

Chief of Staff

Pannunjon, 4 May, 1954.

To: Military Armistice Commission.
From: Swedish and Swiss Members of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission.

On 29 April the Polish Member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission submitted for the consideration of the Commission, at its 124th meeting, a draft to a report to be directed to the Military Armistice Commission. The Swedish and the Swiss Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission rejected this draft in its entirety. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members thereupon decided to forward the document to the Military Armistice Commission in their own name.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members are, of course, perfectly free to convey to the Military Armistice Commission whatever views and opinions they hold. As this particular document claims to be based, however, on facts and figures collected by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the Swedish and Swiss Members feel called upon to present a few comments to the report submitted by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members to the Military Armistice Commission.

In the introductory part of their report the Czechoslovak and Polish Members charges the United Nations Command side with (a) obstructing and restricting the activities of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. (b) introducing military reinforcements into Korea. (c) violating the provisions of the Armistice Agreement under which replacements of combat materiel shall be made piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same types.

The contention that the United Nations Command side has obstructed and restricted the activities of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams is utterly ridiculous. The United Nations Command has from the outset wholeheartedly and unreservedly cooperated with the Neutral



Nations Supervisory Commission and its Inspection Teams. Errors and mistakes have admittedly occurred and there have also been cases of omission, but never has any intention of circumventing the provisions of the Armistice Agreement been proved. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams have been in the unique position of being able to check on the movements of goods amounting to many millions of tons in the sea-ports of Pusan, Inchon and Kunsan, and on the movements of aircraft amounting to many thousands of planes. With such a considerable turnover, it is obvious that some allowance must be made for discrepancies and inaccuracies.

There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the United Nations Command side has increased its combat strength in Korea since the Armistice Agreement came into force. On the contrary, the Swedish and Swiss Members concluded, in their evaluation on rotation of military personnel and replacement of combat materiel for the months of October - November 1953, that the United Nations Command side had considerably reduced its over-all combat strength during this period. The same trend has prevailed in the following months. In this connection it should be noted that, contrary to the assertion of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as such has not submitted any evaluation report for the months of October - November 1953.

The charge that the United Nations Command side has violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement relating to the replacement of combat materiel piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and of the same type is merely a product of the imagination of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members. Their way of reasoning may be illustrated by a statement in the evaluation of rotation of military personnel and replacement of combat materiel which they submitted to the Military Armistice Commission for the months of October - November 1953. The statement relates to the replacement of training aircraft designated as T-33 which, besides, is no combat aircraft. The contention of the Czechoslovak

- 3 -

and Polish Members is that the United Nations Command side is violating the provisions of the replacement piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type by having T-33:s replaced by T-33A:s. The absurdity of this accusation appears from the fact that all T-33:s in South Korea are T-33A:s. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members persist, however, in yielding to the same misapprehensions with regard to other types of aircraft.

In the first period after the signing of the Armistice Agreement the United Nations Command side strictly reported types of combat aircraft as required by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. When the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams started their control operations some three weeks after the Armistice Agreement had been signed, they also confined themselves to reporting of types only of combat aircraft. Subsequently they extended their reporting to include sub-types (models) as well, and the United Nations Command side, for its part, adopted the same procedure, although there was no obligation to do so under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

The assertion of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members that "the United Nations Command side still refuses to report the sub-types of combat aircraft" is therefore completely unfounded. This assertion seems to be based on their ignorance of the definition of the word "sub-type" which, contrary to their belief, has nothing to do with varying serial numbers of aircraft.

Due to the fact that, in the beginning, types only, and no sub-types, were reported either by the United Nations Command or the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, some doubts have arisen with regard to some replacement figures. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members bluntly infer, for example, that the United Nations Command side by 30 November 1953 had introduced four more combat aircraft F-94 than it had shipped out, and, in addition, that F-94:s had been replaced by F-94B:s which they assumed to be an improved version of the F-94. There are, however, two facts they omit to take into consideration: (1) that before the Neutral Nations Inspection

- 4 -

Teams started their control operations the United Nations Command reported to have flown out nine F-94:s more than it had introduced and thus even with due consideration for the figures of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams had built up a credit of six F-94:s by 30 November 1953 (one aircraft was missed in the counting of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members); (2) that there is no difference between the F-94 and the F-94B and thus, in fact, all aircraft in this class should be listed as F-94B. The conclusions of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members are therefore fallacious and completely misleading.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members quote the definition agreed upon by the Military Armistice Commission with regard to "combat aircraft" as referred to by the Armistice Agreement. The definition, of 28 November 1953, reads as follows:

"(1) Aircraft which are designed to expend destructive ordnance and which, even though not equipped with weapons at a given time, can have weapons installed in them at any time; and (2) Aircraft designed for weather, photography, and visual reconnaissance or tactical air coordination".

The application of this definition on aircraft in the territory under the military control of the United Nations Command - as is well known not a single aircraft has been reported as incoming or outgoing in the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers - has met with little difficulties as far as the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams are concerned. They were anyway in a position to check on all incoming and outgoing aircraft, both combat and non-combat, and as a matter of routine they reported to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, long before the definition of combat aircraft was given, all training aircraft that came within the range of their observations. No instructions to that effect had, however, been issued.

The United Nations Command side, for its part, never considered training aircraft to be combat aircraft

- 5 -

and therefore did not list them in the reports which, under para. 13 of the Armistice Agreement, the sides have to submit daily to the Military Armistice Commission and to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Swedish Member, although convinced personally that training aircraft could not be considered as coming under the definition of combat aircraft as agreed upon by the Military Armistice Commission, followed up a suggestion once made by the Polish Member and asked the United Nations Command to clarify its position on the subject. The reply reads as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND MILITARY ARMISTICE
COMMISSION

April 10th, 1954.

Memorandum for: Major General Mohn, Senior Swedish Delegate, NNSC.

1. Reference is made to your recent informal request on why the TB-17, VB-17, T-33, TV-2, TBM-3R and P2V are not considered combat aircraft.
2. I have been instructed to inform you that:
 - a. The TB-17 and TB-26 are former World War II bombers which have been stripped for their guns, bomb racks, armor plate and other distinctive features of a combat aircraft. These types of aircraft are now used for utility and training flights. That is the reason they have been designated by the letter "T" - for training.
 - b. The VB-17, an old B-17, is also a former World War II bomber which has been extensively modified for personnel transport. Similar to the TB-17, it also has been stripped of its armament. That is the reason it has been designated the letter "V".
 - c. The T-6 is an aircraft used extensively as a training plane for flight instruction and general utility flying. It contains no armor or armament. Similarly, it has been designated by the letter "T" - for training.
 - d. The TBM and the TBM-3R are former World War II naval combat aircraft which have also been stripped of armor and armament and are used as utility aircraft

- 6 -

for performing routine administrative missions and cargo flights.

e. The P2V is a patrol bomber stripped of armor and armament and is used in Korea as a transport aircraft.

f. The T-33 is an aircraft designed expressly for training purposes and is not designed to expend destructive ordnance. This airplane provides spaces for instructor and student, dual control and carries no armor. It is used for instruction and instrument training.

g. The TV-2 closely resembles the T-33. It, too, is designed for training and not designed to expend destructive ordnance. It provides spaces for pilot and student, has no armor and is used for instruction and instrument training.

3. None of these World War II aircraft could be converted into combat aircraft without extensive modification, and even were an attempt made to so modify them they would be completely obsolete for combat purposes. As you know, the TV-2, T-33, and T-6 have never been designed for combats.

4. You will note that the characteristics listed above are not those of United Nations combat aircraft. Accordingly, they are not reported as combat aircraft.

HOBART HEWETT
Brigadier General; USA
Chief of Staff".

These explanations fully confirmed the views held by the Swedish and Swiss Members on this matter. Consequently, in their opinion the introduction into South Korea of 177 training aircraft up to 15 April 1954, as claimed by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members, is completely irrelevant to the observation of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover, it is remarkable that the Czechoslovak and Polish Members fail to mention, in this connection, that during the period under review, 164 training aircraft were flown out of South Korea.

The case of the aircraft VB-17 No. 48-3798 is even more revealing of the methods used by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members for imputing violations of the Armistice Agreement to the United Nations Command side. The characteristics of this aircraft are given in the memorandum of the

United Nations Command quoted above. The VB-17 is obviously not a combat aircraft as defined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Team at Kangnung, upon inspection of a VB-17, reached the same conclusion and, upon ~~in~~ⁱⁿquiry, reported its findings to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in its cable No. 190 which reads as follows:

"According to NNIT record of the meeting of
 "6 March the mentioned plane on 5 and 6 March
 "was a VB-17 stop That plane was not reported
 "to NNSC as it is no combat aircraft stop NNIT
 "Kangnung".

The four officers responsible for the dispatch of this cable were: First Lieutenant Leuenberger (Switzerland), Captain Smolick (Czechoslovakia), Major Norrby (Sweden), and Major Hanba (Poland). The actual inspection was carried out jointly by a Swedish and a Czechoslovak officer. They found that the bomb-bay doors were sealed and, furthermore, that the space previously allotted for the storage of bombs had been converted into a sitting room with a pantry and a bar. Therefore, the Czechoslovak Member of the Inspection Sub-team agreed that the listing of this aircraft as a combat aircraft was out of question. The charges brought against the United Nations Command by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are thus in flagrant contradiction with the findings of their own military observers.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members point to a discrepancy between the figures reported by the United Nations Command side and by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams respectively on combat aircraft during the month of September 1953, claiming that the United Nations Command side "illegally" introduced 186 planes. This assertion is based on a misunderstanding. Until the latter part of October the reports of the United Nations Command side on replacements carried the date on which they were issued, with no reference to the date when the replacements actually took place. The reports of the Neutral Nations Inspection

- 8 -

Teams, on the other hand, indicated the date on which combat materiel was introduced or shipped out. Thus, the United Nations Command side included in its October reports planes which the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams listed as incoming or outgoing in September.

Similar remarks can be made with regard to other types of combat aircraft. Contrary to what is stated in the report of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members no "over-introduction" of, for example, B-26 B has occurred. Both according to the figures of the United Nations Command and those of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, there is a comfortable safety margin. The same goes for B-26 C. According to the figures of the United Nations Command ~~these~~^{ere} appears to be an excess of four units in this category, but this is due to the fact that in the beginning the B-26 B and the B-26 C were reported as B-26. All B-26 are either B-26 B or B-26 C and this has to be taken into account before insinuations of armistice violations are made.

In the same way, RB-26 C have been reported as RB-26 and F-51 D as F-51. As in the case of F-84 ^GB, RF-80 C and F-86 F1, the assertions made by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members are based on erroneous calculations. Similarly, F-86 F-30 and F-86 F-10 were originally reported partly as F-86 and partly as F-86 F. Some planes in this category have even been reported by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams as F-86 E and F-86 G which are unknown to the United Nations Command and therefore belong under a different category. With regard to the sub-type F-86 F the United Nations Command has built up a considerable credit.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members are unable to distinguish between types, sub-types and serial numbers or else they attempt to confuse the issue. They claim that the United Nations Command side has exceeded its credit in fifteen types of aircraft, but they only mention two, the F-51 and the RB-26. They furthermore list five sub-types and, in addition, refer to three identifications which are neither types nor sub-types.

In their evaluation on rotation of military personnel and replacement of combat materiel for October - November

- 9 -

1953 the Swedish and Swiss Members have pointed to the possibility that with regard to a few sub-types the United Nations Command side may have slightly exceeded its credit. If, however, a break down of reported incoming and outgoing aircraft into sub-types were made for the period 27 July - October 1953 it would most likely prove that proper replacement procedures had been observed.

For the sake of the record the Swedish and Swiss Members report the tentative figures for outgoing and incoming combat aircraft on the United Nations Command side up to 31 March 1954 according to the reports of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

<u>A. Bombers.</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out(Destr.)</u>	<u>Credit</u>	
1. Piston				
B-26 (either B-26 B or B-26 C)	745	783	5	43
B-29 (B-29 A)	1	1	-	0
AD-2 (AD-2 and AD-2 Q)	19	20	1	2
AD-5	19	21	-	2
AD-4 (AD-4, AD-4 N, AD-4 NA, AD-4 NL, AD-4 Q, and AD-4 B)	27	38	1	12
AU-1	21	47	-	26
2. Jet				
B-45	-	1	-	1
<u>B. Fighters.</u>				
1. Piston				
F-51 (all F-51 D)	48	34	16	2
F-4 U (F-4 ^{U4} and F-4 U 4 B)	-	7	-	7
Fire-Fly	10	11	-	1
Sea-Fury	3	2	-	-
2. Jet				
F-80 (F-80 A or F-80 C)	16	23	2	9
F-84 (all F-84 G)	604	685	18	99
F-86 (all F-86 F, including planes erroneously reported as F-86 E and F-86 G)	808	832	23	47
F-94 (all F-94 B)	54	55	-	1
F-3 D (F-3 D and F-3 D 2)	5	9	-	4
F-7 F (F-7 F and F-7 F 3 W)	-	2	-	2
F-2 H (F-2 H 2, F-2 H 2 P and F-2 H 3)	20	23	-	3
F-9 F (F-9 F, F-9 F 4, F-9 F 5 and F-9 F 6)	87	91	8	12
Meteor MK-8	58	167	7	16

C. <u>Reconnaissance-planes.</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>	<u>(Destr.)</u>	<u>Credit</u>
1. Piston				
RB-26 (all RB-26 C)	144	135	-	-
LT-6 (Lt-6 and LT-6 G)	7	12	-	5
PBM-5 A	1	1	-	-
2. Jet				
RF-80 (RF-80 A or RF-80 C)	118	129	1	12
RF-86 (all RF-86 F)	2	3	-	1
RB-45 (all RB-45 C)	5	5	-	-
D. <u>Weatherplanes.</u>				
1. Piston				
WB-26 (all WB-26 C)	21	20	1	-

The above mentioned figures take into account only the period beginning 19 August 1953, the date on which the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams started their operations in the Southern ports of entry. For the period 27 July - 18 August 1953 only figures reported by the United Nations Command are available. It is to be noted that with regard to "Sea-Fury:s" the United Nations Command has reported three in and three out and with regard to RB-26 160 in and 162 out.

These statistics show that for the period 19 August 1953 - 31 March 1954 the United Nations Command side had built up an over-all credit of 297 combat aircraft according to the reports submitted by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. To this should be added the credit built up before 19 August 1953 for which only United Nations Command reports are available, amounting to slightly under 100 combat aircraft. The United Nations Command side has thus considerably reduced its combat strength in the air since the coming into force of the Armistice.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members comment at great length on the question of disassembled parts, dismantled parts and spare parts, overlooking the fact that nowhere in the Armistice Agreement is there put any restrictions on the introduction into Korea of such material. They also omit mentioning that in this question the United Nations Command side were willing to commit itself beyond the obligations imposed by the Armistice Agreement and that the negotiations on the matter conducted

within the Military Armistice Commission were kept in ~~aboyance~~ abeyance by the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side.

The Armistice Agreement specifically provides that combat materiel which is destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the Armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. It is obvious, therefore, that combat materiel may also be repaired on the spot~~s~~ by the use of spare parts. It can be assumed that the United Nations Command side disposes of a considerable amount of combat materiel the refitting of which, in as much as it is damaged or worn out during the period of the Armistice, requires important quantities of spare parts. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members have produced no proof whatsoever to the effect that the United Nations Command side has introduced dismantled parts of combat materiel for assembling purposes. Their assertion in this respect is again a gratuitous assumption without foundation in fact. It is even surprising that they are willing to display such ignorance of military ordnance. No soldier in his sound mind would infer that the United Nations Command is attempting to build up strength in the way indicated by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members.

The inanity of the accusations brought against the United Nations Command side by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members can easily be exposed. They charge that with spare parts introduced into Korea the United Nations Command could assemble guns and howitzers, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars, and in this way increase their combat potential. Their allegation is particularly revealing with regard to machine guns and mortars.

In respect of machine guns the United Nations Command up till the end of February had built up a credit of 2,063 units and even if it were to assemble weapons in the clumsy way alleged by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members, whose figure for this operation is 1,365, it still would dispose of a credit of 698 units that could be introduced into Korea in strict abidance by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The same goes for mortars. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members claim that with reported spare parts 145 mortars could be assembled. The present credit of the United

- 12 -

Nations Command amounts, however, to 279 units, and even after the deduction of 106 dismantled mortars under dispute, there still would remain a credit of 28 units. As to guns, howitzers, and rocket launchers, the introduction of spare parts does not exceed normal consumption of a large army.

For many months the Czechoslovak and Polish Members have made a major issue of the discovery by the local Neutral Nations Inspection Team at the port of entry of Pusan, of 106 disassembled mortars, claiming that this materiel had been introduced into Korea in violation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The boxes containing the mortar parts had been lying around in the harbour of Pusan unnoticed for more than a month until, on 4 September 1953, they were observed by a Neutral Nations Inspection Sub-team. Their content was clearly marked and the local authorities readily assisted the Sub-team in clarifying the matter. Taking into consideration the circumstances that came to light, the Swedish and Swiss Members resolved that the 106 disassembled mortars had, in fact, been introduced into Korea before the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The details are to be found in the evaluation report of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for the months of August and September 1953.

The whole discussion about the 106 disassembled mortars has, in the meantime, become without object, since the United Nations Command side has shipped out 279 mortars and thus, even taking into account the 106 disassembled mortars, built up a credit of not less than 173 units with regard to mortars.

With regard to alleged "under-reporting" of incoming combat materiel by the United Nations Command, the Czechoslovak and Polish Members have chosen a rather unfortunate example, claiming that in January 1954 the Neutral Nations Inspection Team at Pusan "found out" that ammunition introduced on board a LST No. 520 was four times larger than had been notified by the local authorities. This information is incorrect. The Neutral Nations Inspection Team was notified that 106,617 pieces of ammunition in 23 lots were to be introduced at Pusan.

- 13 -

When proceeding with the inspection a further lot of 2,655 pieces was made available for examination. Even with a stretch of imagination it is hard to realize how the figure of 109,272 could be considered four times as large as 106,617.

In respect to "over-reporting" of outgoing combat materiel by the United Nations Command side, the Czechoslovak and Polish Members claim that in October 1953, 145 LVT-M4:s and LVT-M5:s were reported to have been shipped out from Pusan, whereas the Neutral Nations Inspection Team only found 74. A special investigation carried out at Pusan revealed, however, that the Team, for its part, had neglected to report some of the armoured vehicles involved and reported others under a wrong nomenclature. Unfortunately, other cases of serious misreporting have occurred and it would be most unfair to blame the United Nations Command for such errors.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members further declare "it has been frequently and conspicuously observed that when the United Nations Command side were shipping out replaced vehicles, most of the weapons of the vehicles were stripped off and kept in Korea, whereas the replacing armoured vehicles introduced into Korea by the United Nations Command side were all fully equipped with weapons". The figures given are 160 machine guns cal. 50, 140 machine guns cal. 30, and 15 mortars. In the first place it has to be noted that the United Nations Command disposes of an ample "credit" with regard to armoured vehicles, having shipped out 483 units and introduced only 81 units. Of the armoured vehicles shipped out 349 were complete. The provision of the Armistice Agreement that combat materiel which is destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the Armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type implies that part of, for example, a combat aircraft or an armoured vehicle can be missing. At any rate, the United Nations Command has presently a credit of 2,063 machine-guns. In all, the United Nations Command has considerably reduced its combat strength with regard to armoured vehicles and the

- 14 -

intimation to the contrary of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members must therefore be rejected.

The other example provided to prove that the United Nations Command is reporting incomplete items as complete is also a rather unfortunate one. It so happens^{ed} that when 12 mortars cal. 4,2, 9 mortars 81 mm. and 2,700 rifles cal. 30 were shipped out from Pusan on 1 February 1954, this combat materiel formed part of a large consignment of outgoing combat materiel, for which the United Nations Command did not claim replacement.

The situation with regard to ammunition is a good example of how restrained the United Nations Command has been in its replacement policy. For a total of 136,277,072 rounds of all types reported as destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up from 27 July 1953 to 1 March 1954 only 57,155,029 rounds of all types have been introduced into Korea which represents a replacement of 42 per cent.

If 500,000 men underwent training in the use of light weapons for a period of 5 months with the ammunition reported by the United Nations Command as used up, they would expend 13 rounds per man and per week. As to artillery less than 50 shells could be fired from each one of 1,000 guns per week. These figures are entirely normal according to European standards.

These are some of the comments the Swedish and Swiss Members want to present in order to refute allegations which they consider to be a tissue of malicious fabrications, gratuitous distortions, misleading half-truths, and delusive insinuations without foundation in reality. The methods resorted to consist largely in isolating facts and figures from their proper context and in making sweeping generalisations on the basis of premises thus distorted.

There is no denying that the United Nations Command has laid itself wide open to inspection and observation by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams and has never attempted to conceal anything from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, not even its mistakes and clerical shortcomings. There is no evidence that the United Nations Command side intentionally or even inadvertently had violated those provisions of the Armistice

- 15 -

Agreement, the application of which is the concern of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. As far as the Swedish and Swiss Members have been able to find the United Nations Command has loyally and sincerely abided by both the letter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreement.

Paul Mohn

Major General

Swedish Member of NNSC

E. Gross

Brigadier General

Swiss Member of NNSC