

SWISS DELEGATION

Panmunjom, 25. April 1955
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J.B. 730000.1 (6)

Bericht No. 96

Herr Bundespräsident,

an	Datum	Von
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1) In der 191. Sitzung der NNSC vom 20. April 1955 nahm die Kommission vorerst Kenntnis von einem Bericht der analytischen Abteilung betreffend Fertigstellung der Summary Reports für den Monat März 1955, und die Sekretäre wurden wie üblich mit der Ausarbeitung eines Evaluationsentwurfes beauftragt.

Sodann standen die separaten Schlussberichte des Mobile Team No. 5 betreffend den Luftzwischenfall über dem Gelben Meer wieder zur Diskussion. Wie im letzten Bericht unter 3a) erwähnt, hatten wir unsere Stellvertreter damit betraut, die Möglichkeiten einer gemeinsamen Auswertungsformel zu Händen der Waffenstillstandskommission offiziös zu prüfen; sie waren, wie vorauszusehen war, zu keinem Erfolg gelangt, weil die Polen/Tschechen die für die Schweden/Schweizer unannehmbare Feststellung nicht preisgeben wollten, der Luftkampf vom 5. Februar habe sich in einer bestimmten Phase im Luftraum über nordkoreanischem Hoheitsgebiet, und zwar über der Gegend von Onjong-ni, abgespielt. Am Vortag der Sitzung hatten sich sodann die Senior Members im Quartier von General Hecko zu einer offiziösen Unterredung getroffen. In dreistündigen Besprechungen, in denen alle hängigen Fragen soweit möglich geklärt wurden, einigte man sich dahin, die in den beiden Schlussrapporten des Teams enthaltenen Schlussfolgerungen als separate Auswertungen ohne zusätzlichen materiellen Kommentar an die Waffenstillstandskommission zu unterbreiten. Das Begleitschreiben an die MAC, das unverzüglich genehmigt und unterzeichnet wurde, skizziert zunächst den Gang der Untersuchung und enthält sodann die Feststellung, dass die Kommission nicht zu einer gemeinsamen Würdigung der Untersuchungsergebnisse habe gelangen können, und die bekannten Schlussfolgerungen der Rapporte des Mobile Teams als separate Auswertungen der polnisch/tschechischen bzw. schwedisch/schweizerischen NNSC-Mitglieder angenommen worden seien. Damit wurde offiziell der Schluss-Strich unter das ebenso komplexe wie umfangreiche Geschäft gezogen. Je eine Kopie der separaten Team-Schlussberichte sowie das Begleitschreiben der NNSC an die MAC werde ich Ihnen mit einem besonderen Bericht zu Ihrer Dokumentation unterbreiten.

Das nächste Traktandum brachte die Stellungnahme der tschechischen und polnischen Delegierten zu dem in der 189. Sitzung gestellten schwedischen Antrag betreffend Reduktion der NNSC bzw. Abschaffung der 10 Fix-Teams. Ich habe Sie bereits durch meine Kabel 73 und 74 eingehend über den Gegenvorschlag, der sich durchaus an das polnische und das tschechoslowakische Aide-Mémoire vom vergangenen März hält, unterrichtet und lege die betreffenden Erklärungen zudem in extenso hier bei.

Herrn Bundespräsident Max Petitpierre
Chef des Eidg. Politischen Departements

Bern



Demnach sollen sich, bei grundsätzlicher Aufrechterhaltung aller zehn Teams, deren Mitglieder inskünftig statt aus je vier "Nationen" aus deren je zwei zusammensetzen, m.a.W., die Fixteams würden in Abweichung von Art. 40b des AA durch Sub-Teams ersetzt, was uns eine Einsparung von rund 15 Mann erlauben würde. General Grönwall und ich haben aus unserer Enttäuschung über den wenig befriedigenden Charakter des Gegenvorschlages kein Hehl gemacht; ich habe mir indes vorbehalten, nach eingehendem Studium des Gegenvorschlages und seiner praktischen Auswirkungen darauf zurückzukommen. Auf meinen Antrag wurde die Diskussion vertagt.

Im weitem kam ein Brief des Mobile Team No. 8 zur Verlesung, worin das Scheitern der Bemühungen um einen gemeinsamen Schlussrapport gemeldet wurde. Eine materielle Diskussion erfolgte nicht, da die separaten Berichte der polnisch/tschechischen und schwedisch/schweizerischen Team-Mitglieder noch nicht verteilt worden waren. Gemäss unserem Gentlemen's Agreement vom Vortage machte ich als Vorsitzender den Vorschlag, die Rapporte der nach dem Norden entsandten Mobile Teams 6 bis 8 einerseits und der nach dem Süden entsandten Teams 9 und 10 andererseits gesamthaft zu behandeln, da sie je eine einheitliche Klage zur Grundlage haben. Sachliche wie verfahrenstechnische Gründe sprachen gleichermassen für ein solches Prozedere, und mein Antrag wurde denn auch einhellig genehmigt. Der Beginn der Evaluationsdiskussion ist auf Anfang Mai zu erwarten.

Zum Schlusse der Sitzung entspann sich eine etwas gereizte Diskussion über einen am 17. April 1955 in "Pacific Stars and Stripes" erschienenen längeren Artikel der Associated Press, betitelt "Korea Truce Team Officials Blame 'Farce' on Communists", über den ich Ihnen bereits unter dem 19. d.M. berichtet habe. Der, wie eingangs erklärt wird, auf Aussagen schweizerischer und schwedischer NNSC-Angehöriger beruhende Artikel unterzieht die von Polen und Tschechen und der Nordseite seit dem Waffenstillstand geübte Taktik einer sehr scharfen, um nicht zu sagen vernichtenden Kritik. Der polnische wie der tschechoslovakische Delegierte verwahrten sich heftig dagegen. General Grönwall und ich erklärten, mit diesem Artikel nichts zu tun zu haben, hoben den privaten Charakter der in Rede stehenden Presse-Unternehmungen hervor und mahnten davon ab, die NNSC zu einer Tribüne für Erörterungen über Auslassungen der freien Presse zu machen. Ich betonte meinerseits, die schweizerischen Mitglieder seien zu strengster Diskretion verpflichtet; ich hätte die bestehenden Befehle erneut eingeschärft und eine Untersuchung wegen Verletzung von Dienstvorschriften angeordnet. Der kaum verhüllten Drohung des polnischen Mitgliedes, seinerseits Artikel inspirieren zu können, die der schwedisch/schweizerischen Seite vielleicht nicht ganz angenehm wären, entgegnetend, bemerkte ich, der angedeutete Weg der Selbsthilfe würde meiner Meinung nach für die NNSC keine erfreulichen Ergebnisse zeitigen. Der Pole und der Tscheche lenkten hierauf sofort ein, womit der Vorfall seine Erledigung fand.

2) Die offiziöse Zusammenkunft vom Vortag, auf die ich bereits im Vorhergehenden hingewiesen habe, verlief in jener freundschaftlichen Atmosphäre, wie sie dem neuen Stil der Ostblockstaaten-Diplomatie entspricht, die sich auch in Panmunjom durchgesetzt hat. Die grundlegenden Divergenzen werden durch eine Art von Kameradschaftlichkeit, über deren wahren Charakter man sich keinen Täuschungen hingeben darf, übertüncht; über Fragen, die mehr das Verfahren als den Kern der Sache angehen, einigt man sich ziemlich mühe-los. General Hecko, der übrigens demnächst nach Prag zurückkehrt, erwies sich wieder einmal als guter Gastgeber.

3) Auf den Abend zuvor, Montag den 18. April, hatte der nordkoreanische General Lee Sang Cho, Mitglied der KPA/CPV-Seite in der MAC, zu Ehren meines Amtsantritts in seinem Quartier in Kaesong ein Diner-Buffer veranstaltet, zu dem er, neben 10 weiteren Mitglieder der schweizerischen Delegation, auch die drei übrigen Senior Members der NNSC und ihre engeren Mitarbeiter geladen hatte. Autos der Nordseite kamen uns in der sogenannten "Conference Area" in Panmunjom abholen. Eine etwas mühsame "Stehparty", bei der Stühle nur für die fünf Ehrengäste bereitgestellt waren, und umso mühsamer, als General Lee Sang Cho ausser Chinesisch keine Fremdsprache spricht. Glücklicherweise besteht in Kaesong der Brauch der Tischreden nicht. Man beschränkt sich darauf, immer wieder anzustossen und dabei einige belanglose Höflichkeitsphrasen auszutauschen. Dem Gastgeber war die Schweiz als Uhrenland bekannt; er meinte beiläufig, nach "Aufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen" würden sicherlich zahlreiche Koreaner den Wunsch haben, als Touristen die berühmten Naturschönheiten der Schweiz kennenzulernen. Ich dankte für diese guten Absichten und bemerkte, die Schweiz sei nicht nur ein Land der Uhren und der Hotellerie, sondern habe überdies eine hochentwickelte Industrie und Unterrichtsanstalten von internationalem Ansehen. Die Anspielung auf die diplomatischen Beziehungen liess ich selbstverständlich unter den Tisch fallen. - Mit dieser Veranstaltung ist mein formeller Antrittsbesuch beim Vertreter der Nordseite in der MAC, auf den man in Bern Wert zu legen scheint, abgestattet und der Höflichkeitspflicht genüge getan.

Auf der Fahrt nach Kaesong fielen mir jenseits der Demilitarisierten Zone die intensive Patrouillentätigkeit längs der Strasse und die zahlreichen Wachtposten auf den Hügeln rechts und links auf, ohne dass ich anzugeben vermöchte, ob es sich um eine temporäre, unserer Sicherheit wegen getroffene Anordnung handelt. Von oberirdischen Militärlagern, wie sie zwischen Panmunjom und Munsan-ni in grösserer Zahl zu bemerken sind, war nichts zu sehen; dagegen ist rechts und links der Strasse, soweit der Blick reicht, festzustellen, dass intensiv an permanenten Unterständen und Befestigungen gearbeitet wird. In Panmunjom vergeht denn auch kein Tag, ohne dass wir Explosionen, herrührend von Sprengungsarbeiten, von der Nordseite herüber vernähmen.

4) Seit der Abreise von General Krzemien am 17. April 1955 amtet dessen Alternate, Oberstleutnant Tyckocinski, ein jüngerer Diplomat, als polnisches "acting Member".

Genehmigen Sie, Herr Bundespräsident, die Versicherung meiner ausgezeichnetsten Hochachtung.

Der Chef
der schweizerischen Delegation
in der NNSC für Korea

C. M. M.

2 Beilagen

Verteiler:

Herrn Bundespräsident Max Petitpierre	(2) ✓
Chef des Personellen der Armee	(1)
Schweizerische Gesandtschaft Tokyo	(1)
Minister Stucki	(1)
Sekretariat	(1)

"Reduction of NNSC"
CZ statement, 20.4.55'

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen,

On the basis of the request put forth by the Swedish and Swiss Governments our Commission has proceeded to deal with a task of an extraordinary importance, the reduction of its personnel.

Dealing with this question, we must not, in my opinion, disregard for a single moment the important fact that the NNSC reduction can be carried out only in complete accordance with the respective provisions of the AA and in no way interfering with the conducting of the Commission's responsibilities.

In this connection, I would like to say first some words concerning the attitude of the Czechoslovak Government concerning the question of reduction of the number of NNSC personnel.

All of us know very well that the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland expressed several times in the past their wish to put an end to their participation in this Commission and that did so for the last time in their Aides Mémoires addressed to the Governments of the Chinese Peoples Republic and of the United States of America, about which also the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland were notified. Beside the liquidation of the Commission, the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland requested as another alternative an essential reduction of the NNSC personnel. The contents of these Aides Mémoires and the answers of the Governments involved are sufficiently known and I do not therefore deem it necessary to repeat them here.

Despite that I deem it, however, useful to remind in this connection some points of the Czechoslovak Government's answer to the Aides Mémoires of the Swedish and Swiss Governments. Faithful to its peaceful foreign policy, and being fully aware of the significance of the Supervisory Commission for safeguarding the Armistice in Korea and preservation of peace in the Far East, the Czechoslovak Government declared itself willing also in the future to fulfill all its engagements which it had taken over accepting the NNSC Membership. In contrary to the opinions to stop the activities of the NNSC the Czechoslovak Government is convinced it is in the interest

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of strengthening the peace in Korea that the Commission continues to fulfill all its tasks which it is entrusted with by the AA - and the up-to-day Commission's activity fully confirms this stand.

As far as the request of the Swiss and Swedish Governments to reduce essentially the NNSC personnel is concerned, in the answer of the Czechoslovak Government there is stated that, according to the opinion of the Czechoslovak Government, this question may be discussed in the Commission itself. The Czechoslovak Government underlined, however, the fact that any solution on the reduction "must be in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, especially of its Para 40 so that the Commission would be in a position to fulfill its mission in any situation!"

The above mentioned stand of the Czechoslovak Government is obviously also the basis for the Czechoslovak Delegation when dealing with this question of the reduction in the NNSC and, accordingly, also the frame of instructions I have received from Prague.

At the 189th NNSC meeting held on the 13th of April I heard with a great interest the Swedish Government's proposal for a reduction, put forth by General Groenwall which was joined later also by the Swiss Delegate Minister Stucki.

The basis of the Swedish proposal of reduction of NNSC is, however, the abolishing of one of the basic tasks of our Commission which is the supervision and control of the rotation of military personnel and replacement of combat material according to the paragraphs 13 c and d AA.

Allow me to quote in this connection Para 41 AA which stipulates very clearly these basic tasks of the NNSC: "The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection and investigation, as stipulated in Subparagraphs 13 e and 13 d and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission".

In order to fulfill these basic functions the NNSC, as stipulated by the Paras 42 c, e and 43, has to station its permanent Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in 5 ports of entry in the North

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and in 5 ports of entry in the South.

The Swedish proposal states that the control activity of the permanent Inspection Teams is allegedly ineffective and, therefore, in the frame of the reduction the NNIT:s should be withdrawn from all the ports and that their "control" work should be taken over by the HQ in Panmunjom.

I cannot but ^{to} express my surprise and at the same time my regret that according to the Swedish proposal, the control activity of our Commission, which is its basic task, should be reduced to the activity of a bureaucratic statistical board which would only check the written reports of both sides concerning the rotation and replacement.

In no case I can agree to the description of the stand of the control activity and especially of its ineffectiveness as the Swedish proposal tried to paint it in black colours. I do not maintain, as well, the opinion that the results of the control activity of the Commission are not corresponding to the expenditure of the Members Nations for maintaining their personnel in Korea.

All of us know very well that the observation of the Paras 13 d and 13 c is one of the most important assumptions for maintaining the stability of the Korean Armistice. There is an engagement set to the sides not to extend the stand of foreign troops and of combat material in Korea above the level existing on the day of signing the Armistice.

The Gentlemen know as well as I do that the South Korean ruling circles supported by certain circles in the U.S. entered in the last months the path of a speedy buildup of a powerful South Korean Army which with its 20 divisions and other 10 reserve divisions which are being reactivated just now, represents a going menace to the peace in Korea. I could quote here tens of statements of war thirsty South Korean representatives who dream about a "March to North" and call every day for the resumption of war. These militarist circles in South Korea even declared in the last time several times shamelessly that, in their effort to raise further the fire effectiveness of their 20 divisions, they were negotiating with the U.S. for obtaining the atomic guns.

The South Korean circles, fully supported by certain circles in the USA, lead also a systematic campaign for abolishing some parts of the AA, in not last row also of the Para 13 c and 13 d which impose to the sides restrictions in extending the number

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of military personnel and the quantity of combat material. The South Korean National Assembly went on the 31st of March as far as having adopted a resolution declaring that South Korea does not feel herself bounded by the AA and requests the same of the U.S. and other participants of the war in Korea.

And in this situation should we, Gentlemen, abolish the control activity of our Commission and facilitate in this way a fully unrestricted and fully uncontrolled flood of combat material and eventually also of the military personnel to Korea?

I am of the opinion that no one of us, having in mind the importance of the mission accepted by our Governments when consenting to the NNSC Membership, can agree to a similar thing.

In this connection, I wish to draw your attention to another important fact which fully confirms the correctness of my conclusions. It is very well known that the South Korean authorities, supported entirely by certain American circles, conduct already for several months a strong campaign for driving out the NNSC Inspection Teams from South Korea, accusing them falsely and insulting them.

I do not hesitate a moment to say that the reasons for this hateful campaign in South Korea is just the control activity of our Commission putting boundaries to the introduction of combat material and of military personnel. The withdrawal of the Inspection Teams would be thus equal to a direct assistance to those gloomy forces in South Korea and in the world which wish to provoke new incidents in Korea and to renew the flames of war in this country.

I deem it necessary again to remind the extremely important task which all of us jointly were entrusted with and which the Swedish and Swiss Members stressed several times here - i.e. to watch that the provisions of AA are observed. In these hard days when the aggressive forces would like again to throw the mankind into the horrible chaos of war have all of us sitting at this table not a small responsibility whether the situation in Korea would be developing in favour of strengthening the peace or whether new serious conflicts would occur.

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We cannot and we must not fail in the hopes of all peace-loving people of the world and cannot and must not therefore even propose such measures which in their results would weaken the control activity of our Commission, undermining thus the stability of the Korean Armistice.

Because of the reasons I have mentioned, I have to state that the drastical measures contained in the Swedish proposal, namely to liquidate the normal control activity of the NNSC and to withdraw the NNIT:s from all the ports is fully unacceptable for the Czechoslovak Delegation.

I was not entrusted to discuss similar proposal and I am personally deeply convinced about the incorrectness and danger of this step for the Korean Armistice.

I express the hope that my Swedish and Swiss colleagues having in mind the great responsibility put into our hands when the supervision of the armistice in Korea was accepted, would be in a position to reconsider once more their requests and proposals.

As far as the proposal of the Czechoslovak Delegation of the NNSC reduction is concerned, I am prepared, too, to submit a concrete proposal.

The Czechoslovak Government received with understanding the complaints of the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland that recruiting of experienced personnel for Korea meets serious financial and other troubles. Also the position of Czechoslovakia certainly could not be a different one in this connection, because also Czechoslovakia is a small nation like Sweden and Switzerland. Even maintaining the opinion that the greatest sacrifices for the cause of peace are not in vain, the Czechoslovak Government is willing to meet the requests of the Swedish and Swiss Governments for a reduction of NNSC personnel.

Gentlemen, I am authorized to declare that the Czechoslovak Delegation proposes that the NNIT:s in all 10 ports of entry in Korea be composed instead the actual 4 nationalities only of 2 nationalities in the future. This proposal could be submitted by a joint letter to the both sides in MAC.

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I am of the opinion that the proposal of the Czechoslovak Delegation is reasonable and correct because it is fully in accordance with the stipulations of AA and with our tasks and represents at the same time a 50 per cent reduction of our personnel in the NNIT:s.

Submitting this proposal of a reduction of NNSC personnel the Czechoslovak Delegation declares that it will also in the future fulfill all engagements it took over with the aim that the NNSC would become continuously a more important stabilizing factor in the Korean Armistice.

We see in this, Gentlemen, our contribution to strengthening the peace and security not only in Korea and in the Far East but also in the whole world.

Reduction of NNSC
PO statement, 20.4.55.

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen.

The Polish Delegation studied with great attention the proposal of the reduction of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as expressed in the statement of the representative of Sweden gen. Groenwall, presented at the 189th meeting of the NNSC on April 13th.

The substance of this proposals is aiming at a reduction of personnel based on a change of the organization of the NNSC, because it entails the withdrawal of the NNIT:S from all ports, leaving in Panmunjom a kind of a central body with 10 persons from each delegation in order to register data submitted by the sides, and transferring them to ~~NNSC~~ ^{the} MAC.

The Polish Delegation wishes to take a stand to this project and declares the following:

The Government of the Polish People's Republic in a statement of March 16th being to reply to the aide-memoires of the Governments of Switzerland and Sweden of January 27th, stresses, I quote:

" The Government of Poland when undertaking its participation in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea was aware to the burden which will result of this fact. When agreeing to carry these burdens the Government of the Polish People's Republic considered its participation will contribute to a lasting, peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

Although due to some circles which are not interested in a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem this aim was not achieved till now, the Government of the Polish People's Republic is of the opinion that the existence of the Commission and its control over the implementation of the Armistice constitutes an important positive factor of maintaining peace in Korea and in the whole world.

The almost two year long activity of the NNSC has shown that the Commission can efficiently and usefully accomplish its functions. That is why the Government of the Polish People's Republic thinks it necessary to maintain the NNSC and to take part in its work.

The Polish Government deems it, however, possible to consider a reduction of the personnel of the Commission by exchanging opinions between the ~~natio~~ nations participating in the NNSC. It is obvious according to the opinion of the Government of the Polish People's Republic that such a reduction

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should not hamper the Commission's ability to carry out its functions stipulated by the Armistice Agreement. "

The Polish Delegation realizing the standpoint taken by its Government concerning the question put forth by the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland, having in mind the difficulties of both governments in recruiting of qualified personnel, and the expenditures connected with it, is ready to consider all constructive proposals of reduction of personnel in conformity with the Armistice Agreement.

The Armistice Agreement has entrusted the Commission with the supervision of the armistice which according to para 42 c is carrying out its supervisory and controlling functions through the inspection teams established by the commission itself and stationing in conformity with para 43 in 10 strictly fixed posts of Entry.

The Polish Delegation has to state, however, that the Swedish draft for reduction having in view the withdrawal of NNIT:S from all the ten posts of entry ~~xxxxi~~ constitutes a revision of the Armistice Agreement and as such falls ~~xxx~~ beyond the competence of the Commission.

The NNSC may only recommend to MAC according to para 49 to introduce either amendments or additions to the Armistice Agreement; the recommended amendments, however, should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice - I stress it - a more effective armistice.

The Polish Delegation checking the Swedish proposals against para 49 of the Armistice Agreement states that the reduction as proposed by the Swedish Member is not within the scope of the Armistice Agreement is contradictory to it, and its approval would be against the principal aims and tasks of the Commission for the fulfilment of which it has been established.

The Swedish proposals change the Commission, this high institution of control, having such serious tasks to fulfil in the work of establishing peace in Korea, into a large office registering only the data delivered by both sides. If the Swedish proposal were been adopted, such an office might equally have had its residence in one of our beautiful capitals: in Prague, Stockholm, Bern or Warsaw without harming its work.

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That is why we feel, that we cannot permit that the idea and the leading thought of this high international body should be distorted and that from the position of supervising the armistice the NNSC should be reduced to a second rate function of registering events only. Thus it would lose its present character and would be unable to accomplish its important tasks and doomed to sink forwards a practical, if not a formal, liquidation.

The Polish Delegation feels obligated to emphasise once more that led by the desire inspiring the whole Polish nation to secure peace, it cannot take upon itself the heavy responsibility of such a solution.

0 doubts very much whether any of the governments represented in our Commission would like to take upon itself the heavy responsibility before the nations of the world for the liquidation of the NNSC before its tasks have been accomplished; the responsibility for leaving Korea at a moment when the situation here is still very tense, when some American circles and the ROK government are extensively increasing the military strength of South Korea, are talking about the transfer of certain kinds of nuclear weapons to the South Korean army, openly speaking of the notorious "march to the North" in spite of the fact that the first march of that kind had a bitter end.

The Polish Delegation is well aware of the full responsibility for the Commission, this important international body, the instrument of peace in Korea, an important factor of decrease of tension and the element giving the Korean people the feeling of security. The same idea was expressed by the Swedish Member Maj. Hilke at a meeting of NNIT No.5 in Sinanju on March 2 - I quote - "The mere ~~existence~~ existence of our Team gives to the Korean population a feeling of peace and ~~security~~ security". In connection with the above, the Polish Delegation cannot agree to such a form of control as contained in the declaration of the Swedish Senior ~~member~~ Member.

Such a proposal would reduce the Commission to a dwarfish form, engulf the attained aims and discredit in this way the very idea of the Commission in the world's opinion.

At the same time declaring its good will to take into consideration to the largest extent the difficulties of the Swiss and Swedish governments, in maintaining their delegations in the NNSC (difficulties, which also affect the Polish Dele-

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gation), the Polish Delegation supports eagerly the proposals of the Czechoslovak Delegation seeing in them real and serious possibilities of important savings in funds and personnel without harming the foundations and ~~the~~ principles of the Armistice Agreement.

Polish Delegation.