

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission  
for Korea  
SWISS DELEGATION

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Entmilitarisierung der DMZ (3)

Herr Botschafter,

Anlässlich einer geschlossenen Sitzung, die vor der normalen NNSC Sitzung vom 16. Juli stattfand, teilte mir der als Vertreter General Dziaduras amtierende Alternate der polnischen Delegation, Herr Spyrka ( ein Diplomat ohne militärischen Rang, der auch als Berater der Delegation funktioniert ) mit, er habe die Absicht in der offenen Sitzung eine Erklärung abzugeben, wonach seine Delegation der Ansicht sei, dass die jetzigen Umstände (Verhandlungen zwischen Nord- und Südkorea, sowie Besprechungen in Vorbereitung der eventuellen Diskussion der Koreafrage in der UNO Generalversammlung) für eine Initiative der NNSC, wie sie die Schweizer Delegation vorschläge, nicht günstig seien. Der Vertreter Tschechoslovakiens, General Smoldas wiederholte fast wörtlich seine schon an der vorletzten Sitzung gemachte Erklärung im gleichen Sinne. Der Schwede, General Ljungdahl, erklärte, dass obschon er die schweizerische Initiative befürworte die Möglichkeit eines einheitlichen Beschlusses der NNSC offensichtlich nicht gegeben sei, so dass er es für richtig halte, dass die Kommission einfach von diesem Tatbestand Kenntniss nehme. Man kann also sagen, dass die Schweden uns in diesem Falle kaum unterstützt haben, was mit ihrer neuen Politik gegenüber Nordkorea übereinstimmt.

Darauf hin erklärte ich, dass - obschon die von den anderen Delegationen verwendeten Argumente mich nicht überzeugt hätten, dass ich unseren Vorschlag zurückziehen sollte, - ich bereit sei, zur jetzigen Zeit auf weitere Diskussionen über unseren Vorschlag zu verzichten. Genau in diesem Sinne entwickelte sich dann unsere offizielle Sitzung.

Damit ist unser Vorschlag bis zur Diskussion der Koreafrage in der UNO-Generalversammlung - falls sie wirklich stattfindet - begraben. In diesem Zusammenhang mag es Sie vielleicht interessieren, dass gestern (am 22. Juli) die "Korea Herald", die bekanntlich die Meinung der südkoreanischen Regierung vertritt, einen Artikel über die Zustände in der Entmilitarisierten Zone veröffentlichte. Die darin enthaltenen Angaben über die Zahl, Natur und Bewaffnung der Befestigungen, die angeblich durch die Nordseite in der DMZ gebaut worden sind, scheinen im grossen und Ganzen richtig zu sein. Ergänzungshalber möchte ich noch hinzufügen, dass die meisten Guardposts sich im westlichen Drittel der DMZ befinden, dass heisst auf den zwei wichtigsten Invasionsstrassen (die von Kaesong über Panmunjom und Munsan und durch Uijongbu nach Seoul führen) zur koreanischen Hauptstadt befinden. Die Südseite hat - laut mir vertraulich mitgeteilten Angaben - etwa fünfzig mit Eisenbeton gebauten "Guardposts" in der gleichen Zone (wovon sich drei auf der Achse der Zufahrtsstrasse



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(2)

Richtung Munsan - Panmunjom befinden.)

Es ist schade, dass diese vom südkoreanischen Verteidigungsministerium stammenden Angaben nicht etwas früher - während der Zeit unserer Diskussionen in der NNSC - veröffentlicht wurden.

Genehmigen Sie, Herr Botschafter, den Ausdruck meiner vorzüglichen  
Hochachtung

Der Delegationschef

*Claude van Muyden*  
Claude van Muyden

20 Years After Truce

# N.K. Consistently Builds Arms Above Armistice Accord

Following is the third in a series of articles designed to refresh the memories of those who have tended to forget the real situation on the divided Korean peninsula, and to sketch the background which led up to the present situation. — Ed.


Early in 1972 the Republic of Korea military authorities and the U.N. Command confirmed that north Korea had established permanent fortifications in the Demilitarized Zone with a large quantity of equipment and number of personnel, and disclosed this, with evidences supporting the claim.

The buffer zone, which had been quiet for 20 years since the ceasefire, thus became a tense area. The north Korean military establishment in the DMZ which has so far been confirmed includes:

- 225 fortified concrete guardposts
- 31 76.2mm artillery pieces
- 78 mortars
- 17 rocket launchers
- 450 recoilless rifles (2 per guardpost)
- 225 14.5mm antiaircraft guns
- 676 RP-46 machineguns (3 per guardpost)
- 675 RPD squad machineguns (3 per guardpost)
- 675 RPG (3 per guardpost)

Barbed wire fence extending over 80 kilometers along the Military Demarcation Line, from Panmunjom to Kansong.

The illegal militarization of the DMZ poses a serious threat to the Republic of Korea. North Korea has in effect advanced the front line 20 kilometers by erecting 80 kilometers of barbed wire entanglements along the Military Demarcation Line in the DMZ and fortifying the area north of it. As a result of such illegal activities, south Korean forces deployed



**RETALIATORY SABOTAGE** — The zigzagged coaches of the freight train are the result of deliberate sabotage by red agents sneaking across fortified demilitarized zone. The train derailed Sept. 13, 1967, north of Seoul during the continuing malignant campaign.

along the line are now within the range of fire from Communist north Korean forces.

In 1973, north Korean guard personnel fired at and killed two DMZ policemen from the south who were repairing markers and roads in the DMZ. A group of north Korean military personnel, fully armed and equipped with wirecutters, broke through the Military Demarcation Line and proceeded as far south as the southern boundary of the DMZ. The two incidents were possible because of north Korea's rearmament in the northern half of the buffer zone, which is in open violation of the Armistice Agreement.

The introduction of arms into the DMZ is in violation of Article 1 of the Military Armistice Agreement. In Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this agreement reads: "A Demilitarized Zone shall be

established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities." Paragraph 6 of the same article states that "Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone."

The deployment of a division size force in the Demilitarized Zone goes counter to Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 1, which stipulate: "No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission" and that "The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone ... shall ... in no case exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any time."

By establishing 225 new

military positions and erecting a barbed wire fence along the Military Demarcation Line in the buffer zone, north Korea violated Paragraph 13-a of Article 2, which reads to the effect that "All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period from the time the Armistice Agreement becomes effective."

While consolidating forward positions in preparation for possible reinvasion of the south, and in open violation of the Military Armistice Agreement, north Korea day after day blared out propaganda calling for "peace." As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Seoul government, what is needed for the restoration of peace is not verbal statements but proper action.

North Korea's provocations as mentioned above constitute the scrapping of recognized practices of international law pertaining to armistice. An international agreement signed in The Hague in 1907 on the practice of war states that when one party perpetrates a serious violation of an armistice agreement, the other party shall have the right to abolish it. It then states that serious violations of an armistice agreement include: (1) Tresspassing the fixed armistice line, (2) raising defense barriers overpassing the frontline; and (3) occupying goes against all three of these instances.

After their visits of Pyongyang in 1972 at the invitation of north Korea, Harrison E.

Salisbury, a New York Times correspondent, reported that north Korea resembled a huge barracks. A reporter for the Mainichi Shimbun, a Japanese daily, who covered Tokyo Mayor Minobe's visit to Pyongyang around the same time as Salisbury's trip, reported a 13-year-old boy in a military uniform, chanting, "Let's have a parade in Seoul!" during a military drill at an elementary school.

The north Korean Communists, believing that violence and arms alone can guarantee the success of a Communist revolution, indoctrinate even children in enmity

and hatred instead of love and respect for humanity, in order to raise them as tools of war.

As is shown in the table, north Korea has increased its arms to a level far above that at the time of the armistice. Submarines and high-speed naval vessels equipped with ship-to-ship missiles are not possessed by the south Korean military. In terms of air power, north Korea has almost six times more airplanes than south Korea. It is quite contradictory that north Korea, which has been boasting of its war capabilities, now proposes a reduction of arms.

## North Korea's Military Strength

		At the time of Present(2)	
		Ceasefire(1)	
Personnel	Army	215,000	360,000
	Navy	4,000	12,000
	Air Force	19,000	30,000
Equipment	Artillery	2,950	8,000
	Tanks, Self-Propelled Guns	480	1,000
	Ships	30	117
	Guided Missile Bases	—	3
	Aircraft	230	1,586
	Ground-to-Air Missile Bases(3)	—	13
	Radar Bases(3)	—	16
	Ground-to-Air Missiles and their bases(3)	—	84

Sources: (1) Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea  
(2) International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).  
(The IISS has confirmed the establishment of these bases, but withheld the exact number of them.)