister reported on May 7, 1945. United States officials, he said, were "beginning to speak of Communism as they once spoke of Nazism, and are invoking continental solidarity and hemispheric defense against it."

That solidarity was an American goal in the creation of the United Nations, and in particular in the drafting of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognized the right of "collective self-defense." It was the legal basis for American intervention in the Korean War and the Persian Gulf war.

In May 1945, as the United Nations took shape, the United States knew the negotiating positions of nearly every important member state, the documents show. That was useful to two men who read the Magic intercepts, John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War.

Mr. McCloy was drafting Article 51 in May 1945 when he telephoned Mr. Stimson.

"I've been taking the position that we ought to be able to have our cake and eat it too, that we ought to be free to operate under this regional arrangement in South America, and at the same time intervene promptly in Europe," Mr. McCloy said to Mr. Stimson, according to his biographer, Kai Bird.



# Papers detail U.S. spying on its allies late in WWII

ASSOCIATED PRESS

The United States spied on its allies in the closing months of World War II, intercepting diplomatic messages that described everything from French irritation with American policy to Soviet overtures to Mexico, newly declassified documents show.

The more than 800 pages of so-called "magic intercepts" detail growing American concern about Soviet expansion and the germination of an intensive spying effort that would eventually become a hallmark of the Cold War.

"The American delegates are now beginning to speak of Communism as they once spoke of Nazism and are invoking continental solidarity and hemispheric defense against it," Venezuela's foreign minister cabled after a joint conference with Assistant Secretary of State John A. Rockefeller. The encounter came during the historic April 1945 meeting in San Francisco that gave birth to the United Nations.

The papers — released to a historian as a result of a lawsuit — also chronicle the maneuverings by Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union to divvy up Europe and the Middle East in 1945. And they also show a nascent Soviet Union jockeying for power in Europe and Asia.

A Turkish diplomat in Moscow reported that on April 23, 1945, two days after the signing of a treaty creating a Soviet-backed Polish government, the Soviets censored statements by leaders that no opposition parties would be tolerated and that some Polish army officers were executed for disloyalty.

"The Russian government, which has been able to find out here that it is not surrounded by universal sympathy, is obsessed by the idea of an anti-Soviet coalition," said a French cable intercepted during the San Francisco U.N. meeting.

A document summarizing intercepts from officials of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela at the meeting concluded "a determination to resist Soviet Russia is growing among the American countries, including the United States."

Earlier that year, the Mexican ambassador to the Soviet Union reported a meeting with Josef Stalin in the Kremlin where "American problems were extensively discussed," along with "the possibilities of closer cooperation between Mexico

## SPY TALK

Some excerpts from more than 800 pages of diplomatic messages intercepted by U.S. spies during 1945.

■ On Feb. 23, the Swiss minister to Japan described chaos, great losses from air raids, no transportation, shelters "ridiculous."

"When the American advance to Manila was broadcast, the Japanese found out that they had naively underestimated the enemy. . . . The defeat of Germany seems certain, but the Japanese are desperately clinging to the hope that the Germans will hold out . . . in order to lighten Japan's burden."

■ The Portuguese minister to Germany — who in January had complained about lack of electricity and food in Berlin — in February said a group of refugees from the occupied regions nearby had taken up residence in his castle outside the city, "thus producing an unpleasant promiscuity."

"Humanitarian sentiments prevent us from objecting to the entrance of these people, who otherwise would die of cold at our door during the night."

■ A Greek diplomat reported on a conversation he had with French Gen. Charles de Gaulle Feb. 7: "A south Slav state will probably be formed, but it is doubtful whether such a state can last long, since the Serb element — one of the most virile in the Balkan peninsula — is opposed to the idea."

■ The Swiss minister to Japan on the situation there June 26: "Japan does not expect to win, but is still hoping to escape defeat by prolonging the war long enough to exhaust her enemies. Many eagerly desire the landing of the Americans in Japan proper, since they think it would be the last chance to inflict upon the Americans a defeat serious enough to make them come to terms."

■ June 30, French Secretary General Jacques Focques Duparc, envoy to the San Francisco meeting to form the United Nations, reports: "The 'first concern' of the French government — to see France emerge again as a great power — was achieved and the charter puts France on the same plane legally as the United States, Russia and England."

The Washington Times

and the U.S.S.R. at the end of the war."

The messages were intercepted by U.S. agents who tapped into telegraph cables or monitored radio signals. American analysts then broke the secret codes.

Among other countries whose messages were intercepted: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Iran, Italy, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

The documents, first reported by the New York Times last week, also provide new evidence suggesting the Japanese military was willing to surrender months before the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

"Since the situation is clearly recognized to be hopeless, large sections of the Japanese armed forces would not regard with disfavor an American request for capitulation even if the terms were hard," a German diplomat reported to Berlin after talking with a high-level Japanese naval officer on May 5, 1945. Three days later, Germany surrendered.

Gar Alperovitz, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies who sued

for the papers under the Freedom of Information Act, said such intercepts provided additional evidence that the Allies knew they had won the war in Japan before the bombs were dropped.

"They were reporting back to their home capitals the collapse of Japan and the likelihood of surrender, and we were reading this material and passing it on to the top government officials," he said.

"So it is a powerful, additional intelligence source which indicates the same thing that seems clear in all the other documents — that the war was essentially over."

Mr. Alperovitz had requested more than 900 pages of magic intercepts. For three years, the National Security Agency denied his request, claiming the release would cause "grave damage" to national security.

"At this point, it's ridiculous . . . that they're holding back 50-year-old documents," Mr. Alperovitz said. "They might be a threat to somebody's reputation, but not to national security."

Missing from the released documents are any communiques from Britain or the Soviet Union. But they contain enough information from other countries' diplomats to reveal how the Soviets wanted to divide the postwar world.