

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 125TH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Headquarters, Panmunjom, on
Tuesday, 4 May, 1954, at 1000 hours.

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PRESENT: CHAIRMAN: Gen. Mohn (Sweden)
Gen. Krzemien (Poland)
Gen. Gross (Switzerland)
Col. Stary (Czechoslovakia)

SECRETARIAT: Maj. Boratynski (Poland), Executive Secretary).

1. Introductory statement by Gen. Gross.

CHAIRMAN: I take the opportunity to welcome among us our new Swiss colleague, General Gross, who is the third Swiss member whom we have had the pleasure to see around this table. We are looking forward to his co-operation and participation in our work.

GEN. GROSS: Gentlemen, I should like to thank General Mohn for having welcomed me with such friendly words.

I come from the country and from the town on which at present the attention of the whole world is focussed. The Geneva conference is to decide the future of a peace so fervently desired by all people all over the world.

The fact that Switzerland has been judged worthy of receiving delegates from so many nations although my country itself has had no part in the conflict clearly proves that both sides are convinced that they will find in my country an atmosphere of liberty and independence as regards all parties concerned, as well as the firm endeavour after objectivity which constitutes the basis of our neutrality. I can assure you that we fully appreciate this honour.

Korea where we happen to be at present is the main concern of those who will try to ensure peace at Geneva.



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Maybe for this reason it is not useless to recall at this table just now the conditions on which Switzerland declared its readiness to be represented in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in order to contribute to the re-establishment of peace in the Far East. The Armistice Agreement provided that within 90 days after the armistice had become effective, a political conference should be held in order to settle the Korean problem. The conclusion of a peace treaty was expected to automatically put an end to the activity of the Neutral Nations Commission. But contrary to what had been scheduled this conference has never been held.

Switzerland hopes that the problem of its participation in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will be solved at Geneva. The task I have to perform is a clear one. I am here simply as a soldier. I shall endeavour to discuss and tackle all problems which may arise according to the methods and in the spirit of a soldier, that is with conciseness, clarity and lucidity. I insist on this, gentlemen, out of respect for what I call honour and moreover - needless to say - without ever becoming oblivious of the obligations which our neutrality and objectivity lay upon me.

Gentlemen, the responsibility which I have assumed in my capacity as chief of the Swiss delegation obliges me to gain myself an insight into the conditions under which we have to work both in the North and in the South of Korea. Thus I shall undertake a complete and thorough investigation which will make it possible for me to get into contact with all my subordinates. It is my intention to undertake this inspection trip one of these weeks.

I set about my work in the spirit and endeavour to succeed in performing my task under the best possible conditions.

CHAIRMAN: I thank General Gross for his words.

2. Approval of record No 123.

The record No 123 was approved.

3. Reports from NNITs.

Between 29 April 1954, 1900 hours, and 4 May 1954, 0900 hours, 40 routine reports, and two informational reports from Pusan, were received.

4. Letter from Maj. Gen. J.K. Lacey, Senior Member UNC MAC, dated 15 April 1954, concerning activities of NNSC.

GEN. MOHN: I want to submit for your consideration a draft letter which I propose as a reply to General Lacey's letter. I shall invite the Swedish alternate member, General Ripa, to read out this document.

GEN. RIPA: TO: Senior Member, United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission. FROM: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

With reference to your letter of 15 April 1954 the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission submits the following comments.

The Armistice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953 by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, provides for the establishment of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Nations, neutral in the sense of the Armistice Agreement, who were called upon to appoint members of this Commission, were not consulted on the provisions of the Armistice Agreement that were to rule its activities. The relevant provisions of the Armistice Agreement had therefore to be accepted as they read, with the Military Armistice Commission being the sole authoritative body in respect to their interpretation. It became apparent from the start that many provisions of the Armistice Agreement were liable to be interpreted in different ways and also that there were too many loopholes left to enable the application of a thorough control of the rotation of military personnel and the replacement of combat material. Under the circumstances it became evident that the abidance by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement came to depend on the efficiency of the control activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. In addition, the operations of this Commission were hampered by the fact that in many instances the vote of its four members was found to be equally divided, resulting in a dead-lock.

The cases referred to in your letter met this fate. That is why no action could be taken on your requests that Neutral Nations Inspection Teams be sent to the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers in order to investigate alleged violations of the Armistice Agreement. The Swedish and Swiss members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission maintained that the Commission was under a clear obligation to carry out these investigations, as required both by the letter and even more by the spirit of the Armistice Agreement. The Czechoslovak and Polish members of the Commission held different views.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission feels concerned with regard to the negative attitude taken by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers' side with regard to some of the requests submitted by your side. It is the considered opinion of the Swedish and Swiss Members of the Commission that, lest some of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement are to become completely inoperative, the whole problem of supervision and especially of investigations concerning alleged violations of the Armistice Agreement should be considered by the Military Armistice Commission for further clarification. Under the present circumstances, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will not be in a position to operate as was probably intended by the signatories of the Armistice Agreement.

COL. STARY: The Czechoslovak delegation has very often stressed the serious situation, which arose in the southern ports of entry as a result of the restrictions of the NNITs activities by the United Nations Command side and various obstructions by which this side prevents the NNITs from conducting an effective supervision and inspection, and it has many times pointed out to the necessity of an immediate improvement of this situation which became so serious that the activity of the NNITs in the ports of entry under the control of the UNC side was actually paralysed.

*more on the good will and on the good faith of the signatories than

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Taking fully into consideration the seriousness of this situation, the Czechoslovak delegation submitted on the 13th of April to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission a draft report for MAC. In this draft the attention of MAC was drawn to the alarming state of affairs on the territory under the control of the United Nations Command side. The draft contained numerous facts proving the restrictions and obstructions, which the United Nations Command side imposed upon the NNITs, preventing them thus from conducting an effective supervision and inspection. The draft report contained also an appeal to the United Nations Command side, to take immediate measures in order to create such conditions so as to enable the NNITs to properly carry out and effectively meet their functions and responsibilities. The draft report, unfortunately, was not adopted by the Commission. The Czechoslovak delegation, nevertheless, considered it its duty to draw the attention of MAC to the serious situation, created by the UNC side in the South and forwarded to MAC its report, jointly with the Polish member to NNSC.

The Czechoslovak delegation fully supported and accepted the draft report to MAC, as submitted to NNSC on April 29 by the Polish member. This draft report contained facts proving that the United Nations Command side repeatedly violated the provisions of para 13 d of AA by the introduction of reinforcing combat material into Korea. There was also an appeal to the United Nations Command side to enable the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its NNITs to conduct effective inspection and supervision so as to ensure the stability of truce in Korea and facilitate a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

The attitude of the Czechoslovak delegation to NNSC has always been determined by the faith that NNSC may effectively assist to the solution of the Korean question. It systematically pointed out to and revealed cases of serious violations of the Armistice Agreement, threatening the stability of armistice.

Our delegation, therefore, most resolutely objects against all the slanders raised against it by the Senior Member, UNC side, MAC, Gen. J.K. Lacey, in his letter, dated April 15, 1954, addressed to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. As a result of this letter the situation has become still more serious. Maj.Gen. Lacey does not utter one single word as to what effective measures did the UNC side take in order to finish with the violations of the Armistice Agreement by this side. The Senior Member of the UNC side, on the contrary, tries to shift off the responsibility for these violations by unfounded and slanderous attacks against the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its members. Maj.Gen. Lacey even threatens the continued existence of the Commission, interferes with its authority. Such threats are not only in direct contradiction with the fundamental spirit of the Armistice Agreement and the provisions of para 17, but also completely inconsistent with the status of a side, which invited the Neutral Nations to supervise the Armistice.

In his letter, dated 15th of April, Maj.Gen. Lacey says: "The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has been paralysed to such a degree that it cannot carry out its pledged obligations as outlined under the terms of the Armistice Agreement". The truth, however, is that it is precisely due to the fact that the United Nations Command side has all along violated the Armistice Agreement; interfered with and infringed upon the rights of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, obstructed and restricted the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams' operations in its area so as to make them unable to carry out effective supervision and inspection, and ever-increasingly threatened and jeopardized the existence of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in the area of the United Nations Command side are paralyzed; while at the same time the United Nations Command side has been continuously introducing reinforcing combat material in great quantities ever since the Armistice.

It is the United Nations Command side that should bear the whole responsibility for reducing the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to such a state of incapacity of fully exercising the rights endowed by the Armistice Agreement, fulfilling the tasks prescribed by the same Agreement and conducting an effective control that no military reinforcements may be introduced during the Armistice by the United Nations Command side, so as to ensure the stabilization of the Armistice.

The above mentioned attitude towards the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on the part of the UNC side at the present stage, its restrictions and obstructions on the work of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams as well as its continuous violations of the Armistice Agreement by introducing reinforcing military strength constitute an integral part of a whole line of the United Nations Command side.

The charges contained in the letter of Maj.Gen. J.K. Lacey are quite unfounded and, therefore, do not need to be answered. But the threats against the continued existence of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission require very serious consideration. Therefore, the Czechoslovak delegation does not agree with the draft letter presented today by Gen. Mohn. It reserves the right to present its own draft reply at the next meeting.

GEN. KRZEMIEN: The standpoint of the Polish delegation has already been clearly expressed in the statement made at 122nd meeting held on 23 April 1954. The Polish delegation would like only to avail itself of this opportunity to stress why the arguments brought forward in the discussion on this matter by the Swiss and Swedish Members seem completely inconvincible.

I. According to the statements by the Swedish and Swiss members, the assertion that the activities of our teams in the area under the UNC control are being restricted, is not substantiated. But facts on which our statement is based have not in the least been undermined. More than that, the questions which for several days have been on the agenda of this Commission's meetings fully prove that the work of our teams in the UNC area requires thorough improvement to become normal.

If adequate measures are not taken immediately we shall not avoid, as Gen. Mohn put it, the shower of reports from NNIT:s informing us that they find impossible to carry out inspection according to the preliminary instructions issued by our Commission.

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Hence, there is only one possible conclusion: The difficulties within this Commission originates in the difficulties of the inspection teams stationed in the territory under the UNC control. Neither the Commission nor its individual members are responsible for these difficulties; the full responsibility for this state of affairs lies only on the UNC side.

Instead of issuing instructions aimed at eliminating the obstacles which our teams encounter in South Korea, Gen. Lacey claims that this Commission has been paralyzed and that certain rights and obligations stemming from the Armistice Agreement have been abrogated. The reason of his doing so is that the Commission became inconvenient for his side, its activities derange the UNC side, that he would like to put an end to its existence and, furthermore, shift off the responsibility upon our Commission and its individual members.

II. Just a few words about mobile inspection teams. At the 122nd meeting held on 23rd April 1954, the Swiss Member admitted that the UNC requests to dispatch mobile inspection teams to North Korea gave rise to a number of doubts. Therefore, it is difficult to agree to his further statement that the rejection of this requests was contrary to our obligations provided in the Armistice Agreement.

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That is why I cannot agree to gen. Mohn's draft which erroneously indicates the reasons of our difficulties. The Polish Delegation follows in its work the standpoint of the Polish Government as expressed in its memorandum to Sweden and Switzerland of 16 April 1954. Memorandum says: The Government of the Polish People's Republic was aware that the fulfillment of the tasks of the Commission would require patience and endurance. It believed, however, that those tasks would be fulfilled. Controversial issues must not be passed over in silence but the experience of 8 months' work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission proved that the expectations of the Polish Government were right provided that the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement is observed and all the members of the Commission show good will. The analysis of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission's activities, up to now, authorizes the Government of the Polish People's Republic to state that the Commission can be an instrument able to carry out the supervision of the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and ensure the stability of the Armistice in Korea. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is in a position to solve a number of essential problems. Taking into account the above-said, the Government of the Polish People's Republic is of the opinion that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should function as long as it will be required by the situation in Korea, that is until the Armistice is replaced by a broader agreement settling the Korean problem in its entirety and that all the members of the Commission should in a common effort make its most fruitful. That is why the Polish Member resolutely supports the proposal submitted by the Czechoslovak Member to adopt the document rejecting the allegations contained in Gen. Lacey's letter.

By adopting such a document we shall express what has already been stated here more than once by all the delegations: Our will to defend the Armistice Agreement, our good will to cooperate, so as to fulfil our obligations in the name of the peaceful situation created in Korea by the Armistice Agreement, in the name of facilitating the final positive settlement of the Korean question, in the name of further lessening of the international tension. We shall thus contribute to establishing a lasting peace in Asia and all over the world.

Gen. GROSS: Mr. Chairman, I have for the time being, to abstain from any personal comment since I am not yet sufficiently familiarized with these problems. I therefore leave the floor to Col. Zschokke.

Col. ZSCHOKKE (Switzerland): I should like to stress that I appreciate the Polish delegation's appeal for better co-operation in this Commission. But this does not mean that the Swiss delegate will always comply with the wishes of the Polish delegation. What we have to do first of all is to respect the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement. It is true that, at the time, Gen. Wacker had doubts as to a few points contained in the UNC request for the dispatch of Mobile Inspection Teams. But on principle Gen. Wacker fully supported the proposal that Mobile Inspection Teams should be dispatched.

As the Swiss member of NNSC I should like to make the following statement with regard to this item.

The Armistice Agreement assigns to NNSC two tasks. On the one hand, it has to carry out the control of rotation and replacement in the ports of entry; on the other hand, it has to conduct observations and investigations outside the Demilitarized Zone in accordance with paragraph 28 and 42c of the Armistice Agreement. According to the letter and the spirit of AA there can be no doubt that the second task is of particular importance.

This quite obviously results from the very character of the prevailing conditions. For, should really one of the sides, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, have the intention of increasing its fighting potential, in this case it is most likely that the side will introduce such reinforcement not through the ports of entry, but rather by bypassing these places.

The work of our ten teams as well as the discussion in this Commission are purposeful only if they are completed and supported by adequate control operations in our Mobile Teams. Without such special controls outside the ports of entry the whole activity of NNSC finds itself reduced to a mere book-keeping job which completely fails to ensure any effectiveness of control.

More than that, the attitude frequently adopted by the Polish and Czechoslovak delegates to this Commission with reference to the conditions required for the dispatch of Mobile Teams threaten to undermine NNSC's right to exist. I am fully aware of the stern significance of what I have just said and I should like to solicit my distinguished colleagues to realize in the same way the inescapable consequences. That is all for the moment being.

CHAIRMAN: I consider the debate on this item as closed for today. We are faced with the Swedish draft proposal of a letter to be addressed to the Senior Member UNC MAC. Both the Czechoslovak and Polish members declared that they had to reject this draft. Therefore, I do not put it to the vote.

GEN. MOHN: But the Swedish member reserves the right to independent action in the matter.

5. Comments on the draft letter of NNSC concerning some violations of the Armistice Agreement presented by the Polish Delegation.

CHAIRMAN: I shall give the floor to Gen. Ripa who will read out a joint Swiss and Swedish statement on this question.

GEN. RIPA (Sweden)

Panmunjom, 4 May, 1954.

To: Military Armistice Commission.

From: Swedish and Swiss Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

On 29 April the Polish Member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission submitted for the consideration of the Commission, at its 124th meeting, a draft to a report to be directed to the Military Armistice Commission. The Swedish and Swiss members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission reject his draft in its entirety. The Czechoslovak and Polish members thereupon decided to forward the document to the Military Armistice Commission in their own name.

The Czechoslovak and Polish members are of course perfectly free to convey to the Military Armistice Commission whatever views and opinions they hold. As this particular document claims to be based, however, on facts and figures collected by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the Swedish and Swiss members feel called upon to present a few comments to the report submitted by the Czechoslovak and Polish members to the Military Armistice Commission.

In the introductory part of their report the Czechoslovak and Polish members charge the United Nations Command side with (a) obstructing and restricting the activities of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, (b) introducing military reinforcement into Korea and (c) violating the provisions of the Armistice Agreement under which replacements of combat material shall be made piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.

The contention that the United Nations Command side has obstructed and restricted the activities of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams is utterly ridiculous. The United Nations Command has from the outset whole-heartedly and unreservedly co-operated with the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

and its Inspection Teams. Errors and mistakes have admittedly occurred and there have also been cases of omission, but never has any intention of circumventing the provisions of the Armistice Agreement been proved. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams have been in the unique position of being able to check on the movements of goods amounting to many millions of tons in the sea-ports of Pusan, Inchon and Kunsan, and on the movements of aircraft amounting to many thousands of planes. With such a considerable turnover, it is obvious that some allowance must be made for discrepancies and inaccuracies.

There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the United Nations Command side has increased its combat strength in Korea since the Armistice Agreement came into force. On the contrary, the Swedish and Swiss Members concluded, in their evaluation on rotation of military personnel and replacement of combat materiel for the months of October - November 1953, that the United Nations Command side had considerably reduced its over-all combat strength during this period. The same trend has prevailed in the following months. In this connection it should be noted that, contrary to the assertion of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as such has not submitted any evaluation report for the months of October - November 1953.

The charge that the United Nations Command side has violated the provision of the Armistice Agreement relating to the replacement of combat materiel piece for-piece of the same effectiveness and of the same type is merely a product of the imagination of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members. Their way of reasoning may be illustrated by a statement in the evaluation of rotation of military personnel and replacement of combat materiel which they submitted to the Military Armistice Commission for the months of October - November 1953. The statement relates to the replacement of training aircraft designated as T-33 which, besides, is no combat aircraft. The contention of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members is that the United Nations Command side is violating the provisions of the replacement piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type by having T-33s replaced by T-33A:s. The absurdity of this accusation appears from the fact that all T-33:s in South Korea are T-33A:s. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members persist, however, in yielding to the same misapprehensions with regard to other types of aircraft.

In the first period after the signing of the Armistice Agreement the United Nations Command side strictly reported types of combat aircraft as required by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. When the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams started their control operations some three weeks after the Armistice Agreement had been signed, they also confined themselves to reporting of types only of combat aircraft. Subsequently they extended their reporting to include sub-types (models) as well, and the United Nations Command side, for its part, adopted the same procedure, although there was no obligation to do so under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

The assertion of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members that "the United Nations Command side still refuses to report the sub-types of combat aircraft" is therefore completely unfounded. This assertion seems to be based on their ignorance of the definition of the word "sub-type" which, contrary to their belief, has nothing to do with varying serial numbers of aircraft.

Due to the fact that, in the beginning, types only, and no sub-types, were reported either by the United Nations Command or the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, some doubts have arisen with regard to some replacement figures. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members bluntly infer, for example, that the United Nations Command side by 30 November 1953 had introduced four more combat aircraft F-94 than it had shipped out, and, in addition, that F-94:s had been replaced by F-94B:s which they assumed to be an improved version of the F-94. There are, however, two facts they omit to take into consideration: (1) that before the Neutral Nations Inspection

Teams started their control operations the United Nations Command reported to have flown out nine F-94:s more than it had introduced and thus even with due consideration for the figures of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams had built up a credit of six F-94:s by 30 November 1953 (one aircraft was missed in the counting of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members); (2) that there is no difference between the F-94 and the F-94B and thus, in fact, all aircraft in this class should be listed as F-94B. The conclusions of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members are therefore fallacious and completely misleading.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members quote the definition agreed upon by the Military Armistice Commission with regard to "combat aircraft" as referred to by the Armistice Agreement. The definition, of 28 November 1953, reads as follows:

"(1) Aircraft which are designed to expend destructive ordnance and which, even though not equipped with weapons at a given time, can have weapons installed in them at any time; and (2) Aircraft designed for weather, photography, and visual reconnaissance or tactical air coordination".

The application of this definition on aircraft in the territory under the military control of the United Nations Command - as is well known not a single aircraft has been reported as incoming or outgoing in the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers - has met with little difficulties as far as the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams are concerned. They were anyway in a position to check on all incoming and outgoing aircraft, both combat and non-combat, and as a matter of routine they reported to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, long before the definition of combat aircraft was given, all training aircraft that came within the range of their observations. No instructions to that effect had, however, been issued.

The United Nations Command side, for its part, never considered training aircraft to be combat aircraft

and therefore did not list them in the reports which, under para. 13 of the Armistice Agreement, the sides have to submit daily to the Military Armistice Commission and to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Swedish Member, although convinced personally that training aircraft could not be considered as combat; under the definition of combat aircraft as agreed upon by the Military Armistice Commission, followed up a suggestion once made by the Polish Member and asked the United Nations Command to clarify its position on the subject. The reply reads as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND MILITARY ARMISTICE
COMMISSION

April 10th; 1954.

Memorandum for: Major General Mohn, Senior Swedish Delegate, NNSC.

1. Reference is made to your recent informal request on why the TB-17, VB-17, T-33, TV-2, TBM-3R and P2V are not considered combat aircraft.
2. I have been instructed to inform you that:
 - a. The TB-17 and TB-26 are former World War II bombers which have been stripped for their guns, bomb racks, armor plate and other distinctive features of a combat aircraft. These types of aircraft are now used for utility and training flights. That is the reason they have been designated by the letter "T" - for training.
 - b. The VB-17, an old B-17, is also a former World War II bomber which has been extensively modified for personnel transport. Similar to the TB-17, it also has been stripped of its armament. That is the reason it has been designated the letter "V".
 - c. The T-6 is an aircraft used extensively as a training plane for flight instruction and general utility flying. It contains no armor or armament. Similarly, it has been designated by the letter "T" - for training.
 - d. The TBM and the TBM-3R are former World War II naval combat aircraft which have also been stripped of armor and armament and are used as utility aircraft

for performing routine administrative missions and cargo flights.

e. The P2V is a patrol bomber stripped of armor and armament and is used in Korea as a transport aircraft.

f. The T-33 is an aircraft designed expressly for training purposes and is not designed to expend destructive ordnance. This airplane provides spaces for instructor and student, dual control and carries no armor. It is used for instruction and instrument training.

g. The TV-2 closely resembles the T-33. It, too, is designed for training and not designed to expend destructive ordnance. It provides spaces for pilot and student, has no armor and is used for instruction and instrument training.

3. None of these World War II aircraft could be converted into combat aircraft without extensive modification, and even were an attempt made to so modify them they would be completely obsolete for combat purposes. As you know, the TV-2, T-33, and T-6 have never been designed for combats.

4. You will note that the characteristics listed above are not those of United Nations combat aircraft. Accordingly, they are not reported as combat aircraft.

HOBART HEWETT
Brigadier General; USA
Chief of Staff".

These explanations fully confirmed the views held by the Swedish and Swiss Members on this matter. Consequently, in their opinion the introduction into South Korea of 177 training aircraft up to 15 April 1954, as claimed by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members, is completely irrelevant to the observation of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover, it is remarkable that the Czechoslovak and Polish Members fail to mention, in this connection, that during the period under review, 164 training aircraft were flown out of South Korea.

The case of the aircraft VB-17 No. 48-3798 is even more revealing of the methods used by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members for imputing violations of the Armistice Agreement to the United Nations Command side. The characteristics of this aircraft are given in the memorandum of the

United Nations Command quoted above. The VB-17 is obviously not a combat aircraft as defined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Team at Kangnung, upon inspection of a VB-17, reached the same conclusion and, upon inquiry, reported its findings to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in its cable No. 190 which reads as follows:

"According to NNIT record of the meeting of
"6 March the mentioned plane on 5 and 6 March
"was a VB-17 stop that plane was not reported
"to NNSC as it is no combat aircraft stop NNIT
"Kangnung".

The four officers responsible for the dispatch of this cable were: First Lieutenant Leuenberger (Switzerland), Captain Smolick (Czechoslovakia), Major Norrby (Sweden), and Major Hanba (Poland). The actual inspection was carried out jointly by a Swedish and a Czechoslovak officer. They found that the bomb-bay doors were sealed and, furthermore, that the space previously allotted for the storage of bombs had been converted into a sitting room with a pantry and a bar. Therefore, the Czechoslovak Member of the Inspection Sub-team agreed that the listing of this aircraft as a combat aircraft was out of question. The charges brought against the United Nations Command by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are thus in flagrant contradiction with the findings of their own military observers.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members point to a discrepancy between the figures reported by the United Nations Command side and by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams respectively on combat aircraft during the month of September 1953, claiming that the United Nations Command side "illegally" introduced 186 planes. This assertion is based on a misunderstanding. Until the latter part of October the reports of the United Nations Command side on replacements carried the date on which they were issued, with no reference to the date when the replacements actually took place. The reports of the Neutral Nations Inspection

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Teams, on the other hand, indicated the date on which combat materiel was introduced or shipped out. Thus, the United Nations Command side included in its October reports planes which the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams listed as incoming or outgoing in September.

Similar remarks can be made with regard to other types of combat aircraft. Contrary to what is stated in the report of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members no "over-introduction" of, for example, B-26 B has occurred. Both according to the figures of the United Nations Command and those of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, there is a comfortable safety margin. The same goes for B-26 C. According to the figures of the United Nations Command there appears to be an excess of four units in this category, but this is due to the fact that in the beginning the B-26 B and the B-26 C were reported as B-26. All B-26 are either B-26 B or B-26 C and this has to be taken into account before insinuations of armistice violations are made.

In the same way, RB-26 C have been reported as RB-26 and F-51 D as F-51. As in the case of F-84 G, RF-80 C and F-86 F1, the assertions made by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members are based on erroneous calculations. Similarly, F-86 F-30 and F-86 F-10 were originally reported partly as F-86 and partly as F-86 F. Some planes in this category have even been reported by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams as F-86 E and F-86 G which are unknown to the United Nations Command and therefore belong under a different category. With regard to the sub-type F-86 F the United Nations Command has built up a considerable credit.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members are unable to distinguish between types, sub-types and serial numbers or else they attempt to confuse the issue. They claim that the United Nations Command side has exceeded its credit in fifteen types of aircraft, but they only mention two, the F-51 and the RB-26. They furthermore list five sub-types and, in addition, refer to three identifications which are neither types nor sub-types.

In their evaluation on rotation of military personnel and replacement of combat materiel for October - November

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1953 the Swedish and Swiss Members have pointed to the possibility that with regard to a few sub-types the United Nations Command side may have slightly exceeded its credit. If, however, a break-down of reported incoming and outgoing aircraft into sub-types were made for the period 27 July - October 1953 it would most likely prove that proper replacement procedures had been observed.

For the sake of the record the Swedish and Swiss Members report the tentative figures for outgoing and incoming combat aircraft on the United Nations Command side up to 31 March 1954 according to the reports of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

<u>A. Bombers.</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out(Destr.)</u>	<u>Credit</u>	
1. Piston				
B-26 (either B-26 B or B-26 C)	745	733	5	13
B-29 (B-29 A)	1	1	-	0
AD-2 (AD-2 and AD-2 Q)	19	20	1	2
AD-3	19	21	-	2
AD-4 (AD-4, AD-4 N, AD-4 NA, AD-4 NL, AD-4 Q, and AD-4 B)	27	38	1	12
AU-1	21	47	-	26
2. Jet				
B-45	-	1	-	1
<u>B. Fighters.</u>				
1. Piston				
F-51 (all F-51 D)	48	34	16	2
F-4 U (F-4 U and F-4 U 4 B)	-	7	-	7
Fire-Fly	10	11	-	1
Sea-Fury	3	2	-	-
2. Jet				
F-80 (F-80 A or F-80 C)	16	23	2	9
F-84 (all F-84 G)	604	635	18	99
F-86 (all F-86 F, including planes erroneously reported as F-86 E and F-86 G)	808	832	23	47
F-94 (all F-94 B)	54	55	-	1
F-3 D (F-3 D and F-3 D 2)	5	9	-	4
F-7 F (F-7 F and F-7 F 3 W)	-	2	-	2
F-2 H (F-2 H 2, F-2 H 2 P and F-2 H 3)	20	23	-	3
F-9 F (F-9 F, F-9 F 4, F-9 F 5 and F-9 F 6)	87	91	8	12
Meteor MK-8	58	67	7	16

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C. <u>Reconnaissance-planes.</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>	<u>(Destr.)</u>	<u>Credit</u>
1. Piston				
RB-26 (all RB-26 C)	144	135	-	-
LT-6 (Lt-6 and LT-6 G)	7	12	-	5
PBM-5 A	1	1	-	-
2. Jet				
RF-80 (RF-80 A or RF-80 C)	118	129	1	12
RF-86 (all RF-86 F)	2	3	-	1
RB-45 (all RB-45 C)	5	5	-	-
D. <u>Weatherplanes.</u>				
1. Piston				
WB-26 (all WB-26 C)	21	20	1	-

The above mentioned figures take into account only the period beginning 19 August 1953, the date on which the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams started their operations in the Southern ports of entry. For the period 27 July - 18 August 1953 only figures reported by the United Nations Command are available. It is to be noted that with regard to "Sea-Fury's" the United Nations Command has reported three in and three out and with regard to RB-26 160 in and 162 out.

These statistics show that for the period 19 August 1953 - 31 March 1954 the United Nations Command side had built up an over-all credit of 297 combat aircraft according to the reports submitted by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. To this should be added the credit built up before 19 August 1953 for which only United Nations Command reports are available, amounting to slightly under 100 combat aircraft. The United Nations Command side has thus considerably reduced its combat strength in the air since the coming into force of the Armistice.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members comment at great length on the question of disassembled parts, dismantled parts and spare parts, overlooking the fact that nowhere in the Armistice Agreement is there put any restrictions on the introduction into Korea of such materiel. They also omit mentioning that in this question the United Nations Command side were willing to commit itself beyond the obligations imposed by the Armistice Agreement and that the negotiations on the matter conducted

within the Military Armistice Commission were kept in obedience by the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side.

The Armistice Agreement specifically provides that combat materiel which is destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the Armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. It is obvious, therefore, that combat materiel may also be repaired on the spot by the use of spare parts. It can be assumed that the United Nations Command side disposes of a considerable amount of combat materiel the refitting of which, in as much as it is damaged or worn out during the period of the Armistice, requires important quantities of spare parts. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members have produced no proof whatsoever to the effect that the United Nations Command side has introduced dismantled parts of combat materiel for assembling purposes. Their assertion in this respect is again a gratuitous assumption without foundation in fact. It is even surprising that they are willing to display such ignorance of military ordnance. No soldier in his sound mind would infer that the United Nations Command is attempting to build up strength in the way indicated by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members.

The inanity of the accusations brought against the United Nations Command side by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members can easily be exposed. They charge that with spare parts introduced into Korea the United Nations Command could assemble guns and howitzers, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars, and in this way increase their combat potential. Their allegation is particularly revealing with regard to machine guns and mortars.

In respect of machine guns the United Nations Command up till the end of February had built up a credit of 2.063 units and even if it were to assemble weapons in the clumsy way alleged by the Czechoslovak and Polish Members, whose figure for this operation is 1.365, it still would dispose of a credit of 698 units that could be introduced into Korea in strict abidance by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The same goes for mortars. The Czechoslovak and Polish Members claim that with reported spare parts 145 mortars could be assembled. The present credit of the United

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Nations Command amounts, however, to 279 units, and even after the deduction of 106 dismantled mortars under dispute, there still would remain a credit of 28 units. As to guns, howitzers, and rocket launchers, the introduction of spare parts does not exceed normal consumption of a large army.

For many months the Czechoslovak and Polish Members have made a major issue of the discovery by the local Neutral Nations Inspection Team at the port of entry of Pusan, of 106 disassembled mortars, claiming that this materiel had been introduced into Korea in violation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The boxes containing the mortar parts had been lying around in the harbour of Pusan unnoticed for more than a month until, on 4 September 1953, they were observed by a Neutral Nations Inspection Sub-team. Their content was clearly marked and the local authorities readily assisted the Sub-team in clarifying the matter. Taking into consideration the circumstances that came to light, the Swedish and Swiss Members resolved that the 106 disassembled mortars had, in fact, been introduced into Korea before the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The details are to be found in the evaluation report of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for the months of August and September 1953.

The whole discussion about the 106 disassembled mortars has, in the meantime, become without object, since the United Nations Command side has shipped out 279 mortars and thus, even taking into account the 106 disassembled mortars, built up a credit of not less than 173 units with regard to mortars.

With regard to alleged "under-reporting" of incoming combat materiel by the United Nations Command, the Czechoslovak and Polish Members have chosen a rather unfortunate example, claiming that in January 1954 the Neutral Nations Inspection Team at Pusan "found out" that ammunition introduced on board a LST No. 520 was four times larger than had been notified by the local authorities. This information is incorrect. The Neutral Nations Inspection Team was notified that 106,617 pieces of ammunition in 23 lots were to be introduced at Pusan.

When proceeding with the inspection a further lot of 2,655 pieces was made available for examination. Even with a stretch of imagination it is hard to realize how the figure of 109,272 could be considered four times as large as 106,617.

In respect to "over-reporting" of outgoing combat materiel by the United Nations Command side, the Czechoslovak and Polish Members claim that in October 1953, 145 LVT-M4:s and LVT-M5:s were reported to have been shipped out from Pusan, whereas the Neutral Nations Inspection Team only found 74. A special investigation carried out at Pusan revealed, however, that the Team, for its part, had neglected to report some of the armoured vehicles involved and reported others under a wrong nomenclature. Unfortunately, other cases of serious misreporting have occurred and it would be most unfair to blame the United Nations Command for such errors.

The Czechoslovak and Polish Members further declare "it has been frequently and conspicuously observed that when the United Nations Command side were shipping out replaced vehicles, most of the weapons of the vehicles were stripped off and kept in Korea, whereas the replacing armoured vehicles introduced into Korea by the United Nations Command side were all fully equipped with weapons". The figures given are 160 machine guns cal. 50, 140 machine guns cal. 30, and 15 mortars. In the first place it has to be noted that the United Nations Command disposes of an ample "credit" with regard to armoured vehicles, having shipped out 483 units and introduced only 81 units. Of the armoured vehicles shipped out 349 were complete. The provision of the Armistice Agreement that combat materiel which is destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the Armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type implies that part of, for example, a combat aircraft or an armoured vehicle can be missing. At any rate, the United Nations Command has presently a credit of 2,063 machine-guns. In all, the United Nations Command has considerably reduced its combat strength with regard to armoured vehicles and the

intimation to the contrary of the Czechoslovak and Polish Members must therefore be rejected.

The other example provided to prove that the United Nations Command is reporting incomplete items as complete, is also a rather unfortunate one. It so happened that when 12 mortars cal. 4,2, 9 mortars 81 mm. and 2,700 rifles cal. 30 were shipped out from Pusan on 1 February 1954, this combat materiel formed part of a large consignment of outgoing combat materiel, for which the United Nations Command did not claim replacement.

The situation with regard to ammunition is a good example of how restrained the United Nations Command has been in its replacement policy. For a total of 136,277,072 rounds of all types reported as destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up from 27 July 1953 to 1 March 1954 only 57,155,029 rounds of all types have been introduced into Korea which represents a replacement of 42 per cent.

If 500,000 men underwent training in the use of light weapons for a period of 5 months with the ammunition reported by the United Nations Command as used up, they would expend 13 rounds per man and per week. As to artillery less than 50 shells could be fired from each one of 1,000 guns per week. These figures are entirely normal according to European standards.

These are some of the comments the Swedish and Swiss Members want to present in order to refute allegations which they consider to be a tissue of malicious fabrications, gratuitous distortions, misleading half-truths, and delusive insinuations without foundation in reality. The methods resorted to consist largely in isolating facts and figures from their proper context and in making sweeping generalisations on the basis of premises thus distorted.

There is no denying that the United Nations Command has laid itself wide open to inspection and observation by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams and has never attempted to conceal anything from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, not even its mistakes and clerical shortcomings. There is no evidence that the United Nations Command side intentionally or even inadvertently had violated those provisions of the Armistice

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Agreement, the application of which is the concern of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. As far as the Swedish and Swiss Members have been able to find the United Nations Command has loyally and sincerely abided by both the letter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreement.

PAUL MOHN

Paul Mohn
Major General
Swedish Member of NNSC

GROSS

Ernst Gross
Brigadier General
Swiss Member of NNSC

CHAIRMAN: I state that it is now a quarter past one. My proposal is to adjourn the debate. This meeting has been a heavy one for our interpreters. I take the opportunity to compliment Mr. Goldblat on the improvement of his technique. Also, we are pleased to see among us Mr. Mangold who is the outstanding linguist of this Commission. He has been doing a good job today.

GEN. KRZEMIEN: I should be much obliged to such an owner of a laundry who would so thoroughly wash off all the dirty spots on my old suit as the Swiss and Swedish members did in their report with regard to the UNC side. Undoubtedly, the UNC side should be grateful for such a white washing, after which it seems to be as clean and innocent as an angel. I fully appreciate the meticulous work done by the Swedish and Swiss delegations, but I cannot say the same about the Swedish and Swiss military experts. Poland has no less military experience than Sweden and Switzerland, which for many years did not take part in any wars and is so proud of its neutrality. In Poland every military expert can say that it is quite possible to assemble new weapons out of disassembled parts.

I am a tank officer. I am not an artillery officer but Gen. Gross is an artillery general. I wonder how he could sign a document saying that during peace time 50 rounds of ammunition should be fired weekly per gun, which makes a total of 2600 rounds yearly. I should not sign such a document. Even the report made by Gen. Mohn and Gen. Gross must admit that mistakes have occurred. But the second part of the sentence saying that no intention of circumventing the provisions of the AA has been proved by the UNC side is only a subjective contention. These are my first preliminary remarks.

I agree with Gen. Mohn that the debate should be postponed, because after the works we have been given here, we deserve a good lunch.

CHAIRMAN: I remind the members of the Commission that I put forward a proposal to adjourn the meeting and according to the Rules of Procedure such a proposal has precedence.

COL. STARY: I fully realize that the motion of Gen. Mohn has priority. I should like to make some comments on the report presented by the Swedish and Swiss members. Due to the late hour, I accept the suggestion to adjourn the debate until our next meeting.

GEN. MOHN: I would like also to include in the next meeting's agenda the draft evaluation for the month of January 1954. The Swedish member some time ago submitted the draft evaluation for the month of December 1953. Now the Swedish member is submitting the draft evaluation for the month of January. He is thereby following Gen. Bures' recommendation to speed up the evaluation work.

Meeting adjourned at 1325 hours.